

Vladimir Zhirinovskii in Russian Politics: Three Approaches to the Emergence of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 1990-1993

Umland, Andreas

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Dissertation / phd thesis

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Umland, A. (1997). *Vladimir Zhirinovskii in Russian Politics: Three Approaches to the Emergence of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 1990-1993*. Berlin. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2899743>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/deed.de>

Terms of use:

This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Attribution-Non Commercial-NoDerivatives). For more information see:
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0>

Thema:

Zeitgeschichte Osteuropas

Titel der Dissertation:

Vladimir Zhirinovskii in Russian Politics
Three Approaches to the Emergence of the
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia
1990-1993

Promotionsausschuß
FB Geschichtswissenschaft
Freie Universität Berlin, D-14195 Berlin

November 1997

Disputation am 31.3.1998

Eingereicht von:

Andreas Umland

Rosenweg 1, D-07751 Jena-Isserstedt

Tel.: +49-(0)36425-50530

E-mail: andreas.umland@alumni.stanford.org

Gesamtwortzahl:

221.438

Anlagen:

Lebenslauf

Publikationen

Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache

Gutachter:

Prof. Dr. Michal Reiman
FB Politische Wissenschaft, WE IV
Otto-Suhr-Institut
Kiebitzweg 3
D-14195 Berlin

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wippermann
FB Geschichtswissenschaften
Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut
Habelschwerdter Allee 45
D-14195 Berlin

ZG 2000/1011

Contents

Abbreviations	12
Acknowledgements	
0. Introduction	17
0.1. Zhirinovskii's Ups and Downs	18
0.2. The Origins and Basic Ideas of Post-Soviet Russian Nationalism	22
A Short Overview of Different Interpretations of the 'Russian Idea'	
The Development of Russian Nationalism During the Soviet Period	
Russian Nationalism's Transformation During <i>Perestroika</i>	
The Emergence of a New New Russian Right	
0.3. The Current State of Post-Soviet Russian Right-Wing Extremism Studies	42
Introductory Overviews	
Documentation and Data Collection	
'Anti-Zionism'	
The Zhirionvskii Phenomenon	
After El'tsin	
A New Research Agenda	
0.4. The Scope of the Study	59
0.5. Some Underlying Conceptualizations	62
0.6. The Purpose of Inductive Research	65
0.7. The Sources Used	67
0.8. The Three Parts' Underlying Assumptions and Research Questions	71
0.9. Focuses, Omissions, Prospects	78

Part I: Analyzing the Behaviour	80
1. The Origins of the LDP	80
1.1. The Making of a Politician	84
Citizen Kane <i>à la Russe</i>	
The Man in the Street	
The Possessed	
1.2. Zhirinovskii as an 'Informal'	92
The Birth of a <i>Divan</i> Party	
On the Look-Out	
Excursus I: The Jewish Background	
Excursus II: The <i>KGB</i> Connection	
1.3. Pseudo-Liberals in Pseudo-Politics	103
April-Fool Hoax, Soviet Style	
Centrism, Soviet Style	
Multi-Party System, Soviet Style	
Anti-Communism, Soviet Style	
Coalition Building, Soviet Style	
Political Mobilization, Soviet Style	
Crisis Management, Soviet Style	
Conclusions	
2. Zhirinovskii Enters Politics	125
2.1. A Registration	125
2.2. A Nomination	130
2.3. Finances	133
Some Expenditures	
The Red Millions	

LDPR, Inc.
 Zhirinovskii and Big Business
 Zhirinovskii and the 'Young Wolves'
 Conclusions

3. The Men Behind the Leader	165
3.1. Membership Numbers	165
Wishful Counting	
Plausible Estimations	
3.2. Splits	169
3.3. Alignments	171
Liberalism Embraces Nazism	
The Lone-Wolf Joins the Pack	
Vovka Meets Edichka	
Pathology Befriends Psychology	
Populism Adjoins Conservatism	
Conclusions	
3.4. Foreign Relations	195
Iraq	
Germany/Austria	
Further Possible Sources of Foreign Financial Support	
3.5. The First Enrolment	207
The Functionaries	
The Radicals	
3.6. The Leadership on the Eve of the 1993 Elections	218
Some Numerical Data	
The New Inner Circle	
Conclusions	

Part II: Interpreting the Programme

4. Two Faces of Vladimir Zhirinovskii

4.1. The Centrist

The Liberal Democrat

The Moderate

The Il'in-Admirer

The Provisional Autocrat

The El'tsinite Democrat

The Third Force

The Anti-Conservative

The Conventional Centrist

Conclusions

4.2. The Imperialist

The Anti-Nationalist

The Nationalist

The Cautious

The Resentful

The Populist

The Innovator

The Unitarian

The Federalist

The Restorationist

The Expansionist

The Versatile

The Alarmist

234

234

235

260

The Seer	
The Prudent	
The Guardian	
The Strategist	
The Physician	
The Realist	
The Sympathetic	
The Northerner	
The Expert	
The Geopolitician	
The Unorthodox	
The Saviour	
The Peacemaker	
The Liberator	
The Pragmatic	
The Man of the World	
The Warrior	
The Visionary	
The Pacifier	
The Cleanser	
Zhirinovskii and the Russian Past	
Zhirinovskii and the Russian Present	

Part III: Classifying the Documents 313

5. Fascist Tendencies in Zhirinovskii's Writings in the Newspaper *Liberal* 313

5.1. The Research Framework and Political Context of the Chapter	313
Right-Wing Extremism and Peace Studies	
Zhirinovskii versus Gaidar	
5.2. The 'Whys' of Studying Fascism in Russia	317
5.2.1. The Significance of Zhirinovskii's Political Ideas	
The LDPR's Direct Influence on Russian Politics	
The LDPR's Indirect Influence on Russian Politics	
5.2.2. 'Fascism' - a Redundant Label?	
5.2.3. 'Fascism' in Post-Soviet Russia	
'Fascism' vs. 'Right-Wing Extremism'	
The Moscow Anti-Fascist Centre	
'Fascism' as a Legal Term	
'Fascism's' Pre-Eminence	
5.3. Identifying Fascism	331
5.3.1. Some Methodological Problems of Empirical Fascist Studies in Russia	
'Fascism' a Special Notion in Russia?	
Zhirinovskii a Fascist?: Pros and Cons	
My Approach to Zhirinovskii's Fascism	
The Procedure of this Inquiry	
5.3.2. Some Problems of a Theoretical Conceptualization of Fascism	
Generic Fascism as a Sub-Type of Right-Wing Extremism	
Concepts of Fascist Ideology	
5.3.3. An Operational Definition of Fascism	
Griffin's 'Fascist Minimum'	
A Note on Contemporary Russian Political Terminology	
5.4. Palingenetic Ultra-Nationalism in Zhirinovskii's Articles in <i>Liberal</i>	361
5.4.1. The Newspaper <i>Liberal</i>	

5.4.2. Zhirinovskii's Articles in *Liberal*

Number 2-3, 1990

Number 4-5, 1992

Number 6-7, 1992

Number 8-9, 1992

Number 10, 1992

Number 1 (11), 1993

Number 2 (12), 1993

Number 3 (13), 1993

Part IV: Evaluating the Evidence 414

6. Provisional Inferences about the Nature of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' 414

6.1. Summaries of the Research Results 414

Chapter 1: The Origins of the LDP

Chapter 2: Zhirinovskii Enters Politics

Chapter 3: The Men Behind the Leader

Chapter 4: Two Faces of Vladimir Zhirinovskii

Chapter 5: Fascist Tendencies in Zhirinovskii's Writings in the Newspaper *Liberal*

6.2. A Comparison of the Research Results 419

6.3. Fascism and Centrism 424

6.4. *The Last Dash to the South* a Mere Propaganda Trick? 426

The Last Dash as One Among Several LDP Agendas

The Last Dash as a Non-Issue

The Salience of International Affairs

The 'South' as a Recurring Issue

7. 'Weimar Russia': Misleading Catch-Phrase or Pertinent Metaphor?	439
7.1. Introduction	439
7.2. Controlling for Politics: Some Important Similarities in the Party Spectra, Intellectual Discourses, and Organizational Resources of Inter-War Germany and Post-Soviet Russia	444
7.2.1. Political Parties	
7.2.2. Right-Wing Extremist Contaminations of the Democratic Regimes	
7.2.3. Ultra-Nationalist 'Social Capital'	
7.2.4. Para-Military Organizations	
7.2.5. Conclusions	
7.3. Sketching the Paradigm: Some Basic Characteristics of the Political Culture, Economy, Society and International Environment of Weimar Germany	454
7.3.1. A Holistic-Institutional Interpretation	
7.3.2. Some Further Variable and Intervening Factors	
The Rise of Nationalism	
New Demographic Developments	
The Disillusionment with 'American-Style' Modernism	
The Failure of the Welfare State	
The Unreformed Agriculture	
The Political-Institutional Variable	
Economic Crises	
7.4. Comparing the Cases: Some Notable Similarities and Dissimilarities Between Post-Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany	464
7.4.1. The Simultaneity Problem and Hangover Effects in Germany and Russia	
The Simultaneity Problem	

The Persistence of Old Elites

7.4.2. Socio-Economic Conditions and Institutional Defects in Weimar Germany and Post-Soviet Russia

The Salience of Russian Nationalism, and Russia's International Environment

Further Destabilizing Social and Institutional Factors

7.5. Conclusions 481

8. What Is It All about?: Some Concluding Hypotheses about the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' in Comparative-Contextual Perspective 486

8.1. Fanatic or Opportunist? 486

The Conundrum of Fascist Clownerie

From Right-Wing Populism to Right-Wing Extremism

8.2. A Grounded Preliminary Explanation 488

The Evolutionary Character of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon'

The Separatedness of the State from Civil and Political Society

The Unavailability of the Palingenetic Dimension

The Mixture of Pre- and Post-Modern Politics in Russia

A Final Remark about the Future of the LDPR

Appendix I - Zhirinovskii's <i>Curriculum Vitae</i>	512
Appendix II - 'The West will pay us.': A Talk with Vladimir Zhirinovskii	563
Bibliography	567
Further Reading	591
Primary Sources	591
Commented Secondary Literature	597

Abbreviations

AiF	<i>Argumenty i fakty</i>
AO	<i>Aktsionernoe obshchestvo</i> (stock corporation)
AP	Associated Press
APR	<i>Agrarnaya partiya Rossii</i> (Agrarian Party of Russia)
AZiP	<i>Assotsiatsiya zakonosti i poriadka</i> (Association for Lawfulness and Order)
CDPSP	<u>The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press</u>
CNN	Cable News Network
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
D	<u>Den'</u> (Moskva)
DemRossiya	<i>Demokraticeskaya Rossiya</i> (Democratic Russia)
DK	<i>Devichii kal</i> (A Virgin's Excrements)
DN	<u>Deutsche Nationalzeitung</u> (München)
DPR	<i>Demokraticeskaya partiya Rossii</i> (Democratic Party of Russia)
DS	<i>Demokraticeskii soiuz</i> (Democratic Union)
DT	<u>Daily Telegraph</u>
DVU	<i>Deutsche Volksunion</i> (German People's Union)
EKh	<u>Ekspress-Khronika</u> (Moskva)
ELDP	<i>Evropeyskaya liberal'no-demokraticeskaya partiya</i> (European Liberal-Democratic Party)
FAZ	<u>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</u>
FDP	<i>Freie Demokratische Partei</i> (Free Democratic Party)
G	<u>The Guardian</u>
Gazprom	<i>Gazovaya promyshlennost'</i> (Gas Industry)
GKChP	<i>Gosudarstvennyi komitet chrezvychaynogo polozeniya</i> (State Committee of Emergency)
GmbH	<i>Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung</i> (Private Limited Company)
GMM	Global Money Management
GRU	<i>Glavnoe razvedovatel'noe upravlenie</i> (Main Intelligence Administration)
I	<u>Izvestiya</u>
IABLoko Iavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin-Bloc	(<i>iabloko</i> = apple)
IHT	<u>International Herald Tribune</u> (Neuilly-sur-Seine)
In	<u>Inostranets</u>
IuG	<u>Iuridicheskaya gazeta</u>
Ispolkom Ispolnitel'nyi komitet	(Executive Committee)
ITAR-TASS	<i>Informatsionnoe telegrafnoe agentstvo Rossii - Telegrafnoe agentstvo Sovetskogo Soiuza</i> (Informational Telegraph Agency of Russia - Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
KGB	<i>Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti</i> (Committee of State Security)
KDP-PNS	<i>Konstitutsionno-demokraticeskaya partiya - partiya narodnoi svobody</i> (Constitutional-Democratic Party - Party of People's Freedom)
Kolkhoz	<i>Kollektivnoe khoziaistvo</i> (Collective Farm)
Komsomol	<i>Kommunisticheskii soiuz molodezhy</i> (Communist Union of Youth)
KPRF	<i>Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii</i> (Communist Party of the Russian Federation)
L	<u>Liberal</u> (Moskva: LDP)
LG	<u>Literaturnaya gazeta</u>
LDPB	Liberal-Democratic Party of Bulgaria
LDPR	<u>Liberal'no-demokraticeskaya partiya Rossii</u>
LDPSU	Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union
LR	<u>Literaturnaya Rossiya</u>
ME	<u>Megapolis-Express</u> (Moskva)

MAFC	Moscow Anti-Fascist Centre
MGIMO	<i>Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi institut mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii</i> (Moscow State Institute of International Relations)
MID	<i>Ministerstvo inostrannykh del</i> (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MM	<u>Moscow-Magazine</u>
MN	<u>Moskovskie novosti</u>
MK	<u>Moskovskii komsomolets</u>
Mosgorspravka	<i>Moskovskaia gorodskaiia spravka</i> (Moscow City Inquiry Office)
MP	Member of Parliament
MUR	<i>Moskovskii ugovnyi rozysk</i> (Moscow Criminal Investigation Department CID)
natsmeny	<i>natsional'nye menshinstva</i> (national minorities)
NBP	<i>Natsional-bol'shevistskaia partiia</i> (National-Bolshevist Party)
NDR	<i>Nash dom Rossii</i> (Our Home is Russia)
NEG	<u>Novaia ezheдневnaia gazeta</u>
NG	<u>Nezavisimaia gazeta</u>
NKVD	<i>Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrennykh del</i> (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs)
NORD	<i>Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe russkoe dvizhenie</i> (Russian National Liberation Movement)
NPSR	<i>Narodnaia partiia 'Svobodnaia Rossia'</i> (People's Party 'Free Russia')
NRPR	<i>Natsional'no-respublikanskaia partiia Rossii</i> (National-Republican Party of Russia)
NRS	<u>Novoe russkoe slovo</u> (New York)
NSDAP/AO	<i>Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands/ Auslandsorganisation</i> (National-Socialist Workers Party of Germany / Foreign Division)
NTV	<i>Nezavisimoe televidenie</i>
NV	<u>Novoe vremia</u>
NZZ	<u>Neue Züricher Zeitung</u>
O	<u>Ogoněk</u>
OG	<u>Obshchaya gazeta</u>
OMON	<i>Otdel militsii osobogo naznachenii</i> (Special Tasks Police Department)
OMRI	Open Media Research Institute
P	<u>Pravda</u>
PER	<u>Politicheskii ekstremizm v Rossii: Informatsionno analiticheskii biulleten'</u> (Moskva: Fond 'Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo')
PES	<i>Partiia ekonomicheskoi svobody</i> (Party of Economic Freedom)
PKD	<i>Partiia konstitutsionnykh demokratov</i> (Party of Constitutional Democrats)
Politizdat	<i>Politicheskoe izdatel'stvo</i> (Political Publisher)
PRES	<i>Partiia rossiiskogo edinstva i soglasii</i> (Party of Russian Unity and Accord)
PZh	<i>Pravda Zhirinovskogo</i> (Moskva: LDP)
RAU	<i>Rossiisko-amerikanskii universitet</i> (Russian-American University)
R	<u>Rossia</u>
Rbls	Roubles
RF	<u>Rossiiskaia federatsiia</u> (formerly: <u>Narodnyi deputat</u>)
RG	<u>Rossiiskaia gazeta</u>
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RKhDD	<i>Rossiiskoe khristiansko-demokraticeskoe dvizhenie</i> (Russian Christian-Democratic Movement)
RKP	<i>Rossiiskaia kommunisticheskaia partiia</i> (Russian Communist Party)
RLP	<i>Rossiiskaia liberal'naiia partiia</i> (Russian Liberal Party)
RLDP	<i>Rossiiskaia liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia</i> (Russian Liberal-Democratic Party)
RNF	<i>Rossiiskii narodnyi front</i> (Russian People's Front)
RNS	<i>Russkii natsional'nyi sobor</i> (Russian National Assembly)
ROL	<u>Radical Opposition Leaders</u> (Moskva: What the Papers Say)
ROS	<i>Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soiuz</i> (Russian All-People's Union)
RSDRP	<i>Rossiiskaia sotsial-demokraticheskaia rabochaia partiia</i> (Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party)

RSFSR	<i>Rossiiskaia sovetskaia federativnaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika</i> (Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic)
RSPP	<i>Rosstiskii soiuz promyshlennikov i predprinimatelei</i> (Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs)
RV	<i>Rossiiskie vesti</i>
S	<i>Segodnia</i>
SI	<i>Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia</i>
SED	<i>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</i> (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
Sovkhoz	<i>Sovetskoe khoziaistvo</i> (Soviet, i.e. State, Farm)
Sp	<i>Der Spiegel</i> (Hamburg)
SR	<i>Sovetskaia Rossiia</i>
SS	<i>Schutzstaffel</i> (Protection Squadron)
St	<i>Stolitsa</i>
SZh	<i>Sokol Zhirinovskogo</i> (Moskva: LDP)
taz	<i>die tageszeitung</i> (Berlin)
TsK KPSS	<i>Tsentral'nyi komitet Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soiuza</i> (Central Committee of the CPSU)
TVO	<i>Treuhand-, Verwaltungs- und Organisations-GmbH</i> (Trust-, Administration- and Organization- Private Limited Company)
WWW	World Wide Web
Z	<i>Die Zeit</i> (Hamburg)
Za	<i>Zavtra</i> (Moskva)

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to several scholars for their support in connection with the preparation of the 1994 Master's thesis on which the study is based. Among them are Dr. Klaus Schroeder (Free University of Berlin), Dr. Mark von Hagen (Columbia University), Dr. Rosalinde Sartorti (Free University of Berlin), Prof. Viacheslav Dashichev (Moscow Institute for International Economic and Political Studies), Prof. Michal Reiman (Free University of Berlin), Dr. Harold Shukman, my course supervisor, and Dr. Alex Pravda, my thesis supervisor (both St. Antony's College Oxford).

The extension of the thesis to a larger manuscript, in turn, would not have been possible without the active backing from Prof. Archie Brown (St. Antony's College Oxford), Dr. John D. Barber (King's College Cambridge), and, once more, Prof. Michal Reiman and Dr. Harold Shukman. I am further grateful to Dr. Chris T. Morley (Trinity College Cambridge), Vlasta Wallat (Free University of Berlin) and Jackie Willcox (St. Antony's College Oxford) for the constant attention they have given to my study and scholarship matters. I have benefitted a great deal from advice given by Prof. Wolfgang Wippermann (Free University of Berlin) and Dr. Roger Griffin (Oxford Brookes University).

I should like to express my special gratitude to the following people without the assistance of whom I would not have been able to collect the primary and secondary Russian sources on which the study is based. Among them are Vladimir Berezovskii and Vladimir Chervakov (Moscow Centre for Political Analytical Information), Dmitrii Brodskii (Moscow Independent Public Library), Valerii Solovei (Gorbachëv Foundation Moscow), Evgenii Proshechkin (Moscow Anti-Fascist Centre), Vitalii Zvolinskii (Moscow Civil Society Foundation), Sergei Mitrokhin (State Duma), and Sergei Neganov (Perm City Administration). In addition, I am grateful to Prof. Peter Reddaway (George Washington University) for sharing with me some of his sources and thoughts on Russian nationalism. Christof Schaffranek (Berlin) and Kyril Haramiev (Oxford) were helpful in collecting material on Zhirinovskii's links abroad.

The manuscript was improved greatly through the comments and corrections made by Dr. John D. Klier (University College London), S.P., Wendy Slater (Jesus College Cambridge), Prof. Alexander Galkin (Gorbachëv Foundation Moscow), Dr. Alëna Ledeneva (University of Cambridge), and especially Dr. John D. Barber. Michael Filek is responsible for those phrases and sentences which sound more like English (or Canadian) English than German English. Nevertheless, none of the individuals mentioned here is responsible for any mistakes or misjudgements the study contains.

Financial aid from the following institutions made the preparation of this study possible: the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Bonn (several grants), the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst Bonn (three grants), The British Council Office at Berlin, The British Council Office at Oxford, St. Cross College Oxford, the Gilbert Murray Trust London, the Land Berlin (two grants), the Kurt Hahn Trust Cambridge, the Cambridge European Trust, the Trinity College Eddington Fund Cambridge (two grants), the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences and the Board of Graduate Studies of the University of Cambridge, the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies, the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes together with the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, and the NATO Press and Information Office. Special thanks to the Moscow office of the Carl Zeiss Jena GmbH.

Andreas Umland

November 1997

0. Introduction

'Lebed stole my act, and he stole my votes. I should take him to court.'

Vladimir Zhirinovskii after the Russian presidential elections of 1996 (as quoted by David Remnick in: The New Yorker, 22 July 1996, 52)

This study is based on a Master's thesis written in winter/spring 1994, i.e. within a few months after Zhirinovskii's surprising electoral success in Russia's first post-Soviet multi-party parliamentary elections.¹ At that time, I felt still obliged to explain in the introduction why exactly it would be of interest to have a closer look at the conditions surrounding the advent of Vladimir Zhirinovskii and his so called Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) on Russia's fluid political scene. There was both, a general curiosity about how and why such a quixotic figure could rise that high in Russian politics, and the more serious need to position and evaluate his party in the context of the overall rise of - what has been labelled - the Russian New Right since the late 1960s.²

¹ A concise summary of a part of this thesis has already appeared in German language (Umland 1994b).

² Though more a political publicist than scientist, Alexander Yanov (1978, 1987, 1995) is the Western expert who has probably observed and commented on this process most perceptively (*The Economist*, 15 June 1996, 6). The most comprehensive (though on some details, such as the LDP, partly inexact) survey and insightful interpretation of historic and contemporary Russian right-wing extremism of which I am aware is the one by Walter Laqueur (1993). Useful recent overviews of Soviet-Russian anti-semitism and neo-Nazism are the ones by William Korey and Semyon Reznik (1996). The most accurate and reliable accounts of 20th-century Russian nationalism in general have been provided by John B. Dunlop (1976, 1983, 1985, 1993). Overviews of the bulk of the relevant Western secondary literature on Russian nationalism and ultranationalism in the Soviet and post-Soviet period can be found in review articles by Otto (1990), Solovei (1993a), Rowley (1994) and Umland (1997). More recent developments in especially radical Russian nationalism have been summarized in, for instance, Solovei 1993b, Preißler 1994 and L. Ivanov 1996.

0.1. Zhirinovskii's Ups and Downs

Yet, since the Fifth³ Russian State Duma had been elected in December 1993 for only two years, it was, in 1994, not that clear that the LDPR would become a more enduring matter of concern. To be sure, I already had before December 1993 the impression that Zhirinovskii and his party were unjustifiedly overlooked or only remarked upon in passing by many observers of contemporary Russian nationalism (Umland 1994a).⁴ However, though Zhirinovskii's success in the December 1993 elections (22.92% and, therefore, first in the ballot on the party list⁵) was impressive, it seemed to be to a large degree due to the specific Russian political configuration at that time. These elections were held only less than a dozen weeks after, in early October 1993, Parliamentary Speaker Ruslan Khazbulatov's and former Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi's had

³ The numbers of the post-Soviet Dumas continue, somewhat confusingly, the numbering of the pre-revolutionary State Dumas. The first post-Soviet Duma is thus the fifth overall Russian institution bearing the name 'State Duma' (although the legal setting and composition of the pre-1917 Dumas differed in many respect from the post-Soviet institution).

⁴ See, for instance, the otherwise useful overview of Hahn (1994) who, as many others, did not give much attention to Zhirinovskii. Notable exceptions were, among others, *The Economist* (29th February 1992, 55); Alexander Yanov (*Delo*, no. 12-13, July 1993; Yanov 1994; MK, 11 January 1994; S, 26 January 1994); and Wendy Sloane (1992) who had, already at earlier stages, taken Zhirinovskii seriously.

⁵ Orttung 1996, 7. Half, or 225, of the members of the lower house of the Russian parliament, the State Duma, are elected in single-mandate districts. In this part of the voting, it is enough to collect a plurality of votes to become a deputy, and the LDPR won five seats in December 1993, and one seat in December 1995. The other half of the seats are distributed according to the results of a simultaneous proportional vote on 'electoral blocs' (or parties and their alliances) with a 5% barrier. All results below this margin are not considered in the distribution of the 225 seats designated to the electoral blocs. These details are important in the evaluation of Zhirinovskii's influence. On the one hand, his party's weak performance in the single-mandate plurality vote (as well as in the regional elections determining the composition of the upper house, the Federation Council) meant that he and his party could not transform the nationwide support for Zhirinovskii personally into an adequate amount of parliamentary seats. On the other hand, those electoral associations or parties which, in the proportional part of the voting, managed to win 5% or more of the turnout divided among themselves all the 225 seats which were to be filled up via this component of the poll. In December 1995, that meant that nearly 50% of the ballots for electoral blocs were wasted as they were cast for electoral associations or parties which received less than 5%. Accordingly, those four blocs which received more than 5% are now heavily over-represented in the parliament. Among them is the LDPR with a total of 51 (50 party list and one single-mandate) seats in the Sixth Russian State Duma (Orttung 1996).

staged an abortive coup attempt which led to the temporary discrediting and banning of several right-wing extremist organizations and newspapers (Tolz 1994; Sakwa 1994, 1995; Oleshuk 1994; Fairbanks 1994; Galkin and Krassin 1994; McFaul 1994; Davidheiser 1994; Skillen 1995).

Although the 1993 victory had already been Zhirinovskii's second suprisingly strong showing in federal elections, many observers continued to see his success as a Russian replication of the short-lived Polish Tyminski Phenomenon. In the first round of the 1991 Polish presidential elections, the Peruvian-Canadian emigre businessman of Polish descent, 'self-made millionaire', demagogic populist and 'dark horse' Stanislaw Tyminski came, to most observers' surprise, with 3.8 million votes (nearly 25%) second after Lech Walesa and beat Prime-Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and four minor candidates. As Zhirinovskii would do, he appealed to the 'little man' and losers of the economic transition, talked about agents of a foreign conspiracy, and was suspiciously soft on communism. On the other hand, however, Tyminski also promised - as Zhirinovskii did in 1990-91 - to do everything 'faster', and make the country prosperous through radical free-market policies. He appeared further similar to the LDP leader in that he was accused of year-long contacts to the communist security service, contradicted himself about his past at press-conferences, and, in spite of his capitalist economic programme, cooperated with former communist *apparatchiks* and security officers. His statements and the populist programme of his Party X - 'the party of pain' - also contained anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, and chauvinism, and presented Tyminski as a sort of 'third force' between communism and foreign-inspired liberalism - a feature also heavily prominent in Zhirinovskii's rhetoric (Part II, sec. 4.1.). As Zhirinovskii's LDPR, the Party X became after its first success more clearly right-wing extremist. However, unlike the LDPR, Tyminski and the Party X, concurrently with its radicalization, gradually vanished from Poland's political scene (Hockenos 1993, 260-262; Hellén 1996, 186).

Such a trend seemed, at a first glance, also to seize the LDPR after its December 1993 triumph. In February-April 1994, Russian polling data suggested that the backing of Zhirinovskii's electorate of over 12.3 million voters had already then fallen much sharper than that of any other party (Levinson and Shokarev 1994; NG, 5 April 1994; S, 14 April 1994; IHT, 13 June 1994). This was also the time when a charge was brought against Zhirinovskii because of war propaganda

in his writings (I, 21 January 1994). In spring 1994, what seemed to be most important was that already several other prominent ultra-nationalist leader figures who had not taken part in the 1993 poll were waiting in the wings. Zhirinovskii looked as if he were committing political suicide when, in early 1994, he used his strong position in the new Duma to implement one of his major 1993 election promises - to free the putschists of August 1991 and October 1993 from prison. Many of these right-wing extremists were seen as strong potential rivals in the competition for the nationalist electorate. Subsequently, a number of new scandals and law suits, and especially the apparent rise, in 1995, of the more moderately nationalist Congress of Russian Communities, then led by popular Gen.(ret.) Aleksandr Lebed' (b. 1950), seemed all to indicate that Zhirinovskii's days as the most important non-communist ultra-nationalistic political force were numbered (Ortung 1995b; *Partiino-politicheskie...* 1996, 29-33).

However, the results of the December 1995 State Duma elections indicate that his fall may not be as sudden as his rise. The LDPR won in the proportional part of the poll approximately 7.74 million votes, or 11.18%, which meant that it came, after the Communist Party, second in the voting on party lists. What was even more stunning was that although Zhirinovskii had, before December 1995, vastly exaggerated his estimate of the percentage of the voters who would vote for him (he predicted around 40%), it was - somewhat surrealistically - basically only Zhirinovskii (and only very few political analysts) who had a presentiment that he would *again* do comparatively well. This was, in some respects, a replication of what had happened before the June 1991 presidential elections when he, unexpectedly, came third (6.2 million votes or 7.81% of the turnout), and before the December 1993 elections when his electorate approximately doubled - which meant that his party had by far the best result in the proportional part of the vote. In both cases, it was, except for unnoticed warnings by two or three political analysts⁶, only Zhirinovskii

⁶ Most of the more or less useless Russian and Western polling results and prognoses of October-December 1993 are documented in *Vybory v Gosudarstvennuiu dumu* 1993. A notable exception was former Deputy Foreign Minister Fëdor Shelov-Kovediaev who, as early as on November 3, 1993, named, apart from Egor Gaidar's Russia's Choice and the Communist Party, the LDPR as among those three parties which would do well in the State Duma elections (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 4 November 1993). The percental prognosis which, I know of, came closest to the actual result and had been published more than one week before the elections was one by Prof. Nikolai Nor-Mesek, Director of the Institute for Soviet Studies in Frankfurt-am-Main, who, already in the first days of December 1993, predicted 16% for the LDPR. Nor-Mesek, moreover, had

himself who (although he sometimes exaggerated greatly) more or less correctly predicted the placement among the three or four major competitors (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 17, 150).⁷

In the 1996 presidential elections this pattern seems to have been broken. Zhirinovskii received only approximately 4.3 million votes, or 5.79% of the turnout. This meant that he came fifth after Boris El'tsin, Communist Party chairman Gennadii Ziuganov, moderate nationalist Aleksandr Lebed' and social democrat Grigorii Iavlinskii. He did thus not even confirm his previous self-styled image as the 'third force' after the democrats and communists. One is tempted to conclude that his political descent has begun.

Yet, it is not entirely clear whether the 1996 poll was the beginning of the end of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon', or only a less fortunate stage in the LDPR's development. First, Zhirinovskii's party is still well-represented in the Sixth State Duma the term of which should last until December 1999. He thus remains for the time being an important factor in Russian politics. Second, over the last four years, Zhirinovskii has build up a veritable organizational structure covering most of the cities of the Russian Federation (sec. 3.1.). His activities in the field of 'agitation and propaganda' are certainly among the most extensive in post-Soviet Russia (Umland 1996; 'Further Reading: Primary Sources'). Even if Zhirinovskii disappears from national-level politics, at least a part of these organizational structures and the people involved in them will, probably, continue to play a certain role in Russian federal and regional politics. Third, Russia's political development is still fragile with President El'tsin's volatile health condition as only one potential source of instability. Should there be any kind of escalation of tension in the domestic sphere and/or in foreign relations, Zhirinovskii could be among those who will in one way or another benefit from this. Fourth, the rocket-like rise of charismatic Gen.(ret.) Aleksandr Lebed' as

a good presentiment in that he named the LDPR among those two electoral blocs which would do best, and in that he put Gaidar's Russia's Choice (15%) behind the LDPR. He was, however, totally wrong with regard to Arkadii Vol'skii's 'centrist' Civic Union which he had put on first place (also 16%) although it received merely 1.93% of the vote (*Welt am Sonntag*, no. 49, 5 December 1993, 25).

⁷ Zhirinovskii had predicted 66-67 seats for the LDPR already on October 12, 1993 (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 13 October 1993), and between 10% and 30% in early December 1993 (*Vybory v Gosudarstvennuiu dumu*, no. 8, 1-7 December 1993, 19). The actual result was 64 seats, and 22.92%.

one possible successor of El'tsin may in the future not be quite as good a guard against the Zhirinovskii threat (and other right-wing extremist menaces) as it may now look. To be sure, Lebed' currently certainly fills up to a large degree the political space previously occupied by Zhirinovskii. However, it seems not improbable that he will, as new presidential elections are forthcoming, move further to the political centre, i.e. seek alliances with politicians closer to the centrist, democratic, pro-Western, rather than to the anti-Western 'national patriotic' camp, and use a more moderate language. Lebed's highly publicized trips to Western Europe and the United States, and the largely sympathetic reception he encountered there after his dismissal as Security Council Secretary might be first signs for such a development. Should this trend continue, it seems possible that Lebed' may loose support on the right fringe of the political spectrum leaving this space again open to extremist nationalists.

O.2. The Origins and Basic Ideas of Post-Soviet Russian Nationalism

Before outlining in detail the assumptions and aims of this dissertation, this sub-section will give a short introduction to the general field of Russian ultra-nationalism. It will outline some characteristics of the emergence of right-wing thought in Soviet Russia, show the rise of - what has been labelled - the 'Russian New Right' (Yanov 1978) to a relatively independent force in the *glasnost*' period, and make some suggestions concerning the emergence of a post-Soviet *New New Russian Right* which distinguished itself by an active and pragmatic engagement in politics, electoral competition, and party- and alliance-building. I will refrain here from elaborating on the numerous monarchist, neo-pagan, neo-Nazi and so forth groups on the lunatic fringe, and thus concentrate only on those currents which can be seen as, in some regard, 'mainstream'.

A Short Overview of Different Interpretations of the 'Russian Idea'

Before turning to the history of the New Russian Right of the Soviet period, some clarifications about its main ideological paradigms should be made. Many of its characteristics, such as a Manichean world view, authoritarianism, anti-Westernism - and especially anti-

Americanism -, xenophobia, imperialism, conspiracy theories, and so on, are common to most extremist right-wingers all over the world. However, some concepts are peculiarly Russian and should be therefore shortly explained.

Above of all one should mention Slavophilism - the misnamed starting point of most of the lateron developed traits of conservative Russian thought. The Russian Slavophiles of the mid-19th-century were less concerned about the Slavs in general than about a specifically 'Russian Idea'. In some regards they represented a Russian equivalent of Western - especially German - romantic proto-nationalism of the early 19th century. When the Slavophiles emerged as an intellectual movement in the 1840s, they proceeded from the ideal of an integral personality or total psyche which unites its rational and non-rational branches. The Russians were, according to the Slavophiles, especially pre-destined to realize this vision, because of the originality of their piety. As distinct from the West, which had had a sophisticated pagan past, Russian society took over Christianity at a low level of its cultural development and preserved subsequently the Christian spirit in a purer form. The simple Russian peasant, the Slavphiles argued, has preserved the harmony of the rational and emotional sections of his soul as distinct from the Western citizen or Westernized Russian *intelligent* whose personalities are divided into two conflicting parts. Correspondingly, the ideal form of human togetherness was seen in an all-embracing fraternal community united by the belief in God, undisturbed from egotist individualism of its members and unfettered from political clashes. Political freedom was understood not as freedom in politics but freedom from politics - something that, however, had to be ensured by the state. Politics is, according to this view, the sole domain of the autocrat who, notwithstanding, should not be allowed to interfere in the life of the people and the Church. Both sides, the benevolent Tsar and the people, fulfill different functions in society so that they are relieved from any conflictual situation (Bajohr 1995). According to the 'Russian Idea', the relationship between state and society is determined by the principle of unanimity or *sobornost'* (catholicity) which is the Russian term for this peculiar vision of some kind of authoritarian communitarianism. Slavophilism refers, therefore, not so much to the Slavs in general, but specifically to the Russians, the distinctivness of whom lies in their religion and mores, and not in their ethnicity or race. Today, the monthly 'thick journal' *Moskva*

represents one of the most consistently neo-Slavophile publications in that it draws on the above listed assumptions of classic Slavophile thought.

The next component of Russian nationalist thought which should be shortly introduced here is messianism. One consistent corollary of the Slavophile *Weltanschauung* is that the West is in so far in an inferior state as it is infected by pagan culture and haunted by a split of the originally symphonic human personality. Accordingly, Western society is divided by the individualism of its self-seeking members who have lost the 'true' Christian spirit. Russia's mission in world history is, therefore, to preserve its superior peculiarity and to bring ultimately back Orthodox faith to humanity. After the treason of the Catholic Church which has engaged in secular manners, and the occupation of Constantinople by Turks, Moscow has become the Third Rome, the last stronghold of the original dogma.

A third Russian nationalist concept which should be shortly mentioned here is the ideology of Eurasianism. In view of the successful October Revolution the classic Eurasianists of the 1920s substituted the Slavophile argument about Russia's peculiarity with a new theory presenting Russia as a distinct Eurasian civilization which provides a bridge between Europe and Asia and is distinct from both. The neo-Eurasianists of today interpret not only the Soviet period as having been of advantage to the Russians because it preserved and expanded the Russian grip on the Eurasian 'heartland' (*Geopolitik...* 1994). Some of them see even the Mongol-Tatar yoke from approximately 1240 til approximately 1480 - one of the most gruesome periods in Russian history - in a positive light because, during this period, the Eurasian space was for the first time united and isolated from alien influences. Contemporary Eurasianism is divided into several branches which quarrel about whether the Eurasian empire should have a state religion or not, and whether this should be only the Orthodox faith or an in its anti-Westernism united Islamic-Christian fundamentalism. The latter, pro-Islamic line has recently come to be represented by sections of two important new right-wing publications, the weekly *Zavtra* (Tomorrow), until 1993 called *Den'* (Day), edited by Alexandr Prokhanov, and *Elementy: Evraziiskoe obozrenie* (Elements. Eurasian review), which appears irregularly and is edited by the 'conservative revolutionary' Aleksandr Dugin.

The last peculiarly Russian concept worth mentioning here is National Bolshevism which also emerged in the 1920s among originally anti-communist Russian emigres. This new nationalist intellectual movement accepted the Soviet state, as it was able to preserve most of the Russian empire and to provide a stable order for a recovery after a decade of war. In view of the apparent strength of the communist system the National Bolsheviks compromised with their religious and social ideas, and hoped for a gradual waning of the Marxist ideology and a steady retrogression of the political system into a Russian nationalist one. Later, the National Bolsheviks of the 1970s comprised both, those ideologists who propose a merging of Leninist ideology and Orthodox faith into a new doctrine, as well as those who openly called for a substitution of the Marxist dogma by a nationalist one while preserving the non-Western character of the Soviet society. Various permutations of National Bolshevism seem to be today the lines of right-wing newspapers like the daily *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (Soviet Russia), or the weekly *Narodnaia Pravda* (People's Truth), and also partly of the daily *Pravda* (Truth) and the monthly 'thick journal' *Molodaia gvardiia* (Young Guard) (Brudny 1989).

These are some basic ideological currents of modern Russian right-wing thought which emerged before or shortly after the revolution and I shall now shortly review the emergence of right-wing thought in the Soviet Union.

The Development of Russian Nationalism During the Soviet Period

Right-wing and Soviet ideology seemed to be mutually excluding concepts. Yet, as early as in the late 1930s, there appeared many signs that the hopes of the early National Bolsheviks of the 1920s were partly coming true as Stalin began to resort to the glorification of Russian national history, Russification of national minorities, and Russian traditional socio-cultural ideas about, for instance, family and gender issues such as abortion. The heyday of this official Soviet-Russian nationalism constituted the late 1940s and early 1950s. Such phrases as *zhdanovshchina*, anti-cosmopolitanism campaign, the Birobidzhan Project, and the doctors plot should be mentioned here only in passing (Yanov 1978, Laqueur 1993, Korey 1995). In any way, Stalin's death in 1953 forestalled a further development in this direction.

A subsequent, novel development was the emergence of a non-official, by implication anti-communist new nationalism in Russian literature which seemed at first to be totally incompatible with Soviet ideology. The gradual intermixture of the new societal nationalism and Soviet ideology became possible once the attractiveness of the communist ideology had begun to wane, and the *nomenklatura* was forced to seek other non-democratic sources of legitimation and mobilization. The process started in the 1950s as a reaction on the first revelations about the so called 'repressions'. In the course of the steady erosion of the belief in the socialist model of modernization, the merger of nationalist and Soviet ideology accelerated. While potential establishment right-wingers were still bound by left-wing doctrinal prescriptions, an economic determinism of their official ideology, and the specific dangers of nationalist sentiment in a multi-national state, some of the first seeds of the emerging Soviet civil society, as the dissident movement, the 'thick journals' or several cultural organizations, were to a considerable extent overtaken by the New Russian Right long before *perestroika*.

The All-Russian Social Christian Union for the Liberation of the People, which existed from 1964-67, is generally regarded as the starting point of the dissident wing of the New Russian Right (Dunlop 1976; Yanov 1978, 21-38). A clandestine military-political organization of up to 60 activists it was absolutely antagonistic to the system and set as its aim the armed overthrow of the regime. It was heavily influenced by the ideas of the emigre religious philosopher and historian Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1948), and proposed the creation of a non-Western, albeit partly liberal, nationalist and *de facto* theocratic state. As far as the Union was soon smashed by the KGB and had no direct heirs, it is rather of interest to historians than to observers of the post-Soviet Right. This notwithstanding, the sovietological discussion about the organization reveals already the most fundamental issue concerning the evaluation of the late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian national revival: Can a Russian nationalist political movement provide an alternative concept, that means a 'third' or specifically Russian path for a post-communist development without slipping into fascism?

On the one side, there were a number of Western scholars, among them John B. Dunlop, who did not exclude the possibility or who, indeed, spoke of the desirability of an enlightened post-Soviet authoritarianism of - what was, at one point, called - the 'left-wing' of the Russian

Right (Dunlop 1976, 197-198, and 1983, 243-290). Although these historians and sovietologists did not ignore the danger of perversions, they argued that such a regime would be moderated by Orthodox religion, monarchist sentiment and an anti-totalitarian strand resulting from the anti-Stalinist background of the more 'liberal' right-wingers.

On the other side, emigree publicists as Alexander Yanov or Andrei Siniavskii have sounded the alarm as they viewed the entirety of the existing Russian nationalist trends, whether broad-minded or intolerant, as being dangerous, because of their utopianism, potential extremism and anti-Westernism (Yanov 1978, 1988; reviewed in Solovei 1993a). Yanov argued that the moderate, neo-fascist, and National Bolshevik wings of the Russian right would ultimately converge considering the common liberal-democratic enemy inside Russia and abroad. Should, in turn, a united nationalist front come to power, it would be more likely that the radicals rather than the moderates would dominate such a new regime. Russia could then turn out to become a fascist state.

The programme of the Christian revolutionaries with its ambiguous statements on liberal freedom provided the first basis for the controversy among different observers of Russian nationalism. The fundamental issues of the debate, which started in the late 1970s, are still topical today. However, even if the Liberation Union was relatively extensively treated in the scholarly literature, it had only marginal relevance for the actual course of events. More important were new trends in the cultural sphere which reached a public of dozens of millions.

First of all, a new anti-modernist literary movement - the *derevenshchiki* (ruralists) or *pochvenniki* (nativists) - became popular not only in Russia; they also gained a readership abroad. These nationalist novelists proposed a return to the countryside, old Russian customs, and the Church. In its earlier stage, nativism appeared as a reaction to the destruction of the Russian village and the promethean projects of a forced industrialization without regards for human or cultural losses. Vladimir Soloukhin laid the foundations of the so called village-prose with his novel *Vladimirskie proselki* (Vladimir Back Roads) in 1957. As a consequence of a further anti-religious campaign under Khrushchev and the growing public awareness of ecological, demographic and social dislocations, nativism came forth as an even more up-to-date current. Village writers like

Valentin Rasputin, Vasilii Belov and Viktor Astaf'ev became later on downright leading literary figures. Undeniably, they had in many regards a positive influence on Soviet politics. Due to their popularity the ruralists were, for instance, able to prevent some megalomaniac projects of the government such as the redirection of Siberian rivers to the South. From the spirit of their writings they were clearly anti-communists carrying out a - what has been called - a 'quiet revolution' (Dunlop 1983, 81-82). Yet, on the other hand, these talented writers also encouraged more destructive developments. Their major point of contact with other nationalist trends was anti-Westernism. The *pochvenniki* opposed not only the nihilism of Marxism-Leninism which they tended to see as fundamentally alien to Russia and solely imported from abroad. Western liberalism was seen as equally threatening as it would cause in much the same way the uprooting of the Russians from their native soil, mores and history.

As already indicated, these trends were not only results of a certain censorship-relaxation. Other developments suggested more clearly that the Soviet establishment was itself infected by Russian nationalism.

A crucial decision of the officialdom giving rise to the New Russian Right was the introduction of the daily newspaper *Sovetskaia Rossiia* in the late 1950s (Dunlop 1983, 34-35). The newspaper was designed especially for the needs of the RSFSR and became subsequently the first, albeit hampered, mouthpiece of new societal Russian nationalist sentiment with a mass audience. A further step in the this direction followed in the late 1960s when a new official ideological course was set on foot by the Brezhnev administration, and the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, also called the 'Russian club', and the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Nature were founded and registered. At one point these societies had a membership of 12.5 million and 19 million respectively (Dunlop 1980, 85). Until they became bureaucratized, these associations occupied a somewhat unique place in the history of the neo-Stalinist state as they were the only officially recognized Soviet mass-organizations which had been created at least partly by initiative from below (Dunlop 1983, 64-87).

Another clear sign for the rise of an establishment Right was a sudden nationalist turn of the until then rather dull monthly periodical *Molodaia gvardiia* (Young guard) in 1968 (Yanov 1978,

39-61). The fact that *Molodaia gvardia* was then an organ of the Komsomol seems to denote that age was one cleavage line dividing orthodox communists from new National Bolsheviks. The basic point was made by, among others, the literary critic Mikhail Lobanov who is today still an eminent right-wing ideologist. His proposition was to combat an allegedly threatening Americanization of the spirit of the people by a Russification, and not a Sovietization, of their spirit (*Molodaia gvardiia*, no. 4, 1968). Though the journal's editorial board was subsequently purged in 1970, the monthly continued to be an agent of neo-Stalinist nationalism as well as radical Slavophilism (Brudny 1991, 156-157).

Molodaia gvardia's originally leading role was later on taken over by another 'thick journal' - *Nash sovremennik* (Our Contemporary), the organ of the Union of Writers of the RSFSR. The latter's newly appointed editor-in-chief, Sergei Vikulov, brought with him to the monthly the village prose writers of the relatively liberal nationalist 'thick journal' *Novyi mir* (New World), and the nationalist historians and literary critics of the purged *Molodaia gvardiia*. Subsequently, *Nash sovremennik*'s circulation grew from 60,000 copies in October 1968 to 336,000 copies in February 1981. Yitzhak Brudny sees in the increasing precedence of the journal and the awarding of high state prizes to its contributors an attempt of the Brezhnev regime to co-opt Russian nationalist intellectuals into the system and to conclude a 'political contract'. This 'contract' was finally refused by the Russian nationalists because of their rising expectations and the continuing negative social trends like alcoholism, depopulation of the countryside, or demographic decline. Consequently, it came to a showdown in 1982 when the Central Committee issued an explicit condemnation of Russian nationalism and cut the circulation of *Nash sovremennik*. However, Andropov and Chernenko were at this moment already forced to accept the enormous popularity of Russian nationalism, and did thus not try to eliminate its main institutional basis (Brudny 1991, 158-159). In addition, *Nash sovremennik* was by then joined by a considerable number of other publications which had come under the influence of the nationalists such as *Moskva, Literaturnaia Rossiia* (Literary Russia), *Volga, Don, Avrora, Neva*, or *Sibirskie ogni* (Siberian fires).

Last but not least, the Russian dissident nationalists should be mentioned. Though their writings were not accessible to the bulk of the Soviet population, they were important for the

formation of the views of Moscow's officially publishing, National Bolshevik ideologists who were able to transmit the ideas of the *samizdat* literature in a filtered form. The main dissident publications of this period were the journal *Veche* which had been the name of the popular assembly in ancient Russia, and *From under the Rubble*, a collection of essays by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and some of his dissident colleagues published in 1974.

Yanov distinguished between two faces of *Veche*. The liberal-nationalist or isolationist 'Osipovist' faction (after *Veche*'s editor-in-chief Vladimir Osipov) represented a loyal opposition to the system in so far as it was ready to cooperate in account of an alleged two-front threat to Russia from the West and from China. The National Bolshevik 'Antonovist' faction (after its main spokesmen Mikhail Antonov), on the other hand, sought a union of Russian Orthodoxy and Leninism in view of the inner threats from 'rootless cosmopolitanism' of the Jewish-Puritan 'lumpen' *intelligentsia* (Yanov 1978, 62-84).

In evaluating *From under the Rubble*, Yanov admits that it presents a more liberal form of nationalism in that it makes no concessions to the Soviet system (Yanov 1978, 90-112). However, he is highly critical of Solzhenitsyn's contempt for Western politics and his 'utopia of 'an enlightened authoritarianism'' as an alternative to - on the one hand - totalitarianism, and - on the other hand - democracy.' (1978, 111)

Russian Nationalism's Transformation During *Perestroika*

While, as has been outlined, a Russian nationalist spectrum was already taking shape before Gorbachëv's reforms, its components were either marginal, or did not represent independent political forces at this stage. Despite the apparent dominance of the Westernizers during *perestroika*, *glasnost* was ultimately conducive to the development of right-wing groups in much the same way as for the democratic movement. The limited freedoms of this period facilitated a process of ripening and differentiation of the Right and laid the germ for the post-Soviet right-wing extremist parties.

First and foremost, the main right-wing literary journals *Nash sovremennik* and *Molodaia gvardia* acquired distinguishable profiles already in the early years of *perestroika*. The framework

for such an evolution was the debate about Stalinism. On the one side, the contributors of *Molodaia gvardia* glorified Stalin's law and order, and rallied to defend his measures by referring to the predominant need of a quick industrialization in view of the coming war. The harms of the harsh measures were seen as a necessary price the Soviet Union had to pay to become a superpower. On the other side, *Nash sovremennik* admitted that Stalinism had caused enormous losses for Russia. The journal's - in some respect plausible - conclusion that Stalinism was a result of the revolution and an outgrowth of Lenin's and Bukharin's New Economic Policy period emerged, however, not from a desire to re-interpret Russian history. It was primarily directed against the reformist communists around Gorbachëv as well as against the democratic, non-dissident intelligentsia both of whom saw themselves then as ascendants of the moderate, Bukharinist Bolsheviks of the 1920s. In spite of these considerable ideological differences, *Molodaia gvardia* and *Nash sovremennik* were careful to avoid a split and sought actively for alliances with like-minded figures in the higher echelons of the party and state apparatus (Brudny 1991, 159-177). The main glue between the neo-Stalinists and neo-Slavophiles proved to be anti-Semitism. While *Molodaia gvardia* tended to blame Jewish subordinates of Stalin such as Lazar Kaganovich for the excesses, the new editor of *Nash Sovremennik*, Stanislav Kuniaev, put forth the idea that the terror was actually a fair retribution for the crimes against Russia which had been committed by communist intellectuals of predominantly Jewish origin since the time of the revolution (Brudny 1991, 173).

A further development with considerable consequences was the rise of the notorious *Pamiat'* (Memory) group which became the first right-wing extremist proto-party during the *glasnost'* years. When *Pamiat'* was founded in 1980 as cultural organization of the USSR Ministry of Aviation, its manifest goal was similar to that of the before mentioned cultural societies - preservation of Russian historical monuments. Yet, by 1985 it was overtaken by a new leadership, left the Aviation ministry and presented a different programme. Although *Pamiat'* itself never gained any political significance, it became a main symbol for fierce anti-Semitism. Therefore, the relationship of leading right-wing ideologists to the notorious group served as a touchstone for the sincerity of their allegedly moderate, principled anti-Soviet patriotism. Thus for instance the popular village prose writer Valentin Rasputin decided to defend *Pamiat'* in *Nash Sovremennik* (no.

1, 1988, 169-176). In the aftermath, this appeared as mere pretext for Rasputin's later U-turn from anti-Soviet village prose writing to manifest cooperation with the retired *KGB*-General Alexander Sterligov who will be dealt with later.

The original *Pamiat'* group was also in so far important as it split into several other monarchist, pagan, National Bolshevik, and racist organizations, some of which called themselves *Pamiat'* as well. These offsprings, in turn, became the basis of several more serious, albeit less famous, post-Soviet right-wing parties some of which will be mentioned later.

A further worth-mentioning pre-stage of the emergence of a right-wing party spectrum was the spread of a number of nationalist cultural-political organizations. They included, first, the Association of Russian Artists uniting prominent village writers, literary critics as Mikhail Lobanov and Vadim Kozhinov, and the editors-in-chief of *Molodaia gvardia* and *Nash sovremennik*; second, the Moscow Russian Patriotic Society 'Fatherland' then headed by the historian and prominent *Molodaia gvardiia* publicist Apollon Kuzmin and the later vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoii; third, the Foundation for Slavic Writing and Slavic Culture, lead by, among others, Valentin Rasputin and the National Bolshevik writer Iurii Bondarev; or, fourth, the the Union for the Spiritual Revival of the Fatherland, chaired by the already mentioned Mikhail Antonov. Soon afterwards, some of these cultural organizations joined several other so called 'patriotic' organizations and created in 1989 the Association 'United Council of Russia - People's Accord' co-chaired by, among others, Alexander Prokhanov of *Den'* (today *Zavtra*), Stanislav Kuniaev of *Nash sovremennik*, and Mikhail Antonov (Pribylovskii 1991b, 3, 1993, 106-107). This organization could be already seen as a new stage in the development of the mainstream Right, since it formulated as one of its main tasks the preparation and carrying out of election campaigns (Berezovskii *et al.* 1991, 97-98).

Regarding explicitly politically oriented groupings, this period which lasted until early 1990, was marked by the formation and disintegration of a number of short-lived proto-parties. Among them were also some semi-official hard-line groups, which were either openly reactionary, like the neo-Stalinist United Workers' Front, and Nina Andreeva's organization 'Unity' - For Leninism and Communist Ideals, or, on the other hand, apparently democratic groups which, however, were led by people with known extremist inclinations as for instances the so called

Russian Popular Front, chaired by a certain Valerii Skurlatov (see sec. 1.3.), a former Soviet anti-Zionist writer and author of a notorious chauvinistic manifesto called 'Code of morals' which demanded among other things the sterilization of Russian women who had sexual contacts with foreigners (Duncan 1992, 69). Anyway, in contrast to the mentioned nationalist cultural associations, the latter groupings and leaders disappeared in the course of democratization and remained without direct successor-organizations. One reason might be that they were brainchilds of the *ancien regime* and without a footing among the people. Some of these grouplets will, nevertheless, be dealt with in that they played a certain role in Zhirinovskii's rise (ch. 1).

Apart from the establishment institutions like the CPSU or the KGB, and beside the ultra-nationalist 'thick journals', the *Pamiat'*-groups and the cultural organizations, it was the authentic democratic movement - partly with a dissident history - which became a further main wellspring for the post-Soviet Right. The development of this section of the New Russian Right constituted a novel phenomenon. All of the so far mentioned currents were characterized not only by anti-Westernism but also - somewhat consistently - by a reluctance to participate in the democratic contest. This peculiar feature rather than their alleged unpopularity seems to have been the main reason for the bad standing of the explicitly 'patriotic' groupings in the USSR elections of People's Deputies in 1989 and RSFSR elections of People's Deputies in 1990. The right-wing groups which emerged later in 1990, in contrast, were willing and increasingly able to take part in elections as they transformed themselves gradually into more or less functioning parties.

However, to form a party - representing only a *part* of society - was by itself an anathema to classic Russian conservative thought. As will be recalled, the Slavophiles called for an unanimous society in which politics would be the sole domain of the absolute monarch. As far as these parties have thus broken with one of the basic ideas of Russian conservatism, one would have to distinguish them from the currents mentioned so far and may perhaps call them the *New New Russian Right*.

The Emergence of a New New Russian Right

This *New New Russian Right* can be divided into two large camps: nation-builders and empire-savers. The term 'nation-builders' is here used to describe the mostly liberal wing of Russian nationalism which sees the Russian nation as having existed independently from the Soviet state (Szporluk 1989). This type of nation-builders place the needs of the new Russian Federation first, favour inclusive citizenship-regulations, and accept the current borders among the former Union-republics. Though they do not deny a certain responsibility of the Russian state for the fate of the Russians in the so called 'near abroad' - that means in the post-Soviet independent states -, they nevertheless tend to see these people as citizens of foreign countries. As far as there have for a long time been no democratic parties which are explicitly perceived in the public as being liberal-nationalist, one could mention the publicists Sergei Averintsev and Alla Latynina as having formulated the nation-building agenda in different ways.

It would have been the most obvious choice to label the latter current 'patriots'. Yet this term was already occupied through self-definition by those trends in Russian nationalism which can be summarized by the label 'empire-savers'. This current comprises, firstly, groups who place the need to preserve the integrity of the territory of the former Soviet Union (excluding partly the Baltic states and Moldova) above all other regards, and, secondly, some groupings who propose the creation of an ethnically based Great Russian or Eastern Slavonic unitary state which would include all territories of the former USSR with a predominantly Russian or Slavic population. They can be furtheron divided into those who provide sophisticated ideological explanations for the necessity of a restoration of an empire; and those who ground their demands rather on some kind of pragmatic and above all economic arguments.

The respective parties of both of these sub-currents combine their empire-saving ambitions with the peculiarly Russian ideology of 'statism', a phenomenon which has been described in the following way in the leading right-wing monthly *Nash Sovremennik*:

The basic principle that links these [nationalist] organizations is statism - a desire to preserve and develop the millennium old traditions of [Russia as a] great power.

(Andreev 1992, 111).

Accordingly statism implies the establishment of an internally strong state, which would be able to supply the necessary resources for the pursuit of more or less far-reaching external goals.

As mentioned, among these statistes one can distinguish between those who base their empire-saving statism on refined doctrines and who do not so. The former include, firstly, the neo-communists - that means those who refer primarily to the supposed achievements of the Soviet period. It might at a first glance seem strange to include apparently 'left-wing' parties into this typology of the New Russian Right. However, as Zhirinovskii and his 'Liberal-Democratic' Party have made clear and as I will argue below in more detail, in Russian politics, distinctions have to be made between the outward appearance or self-definition, and the origins or essence of the agendas of some crucial political actors. It is true that, when the communist party of the Russian Federation approved its new programme in February 1993, slogans like 'ideals of socialism and communism', 'the Leninist idea', 'internationalism' or 'materialist dialectics' were still included. However, the election of Gennadii Ziuganov as chairman of the party at this congress marked a turning point. That is because Ziuganov, though being a founding member of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party, had by then acquired a distinguished profile of not only a representative but leader and founding father of the New Russian Right. For instance, he had become the second chairman the first 1989 large umbrella-organization of Russian ultra-nationalists, the Council of National-Patriotic Forces, a Deputy Chairman of Sterligov's Russian National Assembly, and a co-founder of the National Salvation Front. Notably, the summary of his doctoral dissertation was published not in the National Bolshek and neo-Stalinist *Molodaia gvardiia* or in *Pravda* or *Glasnost* (contrary to its name, a major neo-communist weekly), but in the aggressively ultra-nationalist, neo-Slavophile monthly 'thick journal' *Nash sovremmenik*. His statements respectively often contained labels like *narodnost* (nationality) or *otchizna* and *otechestvo* (fatherland) rather than an emphasis on internationalism or class-consciousness. On the eve of the

1993 parliamentary elections Ziuganov, temporarily flirted with social-democratism. Since then, however, his rhetoric has again become more nationalist and, reminding Stalin's U-turn in the 1930s, he is now praising Ivan the Terrible and Peter I., along with Lenin and Stalin, as great leaders of Russia.

The problem of a classification of the *KPRF* could be also approached from a theoretical-ideological viewpoint. Its socio-economic programme appears as being, in the peculiar Russian circumstances, preservative or even reactionary and not in favour of progressive change, structural modernization or revolution which are often seen as characteristics of the so called 'Left'. Also one could argue that the political and economic system of the Soviet Union was only in some respect modern and rational but in other regards pre-modern, irrational and even traditional. Some Marxist theorists in the Eastern bloc went so far to call the Soviet system a prolongation of feudalism. As far as the communists explicitly advocate an, at least partly, return to this type of society, they have been here classified as a part of the right wing and as representatives of a peculiar kind of conservatism. This issue will be again dealt with in this Introduction.

The next constituent part of the right wing are those groupings who base their statist ideology on traditional, mainly pre-revolutionary, Russian conservative thought, like Slavophilism, pan-Slavism, Russian religious philosophy, or Eurasianism. The latter groups, in turn, can be divided into ethno-centrist, conservative-nationalist and christian-democratic parties. Some major representatives of these three streams in Russian nationalist politics should be introduced now.

Although Russia's ethno-centrist parties were hardly worth-mentioning until 1993, they have since become more important. Notably, opinion polls show an apparent growth of xenophobic sentiment among the Russian population (MN, no. 42, 1993; RV, 13 January 1994). The two groups to be mentioned here are the National-Republican Party, *NRPR*; and the Russian National Assembly, *RNS*. Both organizations were represented, in each case, by one deputy in the 1993-95 State Duma: Nikolai Lysenko (33), the chairman of the *NRPR*, and Aleksandr Nevzorov, a notorious right-wing TV-journalist and leading member of *RNS* who will be dealt with in more detail Chapter 3 of this dissertation. These politicians got into parliament as representatives of one-mandate electoral districts, although they were originally also included on party lists. Whereas

Lysenko tried to involve his own party in the electoral contest but failed to collect the necessary 100,000 signatures, Nevzorov was put forward as a candidate of the equally unfortunate so called Constitutional-Democratic or 'Astaf'ev-Party' (after its chairman Mikhail Astaf'ev) because, in 1993, the Russian National Assembly itself did not venture not try to take part in the elections itself.

The National-Republican Party is an outgrow of the *Pamiat'* movement, and has, as Sterligov's organization, in spite of its sophisticated programme and charismatic leaders, turned out to be a relatively unsuccessful grouping. It was also in disagreement with the fact that, in distinction from many other right-wing politicians, the *NRPR* leader of the early 1990s, Nikolai Lysenko, has distinguished himself by trying to build up a strict organizational structure, and was never hesitant to call his group a 'party' instead of 'Assembly', 'Front' or 'Union' - terms which reflect the Russian Right's distaste for the concept of multipartyism. As far as Lysenko had until 1993 not been a member of the Russian parliament (the Russian Congress of People's Deputies) he tried to make up for this deficit by actively propagating his remarkably coherent agenda of national revival in ultra-nationalist press organs. Whereas in 1990, the *NRPR*'s predecessor organization's programme still referred to perils of a world-wide Zionist plot, the National Republicans of 1991 had moderated their stance, and proclaimed themselves as the party of the 'ideas of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn'. Thus the group was able attract some prominent non-*Pamiat'* nationalist activists as, for instance, the former political prisoner Vladimir Sadovnikov who, however, soon left the party when Lysenko declared his readiness to cooperate with the *KGB*.

The today *NRPR* agenda is strongly anti-communist, proposes to rename Russia back into *Rossiiskaia imperiia* (Russian Empire) and represents a mixture of extremist nation-building and empire-saving tenets. On the one side, the *NRPR* accepts the break up of the Soviet Union and calls for a purposeful organization of the immigration of Russians into the Russian Federation. On the other hand, it also wants to solve this problem by revising the Soviet-made borders in order to bring back those territories of other CIS member-states which it regards as Russian. Occasionally, Lysenko still speaks about an international anti-Russian plot, albeit not any longer a Judeo-Masonic one. Concerning domestic politics he proposes a 'third way' which would be neither communist

nor Christian Orthodox, but nationalist. He calls his programme 'national reformism', delimitates this concept from conservative revolutionarism or fascism, and mentions General Franco's regime in Spain as an example. In one of his most remarkable programmatic articles in *Molodaia gvardia* called 'Strategy of Our Fight' (1993a), Lysenko has fiercely attacked the pro-Islamic Eurasian trend in Russian nationalism. As will become clear below, he resembles in his obsessive calling for a military campaign against Turkey and Pakistan in many ways Zhirinovskii's principal writing *The Last Dash to the South* (1993a).

The second ethno-centrist organization to be mentioned here is Aleksandr Sterligov's *Russkii natsional'nyi sobor RNS* (Russian National Assembly) the main aims of which are the preservation of Russia's superpower status and the re-introduction of the *sobornost'* (catholicity) principle in Russian political life. Its leading body once included the already mentioned popular TV journalist Aleksandr Nevzorov, the village prose writers Valentin Rasputin and Vasilii Belov who is today tied to another nationalist organization (the Russian All-Peoples Union *ROS*, see below), Aleksandr Barkashov who is, like Lysenko, an ex-*Pamiat'* and leader of an important neo-Nazi grouping called Russian National Unity, the already mentioned later *KPRF* Chairman Gennadii Ziuganov, Gen.(ret.) Al'bert Makashov who is a former presidential candidate and leader of the October 1993 insurrection, and Valentin Fëdorov who is a former governor of Sakhalin and Deputy Minister of Economics. However, most of these people have by now left the organization. Nevzorov seems to have remained the only prominent figure beside *RNS*-chairman Aleksandr Sterligov, the - in his own words - 'disgraced general'.

When *RNS* was founded in 1991, it appeared as one of the most promising right-wing inventions as it was conceived as an umbrella organization which would unite prominent nationalist intellectuals and patriotic grass-roots organizations. Yet, first of all it proved to be impossible to include in such a seriously designed, broad organization people like the so called *barkashovtsy* - i.e. the members of Barkashov's neo-Nazi Russian National Unity - who openly use the Hitler salute as their form of greeting and a slightly disguised form of the swastika as their party symbol. Secondly, although he has an impressive professional record, Aleksandr Sterligov turned out to be a bad choice as a chairman of *RNS*. The retired counterintelligence specialist who had previously been a

close aide to USSR Prime-Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi (both today leaders of ultra-nationalist organizations), seemed at a first glance to be the ideal cast to provide not only judiciousness and authority which the extremist right-wingers badly needed. He was also able to attract considerable financial support of, for instance, the chairman of the Nizhnii Novgorod stock-exchange. However, since then he has become more and more an embarrassment for the Russian Right as he was accused of corruption and started openly to propagate the use of force as a mean of political struggle. Later on, moreover, he began to distinguish himself by an even in Russian ultra-nationalist terms bizarre anti-Semitism. So, for instance, a brochure called *Enemies* and published in the series *Biblioteka Generala Sterligova* in 1993 defines not only Gorbachëv, El'tsin, and ultra-nationalist editor Aleksandr Prokhanov as 'Jews', or Georgii Arbatov, head of the USA/Kanada Institute, as the leader of the Russian Masonic lodge. The list even mentions as a Jew and thus 'enemy of Russia' Dmitrii Vasiliev, head of the original *Pamiat'* group who had been until then known as Russia's leading anti-Semite. Thus it was no wonder that most right-wingers distanced themselves from the 'disgraced general' and that the *RNS* became an isolated fringe-group. Nevertheless, both, the *NRPR* and *RNS*, had to be mentioned here in that they represented two of the first ethno-centrist Russian ultra-nationalist groups which actively engaged in Russian politics between 1991 and 1993.

The most eminent representative of the second, conservative-nationalist stream in the *New Russian Right* of the early 1990s was *ROS* - *Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soiuz* (Russian All-People's Union). The name of this party - *rossiiskii* (all-Russian) and not *russkii* (ethnic Russian), *obshchenarodnyi* (all-people) and not *natsional'nyi* (national) - indicates already the difference to the former organizations. Whereas the explicitly nationalist *NRPR* has designated as its basic principles 'Nation, Justice, [and] Order' (*Natsional'no-respublikanskaia...* 1993; Lysenko 1993b), *ROS*' main slogans are 'People's Power, Patriotism, [and] Justice' (*Programma i ustav...* 1995). Thus *ROS*' patriotism is more inclusive and Eurasian, and tends to emphasise the supra-national character of Russia's *derzhavnost'* or great-powerness (S, 2 March 1994). In contrast to the *NRPR*, which demands Russia's 'final delimitation from the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia' (*Natsional'no-respublikanskaia Partiiia Rossii: Programma*, 1993, 8), *ROS* wants to recreate a

federal state on the basis of the C.I.S. (Baburin 1995). Concerning its history, *ROS* is an outgrowth of the *Soiuz* (Union) movement which was the leading coalition of anti-reformist and imperialist MPs on all levels until the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991; *Soiuz* will be dealt with in this study extensively. Similarly to Sterligov's *RNS*, *ROS* was originally conceived as an umbrella organization. However, *ROS* has by now metamorphosed into a proper party which is led by one of the perhaps most promising Russian right-wing politicians - the leader of the ultra-conservative 1993-95 State Duma group 'Russian Path' and one of the new Deputy Speakers of the Sixth State Duma since 1995 - Sergei Nikolaevich Baburin (b. 1958). Before entering politics, Baburin studied law, spent a part of his military service in Afghanistan, and was later on for some time the Head of Omsk State University's Law School. There he met the famous lawyer Aleksei Kazannik who was then also professor at this law faculty. Kazannik was elected to the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies in 1989 as a democratic candidate and became well-known when he relinquished his seat in the smaller working parliament, the USSR Supreme Soviet, in favour of Yeltsin in 1989. Later on he became one of Yeltsin's advisors and the Russian Federation's first Chief State Prosecutor. It is said that Kazannik played in those days a crucial role in Baburin's nomination as a candidate for the Russian parliamentary elections in 1990.

The reason for the liaison of the democrat Kazannik with an ultra-nationalist in 1990 was that Baburin's political profile was at this time different from his today image. He had been a member of the anti-Stalinist 'Memorial' society and his election campaign was supported by *DemRossiia* (Democratic Russia), then the main umbrella movement of the democratic camp. However, once elected Baburin changed his mind and became a leading spokesman of the so called 'irreconcilable opposition' in the Russian Supreme Soviet. Although *ROS* had run into difficulties in providing the necessary 100,000 signatures for its inclusion on the ballots of the State Duma elections in 1993 and thus did not pass the 5%-barrier in 1995, it seems probable that this party will continue to exist, grow and participate in forming factions or groups in future Russian parliaments.

Although all in all four christian-democratic parties announced their existence on the eve of the last elections, only one of them seems to be in the running for a survival as a relevant political group - the so called Christian-Democratic Movement *RKhDD*, led by Viktor Aksiuchits. The

RKhDD is also the most explicitly nationalist among these groupings, and its programmatic statements are close to *ROS*. Nevertheless it remains an open question whether it would be justified to include the *RKhDD* in the category of the extreme Right (which will be more clearly defined below). First of all, Aksiuchits has, as distinct from the other so far mentioned leaders, a distinguished past as a dissident and self-made religious philosopher. Secondly, the *RKhDD*'s programme contains beside Christian Orthodox ideas notably also some liberal-democratic points such as the necessity of a conformity of Russian and international law, division of power as well as of the Church and the state, and economic decentralization. It is noteworthy that the programme explicitly acknowledges the importance of liberal-democratic ideas for a rebirth of Russia. Recently, Aksiuchits has become an advisor to the Russia's new reformist First Deputy Prime Minister and former Governor of Nizhnii Novgorod Boris Nemtsov. Last but not least, it should be mentioned that the *RKhDD* refrained not only from allying itself with Sterligov's Assembly, but was virtually the only relevant properly right-wing party which was never associated with the subsequent major ultra-nationalist umbrella organization, the notorious National Salvation Front created in 1992.

A further explicitly nationalist organization which had some relevance between 1990 and 1993 was the *Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskaia partiia - Partiia narodnoi svobody KDP-PNS* (Constitutional-Democratic Party - Party of People's Freedom), of the former Supreme-Soviet-deputy Mikhail Astaf'ev. The party is, as will become clear below, with regard to its misuse of liberal slogans somewhat similar to Zhirinovskii's party. It claims to be the successor-organizations of the influential pre-revolutionary *kadety* - meaning constitutional-democratic - party, and its party-documents contain respectively a lot of slogans taken over from the genuinely liberal-democratic *kadety* of Tsarist Russia. Yet, many of the *KDP*'s political activities were in sharp contradiction to the ideas of their alleged precursors, and, indeed, to the *KDP*'s own apparently pro-Western programmes. This went so far that the all-federal party list of the *KDP* for the State Duma elections included, for instance, Igor Shafarevich, once a leading Soviet mathematician who became an associate of Solzhenitsyn, but later also known as the author of one of the principal, paranoid manifestos of the New Russian Right called 'Russophobia'. Shafarevich explained the Russian

crisis by the existence of a 'small people' inside the great people meaning the Great Russians. This 'small people' undermines purposefully Russian society. Another notorious figure included in the *KDP*'s election list was the already mentioned Iurii Bondarev, a National Bolshevik writer who once proposed to re-name Volgograd back into Stalingrad (I, 28 October 1993).

This short overview should suffice as a general introduction to the rise and transformation of the New Russian Right in the Soviet system, and the emergence of a spectrum of right-wing parties during the systems gradual erosion since approximately 1987. I shall now turn to the literature on the post-Soviet Russian extreme Right, list shortly the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to it, and outline what conclusions this review suggests concerning the scope of this dissertation and the future development of Russian right-wing extremism studies in general. Following these conclusions, I shall then outline the assumptions; purpose, omissions and theoretical approaches upon which this study is based.

0.3. The Current State of Post-Soviet Russian Right-Wing Extremism Studies

Until recently, 20th-century Russian right-wing extremism has been an unduly neglected subject in Western historical writing and social sciences. Instead, most observers focused on what they regarded as specifically Russian permutations of generic left-wing extremism. Yet, there always remained a fundamental conundrum. Many Soviet policies and institutions were perceived as being clearly expression of 'political extremism'. But radical egalitarianism, maximalist universalism, or nihilistic cosmopolitanism could not fully account for a number of central traits of Soviet domestic and foreign behaviour. Considerations such as these may have led Robert Tucker to classify Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) - in many respect the actual founding-father of what we have come to associate with the term 'Soviet system' - a 'Bolshevik of the radical right' (1990, XV).

Introductory Overviews

In view of this, Thomas Parland's 1993 *Study of the Russian New Right* with its focus on the Right's intellectual formation during the Soviet post-World-War-II period constituted a welcome

supplement to the few already published monographs in the field. Besides outlining an original explanation of the rise of Russian nationalism in the light of classical macrosociological theory, the book is also valuable in filling some gaps in previous descriptions of Soviet-Russian nationalism. The author uses not only literary works of such famous russophile writers as the moderate nationalist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and the more extreme Valentin Rasputin; he, in addition, for the first time, extensively introduces belletristic writings by several lesser-known, yet in political terms relevant nationalist authors, such as the liberal patriot Anatolii Anane'v, or the ultra-nationalists Vasilii Belov and Viktor Ivanov. (The tremendous differences between the political outlooks of these writers could, by the way, have been made more explicit.) Furthermore, Parland provides useful summaries and interpretations of some relevant articles of the 1986-1992 issues of the major Muscovite right-radical 'thick journals' *Nash sovremennik* (Our Contemporary) and *Molodaia gvardiia* (Young Guard). In representing a good continuation of earlier studies of the varieties of contemporary Russian nationalism (cf. footnote 2), Parland's analysis, however, also contains some of their flaws. This concerns above all an adequate taxonomy, i.e. an unequivocal typologization of the political spectrum according to generic labels - an issue which will be the major concern in Part III of this study. In Russian conditions, the formulation of internally consistent and informative taxonomic schemes seems to be an especially relevant issue because the Western political vocabulary often gains a different meaning there. By not clearly defining his criteria for distinguishing, for instance, 'fascism' from 'semi-fascism', and these phenomena on their part from 'reaction' or 'conservatism', Parland's - and many other analysts' - conclusions remain sometimes vague, and occasionally even cryptic. A mere location of the different groupings on a moderate-radical scale is, as Parland's considerations illustrate, in turn, a difficult endeavor, and, even if undertaken more or less satisfactorily, insufficiently informative (1993, 231). A sole operation with such a broad and Russia-specific concept as 'national patriotism' (Parland's preferred term), in turn, does not tell much to the political comparativist.

The empirical part of Parland's study may have gained from taking - in addition to the standard texts by Dunlop (1983, 1985) and Yanov (1978, 1987) - into consideration some further relevant secondary sources on the development of Russian nationalism during the period he is

mostly concerned with (e.g. Spechler 1983, Brudny 1991). Finally, one should mention that Parland's 1993 published study had apparently been completed already in 1991. This was, probably, the reason why he did not include in his analysis Ivan Il'in (1883-1954) and Lev Gumil'ev (1912-1992) - two twentieth century Russian rightist theoreticians the writings of whom have, since the early 1990s, in one way or another, become significant points of reference for many Russian ultra-nationalist ideologists and leaders, among them Vladimir Zhirinovskii - see Part II, sec. 4.1. - and Gennadii Ziuganov.

Walter Laqueur's seminal study *Black Hundred* (1993) has already been widely reviewed, discussed and quoted (e.g. Rowley 1994). Notably, it has been translated into, among others, Russian language (Lakër 1994). The book is profoundly important for Russian right-wing extremism studies in that it, for the first time, combines a sharp focus on the subject with a firm historical grounding and consideration of an admirably wide range of disparate ideological phenomena ranging from mainstream Soviet patriotism to some of the most obscure post-Soviet fringe-groups. Laqueur's treatment of ultra-nationalist tendencies in Russian emigre circles, the Orthodox Church and the Cossack movement are especially valuable. In addition, the author who is also a leading authority on generic fascism introduces some pertinent comparative observations on the Russian Right; he contrasts it to, among others, the *Action Française* and the early Nazis. In addition, the book is innovative in setting the rise of the Russian extreme Right from the late 19th century until today in the context of an increasing - if somewhat paradox - international diffusion of ultra-nationalist, vitalistic and elitist theories. Actually, an even more extensive treatment of the comparative and international aspects would have been very welcome.

As others have noted before, Laqueur's account of the late and post-Soviet groupings and personalities contains a number of wrong labels, names and dates. The section on Zhirinovskii confuses some of the personage around him (1993, 255). In view of the freshness of the information at the time of the book's publishing, mistakes such as these are understandable. A serious imbalance, however, is that the author touches only upon in passing the rapidly growing ultra-nationalist tendencies in the Communist Party as exemplified by the rise of Gennadii Ziuganov (Vujacic 1996). He also only insufficiently deals with the *ancien regime's* often, as will be shown,

crucial (if sometimes disguised) role in the appearance, promotion and protection of the explicitly ultra-nationalist politicians such as Zhirinovskii - an issue I will extensively deal with in Part I, sec. 1.3. Notwithstanding, what Laqueur has done with this book is to synthesize finally the broad variety of aspects and subtopics of, and thus to conceptualize, Russian right-wing extremism studies. His conclusion 'Russian Nationalism Today and Tomorrow' (1993, 272-296) is one of the most thoughtful essays on post-Soviet Russian politics I have read so far.

The Ukrainian-Russian author Leonid Ivanov provides in his German book *Russia After Gorbachëv* (1996) a useful continuation for, and complementation to, the studies of Parland and Laqueur. The title of his extensive study does not reveal its actual content which not only includes another comprehensive historical overview of Russian right-wing thought. His book is exceptional in that it, for the first time in a Western language, sketches out the whole spectrum of post-Soviet nationalist and ultranationalist groupings, organizations, parties, theoreticians and politicians with only very few significant omissions.⁸ Whereas the descriptive parts of his study are adequately researched and well-structured, Ivanov's conceptualization of the nationalist spectrum is confusing. He uses colours - red, yellow, black, white and brown - to typologize the groupings; and it is not entirely clear why he did not use the generic categories which he introduces and employs in defining what the colours mean - national communism, statism, conservatism, fascism - themselves. Also some of his explanatory arguments, as, for instance, on the rise of Russian fascism are debatable. Although Ivanov is well aware of the secondary literature on the rise of proto-fascism under the Soviet regime and among Russian emigrees, he, paradoxically, sees the emergence of mimetic fascist parties as well as of Zhirinovskii as a result primarily of the activities of 'hysteric' journalists and democratic activists. Yet, if that were the case, it would seem to be inconceivable how, for instance, Vojislav Seselj's clearly fascist Serbian Radical Party (which has a partnership agreement with Zhirinovskii) could manage to gain considerable support in Milosevic's

⁸ For instance, the Leonid Ivanov's section on right-wing think-tanks (1996) does not mention Aleksei Podberëzkin's Spiritual Heritage Foundation, the major academic-style institutions behind Ziuganov, and Evgenii Troitskii's Association for the Complex Study of the Russian Nation which has produced numerous pseudo-academic books during the last years.

Serbia where 'hysteric' journalists and radical democrats have been effectively suppressed over the last years. Also, Ivanov most probably knows that, as I will outline in detail in Part I, in 1990-91, Zhirinovskii's party was actively promoted not by radical democrats, but by the ultra-conservative part of the Soviet *ancien regime* - and then indeed unduly ignored as a serious threat by democratic forces. In fact, one could make an argument that it was insufficient vigilance - or, in Ivanov's terms, inadequate 'hysteria' - by the democratic media and politicians which allowed the especially extreme ultra-nationalists, such as the neo-Nazis led by Aleksandr Barkashov, to establish themselves lastingly in Russian politics.

In spite of the above criticisms, all three books by Parland (1993), Laquer (1993) and Ivanov (1996) constitute both, useful introductions to the subject for students, and wellcome points of reference for the specialist. Although they do not yet provide adequate classification schemes for the post-Soviet Right and suffer from incomplete documentation, they nevertheless are useful in sketching comprehensively out of what it is that has to be researched in more depth, categorized with generic terms and compared with similar phenomena in other countries.

Documentation and Data Collection

Russia's rapid transformation and beginning democratization during the last decade meant, unfortunately, not only her opening up, but also chaos and anarchy in many respects - including the documentation of activities of political opposition groupings. Among the few initiatives to help Russian and Western students in that regard have been the setting up of the Russian-language anti-fascist journal *Barrier-Challenge* by a group of St. Petersburg human-rights activists in autumn 1992; the production by the Moscow commercial Agency 'What the Papers Say' of the English-language fortnightly compilations *Radical Opposition Leaders* in 1994-96, and Russian-language *Fascism and Fascist Organizations in the Countries of the Former USSR* since June 1996⁹; and the

⁹ Other relevant publication series by the Moscow Agency 'What the Papers Say' neither reviewed here nor used in this study included the Russian-language monthly *Natsional'naiia politika i politicheskii ekstremizm* (Nationalities Policy and Political Extremism) and the English-language weeklies *Jews in Russia and the CIS*, and *Human Rights*.

publication of the irregular Russian-language bulletin *Political Extremism in Russia* by Moscow's Civil Society Foundation since spring 1995.

Barrier, of which four issues were published until 1994, documents right-wing extremist activities, especially those in St. Petersburg and the provinces, and provides concise analyses by Russian and international legal and political experts. *Radical Opposition Leaders* contained shortened or full reprints of English translations of major statements by right-wing politicians and publicists in nationalist publication organs, and also of articles on right-wing activities in non-extremist newspapers and journals. It is noteworthy that the pieces are selected from more than one hundred Russian dailies and periodicals as well as from some TV and radio programs. *Fascism and Fascist Organizations in the Countries of the Former USSR* compiles copies of Russian articles on generic and post-Soviet Russian and non-Russian fascism - subjects which have become of wider interest in connection with numerous legal actions by rightist politicians regarding fascist labelling during the last years, the State Duma's hearings on 'Symptoms of a Fascist Threat in the Russian Federation' in February 1995, President El'tsin's anti-fascist decree of March 1995, etc.

The bulletin *Political Extremism in Russia* (abbreviated as PER in this study), of which fourteen issues appeared until spring 1996, goes further than the above publications, and prints not only useful abstracts of crucial right-wing texts. It also provides a documented chronology of extremist party activities, mass actions, organizational and political innovations, as well as reports on election campaigns, survey data, dossiers on organizations and periodicals, bibliographies, and even an index. In addition, special sections summarize moves by governmental organs and NGOs against anti-democratic activities (including their legal aspects), and outline the positions of moderate political forces regarding their radical counterparts.¹⁰

¹⁰ Periodicals which provided frequent reports on Russian nationalism before the breakup of the USSR included the *Radio Liberty Research* bulletin, and later the Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe Research Institute weekly *Report on the USSR* which, in turn, has been succeeded by the Prague Open Media Research Institute biweekly *Transition*. In view of the high correlation of Russian right-wing extremist with antisemitic tendencies, those journals which focused or still focus on Russian Jewry provide many especially well-informed analyses of contemporary Russian ultra-nationalism. See, for instance, *Jews in the U.S.S.R., Soviet Jewish Affairs* (now: *East European Jewish Affairs*), *Jews and Jewish Topics in Soviet and East European Publications*, *Insight: Soviet Jews*, as well as the *Research Reports* of the London Institute of

An equally useful and, in this study, even more extensively used publication is the 1995 'Panorama' Experts Group manuscript by Aleksandr Verkhovskii, Anatolii Papp and Vladimir Pribylovskii called *Political Extremism in Russia* too.¹¹ The first part of the collection contains analytical sections on the preconditions, emergence and development of anti-democratic organizations in Russia, juridical aspects, a comparison of the different right- and left-wing extremist groupings, a proposal how to fight, and some prognoses on the likely future of, Russian 'political extremism'. The massive Supplement to the analytical part represents the authors' major contribution. In a first section, it gives short introductions to the so called 'New Opposition' wing of the extreme Right represented by such prolific (below more closely scrutinized) neo-fascist publicists as Aleksandr Dugin or Eduard Limonov (Gebhard 1994), and to leftist (*levatskii*) - i.e. above all anarchist - extremism in post-Soviet Russia. The second section, which makes up most of the reader, provides concise, highly informative and, as far as I gathered, very accurate descriptions of 47 organizations and their publications, eight independent publication organs, and 65 political leaders and publicists.

Apart from providing an enormous amount of data, the volume is especially valuable in that the authors meticulously show how, on the one side, the more moderate and, on the other side, the clearly extremist nationalist and neo-communist organizations have over the years interpenetrated each other through personnel fluctuation and complicated organizational interlocking (1995, 47). Thus the dozens of anti-democratic groupings, parties, and editorial boards constitute, in spite of their ideological differences, a relatively uniform milieu which has often reached out into mainstream Russian politics (an issue which will be of special concern in sec. 3.3.). Besides presenting a

Jewish Affairs, and the Research Papers of the Soviet and East European Research Center at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

¹¹ Over the last years, the 'Panorama' group has in general done a great job in providing some very well-informed and comprehensive compilations of documents on, and overviews of, right-wing extremist organizations and activists. See, among others, Pribylovskii 1991c, 1994, 1995a and 1995b; Verkhovskii 1994; Khopak 1995; and Verkhovskii and Pribylovskii 1996. Other worth-mentioning research groups with a somewhat similar profile include the Center for Analytical Information about the Political Situation headed by Vladimir Berezovskii and Vladimir Cherviakov (mentioned in the Acknowledgements and below), or the Archive of Non-Traditional Press of Aleksandr Suetnov (1993, 1995), both at Moscow.

multitude of so far unknown details and many pertinent observations on the context, background and motivations of right-wing extremist actions, Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii have made an important point by explicitly locating large parts of the Cossack movement outside the democratic spectrum. This is in so far of special interest as this particular variety of Russian ultra-nationalism has, along with the non-extremist sections of the Cossack movement, been officially tolerated, and even supported and partly integrated into state structures by the Russian government including President El'tsin.¹²

An principal flaw of the study is, on the other hand, that the authors have chosen to largely ignore the, by Western standards, most relevant Russian non-democratic party - Gennadii Ziuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and its influential think-tank, the 'Spiritual Heritage' Foundation headed by Aleksei Podberëzkin. Instead, the 'Panorama' experts have chosen to extensively describe post-Soviet Russian anarchism. I assume that, for good reasons, most Western students of contemporary Russian politics (including myself) would not be in a position to name a single post-Soviet Russian anarchist leader (and may, perhaps, not particularly bother to be able to do so). Right-wing extremism - whether in the pre-revolutionary russo- or Slavophile, or in the Stalinist or National Bolshevik tradition - , in contrast, seems to be much more of concern.

Finally, one has to mention that, in defining political extremism, the authors had apparently difficulties somewhat similar to those which, for instance, German 'extremism studies' had encountered before (Backes 1989).¹³ In distinction to their German colleagues who use a larger set of criteria, the Russian authors selected here only the readiness to use violence as the crucial

¹² On 15 January 1997, Boris Berezovskii, the newly appointed Deputy Security Council Secretary, even proposed to arm (!) those who call themselves 'Cossacks'. This idea appears especially strange in view of some recent information that, for instance, the Terek Cossacks have announced their support for Aleksandr Barkashëv's important extra-parliamentary neo-Nazi party Russian National Unity. Cf. Robert Ortung in *OMRI Russian Regional Report* 2 (6), Part I, 12 February 1997. On this party, see, for instance, Richter 1996.

¹³ See also *Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie* (Yearbook of Extremism and Democracy) 1-7 (1989-95) edited by Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse.

yardstick for an 'extremist' categorization (1995, 48). Yet, if taken by itself, such a conceptualization would seem to exclude many proto-fascist writings from a consideration as phenomena representing threats to democracy. On the other side, this concept could, if interpreted broadly, lead one to group *all* non-pacifist political positions under the heading 'extremist'. The general problem of an *in ideological terms* conceptualized generic political extremism seems to be that it remains unclear what actually the variable is which takes an 'extreme' value, and what this variable would look like, if it took a non-extreme value. In other words, 'extremism' is deficient in so far as it represents a relational concept. It makes sense if associated to an substantive *genus proximum*, such as nationalism. Yet it does not mean much by itself.

It is not improbable that this particularly problematic aspect of an adequate mapping of the Russian political landscape is related to the one serious flaw of both, the 'Civil Society' Foundation's bulletin, and the 'Panorama' Agency's manuscript *Political Extremism in Russia*. Both expert groups have, for some reason, chosen to list and analyze also a number of activities of the famous radical liberal Valeriia Novodvorskaia, leader of the first Soviet anti-communist party, the Democratic Union founded in May 1988, and one of the last political prisoners of the Soviet Union released only in connection with the failed coup of August 1991. They have thus created a distinctly misleading impression about one of the bravest (if often eccentric) veteran Soviet dissidents.

Notwithstanding the latter remarks, the Russian-language bulletin and the manuscript *Political Extremism* have to be both singled out as being two of the most exhaustive, accurate, reliable and user-friendly descriptions of post-Soviet Russian right-wing extremist activities introduced here. They, therefore, constitute principal readings for everybody closely interested in the subject.

'Anti-Zionism'

Though originally written for the Russian public, Evgeniia Al'bats' 1995 Russian-language essay *The Jewish Question* is also recommendable to the Western reader. The short treatise is not only a brilliant polemic against Russian hate-speech. It provides also a sensitive sketch of Russian

xenophobic stereotypes and antisemitic ideas. A Russian Jew who was born and is still living in Russia, Al'bats vividly illustrates the distinctiveness of these phenomena in the USSR as exemplified, for instance, by the Soviet regime's concept of 'anti-Zionism' - a bogus notion which entails not opposition to Jewish emigration to Israel, but 'resistance' against a world-wide anti-Soviet or anti-Russian Judeo-Masonic 'plutocratic' conspiracy. Al'bats especially shows how Soviet-style crypto-anti-Jewishness gradually transformed back into manifest Russian antisemitism after 1985. Besides also providing some new details on right-wing leaders (as, for instance, on Zhirinovskii's family background; sec. 1.2.), this short piece is a good contribution to - what one may call - the 'hermeneutics of Russian nationalism'. That means it can be helpful to - especially non-Russian - students of post-Soviet right-wing extremism to adequately understand the frequent idiosyncrasies and numerous specific codewords of the contemporary Russian political debate. Two such further characteristic cases are, for instance, the usage of the term 'Jew' as a universal invective against everybody perceived as 'alien' and 'russophobic' (even if ethnically Russian), or the demand for 'proportional ethnic representation' as a mean to stop an alleged Jewish domination and manipulation of the government, academia, or media.

An even more useful contribution in this regard is Semyon Reznik's 1996 comprehensive English-language study *The Nazification of Russia*. In combining the virtues of a perceptive participant observer, shrewd investigative journalist and careful archivist, Reznik has produced an original, informative and very readable account of the development of 'anti-Zionism' in the USSR, and the rise of antisemitic organizations since the beginning of perestroika. His research on Soviet 'zionology' of the 1960s-1980s (Vladimir Begun, Aleksandr Romanenko, Valerii Emelianov, and others) is especially valuable. It provides a considerable number of new relevant particulars on the writings of this infamous group of authors, and on the peculiar intrigues and manipulations which were undertaken by the Soviet establishment in order to protect from critique, and further promote 'zionology'. Reznik also adds some revealing observations on late Soviet Russian mainstream ultra-nationalist thought (Igor' Shafarevich, Viktor Astafiev, Stanislav Kuriaev, and others), and on the rise of *Pamiat'*.

In contrast, his accounts of the post-Soviet right-wing scene are somewhat sketchy, and partly inaccurate. For instance, Reznik at one point confuses some right-wing organizations (*Slavianskii sobor* [Slavic Assembly], *Russkii natsional'nyi sobor* [Russian National Assembly], *Front natsional'nogo spaseniia* [National Salvation Front]; 1996, 221-222), or falsely states that, in spring 1995, the Russian Academy of Sciences did not respond to El'tsin's request to formulate a definition of fascism (1996, 247). He also misinterprets Gorbachëv's unfortunate cadre-policy meaning his appointments of such nationalists as Aleksandr Sukharev, Valentine Rasputin, and Anatolii Luk'ianov (sec. 1.3.). Reznik sees these decisions as a sign for the Noble Peace Prize winner's empire-building ambitions, or for his involvement in a conspiracy against himself (1996, 194, 198). Reznik might have instead taken into account that, first, Gorbachëv's actual range of action - including his freedom to nominate and push through candidates of his choice for high positions - was limited by tactical considerations until the very end of his chairmanship. And, second, his selection of staff turned out to be in general rather ill-fated (not to say naive) as exemplified by the treason of one of his closest associates, his long-time aide and chief of staff Valerii Boldin, in August 1991.

On a conceptual level, Reznik's account is partly confusing when he applies the label 'Nazism' indiscriminately to indigenous as well as to mimetic Russian anti-Semitism and fascism. This is in so far misleading as contemporary Russian politicized antisemitism is, of course, not merely an import from Germany. The term 'Nazism' should, as indicated by its capital letter, be reserved for categorizing those ideologies which directly refer to the German fascist regime's political and social program, including its *völkisch*, biologically racist, Nordic Aryan, etc. elements. At least some of the writers which Reznik labels as 'Nazis' should be seen rather as genuinely Russian ultra-nationalists or fascists (in generic terms), than as full-scale followers of Adolf Hitler. In other words, the issue is less about the 'nature' of certain indigenous Russian right-wing extremist ideologies which may indeed be seen as essentially similar to Nazism. Rather, a rigid distinction should be made for pragmatic reasons. If we use 'Nazism' for all sorts of radically rightist ideas: Which term would we then use to identify those Russian fascists which have indeed in one way or another expressed their sympathy for, or debt to, German fascism (e.g.

Aleksandr Barkashov, Valentin Prussakov, and Aleksei Batogov who will be introduced more closely below)?

Finally, Reznik's book may have - even more than Parland's study - benefitted from considering a wider range of already published secondary literature. Although the author quotes the major works on contemporary Russian nationalism by Dunlop (1983, 1985), Yanov (1987), and Laqueur (1993), he, for some reason, does not refer to previous relevant writings on anti-Semitism in Soviet Russia (e.g. Litvinov 1980, Koenen and Hielscher 1991). There is, in addition, already a formidable amount of well-researched studies specifically on *Pamiat'* which has, unfortunately, also not been incorporated by Reznik (e.g. Deich and Zhuravlëv 1991, Pribylovskii 1991c).

The latter is also true with regard to William Korey's important 1995 English-language monograph *Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism*.¹⁴ Although Korey's book is, concerning *Pamiat'* and the post-Soviet right-wing extremist scene, also unsatisfactory, the study represents the so far most comprehensive, detailed and reliable summary of the different expressions of 'anti-Zionism' in, among others, Soviet propaganda, cultural, educational, nationality and foreign policies between 1967 and 1986. In addition, Korey shortly traces back their pre-revolutionary and Stalinist origins. He also persuasively highlights the importance of the years of intensive 'anti-Zionist' campaigning for post-Soviet Russian politics as exemplified by the astonishing naivety of many Russians with regard to, for instance, the Holocaust, the Jewish contribution to the Great Patriotic War, or the possibility of the existence a world-wide 'Zionist' conspiracy (1995, 187-191, 208-209). Korey, moreover, makes an important point in underlining that, in distinction to the spread of antisemitic attitudes in Western countries, such stereotypes seem to be disproportionately held by educated Russians. It seems not unreasonable to assume that this peculiar phenomenon may be related to, among others, the Soviet 'anti-Zionist' agitation and publication efforts (1995, 192).

¹⁴ Although he frequently quotes an article by Reznik, Korey, in turn, seems to have been unaware of the earlier 1991 Russian version of Reznik's book. That is unfortunate because many of Reznik's pertinent participant observations and source research would have neatly fitted into Korey's otherwise well-documented outline (1995).

The Zhirinovskii Phenomenon

Whereas before December 1993, Russian right-wing extremism was a subject largely of concern to a narrow circle of specialists, Zhirinovskii's victory in post-Soviet Russia's first multi-party parliamentary elections has brought the issue to the attention of a wider public. A group of German and Russian researchers managed to produce the first comprehensive assessment called *The Zhirinovskii-Effect: Where is Russia drifting?* as early as in July 1994 (Eichwede 1994). The title of the collection is somewhat misleading in that its essays deal less with possible consequences of Zhirinovskii's rise, than with various aspects and determinants of his ascendance. In that regard, the book represents a good snapshot of the political situation in Russia at this time, and its historical background. The contributions by Wolfgang Eichwede, Dietrich Geyer, Heinrich Vogel and Gerd Koenen on the course of the Russian reforms, the Russian imperialist tradition, its impact on foreign policy, and connections between the German and the Russian Right are erudite summaries. Karla Hielscher develops a typology of the basic ideological features of Russian nationalism; Gassan Gusseinov makes some interesting observations on its language; Anatolii Maksimov, Mikhail Odesskii and Galina Luchterhandt provide introductions to Zhirinovskii's biography and party; and Aleksei Levinson and Vladimir Shokarev sketch out Zhirinovskii's electorate. Although some of the data and interpretations presented are original, all essays suffer from largely ignoring the previous - as mentioned not so numerous - publications in the field (e.g. Dunlop 1983 and 1985, Yanov 1978 and 1987, Laqueur 1993). On the whole, this little book's scope is too broad, and the contributions only rarely relate to each other. The endeavor would have benefitted from a narrower focus.

Viktor Timtschenko's *I'll Awake Russia with Blood* (1994)¹⁵, Graham Frazer's and George Lancelle's *Little Black Book* (1994), Wolf Oschlies' *The Ugly Russian and Eastern Europe* (1995), and Vladimir Kartsev's *!Zhirinovsky!* (1995) are similar in that they were also written within several months after Zhirinovskii's electoral success. The journalist Timtschenko has done far-going on-

¹⁵ The title of Timchenko's book *I'll Awake Russia with Blood* is apparently an inaccurate quotation from one of Zhirinovskii's interviews (Zhirinovskii 1994a).

the-spot investigations in Moscow, and provides some original data on the internal affairs of Zhirinovskii's party (which will be extensively used in this study). Frazer and Lancelle offer a useful and well-commented collection of Zhirinovskii's more memorable statements on various matters. Oschlies' study is exceptional in that the apparently polyglot author provides a comprehensive overview of Zhirinovskii's activities and the impressions they made in Eastern Europe. Kartsev, a former colleague of Zhirinovskii at Moscow's *Mir* Publishers in the 1980s, has given us some fascinating insights into Zhirinovskii's pre-political life. Yet, none of the books is based on enough empirical evidence to give a full picture or persuasive interpretation of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' as a whole - although Timchenko and Kartsev seem to aspire to do so. For some reason, Kartsev, moreover, tries to prove at length that Zhirinovskii had not been linked to the *KGB* before 1990. That might be true (though Kartsev has not convinced me). It is, however, in so far misleading as, from later empirical evidence, it becomes fairly clear that the rise of Zhirinovskii to national-level politics would not have been possible without substantial support from the reactionary parts of the Soviet establishment, including the security organs - an issue which will be dealt with in detail in section 1.3. of this study.

Peter Conradi's *Zhirinovskii and the New Russian Nationalism* (1995), and Elena Klepikova's and Vladimir Solovyov's *The Paradoxes of Russian Fascism* (1995) appear more suited to serve as general introductions to the subject in that they are based on broader empirical evidence and give sufficiently full and detailed pictures of Zhirinovskii's biography and early political life. Conradi, furthermore, has undertaken some fruitful investigations in Moscow which enabled him to supply some new particulars on Zhirinovskii's entry into Moscow's political scene. His study is in general accurate and readable. Though providing an equally comprehensive account, Klepikova's and Solovyov's book suffers from two principal defects. First, the authors use a definition of fascism by the above mentioned Russian emigre political thinker Ivan Il'in. That is unfortunate because Il'in's ultra-nationalist vision of post-communist Russia contains a number of features which come close to proto-fascism themselves as will be outlined in section 4.1. Second, the two

authors seriously recommended including Zhirinovskii in the Russian government!¹⁶ Klepikova and Solovyov would have been well-advised to refrain from such interpretations, and simply stick to their in-depth empirical investigations into Zhirinovskii's life and political activities - a job they performed well.¹⁷

As early as 1994, the non-Russian-speaking Western reader had been given the opportunity to get acquainted with original Zhirinovskii. However, though by now on sale for three years, Zhirinovskii's German essay *'What I Really Want'* has been largely ignored (Schirinowski 1994). That is surprising as this document is crucial to an assessment of one of Zhirinovskii's most important foreign links - that to the German right-wing extremist party *Deutsche Volksunion* (German People's Union) led by the notorious Bavarian millionaire-publisher Dr. Gerhard Frey whose publishing house edited, contributed special introductory sections to, and produced the small volume (more on Frey in sec. 3.4.).

After El'tsin

The Russian edition of Alexander Yanov's *After El'tsin: 'Weimar' Russia* appeared as a book in September 1995. It is the to date clearest and most comprehensive Russian-language interpretation of, and argument on, post-Soviet Russian right-wing extremism as represented by its major political and intellectual leaders Vladimir Zhirinovskii, Aleksandr Prokhanov, Aleksandr Sterligov, Gennadii Ziuganov, Igor' Shafarevich, Lev Gumilëv, Sergei Kurginian, and Aleksandr Dugin. It summarizes (a) the new risks which have emerged for the young Russian democracy, (b) the differences, similarities and potentials which characterize the various streams of Russian ultra-nationalism, (c) the overall importance of the right-wing spectrum to the formation of the post-

¹⁶ For, in contrast, largely adequate and much clearer recommendations with regard to Western behaviour concerning the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon', see, among others, Morrison 1994, McFaul 1994, and Yanov 1995.

¹⁷ Further relevant publications specifically on Zhirinovskii not specifically dealt with here (though often quoted below) are Forbes and Fink 1994, Hirscher and Lange 1994, Belkin 1994, Morrison 1994, Plekhanov 1994, Verkhovskii 1994, Kipp 1994, Suetnov 1995, Kulikova 1995, Ivanov 1996, and Martelli 1996.

Soviet Russian political agenda, and (d) possible counter-strategies for Russian democrats and Western actors.

On the one hand, Yanov's (1995) comparison of the current Russian condition to Weimar Germany is sometimes sweeping, his generalizations partly not sufficiently substantiated, and the meaning of a number of crucial generic labels he uses (such as fascism), as in Parland's (1993) case, nebulous. On the other hand, most of his basic conclusions seem to be cogent and relevant: a success of Russia's transition to capitalism does not necessarily imply the victory of democracy; the failure of Russian democracy would have serious consequences for international security; and, in view of these circumstances, Western opinion- and decision-makers did not act in an adequate way during the early 1990s. That means that there was too narrow a focus on the promotion of Russian economic reform, and thus only meagre intellectual and material support for democratization processes.¹⁸ These considerations and Yanov's well-informed overview of some major right-wing actors constitute another good introduction to the field, and especially a valuable starting point for further discussions. In contrast, his over-extensive criticism of some of his prominent academic colleagues in the U.S. (Martin Malia, Jeffrey Sachs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Peter Reddaway) seems to miss the point, and is uncalled-for. It will, unfortunately, make the otherwise insightful and original essay unacceptable to many of his Western readers.

A New Research Agenda

In conclusion, Russian right-wing extremism studies would have to change in three ways in order to make more relevant contributions to our understanding of post-Soviet Russian politics. First, in view of the above indicated poor state of documentation of Russian right-wing extremist activities, a stronger mutual consideration and closer cooperation between North American, Russian, Israeli, West European and other individual scholars and research centers seems to be pivotal. This should enable students of this particular aspect of Russian politics to produce more

¹⁸ On the one-sidedness and limited effectiveness of Western support for the Russian democratization, see also McFaul 1994.

accurate, exhaustive and detailed descriptions of Russian right-wing extremist organizations, ideologies and voting behaviour.

Second, it would be welcome, if the apparently rising relevance of Russian right-wing extremism served as an additional incentive to overcome professional parochialism. That means that each of the three or four major groups of experts in the field - i.e. the students of Russian antisemitism, nationalism, imperialism and post-Soviet party politics - would have to consider and read more carefully the writings of each other, and to try to incorporate as much as possible relevant findings in their specific sub-field. Neither can the rise of Russian nationalism since the mid-1960s be adequately interpreted without considering the emergence and spread of 'Zionology'. Nor can students of Russian antisemitism adequately explain this phenomenon without dealing with concepts of the 'we-group' against which ethnic Jews and other 'aliens' and 'enemies' are set. Equally, the specific programs, leadership attributes, and electoral attraction of post-Soviet ultra-nationalist parties can only be appropriately accounted for by relating them to their origins in the Soviet period.

Third, in future analyses, students of the New Russian Right should aim to (a) pose more pertinent theoretical questions to the empirical data they collect, (b) consider in more detail the above mentioned increasing international ideological diffusion process, and (c) communicate more effectively their findings to other political analysts and the public. In order to be able to do so, they will have to start relating their research to - and to integrate it ultimately into - such fields as comparative fascism (e.g. Payne 1980b, 1995; Wippermann 1983; Griffin 1993a and 1995a; Eatwell 1995b¹⁹), or comparative right-wing extremism (e.g. Kowalsky and Schroeder 1994a, Kitschelt 1995²⁰). This could not only be conducive to giving their writings a wider readership; it

¹⁹ Roger Griffin's *Nature of Fascism* (1993a) and *Fascism* (1995a) are for comparative purposes especially useful. For short overviews of the relevant literature on fascism, see the bibliographical notes in Payne 1980 and Wippermann 1983, and the review of Payne 1993.

²⁰ Herbert Kitschelt's study stands out as providing an especially comprehensive interpretation, and clear theoretical framework for the explanation, of the rise of right-wing extremism and populism in contemporary Western Europe (1995). For summaries of the relevant literature on Western right-wing radicalism, see, for instance, *Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie* 1-7 (1989-1995).

would also contribute to a deeper understanding of *generic* fascism and right-wing radicalism.²¹ What has been an issue in sovietology and post-Soviet studies for more than three decades by now, applies equally to its sub-field. Russian right-wing extremism studies will eventually have to become a part of comparative history, political science and sociology.

The present study is an attempt to make a small step forward with regard to all three of the mentioned necessary improvements: first, consideration of a broader primary-source-basis and various secondary sources from different countries; second, reference to, and merger of, findings of the different sub-fields of Russian right-wing extremism studies such as Russian anti-Semitism studies, party politics research, and nationalism studies; and, third, employment of a generic, comparatively derived concept - generic fascism - for the classification of one particular aspect of the Zhirinovskii phenomenon. In Part IV ('Evaluating the Evidence'), moreover, some broader comparative considerations will be made.

0.4. The Scope of the Study

The primary assignment of the study is to introduce the reader (and especially the 'Zhirinovskii-beginner') to some particulars of the biography, party and political views of Zhirinovskii, and to focus on how Zhirinovskii entered and operated in Russian politics between 1990 and 1993.

That implies, firstly, that I will deal only shortly with Zhirinovskii's pre-political life (i.e. before the foundation of his party in March 1990). Not only has this topic already been explored extensively by Vladimir Kartsev (1995), a former long-time colleague of Zhirinovskii, as well as in an excellent documentation compiled by Dmitry Khopak (1995). Kartsev's and Khopak's outlines of Zhirinovskii biography until 1990 of the future LDP leader contain a number of fascinating details (1995).²² The present study is not meant to be a bio- or monography on Vladimir

²¹ Important first steps in this direction are Laqueur 1993 and Vujacic 1996.

²² However, it should be not at once that Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, two ther biographers of Zhirinovskii with insider knowledge of the USSR, criticized that 'Kartsev's account of his former

Zhirinovskii. Instead, it constitutes an exploration of how he and his party appeared and developed in the peculiar context of post-Soviet politics, how their rise was influenced and conditioned by the specific circumstance of a *de facto* revolutionary socio-political transformation of enormous magnitude, and how, in turn, they influenced and co-determined the course of this transformation. Thus this study is about Zhirinovskii and his followers as products from, factors in, and constituent parts of, the Soviet-Russian transformation and post-Soviet Russian politics. It is not about Zhirinovskii and his assistants as private persons. Writing a meaningful, comprehensive and informative account of Zhirinovskii's pre-political life in its particular context(s) - Stalinism, Khrushchëv's 'Thaw', Brezhnev's neo-Stalinism and *detente*, and *perestroika* - would be a subject for a separate dissertation. Thus I will only refer to events in Zhirinovskii's pre-political life in so far as they seem to have a direct bearing on his political behaviour between 1990 and 1993. For those unfamiliar with some basic facts of Zhirinovskii's biography, I would recommend starting this reading with skimming through Appendix I 'Zhirinovskii's *Curriculum Vitae*' until, at least, March 1990.

My approach, secondly, entails that the most important aspect of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' - the LDP's electorate - will also not be touched upon here. A meaningful and conclusive treatment of this topic would call for an extensive overview, statistical analysis and interpretation of a considerable amount of opinion polling and election results data - an undertaking which would, resembling the case of Zhirinovskii's pre-political biography, provide enough primary material, theoretical questions, and methodological problems for a separate dissertation-size study.

It is, instead, a basic rationale underlying this endeavour that to understand and explain adequately the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' it is necessary both to analyse it 'from below' *and* to look at it 'from the top'. That is, it is not enough to seek on the basis of correlations between LDP-votes and characteristics of these voters explanations of why people may have voted for

subordinate often seems embellished [...], and does not always tally with parallel testimonies from other acquaintances of Zhirinovskii of that time' (1995, xii).

Zhirinovskii.²³ It is also necessary to scrutinize (a) for whom or for what it actually was that millions of Russians voted in 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1996, (b) what enabled the LDP to attract and motivate its activists, and (c) what were the differences between Zhirinovskii's agenda, on the one side, and the other varieties of Russian nationalism wooing the adult population of Russia in those years, on the other. In addition, Zhirinovskii and his party's leadership must be analyzed as they now to a certain degree influence the formation of the overall Russian political agenda and public discourse, the political outlook of tens of thousands of LDPR activists and party members, and Russia's domestic and foreign policies and legislation (sec. 2.2.).

I have chosen to elaborate on the LDP only partly in the overall context of Russian politics, as well as to show Zhirinovskii's development not in a strict chronological order. The latter has been already done in other books which have been well investigated and constitute good introductory readings (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995; Conradi 1995). Instead, I will deal with Zhirinovskii and his party mainly along a thematic line. As indicated, the basic facts on, and dates of, Zhirinovskii's life and the LDP's rise until December 1993 are listed in chronological order in the extensive Appendix I. Thus the chapters instead will focus on various dimensions of Zhirinovskii's activities without keeping exactly to the succession of events - with the exception of those cases where the sequence of certain actions and occurrences is of special interest. Additionally, the question of the LDPR's relationship and likeness to the Russian centrists, and other right-wingers shall be raised at several places.

²³ E.g. White, McAllister and Kryshantovskaya 1994; Hough 1994; Whitefield and Evans 1994; Tolz 1994; Urban 1994; Lewinson and Schokarew 1994; Slider, Gempel'son and Chugrov 1994; Sakwa 1994, 1995; Wyman, Miller, White and Heywood 1995; Clark 1995; Byzov 1995; Medvedkov, Medvedkov and Hudson 1996; Klamkin 1996; Zubov and Kolosov 1996; Hough, Davidheise and Lehmann 1996; and Whitefield and Evans 1996.

0.5. Some Underlying Conceptualizations

For the latter purpose, I will have to clarify shortly the meaning of some generic labels which I am going to use in order to summarize certain Russian political streams or groups of political forces which appeared to me as being relevant between 1990 and 1993.

First, I am frequently applying the term 'right' and sometimes the label 'left' in different constructions and contexts. In many writings on 20th-century politics, the extensive, yet unexplained use of these labels causes considerable confusion. This is even more true with regard to analyses of post-Soviet Russia where 'left' and 'right' seem to acquire new meanings. I shall, therefore, make my assumption explicit.

In using these labels here, I am referring to two fundamentally different views on human nature: a cautious, sceptical or pessimistic one in the case of the Right, and a trusting, optimistic and sanguine one in the case of the Left. A cautious or sceptical view on the capacity of human beings to control and transcend their anti-social and destructive impulses would be accompanied by the acceptance that moral values are prior to, and independent of, the individual's existence (Hampden-Turner 1970, 230-233). It would imply the assumption that certain kinds of differences between people should have political implications because full equality is undesirable or impossible (Heywood 1992, 10). It would normally correlate with an inclination towards ideologies most frequently associated with the label 'conservative'. A more radically sceptical - meaning very pessimistic, cynical or even misanthropic - view of human nature would, in the framework of this conceptualization, correlate with a latent or manifest, overt or covered support of ideologies which are understood as being - in at least some respect - extremely anti-egalitarian, ascriptive and particularistic whether in a reactionary or revolutionary vein. Most of these ideologies would probably be summarized under the heading 'right-wing extremism'. In view of the predominant role nationalism - as one particular means of interpreting differences between people as having a political magnitude - has come to play in contemporary world politics, 'right-wing extremism' and 'ultra-nationalism' will be used here interchangeably.

An optimistic view on human nature, in contrast, would imply the view that women and men exist freely, are morally competent (Hampden-Turner 1970, 230-233) and largely equal (Heywood 1992, 9). In its moderate form it would correlate with various degrees of rationally conceived forms of reformism or progressivism in association with outlooks or ideologies called 'liberal', 'social-democratic', or 'socialist'. Revolutionary utopias resulting from extremely 'left-wing' views of human nature would be normally conceptualized in terms of radical egalitarianism, maximalist universalism and nihilistic cosmopolitanism.²⁴

Second, I have chosen to use the terms 'conventional Right' or 'conventional rightists' for those Russian political streams of thought, parties, associations and personalities which would probably be under Western conditions regarded as right-wing too, and which could be also classified as nationalist or ultra-nationalist. Among the parties which are covered by this concept, are often described as 'national patriots' in Russia, and were visible in the given time-period are, for instance, the Russian Christian-Democratic Movement (in Russian abbreviated as *RKhDD*, cf. Abbreviations) led by former religious dissident Viktor Aksiuchits, the Russian All-People's Union (*ROS*) created by current State Duma Deputy Speaker Sergei Baburin, as well as some clearly fascist²⁵ parties such as the National-Republican Party (*NRPR*) headed by the former *Pamiat'* activist Nikolai Lysenko, or the Russian National Assembly (*RNS*) chaired by retired *KGB* General Aleksandr Sterligov.²⁶

These 'conventional rightists' have to be distinguished, first, from the post-Soviet communists, above all Gennadii Ziuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation (*KPRF*).

²⁴ For further reference on 'left' and 'right' in politics, see, for example, Backes 1989, 248-260; Heywood 1992, 9-11; and Podvintsev 1996. For illustrations of the frequent confusion about 'right' and 'left' in Russian politics, see Kagarlitskii 1992, 40-43; and *Levy... pravye?... 1994*.

²⁵ I am referring here to the concept of 'fascism' developed by Roger Griffin who defines this genus of ideology as a 'palingenetic form [i.e. expressing the myth of regeneration, new birth or rebirth] of populist ultra-nationalism.' (1993a, 26) This definition and its application to Russian conditions will be dealt with in detail in Part III of this study.

²⁶ For a comprehensive overview of the programmes of the most important organizational structures of the 'conventional right' from 1991 to 1992, see Koval' 1993, 296-395. See also Prudkov and Bach 1992, 69-86.

Because of the specific Russian historical context - i.e. because of the ultra-conservative dimension communism has acquired in Russia - and because of the dominant position which explicit nationalism has come to play in the agenda of the *KPRF*, I have chosen to locate this party on the right as well (Vujacic 1996).²⁷ Second, there is Zhirinovskii's party which - though essentially right-wing - shows, as I shall argue, against the background of the more traditional brands of Russian nationalist thought some rather unusual traits. Therefore, I conceptualize the communists and Zhirinovskiiites here as both - in different ways - 'unconventionally right-wing'.

Finally, I label 'conventionally centrist' those political forces which stood between the two major agendas of radical economic and political reform oriented towards rapprochement with the West, and the varieties of ultra-conservatism at the time-period covered here. These groupings were by most observers called 'centrist' although their agenda of a moderately interventionist, corporatist, protectionist, semi-democratic statism, and 'evolutionary approach' to economic reform would not be regarded as 'centrist' in the West.

²⁷ Not only has communism in post-Soviet Russian conditions mutated into an ideology of restoration, reaction and a peculiar brand of traditionalism. Ziuganov has, already *before* he was elected *KPRF* chairman, shown clearly 'conventionally right-wing' (as defined above) inclinations in his political theory and practice. Significantly, he had been a member of the ruling bodies of several ultra-nationalist umbrella organizations, e.g. the Coordination Council of the People's-Patriotic Forces of Russia, the All-Russian Patriotic Movement 'Fatherland', the Russian National Assembly (where, by the way, he sat side by side with Russian National Unity Leader Aleksandr Barkashov who uses, among others, a swastika and the Hitler salute as symbols for his movement), and the National Salvation Front.

In a summary of his doctoral dissertation in the eminent ultra-nationalist 'thick journal' *Nash sovremennik* (Our contemporary), for instance, Ziuganov made explicit that his intellectual inspirators are Russian thinkers like Nikolai Ia. Danilevskii, Konstantin N. Leont'ev, and Lev N. Gumil'ev, and even Oswald Spengler (Ziuganov 1995, 103-104). The writings of these men should be classified as either ultra-conservative, or proto-fascist (as defined above). There is no mentioning of Marx or Engels in this article, though one short quotation of Lenin appears at the end (109). For Ziuganov, labels like 'socialism' or 'communism' seem to stand for a genuinely Russian national or civilizational idea and state doctrine, rather than to connote a concept of internationalist class struggle, materialism, cosmopolitanism, rational anthropocentrism, ethical universalism, etc. (see also Adrian Karatnycky in *IHT*, 6 March 1996, 8; *IHT*, 16 May 1996; *The Sunday Times*, 12 May 1996). In view of Ziuganov's development, speculations, such as those by Stephen Carter, about whether a coalition of these 'communists' and the Russian nationalists would be feasible are partly obsolete - as recent events seem to have indicated once more (1995, 182-183). On Ziuganov's biography, see Berezovskii and Cherviakov 1993, 28-29; *Vlast...* 1994 [1995], 2nd vol., 62-63; and on his ideology Scanlan 1996, and Vujacic 1996.

The major umbrella-organization of the 'conventional centrists' in the time period covered here was a party-conglomerate called the 'Civic Union'. It was founded in June 1992 and for several months in 1992-93 probably the most influential political force in Russia, yet has sunk into oblivion since its disastrous performance in the December 1993 parliamentary elections (1.93%). The Civic Union claimed to represent 'industrialists', the 'productive sector' of the economy, and 'workers' collectives'. In fact, its agenda presented some sort of '*nomenklatura* national populism' (Martin Malia) designed to further the interests of the

individuals and social groups advantaged by the *old* Soviet socio-economic system who [...] sought to secure a *new* political and economic role in Russia's post-communist society. This subset of social actors - enterprise directors, trade union bureaucrats, and former CPSU/Soviet ministerial functionaries - did not seek a restoration of the Soviet past. They did have material and organized stakes, however, which they sought to secure and defend. (McFaul 1993, 198; emphases in original)

The most important of the 'conventional centrists' within the Civic Union included until 1993 Arkadii Vol'skii's and Aleksandr Vladislavlev's Industrialists' Union (*RSPP*), Nikolai Travkin's Democratic Party (*DPR*), and Aleksandr Rutskoi's People's Party (*NPSR*) (although Rutskoi personally had shifted back to the radically nationalist camp by September 1993).

Before outlining the aims and structure of the study I shall clarify some further assumptions of this study.

0.6. The Purpose of Inductive Research

In view of my above mentioned call for a rapprochement between specialists on, on the one side, Russian and, on the other side, non-Russian and generic right-wing extremism, it may seem that the area-studies approach which I try to follow in the first two parts of the present study largely misses to make a contribution to social science. Part I and II deliberately avoid making explicit

comparisons, and limit themselves to some implicitly comparatively drawn tentative conclusions at the end of their sections. It appears, however, that prior to meaningful systematically comparative research a stage of 'primary accumulation of data' has to be passed. Not only does adequate holistic analysis of complex - i.e. multiple and conjunctural - causations require an antecedent process of aggregation of a wide variety of disparate 'raw facts' - i.e. 'elementary' events, names, labels, numbers, qualities etc. It is only when a certain diversity of (naturally) biased 'descriptions' - i.e. various non-verified interpretations - exists, that the comparativist has a broad enough basis of both empirical evidence and rival hypotheses in order to engage into a conclusive theoretical argument. Theda Skocpol seemed to point in a similar direction when she noted:

Inevitably, broadly conceived comparative historical projects draw their evidence almost entirely from 'secondary sources' - that is, from research monographs and syntheses already published in book or journal-article form by the relevant historical or culture-area specialist. [...] The comparativist has neither the time nor (all of) the appropriate skills to do the primary research that necessarily constitutes, in large amounts, the foundation upon which comparative studies are built. Instead, the comparativist must concentrate upon searching out and systematically surveying specialists' publications [...]. Plainly, the work of the comparativist only becomes possible *after* a large primary literature has been built up by specialists. (1979, xiv; emphasis in original)

One of the central aims of social inquiry is the 'substitution of variables for proper names' (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 25). Obviously, in order to do this appropriately, these names and some of their cultural-specific connotations have to be known first. Moreover, in the process of finding broadly applicable, yet, at the same time, sufficiently precise generic concepts with which to categorize and typologize the social world around us,

[...] it is the evidence obtained nation-by-nation, or region-by-region (or whatever the unit of analysis may be) that helps us decide which classification works, or which criterion of classification should be developed. (Sartori 1970, 1043)

Ultimately, we aim to establish the general rules according to which certain strategic political actors behave. Yet,

[w]ithout knowledge of the [local] history, the investigator cannot determine the *significance* of these behaviours. (Bates 1997, 168; emphasis in original).

To sum up, interpretative, hermeneutic and inductive ('idiographic') inquiries, and explicitly comparative, analytical and deductive ('nomothetic') research ideally complement each other.

0.7. The Sources Used

At several places in the study, the reliability of the sources available will be a special issue of concern. It should be stated in advance that this account of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' is a distinctly preliminary one not only because of an omission of the issue of the LDP electorate, and a deliberate avoidance of systematic comparisons or hypotheses-testing (because such endeavours would as stated above be, in view of lacking empirical data, unsubstantiated at this stage). The study has also a preparatory character because it is to a large degree based on a particular type of source which reveals only the most obvious aspects of the LDP - i.e. on documents published by the LDP itself.

To be sure, there is good reason for summarizing the Zhirinovskii Phenomenon between 1990 and 1993 as a considerable variety of primary sources is available. Zhirinovskii showed great activity in both, party propaganda activities (newspapers, brochures, books, films), and in terms of personal agitation effort through a multitude of interviews to a wide variety of Russian and

international newspapers. The first type of sources include above all the party's central organs, i.e. the irregular 32-page newspaper *Liberal* (1990-93) and the biweekly four-page newspaper *Pravda Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Truth; 1993-95), as well as the irregular youth organ *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Falcon; 1992-) and St. Petersburg newspaper *Slovo Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Word; 1992-). A further - as in the case of *Slovo Zhirinovskogo* often ignored, but important - source are several issues of the ultra-nationalist *Iuridicheskaia gazeta* (Juridicial Newspaper; 1991-) which had provided columns for Zhirinovskii since 1991 and developed later into a full-scale LDPR-organ. Most of these issues as well as some regional LDPR newspapers have been collected, analyzed and included in this account. In 1992, the LDP published its first book-long publication called *The Zhirinovskii Phenomenon* edited by one of Zhirinovskii major public relations advisers, Professor of Aesthetics Irina S. Kulikova (1992). The major 1993 publications included the first edition of the book *The Last to the South* (Zhirinovskii 1993a), and the three-volume booklet *On Russia's Destiny* (Zhirinovskii 1993b, 1993d and 1993e) including several speeches and articles by Zhirinovskii. In addition, there are a number of publications produced after December 1993 which contain information relevant for the party's development before this date (see 'Primary Sources'). All of the listed publications have been included in the study.

However, although these and some other material mentioned in the 'Primary Sources' section of the 'Bibliography' provide a formidable amount of data and the documents published in them do constitute the LDPR agenda at that period, they give only a limited impression about the inner life of the LDP. To a large amount, they rather indicate what the official picture Zhirinovskii and his assistants wanted to present at the time of the publication was, and not what was really going on in the party. This discrepancy will frequently emerge from a comparison of statements by LDP leaders or newspapers, and observations by LDP dissidents, Russian and Western journalists and Moscow researchers with insider knowledge. On the other hand, though, some of these official LDP publications also contained Zhirinovskii's and other party activists' speeches at party congresses which means that they may reveal some genuinely relevant information on the party in that these speeches contained not only an 'output' of the party, but also an 'input' into the

Zhirinovskii Phenomeon. The documents adopted should be seen as, among others, rallying points for the party activists. In conclusion, thus, the official party publications do provide, on the one hand, the crucial point of reference for evaluating Zhirinovskii's agenda, but have, on the other hand, only limited value for properly deciphering the events and developments which constituted the party's history in the time period under investigation here.

The only three larger sources which go beyond these official statements, and were written by LDP-men are the books directed explicitly against Zhirinovskii by three of his former close associates: the notorious writer Eduard Limonov (1994) who will be introduced in more detail below (sec. 3.3.); the former LDP Moscow headquarters assistant and publicist Ivan Orlov (1996); and the former LDP Krasnoiarsk functionary Vladimir Ivanov (1996). These sources and some other statements by former LDP allies or activists seem to reveal a lot more about the party's internal life and Zhirinovskii's behaviour than the official LDP documents. Thus these unofficial primary sources on the LDP constitute a useful addition to the official LDP documents in that both types of sources complement each other and are, if considered together, a relatively clear indications for what may have happened on certain occasions or what may have been the real circumstances of certain events. At various points, thus a comparison of the various official and unofficial primary sources (e.g. sec. 3.1. on membership) does indeed give the impression of pointing to what was probably the more truthful data and more likely circumstances and succession of crucial events.

Nevertheless, these partly contradictory accounts of enemies of Zhirinovskii constitute an altogether too thin and unreliable basis for a comprehensive assessment of what the developments and relations in the party were at its various stages. Thus, one might argue, they need to be complemented by additional inquiries among former and present LDP activists - i.e., for instance, through in-depth questioning or polls among LDP members and functionaries. Yet, unfortunately, such a systematic investigation through a large-scale interview project would have gone beyond this project.²⁸ Thus the present study constitutes merely a first comprehensive account of the so far

²⁸ Apart from this it is unclear whether currently active LDP functionaries would be able and willing to speak out freely in public. In view of very probably connections of Zhirinovskii to criminal circles, it might even for *former* LDP members risky to provide information against their one-time leader. Thus, for the time

published sources. It does not attempt to verify the empirical evidence obtained from there through on-the-spot qualitative and quantitative research. It merely presents a basis for future systematic studies which would make methodologically refined inquiries in Moscow and the Russian provinces.

Beside the official and unofficial primary sources and newspaper reports, the information collected by some Moscow human-rights activists and politicians, and commercial think-tanks and news agencies proved to be among the most valuable secondary sources. The former have been interviewed and are mentioned in the 'Acknowledgements'. Some of the latter sources were mentioned in the review on the state of Russian right-wing extremism studies and included above all the unpublished manuscripts produced by the Panorama Agency, the already mentioned Center for the Analysis of the Political Information, and the PostFactum Agency as well as some other similar institutions (cf. 'Bibliography'). All of these sources proved to be crucial for this study in that they (a) referred to a number of newspaper accounts not considered by the major Western think-tanks' publishing on Russia (such as the Radio Free/ Radio Liberty Research Institute or the German Federal Institute of Eastern and International Studies at Cologne), (b) provided additional information collected during the researchers' personal encounters with representatives of the LDP (for instance, at party congresses) or through gossip disseminating from Moscow's political publicists' milieux, and (c) added their informed (if sometimes eccentric) evaluation to what mattered most in the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon'.

In conclusion, it remains true that an in-depth, comprehensive and extensively documented account of the Zhirinovskii Phenomenon is at this stage because of too few sources in hand still difficult. Yet, on the other hand, the documents, interpretations, memoirs, hand-books and analyses available as of summer 1997 do justify a first attempt to reconstruct with some clarity and a certain degree of reliability a number of basic developments and characteristics of the LDP in 1990-93. As will become evident at several points in the study, a detailed juxtaposition of official LDP statements on various matters with unofficial statements by LDP dissidents, data collected by

being, one might no have another choice but to wait for further statements or memoirs by former LDP activists in order to paint a clearer picture of the inner party life.

Moscow-based analysts, journalistic accounts and Western research papers does, in the case of contradicting statements, usually point more or less clearly towards a certain passing of an event, configuration of events, or a certain characteristic which appears as more probable than other events, configurations or characteristics. Also, often, a reference to *several* sources detailing *one and the same* event or particular trait of the LDP gives the possibility to present the event or trait and their context relatively comprehensively. Hopefully, thus the basic messages of the individual analyses of the various particular aspects of the LDP will become transparent.

0.8. The Three Parts' Underlying Assumptions and Research Questions

This empirical part of this study is divided into three relatively self-contained Parts: 'Part I: Analyzing the Behaviour', 'Part II: Interpreting the Programme', and 'Part III: Classifying the Documents'. The aim of the empirical part of the study and its division into three separate components is threefold: (a) to introduce various possible conceptualizations for the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'; (b) to employ three relatively independent approaches with diverging assumptions about the nature of political analysis in order to uncover the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' more comprehensively; and, finally, (c) to compare the independently derived, three provisional results in order to formulate more general, tentative conclusions about the nature of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' in the last Part IV.

The study's first, most obvious purpose (apart from merely building up a qualitative and quantitative data set) is doing a first step towards a conceptualization of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'. All three empirical parts assign on the basis of their particular focuses different - either Russia-specific or generic - labels to Zhirinovskii and his party. Although the choice of the different labels is only theoretically substantiated and explicitly defined in the last Part III ('Classifying the Documents') on fascist tendencies, this seems in so far nevertheless a worth-while endeavour as these labels can be understood as interim hypotheses to be verified or falsified in more explicitly comparative research. In a number of concluding sub-sections in Part I ('Analyzing the

Behaviour') and Part II ('Interpreting the Programme'), moreover, *several disparate, competing*, grounded hypotheses or generalizations which seem to emerge from an unsystematic glance on the empirical data, and which have been proposed by various observers so far are listed and shortly compared with each other. In some instances, these comparisons of diverging or even contradictory hypotheses do not lead to final inferences about their relative plausability. Although I would not claim to have found *all* possible hypotheses and preliminary labels which may have explanatory or heuristic power with regard to the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon', I have tried to, at least, mention as many as, and as different as possible, ways to genetically explain and hermeneutically understand it. To sum up, the first aim of this study is to list various *possible* answers to the question of: What *could* the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' be?

Somewhat in contradiction to this premise, stands the second purpose of the study - namely to give a preliminary answer to the question of: What *is* the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' in ideological terms? As indicated, for giving a final answer, this study is not broad enough. Above all, it does not deal with the LDP's electorate; it stops as early as in December 1993 (although some aspects of the development of the LDP's financial matters and allies are outlined until 1996); it makes no systematic intra- or cross-national comparisons with other similar cases; and it does not propose any formal models for capturing the behaviour of Zhirinovskii and his party.

Yet, with regard to conceptualizing the socio-political *ideas* of Zhirinovskii and his followers or, in other words, the *ideological aspect* of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' my research does constitute a substantial - though not a sufficient - basis for proposing some precursory conclusions. That is because ideas and the ways they are expressed - as well as the connotations of political terms in general - are always culturally and contextually conditioned. More broadly speaking, the enterprise of historical writing and social science is insofar not comparable to the pursuit of natural or 'hard' science as many crucial concepts in them are not available for easy transformation into numerical language. The meaning, contents, boundaries and application of *social science* - in distinction to natural science - concepts, such as 'equality', 'justice', 'democracy', is a much more contested and important issue in the academic discourse of the non-natural sciences (with, perhaps, the exception of demography where 'birth' and 'death' are

relatively undisputed concepts). In other words, in political language, there always remains an undeletable, strictly speaking non-scientific, hermeneutic and ultimately normative residue. In order to fully 'understand' political terms, ideas, speeches, and language we can only to a certain degree use narrowly deductive explanation. What remains beyond rigorous systematization is the important, hermeneutic dimension of political language. This particular issue is one of the primary rationales for the area studies approach in social 'sciences' in general, and for this study in particular. Capturing this hermeneutic magnitude is, and will seemingly always, be based not only on logics or mathematics, but also to a large degree on experience, comprehension, empathy, and sensitivity.

It is this specific aspect of research into political ideas which constitutes the grounds for my claim here that I *can* - and should - make here certain provisional conclusions about the nature of Zhirinovskii's and his followers' ideas and motivations. Although I am at this point not able to outline these thoughts in a systematic way and to provide an as much as possible deductively argued conclusion, I can, with reference to the hermeneutic dimension of social research, present what my overall 'impression' from the archival and field research on the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' is. This particular 'impression' can then be taken as a starting point for further discussion and as an instance of critique, and can be compared to other 'impressionistic' statements. A convergence of a large number of such 'impressions' should finally create a certain basic consensus in the 'scientific community' on what the most significant aspects of the LDP agenda are. And the breadth and degree of such a consensus - i.e. how many analysts agree how far on this issue - would, in turn, be open to scientific measurement and statistical analysis. To sum up, the second major aim of this study is to create on the basis of my 'experience' with Zhirinovskii and his party a focal point for further discussion on the question of how to conceptualize his and his party's political ideas, thinking and motives.

In accordance with this aim, the third question of this study is: What do the three largely different approaches to the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' utilized here reveal about its nature? What do they, from their different angles, tell us about the position, agenda and relevance of the LDP in the context of post-Soviet politics? The three approaches of the three empirical parts are marked by

their headings: 'Analyzing the Behaviour', 'Interpreting the Programme' and 'Classifying the Documents'. How, in comparison with each other, informative are these different approaches for adequately answering the questions on the LDP's relevance and 'true' agenda? What are the relative advantages and short-comings of these approaches?

The approach of 'Part I: Analyzing the Behaviour' would assume that the utterances of Zhirinovskii and his assistants, and the attention they received in the national and international media are only of secondary importance for conceptualizing the LDP. To properly evaluate the essence and significance of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' we should rather research what Zhirinovskii and his entourage *did or not did*, than what they *said or proclaimed*. Thus, after giving a short introduction to Zhirinovskii's pre-political biography, the major issue of 'Part I: Analyzing the Behaviour' is to establish in detail the sequence, direction, context and results of Zhirinovskii's major activities between 1990-93, and to contrast these findings with those motives and information he revealed in official statements regarding, for instance, the LDP's political aims, sponsors or membership numbers. Thus Part I tries to uncover the questions about the relative importance, seriousness and ideological motivation of the LDP on the basis of a review of its conduct and performance mainly between 1990 and 1993, and in some regards - e.g. with regard to finances - beyond December 1993.

The approach of 'Part II: Interpreting the Programme' is a more traditional one in that it looks for major regularities, a 'red line' and a certain 'logic' in Zhirinovskii's statements. It not only tries by doing so to uncover Zhirinovskii's thinking. It also attempts to establish whether and to which degree Zhirinovskii developed a sufficiently distinct and coherent political profile which would suggest that a conceptualization of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' beyond mere populism, demagoguery and political clownerie is justified. Besides interpreting Zhirinovskii's political thought, it thus also attempts to make a contribution to an adequate estimation of the LDP's political seriousness, prospects and endurance. In contrast to the above approach, this conventionally interpretative approach assumes that political statements and utterances of political actors *are* informative with regard to these actors' intentions, thinking and motives. It assumes that ideology is neither only a 'window-dressing' used to conceal the 'deeper' realities of political life

such as economic and class interest or personal ambition; nor is ideology merely a point of reference in contextually conditioned, 'rational' decision-making. Ideology by itself constitutes a resource for organizing, mobilizing and subordinating political activists for the sake of achievement of certain tactical and strategic goals. Whereas the above more behaviouralist approach of Part I assumes that only political action itself reveals true and presumably hidden intentions, Part II assumes that coordinated political mass action is impossible without the rallying and disciplinary effects of openly proclaimed political aims. Once officially pronounced, these ideas become new segments of a cumulatively emerging discursive tradition. Once firmly established, an elaborate discursive tradition, in turn, makes a political organization which is equipped with such a tradition to a considerable degree path-dependent. Ideology, at this stage, starts to inform the emergence or decline of political institutions and their particular structure, integration, isolation and way of functioning. Ideology becomes a force by itself (Johnson 1968; Shils 1968; Sartori 1969; Groth 1971; Lemberg 1971; Seliger 1976; Heywood 1992; Eatwell 1993; Gamble 1994).

That means whatever Zhirinovskii may have had in mind when he pronounced or wrote down certain ideas - whether he was sincere in doing so, or not - these ideas became part of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'. They played a certain role in attracting and socializing LDP members, and they determined an increasingly clearly defined the public profile of the LDP. Political ideas, to conclude, have a life of their own, and can, once uttered, not be withdrawn, reformulated or contradicted without incurring costs to the political organization or institution claiming to embody these ideas. Thus officially pronounced political ideas by themselves deserve scrutiny and are important points of reference in evaluating the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'.

Finally, 'Part III: Classifying the Documents' goes one step further in this direction. It assumes not only that ideas do inform political actions, institutions and styles. It also presumes that one can comparatively establish certain generic ideal types of ideologies which across nations and civilizations tend to inform political actions, institutions and styles in largely similar ways. Thus Part III supposes that the classing of a certain, country-specific idiosyncratic political agenda with an abstract generic-type ideology would allow us to formulate explanations and prognostications of political actions of the actor, group or organization under scrutiny by way of referring to previous

observations and generalizations on how other idiosyncratic permutations and sub-classes of the ideal-type ideology influenced political life in other countries, at different periods, and under diverging conditions (Sartori 1969; Groth 1971, 4; Freeden 1994). On the basis of these premises, Part III reviews, in a first step, the previous literature on concepts of fascism, and establishes, in a second step, on the basis of this an operational definition of generic fascism. It then goes on to check whether the agenda of a particular segment of the LDP's official publications - the issues of the major 1990-93, irregular LDP-organ *Liberal* - can be seen as outlining an essentially fascist programme, or not.

Moreover, in Part III, I am not only trying to employ an advance going beyond the narrow confines of the so far applied area studies approach. Part III is also different from Parts I and II in that it attempts to treat the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' in a more systematic way. It does so by limiting itself to only one - though a major one - LDP publication, the newspaper *Liberal*, and by trying to capture nearly *all* aspects of this particular segment of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'.²⁹ This particular aim of dealing with *all* relevant angles of *one* constituent component of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' is aided by the fact that the publication of *Liberal* was discontinued in 1993, i.e. within the time-range I am concerned mostly with in this study. Whereas other aspects of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' have to be studied in more detail, in comparative perspective and with reference to developments after December 1993, *Liberal* as one of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon's' constituent divisions has been covered here comprehensively, in-depth and with a comparative focus.

This distinct quality of 'Classifying the Documents' also constitutes the particular rationale and claims of Part III. Part III assumes that only the systematic, comprehensive and comparative treatment of a particular phenomenon allows for properly substantiated conclusions and generalizations about its nature. With regard to *Liberal* thus the labels and hypotheses I formulate are *not* seen as tentative or preliminary. Part III claims, in contrast to Parts I and II, to have

²⁹ An exemption from this, is a particular series of *Liberal* articles by Zhirinovskii on Russian history which were later re-published as a longer continuous text, and have been, therefore, excluded from this analysis of *Liberal*. See Part III.

accomplished a thoroughly argued, final classification, and asserts explicitly the validity of its generalizations. However, I should emphasize that these conclusions only concern *Liberal* and not the whole 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'. Nevertheless, the findings of Part III are because of their greater substance and depth important for an evaluation of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'. *Liberal* can be seen as one particular instance which as such reveals certain characteristics of the larger whole to which it belongs, i.e. of the entire 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'. Whereas, in Parts I and II, I am making suggestions concerning possible conceptualizations of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' on the basis of *unsystematic, yet broad* treatments of its development between 1990 and 1993, in Part II, I am drawing inferences about the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' drawn from a *systematic, comprehensive and in-depth* analysis of, however, *only one singular, narrow and specific* facette of it.

It should have emerged from this summary of the study's empirical body that all three parts - 'Analyzing the Behaviour', 'Interpreting the Programme' and 'Classifying the Documents' - constitute relatively distinct, individual studies of the Zhirinovskii phenomenon.

It may seem that such a partitioning of the study is detrimental to deriving definite conclusions on the subject as a whole. Yet, as I would argue, it is exactly this disparity of approaches which allows for a more firm grounding of my tentative evaluation of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'. It is thus the fourth and final aim of this study to compare the results of the three relatively independent treatments with each other. Its purpose is to establish of how far the three, individual results can be seen as, on the one side, being congruent, corresponding or correlating with, or, on the other side, contradicting, each other. Thus, in my general conclusions at the end of this study, I should be able to outline which traits of Zhirinovskii's and his follower's activities, which innovations in the LDP ideology, and which generically labelled characteristics of *Liberal* between 1990 and 1993 can be conceived as representing, on the one hand, common and paralleling trends, and which developments in these three segments did, on the other hand, not correlate with each other, or should be seen as inconsistent with findings of the other Parts.

The degree to which these three discrepant 'histories' of the LDP between 1990 and 1993 converge with each other as well as the degree to which one can explain possible divergences

through contextualization or deduction would not only be informative for distinguishing trends of secondary importance from developments of primary relevance. It should also be the basis for answering the question of how far Zhirinovskii and his party should be seen either as a consistent, enduring, serious and ideologically well-equipped political force, or as a political ephemeron which constitutes merely a prolonged, Russian version of the above mentioned, ultimately unimportant Polish 'Tyminski phenomenon' of 1991.

0.9. Focuses, Omissions, Prospects

This study proceeds as follows. After having shortly reviewed the gradual re-emergence of a Russian multi-party system since 1988, the first chapter singles out some notable events in Zhirinovskii's life, and deals with the peculiar conditions leading to his entrance into Moscow's political scene and later to the emergence of the LDP. The subject of the second chapter is Zhirinovskii's subsequent involvement in high politics in 1991, in connection with which his possible financial sources are discussed. In chapter three, I sketch out some dimensions of the LDP's metamorphosis from an amorphous Muscovite dwarf-group into a real party after its comparatively successful performance in the 1991 presidential elections (data on membership, splits, allies, foreign partners, the leadership). Finally, I have tried to cope with the rather difficult task of describing the evolution and peculiarity of Zhirinovskii's political ideology and style until December 1993.

Indeed, one could argue, that there was and is no such thing as a coherent LDPR agenda. In view of the multitude of Zhirinovskii's faces it was difficult to decide which of the facets of his statements had been the more relevant ones for forming the Russian public's image of him during the early 1990s. As far as there seems to be no satisfactory opinion polling data on this particular issue (or, at least, I was not able to find it), it is complicated, if not impossible, especially for an outsider to make meaningful conclusions in this regard. It should be thus noted in advance that there was a certain randomness in the selection of Zhirinovskii's testimonies and of the labels which

I have used in order to categorize the various points he makes in his speeches and writings.³⁰ Even so, one could argue, that if the respective data on the specific nature of Zhirinovskii's appeal existed, one would, perhaps, still not be able to give an adequate evaluation of what in his slogans during the December 1993 elections actually mattered most to whom. There must have been many momentary and purely psychological factors which would explain the public perception of his sometimes patently contradictory argumentation (Zupko 1995).

The claim of this study is ergo not to uncover comprehensively the enigma of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon'. Its task is rather to give an overview of some aspects of the emergence and rise of the LDPR, and to try to single out those events, activities or features which seemed to me the more characteristic for the party and its leader at the time period covered, and which have either not been scrutinized thoroughly, or have not been synthesized comprehensively in previous accounts. As indicated above, a possible continuation of the project would be to juxtapose Zhirinovskii's and his party's attributes established here and in other studies with the distinctive conditions in which they acted. If one then related these data to some generic concepts and nomothetic theories of comparative political science (e.g. charisma, populism, nationalism, political ideology and culture, authoritarianism, development, etc.), one could - within the limits suggested above - try to give some substantiated explanation of what one actually means by talking about 'Zhirinovskii' and his 'Phenomenon'.

³⁰ Possible headlines for further conceptualizations of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' not dealt with in this study would be, for instance, 'goulash nationalism' (Vladimir Prokhvatilov in *Vek*, no. 49, 17-23 December 1993, 3; as quoted by Carter, 1995, 195); 'the politics of resentment' (Fairbanks, 1994); 'nationalist kitsch art' (Kibalnik 1996); or 'Zhirinovskiiism' paralleling 'Mussolinism' which was - according to Piero Melograni - more important to many Italians than Fascist ideology (as quoted by Mosse, 1979, 2).

PART I: Analyzing the Behaviour

1. The Origins of the LDP

'I've got common sense, and I'll always follow it.'

Vladimir Zhirinovskii (L, no. 6-7, 1992, 32)

'Let's make a party!' This was apparently the motto in Soviet politics around 1990. The first principal Russian directory of the new parties contains information on 457 'political and politicized organisations' and mentions in addition 657 further groupings involved in politics at this time (Berezovskii *et al.* 1991, 3). The evolution of the so called *neformaly* ('informals') - i.e. the then illegal, but tolerated political groups - was soon at least partly canalized by the passing of the Soviet Law on Public Associations in October 1990. Still there remained at least 100 groupings describing themselves as political parties in early 1991 (Sakwa 1993, 139).

At the beginning, this development was by many observers, including myself, seen as an encouraging sign. One was tempted to conclude that the huge quantity would finally transform into quality, and that Russia would thus soon get a fully-fledged grass-roots multi-party system. Yet insightful analysts of the apparently ballooning civil and political society warned long before the election test that these so called 'parties' were nearly all mere brain-children.

Between 1988 and 1991, and especially in 1990 which one could call the birth-year of the post-Soviet Russian multi-party system, there appeared a considerable number of political gatherings, which were brought into being by small *intelligentsiia* groups. Most of them tried to implant into post-communist Russian reality, on the one side, advanced Western theoretical concepts which, however, were too new and sophisticated to attract a large enough following among the Soviet population, or, on the other side, pre-revolutionary Russian political features which had become outdated or forgotten in the meantime (Harms 1992, 108). In addition, as I shall show below, the formation and popularization of viable new political identities, agendas and organizations had until 1991 to take place under the conditions of active obstruction and perversion

by the reactionary parts of the *ancien regime*. Thus most of the new 'parties' managed little more than a continuation of the Soviet '*kruzhkovshchina*' (gathering in circles) of mainly metropolitan intellectuals many of whom seemed often anyway more interested in theorizing and global polemics than in imposing on themselves the burdens of communal politics, supra-partisan consensus finding, or coalition building (*Ibid.*, 109; Hosking *et al.* 1992, 211). Finally, the peculiar Soviet-Russian mode of institutional transformation created unfavourable conditions for party-building in that some selected building blocs of a modern electoral democracy were (paradoxically) introduced *before* substantial political liberalization. This meant that many leading democratic activists were already in 1989 and 1990 - only two or three years after the announcement of perestroika and glasnost - able to transform their new popularity into spectacular electoral successes. That former dissidents and radical CPSU reformers were able to gain that quickly popular mandates, immunity as parliamentarians and a foothold in the Soviets turned, however, out to be a mixed blessing because the reformed Soviets were still largely representative organs with little well-defined prerogatives.

Indeed, the sudden availability of office-seeking opportunities and the conditions under which offices were sought not only siphoned off human capital that might otherwise have flowed to independent organizations. They also encouraged a type of purely individualistic, free-lance political entrepreneurship even among those persons who *did* both win deputies' seats *and* work in autonomous associations. (Fish 1995, 134; emphasis in original)

Therefore, membership numbers, name-recognition, sponsoring, or media presence of the self-proclaimed 'parties' remained low.³¹

The more important source of organization, aggregation and representation of social interests became, therefore, not the *neformaly* groups spreading 'from below', but, somewhat later,

³¹ The Democratic Russia (*DemRossiia*) movement was, of course, partially an exception in that it delivered significant electoral victories in the 1990 parliamentary and 1991 presidential elections. However, it fell apart in 1991-92, and has never recovered from the splits, and thus virtually disappeared from Russian politics.

executive power structures which, in around 1991, started increasingly actively to set up political organizations 'from above'. On the one side, the old party and state apparatus managed to save to some extent its web of connections, adapt to the new conditions and to create, among others, the *KPRF*, the Agrarian party (*APR*), and the less fortunate but still influential Industrialists Union (*RSPP*).

On the other side, the new governmental network gave birth to Egor Gaidar's *Vybor Rossii* (Russia's Choice) bloc and Sergei Shakhrai's Party of Unity and Accord (*PRES*) in 1993, and to Viktor Chernomyrdin's 'Our Home is Russia' bloc (*NDR*) in 1995. *Vybor Rossii* was at least partly able to use rudiments of the former major, but in the meantime insignificant, umbrella organization of the democrats, the *DemRossiia* movement, for building up a new organization in 1993. *PRES* and *NDR*, in contrast, were solely conjured up by the tight federal executive hierarchy. Their campaigns were financed by, among others, the huge monopolist gas-combine *Gazprom*, by far the largest Russian enterprise (S, 9 July 1996), which had been headed by prime minister Chernomyrdin until he entered the government in 1992.

A partial exemption from this feature is the social-democratic-like Iavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc (*Iabloko*) which was set up from outside the government just before the 1993 parliamentary elections. However, though the Bloc was based on several small democratic grass-root organizations, its three most prominent leaders, Grigorii Iavlinskii, Iurii Boldyrev and Vladimir Lukin, came to prominence when they were members of the Soviet government and benefitted from their connections established at the previous stages of their involvement in high politics.

The only two parties that had been founded as apparently genuine grass-roots political groupings in historic 1990 - the birth year of the Russian multi-party system - and that in 1993 passed the election-test were the Democratic Party *DPR*, and the LDPR. Even so one could argue that the *DPR* is actually not a 'clean' case as its list of candidates then included three former, albeit not exceptionally well-known, ministers (Aleksandr Titkin, Nikolai Fedorov, Sergei Glaz'ev). Though the insider knowledge of these men played a certain role in the election campaign, it was presumably Nikolai Travkin's - i.e. the party leader's - charisma and comparatively well-organized apparatus which brought most of the votes. In any event, the *DPR* virtually disappeared from

Russia's political landscape after the December 1995 State Duma elections, and can thus also be disregarded in the following comparison.

It turns out that, all things considered, the LDPR is seemingly a comparatively exceptional case in post-Soviet Russian party politics. First, it has been active since early 1990 - the zero hour of the post-Soviet Russian multi-party system and time of foundation of dozens of other Russian micro parties which, by now, have *de facto* all either vanished or become negligible. Secondly, being today the only first-generation political organization still manifestly present in national-level politics, it has in contrast to the overwhelming majority of the subsequently founded parties, survived, in an - at least on the surface - largely unchanged state. It was, thirdly, constantly present in the media and able to conduct four generally effective federal election campaigns in succession until 1996. It was, fourthly, capable of doing so without any significant personal influx from 'above'.³² This indicates that the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' cannot be exclusively traced back to some momentary effects of intensive pre-electoral media magic which is why it seems worthwhile to have a closer look at the origins of the LDPR, and first of all on the background of its predominant leader.

³² An exception to this rule, one could argue, is Vladimir Kuz'mich Gusev (b. 1932) who is a former First Secretary of the Saratov region organization of the CPSU (1976-1984), First Deputy Prime-Minister of the RSFSR (1985-1986), and Deputy Prime-Minister of the USSR (1986-1991). Gusev suddenly appeared on position 10 of the LDPR all-federal list for the parliamentary elections in December 1993 (IuG, no. 40-41 [110-111], 1993, 6). He thus entered the Fifth State Duma where he became the Chairman of the Committee for Industry, Building, Transport and Energy (*Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 1st vol., 140). Subsequently, he has become a member of the LDPR, and the Chairman of the Committee for Industrial Policy in Zhirinovskii's 'shadow cabinet' (LDPR, no. 6 [26], 1996, 2). However, the case of Gusev does not in principle defeat the argument developed above as far as he was not, at the moment of his joining of Zhirinovskii (in spite of his former high positions), a very well-known political figure in Russia. Also, it seems that he has not been particularly active in the LDP's inner party life.

1.1. The Making of a Politician

Much has been written about Zhirinovskii's childhood and youth to explain his eccentric behaviour today. Yet, one could also approach Zhirinovskii's life story from another viewpoint. Not 'Why has he become so bizarre', but instead 'Why has he become such a fortunate politician?'

Citizen Kane à la Russe

The most relevant aspect of Zhirinovskii's childhood and youth, which comes to light from his own descriptions, is that he has apparently gone through an accumulation of what one might call 'sinister energy'.³³

Above all, he seems to have perceived his home as alien and unfriendly. He grew up as the sixth child in his family and lost his father (b. 1907), the second husband of his mother, shortly after his birth (Maximow and Odesskij 1994, 103). As will be detailed below, Zhirinovskii's three sisters and two brothers were apparently children from his mother's first husband who had died in August 1944. This meant that he, the only curly-headed and youngest child, bore a patronym and surname different from those of his older sisters and brothers. His mother had to feed her children alone, to work full-time, and could spare little time for the youngest child. The family lived in a cramped communal flat which they had to share with other people. According to Zhirinovskii, his fellow-lodgers showed no consideration for the young boy and even disfavoured him. He speaks of his home as a cave without a space of his own, and details shortages of food, sleep, clothes and toys. From the age of two or three, he attended for some time a 24-hour six-day-per-week creche which, he writes, he did not like and tried to escape from several times (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 6-30).³⁴ He also reported that his mother used to feed him in the canteen where she worked as a result of which he acquired gastritis and colon inflammation (Maximow and Odesskij 1994, 104-

³³ This line of argument tries to follow somewhat Harold Laswell's approach to biographies of political activists (1977).

³⁴ The following numbers in brackets will refer to pages in the autobiographical sections in the first September 1993 edition of Zhirinovskii's major political writing *The Last Dash to the South* (1993a).

105). He seemingly developed an adversarial relationship to his mother's lover, a younger man and apparently a drunkard who lived with his family when Zhirinovskii four to sixteen years old. Solovyov and Klepikova quote Zhirinovskii as saying that this stepfather 'brought us many sorrows' and that, when his mother 'had to choose between us, she chose him, because he was her lover'. The two biographers also speculate that young Vladimir has witnessed his mother and her lover making love in the small apartment, and that he mythologized his biological father Volf whom he knew only secondhand (1996, 30-31). One affirmative account of Zhirinovskii says that Zhirinovskii was actually brought up by his older sister Vera (N.N. 1994, 116). Zhirinovskii himself said that his birthday first was celebrated when he turned 12 years old (Lancelle and Frazer 1994, 132). If these and other similar descriptions are true, Zhirinovskii had a difficult childhood, and to rely at too early an age upon himself.

In a second stage he reports to have experienced a continuation of what he calls a '*dedovshchina*' (*ded* = grandfather) which is military slang meaning the hazing or bullying of newcomers by senior soldiers among the lower ranks of the army (24). As a Russian (at least by culture), he grew up in the capital of Kazakhstan, then called Alma Ata (today: Almaty). He reports that when he went to school, he encountered discrimination as a non-native and the more favourable marking of study performances of the Kazakhs. His mother, Zhirinovskii reports, explained to him that they were living under poor conditions because they were non-indigenous people and for that reason treated differently.³⁵

However, there is a strong suspicion that the latter allegations may be related less to real disadvantages or ethnic tensions, than to Zhirinovskii's later developed inferiority complex about having grown up as a Russian (at least by culture) in a non-Russian national republic (Kartsev

³⁵ Kartsev's commentary on this issue should be mentioned. The one-time boss of Zhirinovskii at *Mir* Publishers quotes a former Kazakh neighbour of Zhirinovskii in Almaty, Dyusenbek Nakipov, who reported that the boys in the neighbourhood did not accept and even bullied young Vladimir. On the basis of this, Kartsev claims that the incident '[...] does indeed illustrate to a certain extent the very nationalities problem that Zhirinovskii talked and talks so much about' (1995, 25-26). In view of the contextualization outlined below, I doubt, however, whether that is a sufficiently well-grounded conclusion (over 80% of the population of Alma-Ata was Russian). As will become clear later, it could be thought that young Vladimir may indeed have suffered from a specific nationality problem - anti-Semitism.

1995, 25). His anti-Kazakh assertions could be a mere projection into the past of Zhirinovskii's subsequently developed racism (Solovyov and Klepikova 1994, 48). That is because Almaty (formerly Vernyi) had been, as Zhirinovskii frequently points out himself, founded by Russian Cossacks in 1854 which meant that it was, at least in the 1950s-1960s, a largely Russian-populated city with relative inter-ethnic harmony. Zhirinovskii detailed that, in 1993, still 86% of the population were Russian (1993, 4). Although this figure might be an exaggeration with regard to 1993, Solovyov and Klepikova confirmed that, when Zhirinovskii grew up in Almaty, approximately 80% of its citizens were Russians who felt themselves to be the bosses. Zhirinovskii had thus only limited opportunities to actually meet Kazakhs, not to mention to be discriminated against by them (1995, 46-47).³⁶

Further, Zhirinovskii in his autobiography also complains that the so-called *natsmeny* - an acronym for *natsional'nye menshinstva* (national minorities) used pejoratively for non-Russian Soviet citizens - had easier access to Moscow's institutions of higher education (24). This allegation may, in contrast to the above one, have some real basis. There had indeed been a tendency in Soviet nationality policy to 'develop' - i.e. to russify - non-Russian 'national cadres' from the

³⁶ If his recollections were, in turn, not entirely untrue, another supposition would arise. As will be detailed below several journalists discovered in 1994 that Zhirinovskii's father was apparently Jewish (sec. 1.2.), and that Vladimir Vol'fovich had, therefore, borne the distinctly Jewish sounding surname Eidelshstein until the age of eighteen when he became old enough to change officially his surname. Some Russians and Russian Jews who have written on him have even claimed that they recognize from his physiognomy that he is Jewish (e.g. A. Minkin as quoted by Limonov 1994, 44; Timtschenko 1994, 14). On the basis of these circumstances, the assumption suggests itself that, if Zhirinovskii had been honest about early discriminations against himself and his family, they might have, in fact, been due to popular anti-Semitism (in combination, perhaps, with official 'anti-Zionism'), rather than to Kazakh anti-Russianness. As far as anti-Semitism was, according to one assessment, not particularly spread among ethnic Central Asians (Korey 1995, 115) and as Alma-Ata's (and, of course, his study place Moscow's) population was predominantly Russian, one can further speculate that Zhirinovskii might actually have suffered from discrimination against him by his 'fellow Russians', rather than by Kazakhs or other non-Russians. Notably, Zhirinovskii devoted in his autobiography some sentences especially to Jews in Alma-Ata:

There were in general many Jews in Alma-Ata, in the [school] class, in the city; the Jewish community was strong in those years. Apparently, that was a result of the relocations, migrations. In the years of World War II, the Jews flew from the West a long way to the East [and] found themselves in Alma-Ata. There were especially many of them among intellectuals [...]. (Zhirinovskii 1993e, 9)

titular Union and autonomous republics who would later become Moscow's indigenous satraps in the outer parts of the Soviet Empire (Suny 1993).

After school Zhirinovskii moved to Moscow to study, and describes this as a further step in this development. This time he saw himself in his institute as the alien and handicapped provincial amongst the privileged children of the capital's high officials. He writes in his autobiography that his constant feeling of isolation and being cornered made him concentrate his energy on personal advancement and social affairs. His study record can be seen as an early confirmation of this. He was admitted to the prestigious Moscow State University's Oriental Institute which had, according to one source, approximately three applicants on one place. Although he might have benefitted from a special quota for students from other national republics (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 60)³⁷, this was quite an achievement for somebody who had come from as far as Alma-Ata. The undergraduate Turkish area studies course he did at this institute was probably on a comparatively high level, and included intensive Turkish as well as some English language training. After six years of full-time study which included several practicals, Zhirinovskii passed 'With Distinction' in 1970. By this time, he had been a trade-union activist, and become the *Komsomol* secretary of his class, an important position on the Soviet career. Concurrently, he studied at the Department of International Relations of the University of Marxism-Leninism from 1965 to 1967 (Verkhovskii 1994, 2). Moreover, he subsequently managed to do a second degree by correspondence in international law also at Moscow State University, while learning simultaneously some French and German.³⁸

³⁷ Solovyov and Klepikova seem to imply that Zhirinovskii was, in view of his allegedly comparatively poor performance in the entrance examinations, admitted *only* because of a quota for students from other national republics (1995, 60). However, as far as they do not provide documentation for, or outline the specifics of, the affirmative action in place, it is not beyond doubt that Zhirinovskii's admission was indeed primarily related to a quota system. To be sure, there were, as mentioned, certain provisions in Soviet nationalities policies to 'develop' cadres from the non-Russian republics. Yet, in the first instance, these schemes aimed to sovietize and *de facto* russify the *indigenous* nationals from the Union republics. It is not clear whether Zhirinovskii, being not an ethnic Kazakh, but (a partly Jewish) Russian, was entitled to benefit from Soviet-style affirmative action.

³⁸ One author, in contrast, seemed to imply that, because Zhirinovskii confessed to have no strong inclination for science and the humanities, he is not a diligent and hard working person (Kibalnik 1996, 16). However, reports on his employment as a lawyer at *Iniurkollegiia* and *Mir* in the 1980s, and statements of

Although this *curriculum vitae* looks promising, it appears that his advancement was rather a compensation for private grievances than an expression of a fulfilled life. His son, Igor' Lebedev, confirmed in an October 1994 interview what several of Zhirinovskii's former and current political associates had stated before - that Zhirinovskii has no personal friends (as quoted in Oshlies 1995, 20). Although he married and had a son, he apparently divorced his wife in the mid-1970s (Conradi 1995, 53), lived until 1985 with his mother, and reanimated his marriage in the early 1990s for mere image reasons. Zhirinovskii himself wrote in his 1993 autobiography frankly that he had neither close friends as a child or later, nor a love interest or warm relationships with his relatives, and, therefore, a constant feeling of dissatisfaction (1993a, 42-43). He speaks openly about his ill fortune which he sees as a necessary precondition for becoming a mature and socially engaged citizen.

Apparently this was fate. [...] Like an artist or a composer who needs misfortune in order to create [art], [and] in order to get an inspiration. The same with me. In order to understand better and deeper political processes in society, I was deprived in all other regards. (42-43)

Implicitly, however, he admits that he would have been glad to waste 'half [...] or the larger part' of his energy on an *amant*, and more time on a close friend or good relations with his relatives (43). Nevertheless, he concludes that these circumstances ultimately had a positive effect as they stimulated his social concern.

The last point to be made here in this regard touches a second aspect of Zhirinovskii's evolution as a politician. It seems to be a crucial characteristic of his political rise that he

his former bosses there clearly confirmed that he worked hard, cleverly, inventively, and competently (Conradi 1995, 52; Kartsev 1995, 16-19, 70). The overall impression I got from the study of Zhirinovskii's political rise is too that he put a lot of time and energy into his advancement, and showed considerable effectiveness in, and concern for, not only political, but also organizational matters. This is in contrast to Adolf Hitler who was known as being lazy, undisciplined and ineffective in day-to-day matters, and had been, in his pre-political private and professional life, largely a loser (Waite 1993 [1977]).

accomplished it as a - at least on the surface - relatively isolated figure. To start with, it is striking that Zhirinovskii, though he had been a *Komsomol* functionary, was never a Communist Party member. He is now proud of the latter aspect (and seems to have forgotten about the former), and counts it presumably rightly as a considerable political plus (Part II). Yet, documents and witnesses have proven that this is by no means a result of a consciously taken decision made by himself, but rather a resolution which had been made by his superiors. In fact, he tried twice to become a CPSU member as an undergraduate student at the Oriental Institute in the late 1960s and as a lawyer at the Soviet Soviet Foreign Bar Association *Iniurkollegiia* in the early 1980s. He simply did not get in (AiF, no. 2-3, 1994; Khopak 1995; Appendix). Moreover, after his second unsuccessfully application, he reportedly showed considerable anger about the refusal of his superiors to support his request (IHT, 7 March 1994; Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 76-78).

On the other hand, Zhirinovskii did not enter one of the semi-official anti-Soviet circles of the metropolitan *intelligentsiia* as, for instance, those of the *institutchiki* (men of the academic institutes) or artists. For an allegedly socially concerned and well-educated man living in Moscow this was a somewhat unusual separateness.

Zhirinovskii's non-communist and non-dissident past meant that, when he entered politics, he was in a peculiar situation. In distinction from most of his political competitors, he seemingly could neither count on any previously established firm, unofficial bonds, nor benefit from a formal attachment to surviving Soviet institutions which had been adopted to the new system and could have provided a convenient network for advancement in post-Soviet Russian politics. The former establishment was partly able either to adjust simply its existing organizations to the new conditions, or to translate previous political or administrative influence into economic ones, and to use then its financial resources in its bid for power under new conditions. The new democrats coming 'from below', on the other side, had little trouble with promotion as they could quickly attain powerful positions in the 'tail of El'tsin' who after the August 1991 putsch suddenly acquired large powers. Zhirinovskii, in contrast, had (at least officially) nobody on whom he could rely on, or who would have fostered him, and no significant political past. His only chance was the Russian voter. I would suggest that he was one of the few significant Russian political actors of 1991-93

who took the electoral game seriously from the beginning believing that it provided the only proper way of political advancement, and who, therefore, earlier than many of his rivals, developed a high sensitivity for some crucial democratic rules and populist devices.³⁹ One could add that Zhirinovskii was well-prepared for this, as he had, as indicated above, become used to fighting alone against an environment which he perceived as unfriendly. Finally, Zhirinovskii's reportedly only Oriental Institute fellow student who had also a non-privileged background, Iurii Sheka, today a Turkish language lecturer at the Institute, stated that

[w]henever [Zhirinovskii] was asked what he wants to do with his live he said that he wants to become an organizer, somebody who organizes people. (as quoted in Conradi 1994, 42)

It is against the background of the inglorious record of Zhirinovskii's competitors of 1990 - i.e. of the original multiple authentic democratic organisations - that Alexander Yanov's noted:

Zhirinovskii [is] a serious politician, and it is a mistake to perceive him as some kind of political clown. He is, I would say, one of the few Western style politicians in Russia, [one of] those who attach great importance to their image especially among the masses, who feel the mood of the masses, and who are able to present themselves as such human beings, who can please them [the masses]. The others do not attach to this importance, [and] reckon conceitedly on that their deeds will speak for them. (1993)

³⁹ For instance, he managed to visit the obscure provincial city of Vologda four times between 1990 and December 1993. In view of such an exceptional attention by a federal-level politician, it becomes understandable that the Vologda Popular Movement of young entrepreneurs advocating a 'capitalism with a Russian face' distributed leaflets warning that they would take 'all measures to retaliate against a person or representative of the mass media who attempt to discredit the person and activity of V.V. Zhirinovskii.' (as quoted in Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 167)

The Man in the Street

A further possible reason for Zhirinovskii's success-story is that the seemingly peculiar experiences of his youth are in fact in some respects remarkably similar to that of many ordinary Russians. The biographies of a large part of the Russian population include migration through the Soviet empire, life in *kommunalki* (communal, shared flats), encounters with national tensions and injustice (both real and imagined), and frustrations resulting from unfulfilled hopes for social advancement. Hundreds of thousands lost their parents - mostly their fathers - during Stalin's campaigns and purges, and World War II. They thus went through a childhood not dissimilar to that of Zhirinovskii. In contrast, many of the old communists and new democrats have benefitted from various privileges during - at least - parts of their life time, when they were either *apparatchiki* or *institutchiki* (i.e. when they belonged to the administrative or academic sections of the Soviet elite). Therefore, one could argue that Zhirinovskii is not entirely wrong in saying to his voters: 'I am one of you!' (as quoted in Plekhanov 1992, 82), inasmuch as he may have a deeper understanding of the grievances of the ordinary Russian than many of his metropolitan competitors (Gussejnow 1994, 90; Ignatow 1994a, 6).

The Possessed

A final aspect worth mentioning in connection with this refers to the above formulated hypothesis about his 'sinister energy'. Zhirinovskii's obsessive political activity, his radical statements and his promises of quick solutions are perhaps for Western observers indications that he cannot be taken seriously and is disqualifying himself as a statesman. However, this image of an especially energetic and resolute leader has its appeal not only because of the contemporary deep social crisis in Russia. Its attractiveness is also founded on Russian political tradition (Oleshuk 1994, 78). It was possibly one of the most fateful developments in the Russian revolutionary movement, that, beginning with the terrorist Sergei Nechaev (1847-1882) - Fëdor Dostoevskii's primary example for his novel *The Possessed* - boundless energy has been seen as the revolutionary's highest virtue. Lenin and Stalin

ascended to the top partly because of the Party's conviction that their rivals, while perhaps superior to them morally and intellectually, lacked the main prerequisite of revolutionary leadership: ruthless energy. (Ulam 1977, 199-200).

This trait of Russian politics seems to have now come to the foreground again.

1.2. Zhirinovskii as an 'Informal'

The Birth of a *Divan* Party⁴⁰

Like a number of other political groupings which have emerged in Russia in 1990, the Liberal-Democratic Party was a late split off of the first official and independent anti-communist party of the Soviet Union, the Democratic Union (*DS*) (Aves 1988; McFaul and Markov 1993, 22-42). Although a liberal-democratic initiative group was set up already on 8-9 May 1988, when the *DS* itself was founded, there was apparently, in the beginning, no plan to create an autonomous party of that kind. The separation began when some members of *DS* were expelled after a quarrel with one of its leaders, Valeriia Novodvorskaia (b. 1950). Among them were Lev Ubozhko (b. 1933), a former political prisoner, and Vladimir Bogachëv (b. 1944). Bogachëv, a poet and composer, had reportedly many confrontations with the *KGB*, and been imprisoned for anti-Soviet propaganda three times between 1968 and 1986 (St, no. 44, 1992, 14; Berezovskii and Cherviakov 1993, 69; Verkhovskii 1994, 26; Conradi 1995, 62). He was later reported to own some commercial kiosks around the Moscow House of Government or 'White House' (Pribylovskii 1995c, 43).

Ubozhko, Bogachëv and some others formed at the end of 1988 a micro-organization named the Democratic Party, which calls itself today the Conservative Party. Soon afterwards, Bogachëv, in turn, left this party, and founded his own political group in the spring of 1989. At

⁴⁰ 'Divan party' is a post-Soviet Russian label for a political organization the members of which can be seated on one sofa.

some point in 1989, he was joined by Zhirinovskii, who had by this time written a programme for a Social-Democratic Party of Russia (reprinted in Verkhovskii 1994, 39-40; Schmidt-Häuer 1993). On 13 December 1989, the Bogachëv-Zhirinovskii group held an organizational meeting for the foundation of a new political organization, and Zhirinovskii's revised script became the basis for the draft programme of the Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union LDPSU (Pribylovskii 1991b, 17). Its founding congress took place on 31 March 1990, when a Central Committee (12 members), a chairman (Zhirinovskii) and a 'coordinator' (Bogachëv) were elected.

On the Look-Out

The reports about Zhirinovskii's previous political development during the *glasnost* period 1985-1990 are, so far, only partly documented. At that time he was working as a lawyer for a large publishing house in Moscow called *Mir* (Peace). At *Mir*, he had become known for his outspokenness on political issues already in early 1985, before Gorbachëv came to power. When, in 1987, it became obvious that Gorbachëv would politically keep a slack rein, Zhirinovskii even developed into a democratic activist, and tried to use *Mir* several times as a spring-board for a political career (Khopak 1995; Appendix). Because this turned out to be a pointless endeavour, he became instead increasingly involved in Moscow's emerging alternative political scene.

According to one source he joined an 'informal' club called *Fakel* (Torch) as early as 1987. Subsequently, he participated in the prominent - yet probably heavily *KGB*-infiltrated - human rights seminar 'Democracy and Humanism', which in turn was an off-spring of the dissident group 'Trust - for the Establishment of Trust between the East and the West' founded in 1984. 'Democracy and Humanism' took part in the above mentioned foundation of the Democratic Union in Moscow in May 1988. Zhirinovskii was elected to the *DS*' coordinating council, but reportedly expelled the next day for communist predilections (S, 22 December 1993; Berezovskii *et al.* 1992, 7; *Idem* 1991, 44-47). Two Russian authors, however, specified that he made the proposal:

Let us rather write [into the party programme] that we support the communists. Later we will stab them in the back. (as quoted in Maximow and Odesskij 1994, 101)

Other sources report that Zhirinovskii became a co-director of a Jewish cultural organization called *Shalom* founded in late October 1988 (RM, 15 January 1993; Limonov 1993; In, 22 December 1993). The creation of this organization was sponsored by the so called Jewish 'Anti-Zionist' Committee, an odious *KGB* creature (Korey 1995), in order to prevent the formation of an independent Jewish movement. This is confirmed by, among other things, the fact that Lev B. Shapiro, a CPSU Central Committee member and First Secretary of the Birobidzhan Jewish Autonomous District, was the chairman of *Shalom*'s leading body. Since Zhirinovskii had no previous contacts with Jewish groups, he was believed to be a representative from the Soviet authorities. However, once elected a co-director of *Shalom* (no. 12 on the list of its administrators), and head of four sections of its leading body (humanitarian-judicial issues, philosophical-religious issues, history, foreign economic relations), he is said to have made useful comments, and helped to oust directors linked to the Anti-Zionist Committee and to have cooperated with the independent wing of the organization. One report even says that without Zhirinovskii's statements the organization would have been pro-Soviet. Anyhow, *Shalom* was superseded by an independent organization called *Vaad* (Council) already 1989. After he left *Shalom*, Zhirinovskii is reported to have given occasional help in legal work to *Vaad* (G, 17 December 1993; *Russkii Vostok*, no. 14 [33], 1993; *taz*, 21 December 1993; Spier 1994; Estraiikh 1994; *Moskva-Ierusalim: Sionistskaia gazeta*, no. 3 [20], March 1994, 3).

Excursus I: The Jewish Background

This information raises the question about Zhirinovskii's family record, which is - unfortunately for the would-be Russian president - not unimportant for an ultra-nationalist politician.⁴¹ The activities described above and further information suggest that Zhirinovskii is partly Jewish (Tolz and Teague 1992, 2; Yasmann and Teague 1994, 34). Not only had Zhirinovskii in his autobiography, for some reason, listed 'legions of relatives on his mother's

⁴¹ In an interview, Zhirinovskii himself pointed out: 'If I had been an Ivanov, I would have been President for a long time.' (as quoted in Al'bats 1995, 50)

side', but not mentioned 'a single one of his father's relations' (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 27). There was always an obvious gap in Zhirinovskii's official biography in that it remained unexplained who was the father of Vladimir Vol'fovich's siblings who have without exception a different patronym, i.e. Andreev or Andreeva (V. Ivanov 1996, 63). Some commentators went so far as to pose the question why Zhirinovskii derived his Russianness only from the fact that his *mother* was Russian. By this, these commentators interpreted, he is invoking the laws of orthodox Judaism whereby a person is considered a Jew only if his mother is Jewish (Al'bats 1995, 50; Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 27).

One of the rare statements of Zhirinovskii about his paternal background was made in connection with allegations against him that he is a fascist. The LDP-leader stated that '[n]early the whole of my father's family was shot by the [German] fascists' (as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 60). Though millions of Russians perished under Nazi occupation, the more systematic forms of killing, among them shooting, were primarily applied to (besides communists) Soviet Jews (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 27).

In 1994, a team of journalists found documents in an Almaty archive which apparently prove that Zhirinovskii's father's (i.e. his mother's second husband's) actual name was not Vol'f Andreevich Zhirinovskii, as stated in Zhirinovskii's official biography, but Vol'f Isaakovich Eidelstein - a typical Jewish name (CNN, 8 April 1994). It has been also questioned whether Zhirinovskii's notorious, frequently quoted phrase 'My mother is Russian, my father - a jurist' is actually correct. Al'bats quotes a Western journalist who apparently discovered that, in fact, not Vol'f Isaakovich, but Zhirinovskii's uncle Aron Isaakovich Eidelstein had been a jurist. Vol'f Isaakovich was, according to this information, a manager at an enterprise producing shoes and clothes. The man whose surname Zhirinovskii bears is Andrei Vasil'evich Zhirinovskii, the first husband of Zhirinovskii's mother who died of tuberculosis, probably, in late July or on 1 August 1944, and thus could not have been the father of Zhirinovskii who was born on 25 April 1946 (Morrison 1994, 26; Conradi 1995, 36). Andrei Vasil'evich is reported to have served with the *NKVD* (the predecessor organization of the *KGB*) where he had risen to the position of Security Department Head of the Leningrad Railway until he fell victim to Stalin's purges, and was

imprisoned for one year in the late thirties (Al'bats 1995, 50). His last job before his death was as the Forestry Department Head of Turkestan-Siberian Railways (Conradi 1995, 36).

Reportedly, Zhirinovskii's mother registered her youngest son in school not as Vladimir Vol'fovich Eidelstein, but as Vladimir Andreevich Zhirinovskii. However, it was only in June 1964 when Zhirinovskii - alias Eidelstein - had become 18 years old, and, therefore, was allowed to choose officially between his father's and mother's last names. He was thus able to apply successfully for a change of his surname which meant that 'Zhirinovskii' appeared on his school-leaving diploma (Al'bats 1995, 52; Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 28).⁴²

Finally, one could mention that some reports said that he received an invitation for emigration to Israel in 1983 (In, 22 December 1993).⁴³ According to Zhirinovskii's former fellow

⁴² For the benefit of the psychologically interested reader, it might be worth mentioning that Zhirinovskii described in his biography a similar change of names by his English teacher Esterna Moiseyevna Blinder who became Yelena Mikhailovna Blinder '[a]pparently, under the influence of anti-Semitism'. Zhirinovskii reports that he had a serious conflict with this teacher who, he thought, persecuted him (as quoted in Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 32-33).

⁴³ Kartsev puts forward the argument that Zhirinovskii 'could never pass for Jewish' because he is not circumcised (1995, 30). However, this fact seems to be irrelevant to the discussion about who was his father. For further particulars on Zhirinovskii's family background, see the carefully investigated study by Conradi (1995, 35-41).

It goes without saying that the collection of these kind of details is a somewhat strange endeavour. I (and other students of Zhirinovskii's life as well) naturally do not care about Zhirinovskii's ethnic background (he seems to be, by culture, 100% Russian). It is in view of his occasional anti-Jewish statements (sometimes transmitted by the codeword 'Zionism') that these facts have a certain political significance (Spier 1994; Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 25-26).

In addition, the issue of the nationality of his father, or Zhirinovskii's thoughts on who his father was could be of interest to psychological analyses of the LDP leader. For instance, Adolf Hitler is not only somewhat similar to Zhirinovskii in that he did not grow up in what he considered his real fatherland, Germany, but in Austria. Hitler's mere suspicion that his grand-father *might* have been Jewish (an issue never solved) has been interpreted as an important factor in the formation of his world view and policies (Waite 1993).

One should note though that Zhirinovskii's anti-Semitism is much less virulent than Hitler's. It is even more moderate than that of many other Russian right-wing extremists (including some in Zhirinovskii's entourage). For several of them the Jews are, as in Hitler's case, the primary concern (Reznik 1996). Solovyov and Klepikova go so far as to approve the late former US-President Richard Nixon who during a visit to Moscow in 1994 stated that, for Zhirinovskii in contrast to Hitler, anti-Semitism 'is a tactic, a cynical attempt to exploit popular biases' (1995, 111). Anyway, in view of the, in comparison to other Russian ultra-nationalists, apparently subordinate importance of anti-Semitism to Zhirinovskii's ideology, I have chosen to skip in this study this particular aspect of his rhetoric.

student, Dmitrii Prokof'ev, now a correspondent for Israeli radio in Moscow, the *KGB* intended to plant Zhirinovskii in Israel, but had second thoughts at the last minute (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 34). According to former LDPR functionary V. Ivanov, former *KGB* Chairman Viktor Barannikov told him there is a copy of Zhirinovskii's application for emigration in the *KGB* archives (1996, 222).

On December 24, 1993, eloquent Zhirinovskii made clear:

I had thousands of blood-tests. If you could find specialists who could find at least 5% of Jewish blood in me, I would be happy. But there is nothing. (as quoted in Oschlies 1995, 22)

Excursus II: The *KGB* Connection

This leads to another aspect of Zhirinovskii's biography which could be relevant to his future prospects in Russian politics: Had he been tied to the *KGB* before he entered politics, and, if yes, when, and how close were these links? For instance, one report details that he became an informant during his law studies by correspondence in the mid-1970s. Allegedly, he was caught dealing illegally in hard currency and started to work for the secret service in order to escape prosecution (MN, no. 45, 1990; Tolz and Teague 1992, 2). However, since this information was given during a conflict inside the LDPSU by political opponents in 1990, it might be unreliable.

It might be finally worth-mentioning that there is an indication for another possible parallel in the psychology of Zhirinovskii and Hitler. As Hitler did, Zhirinovskii has expressed exceptional feelings for his mother. He admitted openly that his private life as a teenager and in the twenties had been unsatisfactorily. With reference to this experience he stated that

[m]aybe the love to [my] mother played also a [certain] role. I grew up without a father. And everything to which my child-soul was able was directed to my mother; I loved her very much. And I could not imagine that she dies or disappears. Apparently, [my] whole potential for love was absorbed by the love of the son for his mother, including also a young man's potential for love for a young women. (Zhirinovskii 1993, 10)

Further suggestion concerning the psychopathological aspects of Zhirinovskii's personality might be found in the books by Aaron Belkin (1994), and Vladimir Ivanov (1996) who are both physicians.

Other speculations cover the whole career of Zhirinovskii. There have been reports that the *KGB* was the patron of Zhirinovskii's school (reportedly the best one) in Alma-Ata since its local headquarters were next to the school (*Time*, 11 July 1994; Kartsev 1995, 59). In accordance with this, further reports imply that his admission to Moscow's Asia/Africa-Institute was already the starting point of cooperation with the security organs. Zhirinovskii's entrance into the Oriental Institute itself caused suspicion because, as mentioned above, its student body consisted mainly of children of *apparatchiki* from Soviet central institutions. This could mean that the passing of the entrance examinations may not have been the only prerequisite for admission to this school. Al'bats, for instance, speculates on whether Zhirinovskii may have sought the support of former colleagues of his mother's first husband Andrei Vasil'evich Zhirinovskii, a former security service officer, in his application to the Oriental Institute (1995, 53). Equally, Semyon Reznik speculates:

Since his mother did not have money for a lucrative bribe, the likely alternative [way of getting admitted at the Institute] is that the young man had connections. Someone very powerful (the *KGB*?) wanted him to be in the Institute. (1995, 232)

In connection with this, one should mention that, according to one account, approximately one-fourth of the institute's graduates went directly into elite foreign intelligence work, and many of the rest secured jobs in other branches of the *KGB* (Yasmann and Teague 1994, 34).

A probation period in Turkey during Zhirinovskii's university studies in 1969-70, and an incident there, prompted further guess-work. The originally planned 12-month Turkish internship was, according to some sources, the first such practical for a student of the Oriental Institute (MK, 9-10 November 1994; Oshlies 1995, 24). The approval for a practical work period in a capitalist country was certainly given by, among others, the *KGB*. It must have ergo been confident about Zhirinovskii's loyalty which led former *KGB* staff Oleg Kalugin and Oleg Gordievskii to assume that Zhirinovskii was recruited in Turkey (Morrison 1994, 18). However, for reasons never fully disclosed he had some serious trouble with the Turkish authorities. According to the later Turkish ambassador to the United States Nuzkhet Kandemir, it was well-known that Zhirinovskii worked as

a *KGB* agent. The immediate cause for his arrest after the first eight months of his stay, however, seems according to Kandemir have been that he propagated communist ideas among Turkish workers and goaded them against the Turkish government (Conradi 1995, 46). Reportedly, he was held in prison several days and then, under a mutual agreement with the Soviet embassy, forced to leave the country within 24 hours because of 'communist propaganda' (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 72). Zhirinovskii himself claims that the only thing he did was to distribute among friends badges showing Aleksandr Pushkin's or Lev Tolstoi's heads, which were mistaken as Marx' or Lenin's portraits. What exactly happened has remained unclear, but one report says that Zhirinovskii's professors and co-students, who had known him before the trip as a merry fellow and joker, perceived him after this as badgered and morally broken (AiF, no. 2-3, 1994). Solovyov and Klepikova wondered that Zhirinovskii had not been excluded from the *Komsomol* after the incident, and mentioned reporters who had ascribed the mildness of the punishment to this rapprochement with the *KGB* (1995, 73). Mysteriously, the internship in Turkey was not reported in the file on Zhirinovskii in the university archives (Conradi 1995, 46).

The next station of his biography - a two-year service in the Soviet Army - could also be interpreted as a sign of links with the security forces, as he became a political officer in a military intelligence unit. After this he worked for the Soviet Committee for the Protection of Peace, which was regarded to be a communist front-organization and a *KGB* offshoot.⁴⁴ Zhirinovskii's following occupation was to take care of foreign trade union activists studying at the Moscow Higher Trade Union School, a job which was probably under the control of the *KGB* too. His attendance of evening classes in law at Moscow State University was, in one report, also interpreted as a proof for connections to the Secret Service, because those courses were primarily designed to improve the professional skills of police and security officers (Sp, no. 51, 1993, 114). His last station before

⁴⁴ The Peace Committee later reappears in Zhirinovskii's biography as the place of the founding conference of the notorious Centrist Bloc in June 1990 (sec. 1.3.; Luchterhandt 1991, 4). One source mentioned that the Peace Committee's 1987-92 chairman, the famous writer, journalist and USSR People's Deputy Genrikh A. Borovik (b. 1929) - falsely called Borovoi - is married to *KGB* Chairman Vladimir Kriuchkov's sister (Limonov 1994, 38). Another source even mentioned rumours that Borovik was himself a *KGB* General (L. Ivanov 1996, 241). On the dubious activities of the successor institution of the Soviet Peace Committee after 1991, see St, no. 30, 1994, 16-18.

entering politics, the *Mir* publishing house, had mostly to do with foreign customers. It was, therefore, potentially interesting for the *KGB* as well which led Viktor Dashevskii to assert that Zhirinovskii then started to work for the Committee of State Security (Kartsev 1995, 39-41). Less plausible was the report of an Austrian journalist who revealed that, allegedly, Iurii Andropov (1914-1984), a former *KGB* Chairman and CPSU General Secretary, had firstly discovered Zhirinovskii's 'talents' (as quoted in N.N. 1994, 61).

Concerning his early political activities one author draws attention to the fact that Zhirinovskii never had problems with the police or security forces though he was present at several public demonstrations of the radically anti-Soviet liberals of the *DS* in the late 1980s. According to the same author, Zhirinovskii introduced himself as a former *KGB* officer at a press conference after the foundation of the *DS* in early May 1988 (Luchterhandt 1994, 119). *DS* co-founder and chairwomen Valeriia Novodvorskaia explicitly identified Zhirinovskii as a *KGB* agent in January 1994 (Timtschenko 1994, 37). A Russian journal reported that Zhirinovskii had openly backed a *KGB* candidate in local elections in Moscow in early 1990 (St, no. 36, 1991, 20). One factor leading to the split of the LDPSU in October 1990 were accusations by his compatriots that Zhirinovskii was in league with the *KGB* (Conradi 1995, 87). In 1991, the leading democratic activist Gleb Iakunin declared that Zhirinovskii's party was a creature of *KGB* chairman V.A. Kriuchkov (*Vechernii klub*, no. 14, 1991, 1). Viktor Aksiuchits, chairman of the Russian Christian-Democratic Movement, made similar allegations (St, nos. 26, 27, 36 and 44, 1991). A former deputy of the LDPR leader, L. Alimov, noted that, when Zhirinovskii visited in 1991 the cities Inta and Vologda, he first went to the local *KGB* offices (St, no. 5, 1992, 8). An RSFSR Supreme Soviet commission on the circumstances of the August 1991 putsch came in late 1991 to the conclusion that not only the CPSU Central Committee (via Polozkov's *RKP* and Zavidiiia; sec. 2.3.), but also the *KGB* had supported the LDP financially (*Kommersant*''', no. 50, 1991; St, no. 5, 1992, 8). In January 1994, the former mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatolii Sobchak, made the widely disputed allegation that also the reformist wing of the political leadership - including Aleksandr Iakovlev and Gorbachëv himself - were involved in the decision to create the LDP after the abolition of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution which had fixed the dominant role of the

Communist Party in Soviet society and politics until mid-March 1990 (LG, no. 2, 12 January 1994; Luchterhandt 1994, 120; Sobchak 1995, 162).⁴⁵ The allegation that Zhirinovskii had been an agent who infiltrated the democratic movement was confirmed by Oleg Kalugin, a retired *KGB* General (Sp, no. 51, 1993, 115). Kalugin also stated that his former colleagues told him that Zhirinovskii was in fact recruited by military counter-intelligence in his student years and was called 'our Volodia [the Russian diminutive of Vladimir]' at the *KGB* (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 69). The former *KGB* Deputy Chairman Viktor Ivanenko stated that Zhirinovskii was 'without doubt a person who was of interest for the intelligence agencies'; yet 'there are of course no proofs' (as quoted in Hirscher and Lange 1994, 38). Another former *KGB* officer, Colonel Oleg Nechiporenko, also assumes that Zhirinovskii had served with the security service (Al'bats 1995, 52) whereas other high *KGB*-officials concluded that Zhirinovskii was a covered agent of the *GRU* (Main Intelligence Department), i.e. the spying service of the Soviet Army (Al'bats 1995, 55). One source detailed that he was an active reserves *KGB* Captain (Maximow and Odesskij 1994, 111). In an interview in October 1995, the former *KGB* staff official Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Valentinov asserted that Zhirinovskii's emergence was masterminded in the security organs which, by developing an odious political figure, allegedly wanted to create the impression that no alternative to the country's chief political leader exists, and wanted to give Gorbachëv room for negotiations on the international arena (Zhilin 1995).

Concerning the period after Zhirinovskii's entrance into politics, there were speculations about whether his running-mate in the 1991 presidential elections, Andrei Zavidia (sec. 2.3.) is a

⁴⁵ Gorbachëv strongly rejected Sobchak's accusation, and denounced, in turn, El'tsin's entourage (to which Sobchak then belonged) for having taken Zhirinovskii out of political nowhere on the eve of the December 1993 elections in order to appear themselves as a more attractive choice (I, 13 January 1994, 2). The notorious chairman of the so called Centrist Bloc, Vladimir Voronin (sec. 1.3.), added a further twist to these allegations. He claimed that, in late 1990, Sobchak was elected to the post of 'Prime-Minister' of the shadow cabinet of the Centrist Bloc (of which the LDPSU was a member at that time). Allegedly, Zhirinovskii had by then met Sobchak 'dozens of times' at the Bloc's headquarters (as quoted in Timtschenko 1994, 55). (As will become clear in sec. 1.3., Voronin is not among the most reliable sources.) Sobchak himself only confirmed that, after the Centrist Bloc had asked 'persistently' for a meeting with him, he met once with Voronin, Zhirinovskii and ten further persons associated, among others, with the CPSU and *Komsomol* Central Committee apparatuses and the CPSU Academy of Social Sciences in autumn 1990. The meeting, however, was without any results (Sobchak 1995, 162).

KGB General (Hirscher and Lange 1994, 77). The treasurer of the German Party of Democratic Socialism, the successor organization of the East German communist party, Dietmar Bartsch stated in January 1994 that Zhirinovskii may have had access to money from the former East German Socialist Unity Party through the *KGB* (Hirscher and Langer 1994, 52; sec. 2.3.). Two former LDP activists (who each had worked with Zhirinovskii for about four years) independently pointed out the close contacts between Zhirinovskii and Mikhail Barsukov who, between 1994 and June 1996, headed the major successor organization of the *KGB*, the Federal Service of Security (Orlov 1996, 207; V. Ivanov 1996, 276).

On the other side, the extremely informative book on Zhirinovskii's pre-political biography by Vladimir Kartsev, the former boss of Zhirinovskii at *Mir*, argued explicitly that the LDP leader had not been tied to the *KGB*, at least not before his entrance into politics (1995). Kartsev may have a point. The leading specialist on Soviet-Russian anti-Semitism, William Korey, refers to the famous Soviet dissident Roy Medvedev who reported that a secret CPSU directive of 1970, i.e. of the year in which Zhirinovskii finished undergraduate studies,

recommended that Jews not be employed at 'responsible levels' at various scientific and security institutions. The directive even applied to those who were listed as Russian in their internal passport or other documents, but whose father or mother had been Jewish [which was the case with Zhirinovskii - A.U.]. (Korey 1995, 118)

This information could well be an additional explanation for Zhirinovskii's ultimately relatively unsuccessful career (in view of his education) in Soviet state and party structures.

However, the conclusion that Zhirinovskii's employment in sensitive areas, and thus his cooperation with the *KGB*, was totally blocked from the outset would seem to contradict such weighty facts that Zhirinovskii visited a capitalist country already as a student, and did in the 1970s work in institutions like a Transcaucasian intelligence unit of the Soviet army, the Western Europe Department of the Soviet Peace Committee, or the Moscow Higher Trade Union School where he was responsible for foreign students. It is inconceivable that he got these jobs without - at

the least - explicit consent of the security organs. Moreover, at some points Zhirinovskii openly admitted his connections to the KGB, as on the occasion of the foundation of the Democratic Union in May 1988, or when, in 1994, he announced the 'liquidation' with the help of the *KGB* of a Moscow German embassy consular employee who informed him that his application for a German visa had been rejected (Timtschenko 1994, 109).

In any event, none of the allegations concerning Zhirinovskii's close ties to the *KGB* were properly supported by documents. Indeed, they hardly could have been substantiated properly in the case of a former security service officer.⁴⁶ The accusations were apparently stimulated by some notable side-effects of Zhirinovskii's advancement into high politics which were very strange indeed. In distinction to most of the details mentioned above, the circumstances of what happened since 1990 are well-documented.⁴⁷

1.3. Pseudo-Liberals in Pseudo-Politics

April-Fool Hoax, Soviet Style

The Soviet public was informed about the LDPSU's existence on 1 April 1990, i.e. the day after the founding congress of the Zhirinovskii-Bogachëv group. Not only was, for some reason, the LDPSU foundation at the Moscow Rusakov House of Culture protected by police, and the first press-conference of the LDPSU provided by Boris Oleinik, a member of the CPSU Central

⁴⁶ In August 1991, the *KGB* issued an official statement 'confirming' that Zhirinovskii has never worked for the security organs. This statement has subsequently been reproduced in the LDP press (L, no. 4-5, 1992). However, the character and content of many previous utterances by this agency and its representatives suggest that one should not take such statements too seriously. Former *KGB* Deputy Chairman Viktor Ivanenko remarked:

[Zhirinovskii] was doubtlessly a person of interest for the security services. [...] But concerning a proof... of course, there are no proofs. (as quoted in Hirscher and Lange 1994, 38)

⁴⁷ It is less because of the above multiple allegations against Zhirinovskii concerning his possible cooperation with the *KGB*, than in view of later developments outlined below that Kartsev's extensively outlined assertion that the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' is not related to the *KGB* (1995) is inconceivable.

Committee, at the Hotel *Oktiabr'skaia*, the major Moscow guest house of the Communist Party elite (Pribylovskii 1995c, 43; Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 8). In a sudden touch of pluralistic enthusiasm, which went clearly beyond the still existing limits of *glasnost*, all the major Soviet newspapers announced the foundation of the LDPSU - 'the USSR's first opposition party' - on their front pages (as quoted in Mevedev 1993, 85). Even the main evening television news-programme *Vremia* (Time) reported the event as a headline. In view of more recent developments, the Soviet Central-Committee-controlled mass media seems to have been exceptionally far-sighted in devoting so much attention to these 'liberal democrats'. In 1990, the excessive coverage of the foundation of the miniscule LDPSU, however, contrasted sharply with the meagre and less favourable treatment of the creation of other *neformaly* groups, some of which were nevertheless much better known among the public, politically more significant and, in comparison to Zhirinovskii's group, significantly larger at this stage (as, for instance, the Democratic and the Social-Democratic Parties of Russia). In addition, they were often led by members of the Union or republican parliaments, as distinct from the then obscure Zhirinovskii and Bogachëv who had no mandate (Luchterhandt 1991, 2, and 1994, 120; Wishnevsky 1990, 5).

Centrism, Soviet Style⁴⁸

The next step in a series of such rather peculiar nuances was the setting up of a so called Moderate-Radical Centrist Bloc of Political Parties and Movements - an event also widely reported in the central media in summer 1990 (Luchterhandt 1994, 121). The Bloc proclaimed itself as a force of moderation and mediation between the conservative Soviet Establishment, and the 'radical' democrats. Its founding conference took place in the building of the Soviet Peace Committee, once a KGB-controlled employer of Zhirinovskii, in early June 1990 (Luchterhandt 1991, 4, and 1994, 121). Its first press-conference was given in the press-centre of the Central Committee of the CPSU in September 1990 (Conradi 1995, 86). According to one source, the Bloc's original founder was

⁴⁸ The elaborations on the (pseudo-) 'centrism' of the Centrist Bloc 1990-1991 are largely unrelated and irrelevant to the category of 'conventional centrism' introduced briefly in the introduction, and used in Section 4.1.

the notorious Muscovite monarchist Aleksei Brumel' (Berezovskii 1994, 99) who, according to a former LDP headquarters employee, later developed ties to one of Zhirinovskii's personal assistants, G.P. Kazantsev (Orlov 1996, 208). Its then only really well-known founding member, according to another report, was chess world-champion Garri Kasparov who, however, soon left the grouping without having played any role in its activities (Conradi 1995, 85). The Bloc included temporarily more than 40 micro-parties and ghost organizations of which the LDPSU (with its *alleged* 3,000 members) was apparently the largest. Concerning the Centrist Bloc's membership numbers, one reference book estimates that, in deviation from the respective official figure of 1990 for the LDPSU alone, the Bloc's total number of supporters had been not more than 100 to 150 (Pribylovskii 1991b, 50).

Multi-Party System, Soviet Style⁴⁹

Among these organizations was, firstly, a group called *Soiuz demokraticeskikh sil imeni A.D. Sakharova* (Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces) numbering about 3 to 4 political activists and 10 to 15 payed employees (Pribylovskii 1992a, 88-89). The Union bearing the name of Russia's most eminent democratic dissident was led by a certain Vladimir Vasil'evich Voronin (b. 1936 or 1937), a former student of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and physical training instructor who was confined to prison from 1976 to 1979 for 'especially serious embezzlement of state funds' and for currency violations (crimes, it should be noted, that would have been investigated by the *KGB*). During *perestroika* Voronin became a real estate broker (MN, no. 45, 1990; Dunlop 1991, 4). Apart from the Sakharov Union and Centrist Bloc, Voronin also founded the obscure International Foundation for Popular and Parliamentary Initiatives and the International Foundation 'The Human Being, Peoples, Parliaments and Politics', as well as the small irregular newspaper *Tsentr* (Centre) (Verkhovskii 1994, 28). Beside the intention to establish a Sakharov World Union, the programme of the Sakharov Union contained, for some reason, the demand 'to introduce direct presidential emergency rule in Iakutiia and on the Kola peninsula' (as quoted in

⁴⁹ I have taken this formula from an important article by Julia Wishnevsky (1990).

Luchterhandt 1991, 3). Former associates of Andrei Sakharov, like his widow Elena Bonner, and his friends Anatolii Shabad and Sergei Kovalëv had already protested in 1990-91 against the usage of the name of the Nobel Peace Prize winner in this way (Pribylovskii 1992a, 6, 88). The peak of Voronin's impertinence was reached in January 1994 when the remnants of his Centrist Bloc (of which the still functioning 'Sakharov Union' is a member) set up an alliance called Movement for National Revival with the openly 'monarcho-fascist', rabily anti-Semitic *Pamiat'* group led by notorious, veteran Russian hate-speaker Dmitrii Vasiliev (Pribylovsky 1994, 29, 32).⁵⁰

The Centrist Bloc, secondly, included, as an observer, the Party of the Human Being, and, as a member, an organization which was apparently related to the Human Being Party and called the Blue Movement or All-Union Association 'For a Social Ecology of Man through Mass Creativity', led by Dr. Iurii I. Bokan' (b. 1945), a former *Komsomol* functionary, CPSU Central Committee consultant for cultural issues, and, since late 1991, also leader of the so called Republican Humanitarian Party (L, no. 2-3, November 1990, 2; Mikhailiuk 1991; Pribylovskii 1992b, 90; Prudkov and Bach 1992, 94-95; Berezovskii and Cherviakov 1993, 16-17, 86; Timtschenko 1994, 53). Notably, the Blue Movement had, according to its own information, been founded as early as 1981. It reported that it had many Academicians and Doctors of Science among its 'tens of thousands of members' (apparently a vast exaggeration). Its professed aim was to adapt and apply the ideas of the Russian intellectual tradition of 'cosmism' and of V.I. Vernadskii to contemporary Russian conditions (Bolgarin and Maslov 1991). The later founded Republican Humanitarian Party, chaired by Blue Movement leader Iurii Bokan', declared as its goal the 'creation of a great spiritual Eurasia' and the 'universal unity of mankind' (Pribylovskii 1992b, 90), whereas another organization led by Bokan', the Eurasian Humanitarian Forum founded in June 1992, bases its activities on the 'ideals of respect for the human being' and the 'principles of real humanism' (*Partinform*, no. 1, 30 July - 5 August 1992, 8-9). The Blue Movement reports to have been involved in many commercial, academic and humanitarian activities since its foundation and especially since 1990 (among them a project with the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation).

⁵⁰ For a detailed description of Voronin's biography, see Verkhovskii 1994, 26-28.

The Movement also stated that it has cooperated with the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences in setting up a lecture course on 'Social Ecology of the Human Being'. In 1991, it created its own bank called *Elbimbank* (a major Moscow office of which is located next to the former Social Science Academy now called Russian Academy of State Service of the Office of the President of the Russian Federation). At the same time, its leader Iurii Bokan' was the 'founder' and, according to Pribylovskii in 1992, a 'co-owner' of *Inkombank*, which has by now become one of the largest and most influential banks of post-Soviet Russia (Pribylovskii 1992b, 90, 119; see sec. 2.3.). The Blue Movement claimed that, in 1990, its various divisions had a turn-over of more than Rbls100 million - at that time a considerable amount (Bolgarin and Maslov 1991). The movement reconstituted itself on an All-Union Foundation Congress on March 31, 1990, the same day the LDPSU held its foundation congress. According to Pribylovskii,

the participants of the organization became mainly former or current party workers. By the end of 1991, the former CPSU functionaries - i.e. the participants of the Blue Movement - adapted painlessly to the market economy by converting their connections, posts and privileges into material assets which became their private or collective property (which was apparently the aim of the creation of the organizations). (1992b, 119).

Bokan' declared, after the Centrist Bloc's utter self-discreditation in winter 1990-91 (see below), that the Blue Movement had participated in the Bloc only as an observer, and not as a full member. Yet, at the same time, the Movement had played a crucial role in the survival and development of one of the Bloc's major member organizations - the LDPSU. In early October 1990, Zhirinovskii had in absence been excluded from the LDP. At the end of October 1990, he and his few supporters summoned their own LDPSU Conference in order to exclude the anti-Zhirinovskii group and reconstitute the party. Yet they were not able to assemble a quorum for taking such decisions. Here the former CPSU functionaries of the Blue Movement proved to be helpful, transformed themselves into LDPSU 'delegates', and saved Zhirinovskii's LDPSU from dropping completely out of sight (Pribylovskii 1992b, 119).

Third, an organization named League of Independent Scholars, founded on 28 April 1990 and apparently identical to the so-called Progress Party of the USSR (then: 5-7 members), was, at least for some time, also a member of the Centrist Bloc. The founding congress of the Progress Party took place on 15 December 1990 at the Institute of Youth, the former Higher *Komsomol* School (Pribylovskii 1991b, 31). The Scholars League's project for a new Union Treaty for the USSR played, as will be outlined in Part II, a certain role in the development of the political agenda of 'Black Colonel' Viktor I. Alksnis (b. 1950) with whom Zhirinovskii cooperated for some time in late 1990 and early 1991 (see below). At this time, the Progress Party and the League advocated the transformation of the USSR into a unitary Russian Republic which would have no national Union or Autonomous Republics and be divided solely into gouvernements. The League rejected privatization of housing and trade (Pribylovskii 1992b, 86).

The Independent Scholars League presented itself as an alternative to the USSR Academy of Sciences, and was during its association with the Centrist Bloc and cooperation with Alksnis, and still is, led by Viacheslav Potëmkin, a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Engineering and Physics and theoretical physicist by profession, but philosopher and officially nominated (but unregistered) 1991 Russian presidential candidate by vocation (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 23 April 1991). He has published several books, among them, *Science and Entrepreneurship*, *You Are God, You Are the Spirit*, and *Notes of Grigorii Rasputin*. The latter represents an affirmative account of the notorious monk at the court of the last Tsar, Nicholas II. Rasputin is quoted as prophesying that, in 1991, Russia will be 'ruled by rats'. Potëmkin rejects explicitly Western democracy as a model for Russia, and instead advocates 'the transition of Russia into a world intellectual great power' (ME, no. 31, 9 August 1995, 5-6). The president of the Independent Scholars' League (which, it should be noted, has almost no political weight in Russia) acquired some publicity in October 1994 when the then Chairman of the Federal Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, Vladimir Shumeiko (b. 1945), plagiarized Potëmkin by putting forward a so called 'all-Russian idea' in the form of a trinity of three fundamental approaches: 'supremacy of the spiritual over the material', 'preference of the normal material subsistence [*dostatok*] over affluence', and 'priority of good

over evil'. Shumeiko acknowledged later that he took this set from Potëmkin's book *You Are the Spirit* (ME, no. 31, 9 August 1995, 5-6).

A fourth Centrist Bloc collective member was the Russian People's Front *RNF*, led by Valerii Ivanovich Skurlatov (b. 1938). Skurlatov, who is a former department head of the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Berezovskii and Cherviakov 1993, 63-64), was (apart from Kasparov who soon left the Bloc) the only comparatively well-known figure among the 'centrists', and had been earlier classified as a representative of the Soviet Establishment-Right (Yanov 1978, 166). For the first time, Skurlatov attracted attention in 1965 when, as a *Komsomol* activist in Moscow, he distributed a so called 'Code of Morals' to functionaries of the Moscow City Party Committee and the *Komsomol* Central Committee. The strident document, which was originally conceived as a discussion paper on the reorganization of the Communist Youth Union ordered by the Moscow City *Komsomol* Committee, demanded, among others, the sterilization of women who had sexual relations with foreigners, corporal punishment and intensive barrack drill for young men, the preservation of racial purity, a revival of a 'soldier cult', and so forth (Yanov 1978, 170; Dunlop 1991, 4). In the seventies Skurlatov became again active as a publicist, and edited or wrote a considerable number of further clearly proto-fascist 'anti-zionist', metaphysical, pseudo-historic and science fiction texts (Skurlatov 1980; Litvinoff 1980, 69; Kaganskaya 1986-87; Laqueur 1993, 114-116).⁵¹ From 1983 to 1986, he took part in the activities of the later notorious anti-semitic *Pamiat'* (Memory) group before he co-founded his first own political organization, the *RNF*, at the Moscow Institute of Sociology in mid-December 1988 (Fadeev 1992, 102-118). Anticipating somewhat the concomitant circumstances of the LDPSU foundation in spring 1990, *RNF*'s foundation was reported nationwide by the official Soviet news agency *TASS* and *Sovetskaia Rossiia* - the newspaper which had earlier in 1988 positioned itself politically by publishing Nina Andreeva's (b. 1938) major neo-Stalinist anti-perestroika manifesto 'I cannot forgo my principles'. *RNF* obtained immediately after its foundation office space and set about distributing a circular letter accross the country stating that it

⁵¹ For a revealing self-defense of Skurlatov against allegations that he is a fascist, see Skurlatov N.d.; and *O preduprezhdenii...* 1995, 71-77.

were the sole genuine Popular Front (Kagarlitsky 1990, 103). *RNF*'s members proclaimed themselves as admirers of the pre-revolutionary Tsarist Prime Minister Pëtr Stolypin (1862-1911), tried to take under their control the independent, democratic regional 'Fronts' in the Russian Federation, and were suspected of working for the *KGB* (*Novosti narodnogo fronta*, no. 1, 1989, 15; Divin 1991).⁵² In autumn 1990, former *KGB*-General Oleg Kalugin (b. 1934) identified Skurlatov as having in the past served as a *KGB* informer (Dunlop 1993, 110). Shortly after the foundation of the *RNF*, Skurlatov, apparently for the first time, met Zhirinovskii at an *RNF* meeting. However, Skurlatov reported that he had then rejected Zhirinovskii's offer of cooperation because Zhirinovskii 'did not want to be a servant of his homeland, but saw his homeland only as a means of fostering his own interests' (as quoted in Maximow and Odesskij 1994, 101). After having left the CPSU in 1990, Skurlatov, the *RNF* and some other micro-organizations related to, or led by, him, among them the *Partiia vozrozhdeniia* (Party of Rebirth), have been constantly present in Moscow's political scene, yet without ever gaining any national-level significance (Verkhovskii 1994, 31-33). It should be finally noted that, after the break up of the original Centrist Bloc, Skurlatov preserved his connection to Zhirinovskii, and took part, for example, in the Third and Fifth LDP congresses in April 1992 and 1994 (L, no. 6-7, 1992, 6; *Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia...* 1994, 48-50). Apparently, the notorious State Duma deputy Viacheslav A. Marychev (b. 1939), who had been a co-founder of the *Nashi* group (sec. 3.3.), a St. Petersburg LDP representative since 1991 and an LDPR central committee member since 1992, became, in 1993, simultaneously a leading figure in Skurlatov's Liberal-Patriotic Party 'Rebirth', a split-off of the *Partiia vozrozhdeniia*. Subsequently, Marychev became number 3 on the LDP federal list for the Fifth State Duma elections, and thus a member of the LDP faction from 1993 to 1995. During his deputyship Marychev became known all over the country as a brawler and clown, and contributed through his dull jokes and extravagance to deligitimizing the young Russian parliament (*Kto est' chto...* 1994, 158; *Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 2nd vol., 17; V. Ivanov 1996, 190-195).

⁵² Pëtr A. Stolypin (1862-1911) was an influential and famous nationalist-reformist Prime-Minister of Tsarist Russia between 1906-1911.

Further temporary member organizations of the Centrist Bloc were the Federation for Peace and Accord (a successor-organization of the KGB-controlled Peace Committee at which Zhirinovskii worked for some time in the seventies), the Society of Internationalists of Abkhazia, the People's Forum of Abkhazia, the Turkish Society 'Watan', the so-called Association of Soviet-American Integration led by V. Marchenko, Sergei Nikologorskii's Party of Peace (which made itself known in June 1992 when it proposed the adoption of an anti-abortion law to the Russian Supreme Soviet), Lev Ubozhko's Democratic Party (sec. 1.2.), the Popular Information Party including mainly the staff of *Mosgorspravka* (the Moscow City Inquiry Office) and led by Ivan Iuzvishin (see sec. 2.3.), as well as some other 'letter-box parties' (Pribylovskii 1991b, 12; Verkhovskii 1994, 21; Timtschenko 1994, 53).

Anti-Communism, Soviet Style

As mentioned, initially, the Centrist Bloc's loudly propagated profile was that of a middle-of-the-road grouping ready to cooperate with both the 'informals' and the *ancien régime*. Ostensibly, the Bloc would thus provide a bridge between the antagonists (Luchterhandt 1991). In spite of this self-styled image, perhaps ultimately the most consequential political action of some of its leaders was of a different kind. Despite the 'centrists'' apparent emphasis on political moderation, some of its leading representatives were simultaneously members of an especially radical pro-democratic and explicitly anti-communist group called Russian Democratic Forum which had been founded in February 1990 (Berezovskii *et al.* 1991, 104-105). This organization was dominated by Skurlatov's *RNF* and included Lev Ubozhko's Democratic Party. According to one report Voronin and Zhirinovskii were also at least partly involved in the activities of the Forum (Luchterhandt 1991, 4). According to an announcement of the Centrist Bloc, the Russian Democratic Forum was actually one of its collective members - an ideological absurdity in view of the RDF's official political profile (L, no. 2-3, 1990, 2; Berezovskii *et al.* 1991, 58).

The Forum became known in August 1990 when Skurlatov published in its name a so-called 'Action Programme-90' - a strident document adopted on July 31, 1990, and standing out markedly from the programmes of the mainstream authentic democrats. The Programme called for

a 'revolutionary policy of liberation and democratization', mass action, the peasants' seizure of collective land by force, pickets and strikes to bring down the central government, and the dissolution of the USSR parliament. It also advocated tearing down monuments to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Feliks Dzerzhinskii (the founder of the Soviet secret police), and called for a twofold increase in wages and pensions for the entire Soviet population. The Central Committee and Russian nationalist media presented the programme as that of the whole democratic movement, accusing the Russian democrats and the Ukrainian nationalist organization *Rukh* of trying to destabilize the country. Perhaps, in reaction to the mainstream democrats' explicit distancing themselves from the document, the Russian Democratic Forum held, according to one specialist, a 'congress' on September 23, 1990. The 'congress' was attended by 15 people, among them Zhirinovskii, Skurlatov, Voronin, and Ubozhko, who adopted the 'Action Programme' as an official Forum document (Luchterhandt 1991, 4, and 1994, 121). Such leading 'informals' as Galina Starovoitova suggested that *KGB* chief Vladimir Kriuchkov used 'Action Programme-90' to persuade Gorbachëv not to cooperate with the independent democratic movement (Duncan 1992, 96-97; Dunlop 1991, 4-5; Laqueur 1993, 247-248; Verkhovskii 1994, 33; Luchterhandt 1994, 121).

Coalition Building, Soviet Style

In sharp contrast to the Bloc's organizational overlap with the apparently radically anti-communist Russian Democratic Forum, there was in autumn 1990 a rapprochement between the 'centrists' and the most significant hard right-wing organization of this period, the imperialist *Soiuz* (Union) Faction of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies set up on 14 February 1990 (Teague 1991; Miller 1993, 163-165; Laqueur 1993, 249-251; Luchterhandt 1993, 203-210, 216-220). The grouping was mainly led by ethnic Russian or russified representatives from the non-Russian Soviet republics and activists of the so called 'Inter-Fronts' or 'Inter-Movements', republican organizations (most prominent in the Baltics) which under the slogan of 'internationalism' claimed to represent the interests of anti-separatist ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers, yet were often used for staging provocations masterminded by the reactionary sections of the central and

republican CPSU and state apparatuses. Among the most prominent politicians in *Soiuz* were the 'Black Colonels' Viktor Alksnis from Latvia and Nikolai Petrushenko from Kazakhstan, *Soiuz*'s Chairman Iurii Blokhin from Moldavia, Professor Georgii Komarov from Kirgiziia, Evgenii Kogan from Estonia, Sazhi Umalatova from Chechnia, or Anatolii Chekhoev, former First Secretary of an *Obkom* at Southern Ossetia in the Georgian Union Republic. In December 1990, *Soiuz* became, after the CPSU faction (730 deputies), the second largest USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies faction when it comprised 561 anti-reformist deputies with communist, monarchist and democratic backgrounds, who were all in favour of the preservation of the USSR as a single *de jure* federal, yet *de facto* unitary state (Luchterhandt and Luchterhandt 1993, 196-197). Also in December 1990, it transformed itself into an association of imperialist MPs of all levels, including People's Deputies of republican and regional legislatures. By winter 1990-91, clearly Colonel Viktor Alksnis (b. 1950) had become *Soiuz*'s most notorious spokesmen and aggressive attacker of intra-establishment reformism, above all of Gorbachëv himself. Zhirinovskii later announced that Alksnis is among his most favourite politicians (Verkhovskii 1994, 3), and that, once he is elected president, he would make Alksnis governor of a unified Baltic gouvernement (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 9 August 1991). Although, by March 1991, *Soiuz* comprised already more than 700 USSR Congress Deputies, and, in April 1991, it expanded once more into an All-Union Movement '*Soiuz*' with a programme and statutes, Gorbachëv's 'turn to the left' in spring 1991, and finally the abortive coup of August 1991 deprived the movement of its prominent position in Union-level politics. In winter 1991-92, many former *Soiuz* activists went over to other right-wing imperialist organizations, and, although it continued to exist, the Movement became a marginal political force in post-Soviet Russian politics (Pribylovskii 1992b, 166-167). In 1991-93, Alksnis joined the *Otchizna* (Fatherland) Movement founded by the Generals Boris Tarasov and Al'bert Makashov, Sergei Baburin's Russian All-People's Union, and the National Salvation Front, and became a member of the editorial boards of the most important ultra-nationalist Russian weekly *Den'* (The Day) edited by Aleksandr Prokhanov, and of the influential, irregular, neo-fascist theoretical journal *Elementy: Evraziiskoe obozrenie* (Elements: Eurasian Review) edited by Aleksandr Dugin (*Partinform*, no. 4 [25], 21-27 January 1993, 11-12; Pribylovskii 1993, 6-7).

Apparently, *Soiuz* first announced its entry into the Bloc on 18 October 1990, and took part in some of the activities of the 'centrists' (Dunlop 1993, 150). However, in December 1990, it ultimately decided to have only an observer status (Luchterhandt 1991, 4, 1993, 203, and 1994, 121; Berezovskii 1994, 100). As matters developed it became clear that this alignment had been only the starting point of a cardinal change in the 'centrists'' political activities. Already before *Soiuz*'s announcement of entry into the Centrist Bloc, in September-October 1990, its leaders had been invited by the CPSU Central Committee to consultations concerning a new Union-treaty at the Petrovo-Dal'nii *dacha* (summerhouse) of former Soviet Prime-Minister Kosygin. CPSU Central Committee Member and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Boris Oleinik who had helped organizing the first 1990 press-conference of the LDPSU took, in autumn 1991, a lead in establishing contacts with a number of second and third rate parties. Reportedly, he had two meetings with representatives of several small parties, including Zhirinovskii, in September-October 1990. Among the groups he, for instance, met on October 11, 1990 were such differing groupings as Nina Andreeva's hard-line Bolshevik *Edinstvo* (Unity); one of the extremely anti-semitic *Pamiat'* (Memory) groups; a constitutional-democratic party; anarcho-syndicalists; socialists; the LDPSU; etc. - in total sixteen political organizations (Wishnevsky 1990, 5). It was apparently at this meeting that an Inter-Party Political Agreement was adopted. Although the meeting was confidential and not reported in the central press, the human-rights activists' newspaper *Khronika* (Chronicle) got hold of a copy of the Agreement. One of its most characteristic statements said that the groupings which participated in the meeting would:

cooperate with each other in all cases of a threat to the security of the country and to its economic and social stability. (as quoted in O, no. 2, 1992, 23)

Among the signers of the Agreement were the Russian People's Front (V. Skurlatov), the LDPSU (V. Zhirinovskii), the Marxist Plattform in the CPSU (Iu. Egorov), and the Russian Popular-Democratic Front of the *Pamiat'* Movement (V. Novikov) (O, no. 2, 1993, 23). Following these consultations Centrist Bloc co-chairman Voronin even claimed that the Council of Nationalities (i.e.

a chamber of the Soviet parliament) represented by Oleinik, had joined the Centrist Bloc as an 'observer' (*Dialog*, no. 16 1990, 47-49; Dunlop 1991, 5).

On October 29, Zhirinovskii, Voronin and Colonel Viktor Alksnis, then the major spokesmen of *Soiuz*, were seen by not a lesser figure than the Soviet Union's Prime-Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, with whom they discussed the issue of the 'formation of a coalition government of national unity' (Pribylovskii 1991b, 50; Dunlop 1993, 150; Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 8).

On November 1, Anatolii Luk'ianov, then Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, imitated the pattern set by Oleinik and Ryzhkov and met also with representatives of a wide range of groups including the Centrist Bloc. Although, according to one report, representatives of the LDPSU were present at that meeting (Wishnevsky 1990, 6), Zhirinovskii himself did not participate in it (Pribylovskii 1995b, 51). As in the case of the former gathering, none of the parties which had a higher popularity rating than the CPSU were present at the meeting (*Ibid.*, 3). Reportedly, they nevertheless also spoke about the possible creation of a 'coalition government', as well as about the content of a new Union-treaty (Luchterhandt 1991, 4). Luk'ianov offered to carry out the 'centrists'' planned 'Forum of All Democratic Forces of the USSR' under the motto 'For unity' in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. The 'centrists' subsequently formed an 'organizational committee' for the preparation of such a Forum. However, *DemRossiia*, the major umbrella organization of the authentic democratic movement, strongly distanced itself from this proposal (MN, no. 45 1990; Pribylovskii 1991b, 50).

In November 1990, representatives of *Soiuz*, activists from the Inter-Movements in the non-Russian Union Republics, Zhirinovskii's party and Skurlatov's *RNF*, held, what they called, a 'round-table' discussion of how to retain 'the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union' (as quoted in Dunlop 1993, 150-151). Among later incidents consistent with the described developments were the Centrist Bloc's invitation to the grand meeting dedicated to the anniversary of the October revolution, and to a military review, apparently both in early November 1990 (MN, no. 17 1991; Pribylovskii 1991b, 50).

Until this point, the actual purpose of the increasingly open liaison between the authorities and the Centrist Bloc had been not fully intelligible. Clearly, the meetings with the 'centrists' and

other independent political activists were exceptional as the central authorities had until then been noticeably reluctant to communicate with *neformaly* groupings. Although the selection of the groups invited did already indicate the scheme the anti-reformist forces in the Soviet establishment had in mind, their exact plans and the specific role of the 'centrists' in it remained hidden. As a new round of even stranger events followed, the conservatives' scenario became increasingly clear, and the final political 'coming-out' of the 'centrists' was drawing nearer.

Political Mobilization, Soviet Style

The exact sequence of what happened in mid-November 1990 reportedly became known only later. Apparently, the Centrist Bloc established a so called Committee of National Salvation of the USSR on 15 November, an action, it should be mentioned, that had been proposed only two months before by Ivan Polozkov, then the leader of the Russian Communist Party (*RKP*, today *KPRF*), at a session of the *RKP* Central Committee. The programme of the 'centrists' Salvation Committee contained demands like: a declaration of a state of emergency on the whole territory of the USSR; a suspension of activities of all political parties; a reimposition of press censorship; and the replacement of governing bodies on all levels by republican, regional, and local Salvation Committees. A central role was to be played by the Soviet Army, which was seen as the only organized force that could stop the disintegration of the country (Luchterhandt 1991, 5). The Committee proposed to hold a referendum of confidence on the central government, and also on transferring power to the Salvation Committee. Zhirinovskii and Voronin visited Abkhazia and the Baltic republics in the same month, and agitated there for the creation of Republican National Salvation Committees (MN, no. 27, 1991). In addition, they and other representatives of the Centrist Bloc went to the Russian-speaking communities of Moldavia, Georgia and Central Asia during autumn 1990, and called for the establishment of regional Salvation Committees (Luchterhandt 1991, 5).⁵³ A Russian political analyst summarized the following development:

⁵³ According to another author the LDP participated in an attempt to solve the conflict between the Georgians, Ossets and Abkhazians in November 1991 (Berezovskii 1994, 100). However, that seems to have been rather the official cover for Zhirinovskii's and his colleagues' trips, than their true purpose.

In a number of sessions of the Presidium of the C[entrist]B[loc] the majority of its members supported the new programme of actions of the Centrist Bloc which was orientated on the French model of a provisional authoritarian regime for the overcoming of the crisis with a subsequent development of political pluralism and market economy, [and a simultaneous] preservation of a strong (practically unitarian) stateness of the Soviet Union under the guidance of Russia. (Berezvoskii 1994, 100)

Accordingly, the Centrist Bloc published a Manifesto in December 1990 in which it outlined its proposals for radical measures to overcome the crisis. In view of the 'total bankruptcy' of Gorbachëv's reformist political course, it now openly proposed the formation of a Union National Salvation Committee which would fully take over power in the USSR. The anti-crisis measures it proposed included once more the introduction of a state of emergency; banning of activities of all parties and all existing state structures; the replacement of these structures with National Salvation Committees and the establishment of jury courts; the introduction of a free market on the whole territory of the USSR through full privatization; and resolute actions for fighting corruption and sabotage (Berezovskii 1994, 100).

These activities coincided - apparently not by chance - with an attack on Gorbachëv by the 'centrists' colleagues from the *Soiuz* faction of the USSR Supreme Soviet. On 13 November 1990, Gorbachëv met more than a thousand military deputies who complained about the state of the army and who harshly criticized domestic and foreign policies of the country leadership. The next day Colonel Alksnis announced that the USSR president was left without an army (Morrison 1991, 201-207). Three days later Alksnis made a notorious speech, in which he demanded a solution of the conflict between the central government and the separatist republics within 30 days; otherwise the question of Gorbachëv's presidency would be 'probably solved' (as quoted in Schneider 1991, 3; see also Teague 1991). One day later, on 17 November, Gorbachëv returned to the Supreme Soviet, and proposed far reaching changes in the structure of the Soviet government designed to meet the demands of *Soiuz* and other ultra-conservative groupings (Miller 1991, 166-167).

On 1 December, the USSR Congress *Soiuz* Group of People's Deputies expanded into an All-Union Association of People's Deputies at a Founding Congress in Moscow at which 354 delegates, among them 175 USSR People's Deputies, took part. To mark the occasion, USSR Minister of Defense Dmitrii Iazov had a talk with a delegation of *Soiuz* led by Alksnis on the same day. One day later the liberal Minister of the Interior Vadim Bakatin was replaced by the conservative Boris Pugo, and on 20 December Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze resigned accusing the 'lads with epaulettes' - obviously meaning the leading *Soiuz* activists, the 'Black Colonels' Alksnis and Petrushenko - of preparing a military coup.

The following events appear as a continuation of these actions and were seemingly directed towards a final assault. In January 1991, republican 'National Salvation Committees' appeared in the Baltics Soviet. On January 13, the Lithuanian and Latvian National Salvation Committees called 'in the name and behalf of the people' for the intervention of *OMON* special police troops for the 'protection and preservation of the Soviet Union'. The Vilnius *OMON* stormed the television tower in Vilnius which resulted in fifteen deaths. Further people died during similar attacks in Latvia which caused large pro-Baltic demonstrations in several Russian cities on January 20, 1991.

As in late 1990, there was a parallelity of these activities clearly initiated by some high-standing figures in Moscow with the actions of the Centrist Bloc and *Soiuz*. In January 1991, Voronin himself formed a Committee of National Salvation, and offered to take over power (Pribylovskii 1991b, 50). On January 21, 1991, during a break of the session of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, Alksnis charged that Gorbachëv had allegedly planned the destabilization of the Baltic governments and had encouraged the creation of the Lithuanian and Latvian National Salvation Committees, but then lost his nerve and tried to make the armed forces a scapegoat. He called Gorbachëv a 'weak man' who has betrayed the military (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 22 January 1991). In late January 1991, Voronin and Zhirinovskii went to Latvia and Lithuania and met with representatives of the National Salvation Committees. After their return to Moscow on January 29, 1991, Voronin and Zhirinovskii said that the pro-independence Lithuanian and Latvian parliaments were entirely to blame for the crises in their republics (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 30 January 1991). On January 30th, Alksnis told the Finish daily *Uusi Suomi* that

Gorbachëv's and El'tsin's days are numbered, and admitted that he had been involved in setting up the Baltic National-Salvation Committees (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 31 January 1991). On the same day, the politically obscure as ever 'centrists' were again received by a high-standing official, this time by KGB chairman Vladimir Kriuchkov.⁵⁴ On February 3, Alksnis accompanied the notorious ultra-nationalist St. Petersburg TV journalist Aleksandr Nevzorov (sec. 3.3.) to downtown Riga to film once more the OMON Black Berets (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 8 February 1991).⁵⁵ On February 6, 1991, Voronin stated that the fate of the Soviet Union is more important than republican demands for sovereignty, and urged Gorbachëv to introduce presidential rule in the Baltics. At the same time, he noted that the Baltic National Salvation Committees were illegal and should be disbanded. Zhirinovskii, in the same TASS report, rejected the idea that the latest events in the Baltics were inspired by Moscow (as quoted in *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 8 February 1991). On February 16, 1991, the Centrist Bloc staged an All-Union Conference at the Moscow House of Tourists at which its leaders advocated the introduction of presidential rule, the dissolution of the Russian Federation and Baltic parliaments, and the banning of all political parties (Pribylovskii 1991b, 50). Alksnis, also in February as well as later in spring 1991, restated several times in public the idea of a Salvation Committee which would be the only way to prevent civil war. He demanded a moratorium on all ideological questions, a state of emergency for the whole country, and also a ban on all political parties and movements. Oddly, this should, according to the Colonel, have served the purpose of introducing quickly a market economy by authoritarian means in a similar way the occupation by US army forces guaranteed the establishment of market relations in Japan after World War II (MN, no. 6, 1991; Schneider 1991, 4-5). In an analogous guise, Alksnis, Zhirinovskii, LDP ideologists and other politicians compared the Russian situation to that of post-

⁵⁴ Subsequently, the 'centrists' reportedly also met the Chief of the General staff of the Soviet Army, Mikhail Moiseev, and the Deputy Minister of the Interior, Boris Gromov (MN, no. 17, 1991).

⁵⁵ Nevzorov became notorious all over Russia when he, on January 15, 1991, showed a documentary called *Nashi* (Ours) which portrayed the Vilnius and Riga killings as a myth and the Baltic OMON troopers as heroes. Allegedly, 'the Lithuanians had put corpses in front of the tanks, which supposedly were trying to restore order, and then claimed that the tanks had killed the civilians in cold blood.' (Hosking, Aves and Duncan 1992, 133)

war Germany, to the South Korean dictatorship, to Chile under Pinochet, or even to France under de Gaulle.⁵⁶

Crisis Management, Soviet Style

These developments represented only small episodes in a much larger story. What was going on in Moscow in late 1990 and early 1991 was a major battle inside the Soviet establishment over which course the country should take. According to prominent economist Nikolai Petrakov, in autumn 1990, establishment conservatives were shocked by the possibility of a Gorbachëv-El'tsin coalition. They gave Gorbachëv an ultimatum, and forced him with initial success to change the political course in November 1990 (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 28 January 1991). Berezovskii speaks of the following period as a 'frontal offensive of the adherents of centralism in the parliament and government of the USSR' (1994, 99). Among those events between November 1990 and March 1991 which were connected with this confrontation and became, besides Bakatin's and Shevardnadze's departure and the clashes in the Baltics, much better known among the Russian public and Western journalists were: Gorbachëv's dismissal of Grigorii Iavlinskii's and Stanislav Shatalin's '500-Day-Plan' for a radical economic reform; Iavlinskii's subsequent resignation as member of the RSFSR government; Marshall Sergei Akhromeev's public advocacy of a usage of the military for the 'protection of the unity of our country and its social order'; the retirement of the discredited Prime-Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov; the abolition of the Council of Ministers and its replacement by a Cabinet of Ministers led by the ultra-conservative later putschist Valentin Pavlov; a hasty monetary reform which caused great annoyance in the population; the abolition of the relatively pro-democratic Presidential Council, the upgrading of the Federation Council, and the creation of a Security Council (the majority of its members formed the core of the August 1991 putsch committee); *KGB* chairman Kriuchkov's announcement at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies that the country should be prepared that blood-letting might be necessary to restore order;

⁵⁶ Affirmative references to the South Korean regime, Chile under Pinochet or France under de Gaulle became subsequently a recurring feature of Zhirinovskii's argumentation. See, for instance, L, no. 8-9, 1992, 8; and sec. 4.1.

the appointment of the conservative Leonid P. Kravchenko (b. 1938) as chairman of the Committee of Radio and Television and Kravchenko's subsequent banning of the popular political weekly TV magazine *Vzgliad* (View) and the daily *Televizionnaia sluzhba novostei TNS* (Television News Service); as well as attempts of a discreditation of the reformist RSFSR government through the so called 'Fil'shin-Affair'.⁵⁷

What exactly was the role the 'centrists' had to play in this confrontation? Vladimir Berezovskii summarizes:

As far as the enemies [of the '500-Day-Plan'] (the deputy-group *Soiuz*, the military-industrial complex, the *Kolkhoz-Sovkhoz* sector) had at this time no alternative project, they could battle against the programme only by organizing a strong parliamentary and emotional ideological pressure on the Union government. One of the levers for such a pressure became the Centrist Bloc, the aim of which was, according to the scheme of its godparents, to *liquidate the monopoly of the Russian [i.e. the reformist RSFSR] government in expressing the opinion of the political structures of the new Russian multi-party system.* (1994, 99, emphasis in original)

However, in spring 1991 the democrats regained the political initiative as Gorbachëv started to delineate himself from the Establishment-Right, came to an agreement with nine Union Republican leaders at a meeting in Novo Ogarëvo, and El'tsin received powerful support from large demonstrations in Moscow and strikes of Russian miners. Respectively *Soiuz*'s influence began to wane, and the Centrist Bloc soon disappeared from the political scene.

⁵⁷ Among the lesser known developments in this period were the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat Decree 'On Urgent Measures in Connection with Gathering Anti-Military Manifestations in Many Regions' and the Ministry of Defense's move to remove officers of indigeneous nationality from charge of munitions in some republics (Miller 1991, 148, 162, 168). Both of these orders were issued on 15 November 1990, i.e. the date which Luchterhandt gave for the creation of the Centrist Bloc's National Salvation Committee (1991, 5). These events took place one day before Gorbachëv's crucial first step in his temporary 'turn to the Right' on 16-17 November 1990.

Conclusions. Looking back on this sequence of events, one can identify several functions which the Centrist Bloc and its member organizations were apparently designed to fulfil for the conservative part of Moscow's political establishment:⁵⁸

First of all, there seemed to be an intention to split the democrats into radicals and revisionists by inserting a supposedly 'moderate' grouping which would attract those who were seeking for alternative alignments. However, nothing became of this, as neither the Centrist Bloc as a whole nor any of its 'centrist' member organizations managed to gain even a minimal social basis or public acceptance.

Much more realistic and useful was an obvious second function of the Bloc - to cause confusion by the 'centrists'' public handling of labels like 'liberal democracy', 'centre', or 'moderate', or by the repugnant abuse of the name of Andrei Sakharov by Voronin. However, although the broader public may have been partly puzzled by this 'playing old Harry' with the pro-Western *neformaly*'s ideals, the democratic activists soon realized that the Bloc represented a false political Centre, and distanced themselves officially from it. The establishment reformers (such as Aleksandr Iakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Vadim Bakatin) equally did not take it seriously. Contrary to Sobchak's far-reaching accusations (1995, 162), there is no reliable evidence that an allegedly planned meeting between the USSR President and the 'centrists' or Zhirinovskii himself ever took place (MN, no. 45, 1990).

An apparent third role designed for the Centrist Bloc was, as indicated by Berezovskii (1994, 99), to play a proxy part for the high-standing conservatives in their fight against the real political Centre located inside the Soviet establishment, and above all, against Gorbachëv himself. At the beginning the Bloc proposed an alliance between the CPSU and the 'moderate' part of the democratic movement - i.e. with itself - which could have served as an excuse to replace the reformist wing of the Soviet leadership. Subsequently, however, the formula was changed, and the

⁵⁸ The qualification though has to be made that the financial and organizational support, employment and manipulation of quasi-independent groups by the reactionary wing of the CPSU apparatus and the KGB was not a practice exclusively applied to the Centrist Bloc and the LDPSU between 1989 and 1991 (Maximow and Odesskij 1994, 112; Luchterhandt 1994, 118).

'centrists' and Alksnis began to propose a supra-partisan temporary authoritarian regime, the self-legitimization of which would have been a swift transition to a market economy on the models of countries under military occupation or right-wing dictatorships such as Chile under Pinochet (Laqueur 1993, 250).

The probably most effective of these activities was, however, the public provocation of Zhirinovskii and the other 'centrists' who, by way of posing as parts of the multi-party system, managed to partly discredit this idea and its applicability to Russia in the eyes of the public, and the reformist parts of the authorities. Above all, Skurlatov's 'Action Programme-90' was, according to Starovoitova, conducive to causing mistrust between the establishment and societal reformers, contributed especially to the temporary alienation of Gorbachëv from the democrats, and was thus instrumental to his turn to the Establishment-Right in fall 1990 (Luchterhandt 1994, 119).⁵⁹ *DemRossiia* took the 'Action Programme-90' published in the name of *RDF* (Russian Democratic Forum) seriously enough to reject the application for collective membership by the Christian-Democratic Union led by *RDF*'s co-founder Aleksandr Ogorodnikov although Ogorodnikov had, in autumn 1990, publicly distanced himself from the 'Action Programme-90' (*Partinform*, no 22 [43], 27 May-2 June 1993, 11).

The last noteworthy episode in the semi-official coalition of Zhirinovskii and the right-wingers in the Soviet establishment was the LDPSU's open support for the coup attempt in August 1991. According to one report, Zhirinovskii was received by later putsch leader, USSR Vice-President Gennadii I. Ianaev (b. 1937), in July 1991. They allegedly spoke *only* on the issue of new accomodation for the LDPSU headquarters (Plekhanov 1994, 66). This seems improbable as, at that time, the programmatic and organizational preparation of the coup was already in full speed leading to the voluntary, demonstrative resignation of perestroika's major ideologist, Aleksandr N. Iakovlev (b. 1923) on July 28, 1991 and his leaving the CPSU a few days later. Notably, the LDPSU and *Soiuz* were the *first* independent political forces which openly declared its support of the *GKChP* at noon of August 19, 1991. It should be, further, noted that there were, during the

⁵⁹ Yet it was ridiculous to make Skurlatov a leader of both the ultra-radical Democratic Forum and the allegedly moderate, and later more and more openly reactionary Centrist Bloc.

whole course of the coup attempt, only very few organizations which dared to proclaim *officially* their approval of the plotters.⁶⁰ Howevernevertheless, none of the former or current 'centrists' or their allies were included in the *GKChP* (the 'State Committee of Emergency' how the putschists called themselves), and even people like the 'Black Colonels' Alksnis or Petrushenko remained aside.

In any event, Zhirinovskii was no longer dependent on support from above or on connections with other groups at this stage. By August 1991, he had already become a national-level politician in his own right, and a leader of a growing party.

⁶⁰ Other eminent politicians who openly and explicitly declared their support for the *GKChP* included the member of the Presidium of the *Soiuz* group of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies Georgii Tikhonov, the First Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Al'fred Rubiks, the leader of the Bolshevik All-Union Movement *Edinstvo* (Unity), the Ataman of the Terek Cossaks Vasilli Koniakhin, and the President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev who is still in power (*Khronika putcha...* 1991, 7, 10, 28, 55, 73, 95).

2. Zhirinovskii Enters Politics

The previous paragraph may have given the impression that Zhirinovskii is just a creature of the upper echelons of the *nomenklatura* who were desperately trying to save their power and to protect their privileges in view of the collapse of the Soviet system. Apparently the old authorities were using him and the other 'centrists' as minor players in a bigger game. From such a viewpoint Zhirinovskii would appear as merely a relic of the Soviet *ancien régime*. As will be shown below, he owed indeed in many respects his progression from his 1990 pseudo-political hurly-burly into real politics in 1991 to carefully directed support from above. The overall picture gives, however, the impression that Zhirinovskii was already then more than a mere servant of the *ancien régime*.

2.1. A Registration

To run in the first presidential elections of the Russian Federation in June 1991 Zhirinovskii needed three things: registration of the LDPSU, which would give him official authorization for independent involvement in party-politics; to be nominated as a presidential candidate; and sufficient money to finance a campaign. To the extent that the LDPSU was still a micro-party in early 1991, it should have been difficult to solve especially the latter two problems. Under normal conditions, it would have been problematic, if not impossible, for a newcomer and isolated figure, as Zhirinovskii then was, to become nominated as a presidential candidate. An affluent would-be president could have balanced a lack of political weight with financial power. Yet Zhirinovskii had no (official) resources of his own, and was until spring 1991 not tied to any state or commercial structure which could have provided the necessary support. Notwithstanding, characteristically the first and most formal condition, the registration, and not the latter two, turned out to be the more difficult part.

On 28 January 1991, the LDPSU became the first political party in the history of the Soviet Union to apply for registration (Conradi 1995, 95-96).⁶¹ When, on 4 February 1991, Zhirinovskii appeared for the first time in the appropriate department of the Ministry of Justice headed by V.N. Zhbakov in order to officially notarise the LDPSU, he brought with him a list of less than 150 party-members. He was told that, according to the law, his all-Union party had to be able to show a list of 5,000 members and to prove that it had sub-organizations in at least eight Union Republics. (Zhirinovskii should have known this as a lawyer.)

As stated in the chronological reference written down by Zhbakov, on 12 February 1991, the LDPSU-leader produced member lists of various regions of the USSR, ranging from 14 Latvian members, 108 from the Moscow region, and to '1,120 members from Abkhazia [an autonomous region within the Georgian Union Republic]' (O, no. 2, 1992, 22; Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 9-10). Until early March, Zhirinovskii had submitted documents listing in total 5,462 alleged LDPSU members. On 14 March 1991, he was invited to the ministry and told that only the data on 530 people conformed to the rules. By then the number of Abkhazian 'liberal democrats' had, for example, increased to 2,714, among them, inhabitants of the villages Arazydkhaz (158), Lykhna (221), Chërnaia rechka (630), Bzyba (677), and of the borough Durinsh (224). Notably, among the LDPSU members were some citizens from the vialge Otap born between 1907 and 1913, 153 Turkish Meskhetians from two villages in the Orlov *oblast'*, and 959 of the camp city of Inta (Suetnov 1995, 14). One hundred and twenty five names were mentioned more than one time. Apparently, there was also no evidence that the LDPSU has, as prescribed for a union-wide party, basic organizations in eight Union Republics. Hence, on 3 April all documents were returned to the LDPSU for revision. Notwithstanding, Zhirinovskii came back five days later and brought with him again the incorrect documents. This time, however, he was seen by USSR Minister of Justice Sergei Lushchikov himself. On the same day, at a meeting in the office of Deputy Minister of Justice Vyshinskii, it was decided to register the LDPSU (O, no. 2, 1992, 22). The only condition the LDPSU had still to fulfill was to make some minor changes in its statutes (Conradi 1995, 100). Shortly afterwards the responsible department

⁶¹ Zhirinovskii himself though gives January 2, 1991, as the date when the LDPSU applied first for registration (1995c, 276).

head, V.N. Zhbakov, was removed from office. On 12 April 1991, the Ministry of Justice dropped the last condition to registering the party - i.e. to modify its statutes - and made official that the LDPSU was registered. Only one party had managed to do this so far. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union had been registered one day before (*Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no. 6, 1991, 43-46; Luchterhandt and Luchterhandt 1993, 185).

At this stage, Zhirinovskii had, in addition, already scored another remarkable success - the publication of a long, well-formulated, and high print-quality party programme. The brochure containing this programme and the LDP statute says that these documents were adopted on the First LDPSU Congress in March 1990, and amended at the LDP Conference on 20 October 1990 (*Liberal'no-demokraticheskaiia...* 1991, 17, 52). That seems to be false. Instead, it appears that the programme was not written before the foundation of the party in March 1990 and not even before the conference in October 1990, but in early 1991.

Its author was seemingly neither Zhirinovskii nor the LDP or one of its members, but the man who wrote the introduction to the documents and edited the whole brochure - Andrei N. Zagorodnikov, a Senior Lecturer of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy at the Moscow Institute of Transportation who had written his doctorate on modern liberalism, and was in one account classified as a 'academic consultant to the LDP' (Kulikova 1992, 38). Zagorodnikov (who, contrary to other reports, seems never to have been closely related to the LDP) later detailed that, in 1990, he was approached by Zhirinovskii to write a programme for the LDPSU. Zhirinovskii told him that CPSU Central Committee Secretary for Ideology 'Aleksandr Dzasokhov [b. 1934] would resolve all questions connected with the publication.' (I, 14 April 1994) Thus, Zagorodnikov reported to France Press, he wrote the whole program with the exception of the sections on foreign policy and the statutes, although he then took this assignment as a 'joke' (Maximow and Odesskij 1994, 112; Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 7).⁶² When exactly the writing of the programme was completed is unknown. What is, however, documented is that, on 22 March 1991, the *Politizdat* publishing house (which was directly subordinate to the Central Committee of the CPSU and also used by the

⁶² According to Solovyov and Klepikova, two staff members of the CPSU Central Committee's Institute for Social Studies drafted many of the LDP documents (1995, 12).

communist presidential candidates) sent the brochure containing the alleged LDPSU documents to the *Krasnyi proletarii* (Red Proletarian) Printer also related to the Communist Party. This action apparently was also supported by Dzasokhov (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 7, 12). The brochure passed for printing in only six days, which, in Russian conditions, was - at least then - an exceptionally short time. Suddenly, 50,000 copies of a distinctly liberal and pro-Western, and thus - by implication - decidedly anti-communist political programme of a then still unregistered party were available for the price of one rouble on the Soviet book market (O, no. 2, 1992).

On April 22, the then Minister of Justice of the Russian Union Republic Nikolai Fëdorov sent an inquiry regarding the circumstances of the registration of the LDPSU to the USSR Ministry of Justice. He enclosed a telegram of a former party colleague of Zhirinovskii, Konstantin Andreevich Krivonosov, meanwhile leader of a group called Russian Liberal Democratic Party *RLDP*, a split off of the LDPSU. Krivonosov asked the ministry to check the lawfulness of the registration of the 'Zhirinovskii party', and called its very existence into question. On the same day, USSR Minister Lushchikov enclosed a resolution to Fëdorov's inquiry instructing the appropriate department of his Ministry to give Fëdorov a purely official response, and to withhold all information on the particulars of the registration. The responsible officer - the replacement for the above mentioned Zhbankov - acted accordingly, and added to his reply to the Russian Minister that he had not been able to contact Krivonosov because he could not find out the *RLDP*'s 'co-ordinates'. Oddly, however, Krivonosov's address was given in Krivonosov's telegram, which also stated that the *RLDP* was '[r]eady to cooperate in the unmasking of the provocateur' (O, no. 2, 1992, 23).

Two months later the story was repeated. A group of people's deputies of the *RSFSR* Congress, together with some journalists, approached the USSR Ministry of Justice in order to unveil the secret of the registration of the LDPSU. The official answer was the same: the party is registered, 'no details' (O, no. 2, 1992, 23).

It was only after the dissolution of the USSR and the liquidation of the Union Ministry of Justice, that its Russian successor organ annulled the registration of the LDPSU in August 1992. It was announced that there already had been doubts about the authenticity of the party's member lists. Referring to the large number of Abkhazian 'liberal democrats', one report states that the member lists

bore the official stamp of the Abkhazian People's Front - an organization related to the Centrist Bloc, but not to the LDPSU (O, no. 2, 1992, 23). Other sources say that Zhirinovskii simply used data of the last census in the city of Gantiadi on the Black Sea in Abkhazia, a member-list of the Russian Movement of Turks led by Jussuf Sarvarov, and an address list of a Moscow neighborhood which was expecting to receive humanitarian aid (Timtschenko 1994, 54; Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 9).

It is finally worth-mentioning that a representative of the Supreme Soviet Commission for the Investigation of the Reasons and Circumstances of the Coup of August 1991 stated that the registration 'was done not without pressure from the side of Anatolii Luk'ianov' (MN, no. 33, 1992, 2).⁶³ Conradi detailed that, on 12 April 1991, Luk'ianov made a phone call to the USSR Justice Ministry as a result of which the LDPSU was registered on the same day although it had, as mentioned above, neither provided valid membership-lists, nor made the required changes in its statutes which had been the only condition put forward by Lushchikov at his meeting with Zhirinovskii on 8 April 1991 (1995, 100).

⁶³ Further institutions or persons who have been named by former Zhirinovskii assistant Andrei Zagorodnikov as having been involved in the creation and rise of the LDP were Mikhail Gorbachëv himself who allegedly initiated the creation of the LDP (a highly questionable assumption), Aleksandr Dzasokhov who may have been helpful in the publication of the first longer party programme in March 1991 (*Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia...* 1991), and a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs who may have ordered the financing of Zhirinovskii's trip to Slovenia in 1990. According to another early Zhirinovskii-confidant, Leonid Alimov, the formation of the LDP was promoted by 'the CPSU Central Committee, the Moscow CPSU City Committee, as well as *Komsomol* chairman Viktor Mironenko' (I, 14 April 1994).

2.2. A Nomination

The second requirement necessary to become a presidential candidate - nomination - should have been more difficult. Zhirinovskii had to collect either 100,000 signatures of Russian citizens backing his nomination, or to persuade 20% of the people's deputies of the *RSFSR* Congress - i.e. at least 213 parliamentarians - to support the appearance of his name on the ballots. Zhirinovskii chose the second way, although there were no members of his party in the Congress.

It remains unclear how, in fact, the still obscure LDPSU-leader managed to get through to the parliament's podium. A pivotal prerequisite, the registration of the party, though was fulfilled in time. Immediately after this decision was made official on 12 April 1991, the LDPSU held its Second Congress on 13-14 April. It announced its exit from the Centrist Bloc⁶⁴ and the nomination of Zhirinovskii as a presidential candidate. This was legally invalid because the forty-four delegates at this Union-level Congress came not only from the Russian Federation, but also from Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Uzbekistan (Dunlop 1993, 155). Therefore, another convention of the 'liberal democrats' had to be organized. It took place in the *Lenin kolkhoz* near Moscow (where LDPSU General Secretary Akhmet Khalitov lives) on 10 May 1991. In all, 25 people gathered there to create an *ad hoc* Russian section of the LDPSU which elected Zhirinovskii as chairman of its Coordination Council, and nominated him as a presidential candidate (Conradi 1995, 101; Abramov and Golovina 1996, 236). Already on May 1, 1991, Zhirinovskii had been given the opportunity to present his views in the Soviet Army's official newspaper *Krasnaia zvezda* (Red Star) - at that point

⁶⁴ According to another source (which apparently referred to statements of the remaining members of the Centrist Bloc), the LDP was excluded from the Centrist Bloc on the ground of 'treason', i.e. because of sabotaging the registration of the Bloc and the nomination of Centrist Bloc candidates for the offices of the President and Vice-President of the Russian Federation (*Kto est' Chto...* 1994, 146). Voronin, the chairman of the Centrist Bloc, detailed that, on 17 April 1991, the Bloc held a meeting on which it wanted to nominate its candidate for the presidential elections. All members agreed that Voronin would be this candidate except for Zhirinovskii who stated that the LDPSU had not taken part in the voting. When the 'centrists' wanted to register their Bloc at the Ministry of Justice the following day, Zhirinovskii withdrew the LDPSU documents necessary for the registration which meant that the Bloc could not register. Thus the LDP was, according to this version, excluded from the Centrist Bloc on 18 April 1991. For a more detailed description, see Timtschenko 1994, 53-54.

still an exceptional privilege for an 'informal' (Kulikova 1992, 9). On May 16, 1991, Zhirinovskii became the first Russian citizen to *apply* officially for inclusion on the ballots in the upcoming presidential elections (Plekhanov 1994, 22). The major nightly television newscast *Vremia* (Time) made the somewhat misleading announcement that Zhirinovskii was already then the 'first and, for the time being, only officially registered [?] candidate for the post of president of the RSFSR.' (as quoted in Dunlop 1993, 155)

On the Fourth RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies at the end of May, Zhirinovskii was given twenty minutes to make himself and his programme known. First, Zhirinovskii introduced himself:

Whom do I represent? The ordinary folk. Not people at the top, from the elite. And not from the bottom - prison guards, drunkards, and the homeless. No. Our common people are millions of Soviet citizens. I come from where you do, from below, but I have enough education to understand what's going on! (as quoted in Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 12)

He stated that 'as the future Russian president' he wants 'to raise the Russian question' in the same way such questions had been raised with regard to other nations of the USSR. Accordingly, the Russian president would have to be the president not only of Russia, but of all Russians, Russian-speakers and small nationalities of the USSR. The Union centre (i.e. Moscow) should deal with only seven political issues: foreign policy, defense, finance, transport, communications, energy, and ecology. Zhirinovskii also lamented that the words 'Russian', 'communist' and '[army] officer' had become insults. His first action as Russian president would be to announce, together with the USSR president, that the confrontation between the Russian Federation and the Union is over. He finally proclaimed that there would be

[a] new president, a new Constitution, new laws, a new economy - everywhere! Simultaneously, immediately! Either we go for the market [economy], or we fall behind

[otkatyvaemsia]! [...] All people should be equal, and under the protection of law. What is necessary is a civil society without national, political and religious biases. (as quoted in Berezovskii 1994, 102)

Following this and a subsequent short address in Turkish, the deputies voted whether to include the speaker on the ballots. To the astonishment of the media - and apparently Zhirinovskii himself - an unexpectedly high number of deputies, 477, were for his nomination, and only 417 against, with 36 abstentions (Berezovskii 1994, 102).

It has been suggested that conservative deputies simply voted in favour of Zhirinovskii's inclusion on the ballots because they thought that this would take away votes from El'tsin. According to such an interpretation, possibly any candidate would have got the necessary 213 votes. Yet the reports about the effect of Zhirinovskii's speech hinted that there may have been more to it. An affirmative essay on the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' says that

[t]he deputies [...] were staggered and perhaps shocked not only by the peremptory directness of the statements of the aspirant, and by the radicalism of his appraisals, but also by his carriage: [his] self-reliance, at times turning into self-assurance, [his] unchecked self-advertisement, [and] the imperious, authoritative character of [his] gestures. (Kulikova 1992, 7)

This speech can be seen as marking Zhirinovskii's coming out as a national-level politician.

Conclusions. Looking back on the sequence of these events it emerges how suddenly, quickly and smoothly Zhirinovskii entered the newly emerging federal-level party politics in 1991. A crucial date seems to have been 17 March 1991 when the citizens of the Russian Federation voted in a referendum to have their own directly elected president. Five days later, the long LDPSU party programme was sent to the printer 'Red Proletarian'. After only six days it passed for printing. Eleven days later, Zhirinovskii met the USSR Minister of Justice. Four days after this, it was announced that his party

was registered. During the following two days, the LDPSU declared Zhirinovskii its presidential candidate. Two weeks later, the major Soviet Army newspaper agreed to publish an outline of Zhirinovskii's views. Ten days later, Zhirinovskii's micro-party formed a miniscule Russian section which promptly nominated him as presidential candidate. Six days later, Zhirinovskii is the first to apply for registration as presidential candidate. Six days later, the RSFSR Congress of Peoples Deputies decided to include him on the ballots. Three weeks more, he was a fully established politician who proclaimed, referring to the size of his electorate of over 6 million: 'A whole country - "Switzerland" - has voted for me.' (LR, no. 28, 1991, 3)

2.3. Finances

All the above mentioned efforts should have been for nothing, if Zhirinovskii did not have a great deal of money with which to conduct an effective election campaign. Yet there was only one official source of funding. Every presidential candidate was automatically entitled to get Rbls200,000 from the state budget (Timtschenko 1994, 44).⁶⁵ Although, in May-June 1991, this was still not an insignificant amount of money, it could have been hardly enough for such an enterprise as a presidential election campaign. Zhirinovskii's position was, moreover, remarkably different to that of the other candidates, in that he was the only one without *official* ties to a branch of the Soviet Union or Russian Federation governmental institutions (including the CPSU apparatus), and therefore without any *official* state (including CPSU) funds or other non-monetary privileges at his immediate disposal. To be sure, there is an obvious explanation for the coverage of Zhirinovskii's 1991 presidential election campaign.

The candidate's pre-election trips through the country were payed from the CPSU budget; the would-be president was protected by *OMON* [Special Tasks Police Department] units; his active, local accomplices were *KGB* officers who, according to the version of the Commission

⁶⁵ The USSR's *official* exchange rate (very far away from the market rate) was until 1991 Rbls0.56 for US\$1.00 (Kruchina 1991, 302).

[investigating the circumstances of the August 1991 putsch attempt], fulfilled an order by their chief [KGB Chairman] V. Kriuchkov. (L. Kisliakova in *Vecherniaia Moskva*, 26 December 1991, 1)

Although all of this has most probably been the case and is partly documented,⁶⁶ accounts such as these leave many questions open. For instance, by 1991, the CPSU had become an ideologically heterogeneous organization, and included social democrats (M. Gorbachëv, A. Iakovlev) as well as ultra-nationalists (G. Ziuganov) in leading positions. In general terms, it would be of interest who exactly in the state apparatus helped Zhirinovskii in which way and to which degree. What were the specific motives, political circumstances and social context of the financial support by the relevant sections of the *ancien regime*? Which of the help by the various agencies was comparatively more or relatively less important for the emergence of Zhirinovskii's party and the success of his campaign? Is there actually empirical evidence for the Commission's 'version' that Kriuchkov personally gave orders concerning Zhirinovskii?

⁶⁶ The journal *Ogonëk* published, for instance, two documents which prove that USSR state and party organs intended to assist Zhirinovskii when he travelled through the country in summer 1991. On August 14, 1991, Iu. Gal'tsev who is identified as 'Responsible Secretary of the Vilnius GK [probably: *Gorodskoi komitet* = CPSU City Committee - A.U.] of the Lithuanian SSR' wrote a letter to the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee (LCP CC) Head of Management, N.A. Griбанov:

[I would like to] ask for your instructions on the quartering of representatives of the Liberal-Democratic Party of the USSR in the hotel of the LCP CC with payment at the expense of the LCP CC: V.V. Zhirinovskii - single-bedroom; V.N. Minova, Iu.A. Levina - double-bedroom; N.V. Morozova, A.N. Khrabrykh, I.N. Pakhomova - three-bedroom. [...] (as quoted in O, no. 2, 1992, 23)

In his letter to the Vilnius *OMON* Commander of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Police Major B. Makutynovich, Gal'tsev wrote referring to the same planned visit of Lithuania by the LDPSU delegation:

[I would like to] ask you to help in the organization of the guarding of representatives of the Liberal-Democratic Party of the USSR during their stay in the cities of Klaipeda [...], Vil'nius and Snechkus in the period 3 p.m. on 20 August til 8 a.m. on 23 August [...]. The mode of escort is established by agreement. (as quoted in O, no. 2, 1992, 23)

Some Expenditures

It is so far one of the principal unresolved issues regarding the rise of the LDP: Which people, groups or structures were financing Zhirinovskii at which point most? Even before the 1991 elections Zhirinovskii must have had considerable financial resources as he had taken five trips to the West as a representative of Russian liberal democracy (NZZ, 27 May 1990). Also, the fee for the registration of the LDPSU at the USSR Ministry of Justice in April 1991 had been Rbls5,000 for the registration of a union-wide organization - an amount then still equivalent to several monthly average incomes (Zhbakov 1991, 30).

Some of the funds and expenses of the LDP are documented in detail. In February 1992, the Moscow cooperative *INO*, an LDP proxy, leased for the monthly rent of Rbls1,700 from the Moscow Metro garages for three trucks and seven cars of the LDP Central Committee and *INO* (MK, 6 February 1992). A former LDP headquarters employee, detailed that Zhirinovskii paid altogether Rbls30,000 per month for parking-places, and bought a four-flat section in Mitino for Rbls12 million (Orlov 1996, 206). The same author quotes a speech of Zhirinovskii's in which he lamented about high expenditures at the Third LDP Congress on 18 April 1992.

Rbls700,000 per year [are the expenses] for the accomodation of the staff. Now the rooms grow and the rent as well. [...] Rbls1 million per year [are the expenses] for the *Juridical Newspaper* [for providing columns for the LDP], now more. [...] The rent for the halls for the Congress [is] Rbls150,000, [and] for the conference [on 4 April 1992] Rbls4,200 [...]. (as quoted in Orlov 1996, 191)

A journalist gave in spring 1992 the information that Zhirinovskii paid a salary of up to Rbls3,000 per month to his several bodyguards (*Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 6 May 1992). In early 1993, Zhirinovskii invited journalists to a 'breakfast' the costs of which were estimated at Rbls300,000 (*AiF-Moskva*, no. 3, 1993, 4). In June 1993, Zhirinovskii reported that the LDPR's monthly budget was then Rbls3-4

million (but 'necessary is [an amount] ten times higher'), and that the party is planning to introduce shortly an LDPR Foundation (as quoted in *Partinform*, no. 26 [47], 23-29 June 1993, 7). At a conference in early July 1993, the LDPR announced that it planned to spend Rbls75 million during 'the first stage of the propaganda activities' (ME, no. 27, 14 July 1993, 17). In September 1993, the LDPR planned to send a delegation to Iraq; the costs of the trip were estimated at Rbls1.5 million (ME, no. 37, 22 September 1993, 17). According to a former LDPR headquarters employee, when the electoral blocs had to submit signature lists in their support for registration for the State Duma elections, Zhirinovskii paid Rbls100 for one signature in October-November 1993, and Rbls400,000 for 1,000 signatures in October-November 1995 (Orlov 1996, 204). Timtschenko details that every activist of the October-December 1993 LDPR election campaign earned circa Rbls150-200,000 (then approximately DM210-280) per week, and that Zhirinovskii spent a total of Rbls1 billion - approximately DM1.1 million - for this campaign (1994, 125). Among the 13 'electoral blocs', the LDPR bought 14% of the overall time spent for electoral advertising requiring payment on the *Ostankino* and *RTR* television channels, and 34.2% of the overall time spent on paid ads on the major radio stations (Evropeiskii institut... 1994, 96-97). In 1993, one minute of TV election advertisement cost around Rbls1.2 million (Luchterhandt 1994, 133).

The officially given figure of the LDPR's expenditures for the 1993 election campaign was Rbls925 million (OG, no. 51 [127], 21-27 December 1995, 1). Thus one parliamentary seat costed the LDPR only Rbls17 million. This appeared as a comparatively effective use of funds in so far as only those two Fifth State Dume parties which could rely on a large Soviet institutional heritage spent lesser amounts per seat: the agrarians (using the *Kolkhoz-Sovkhoz*-directors network) needed Rbls2.4 million per seat, and the communists (relying on hundreds of local party cells) spent Rbls3.3 million for one seat. The party which came next after the LDPR in December 1993, Egor Gaidar's Russia's Choice, in contrast, spent approx. Rbls50 million per seat (Kovler 1994, 114). Solovei, however, gave the information that experts had come to the conclusion that Zhirinovskii's real overall expenditures must have been between Rbls1 and 3 billion in 1993 (1994, 2). It is also unclear whether the official data given by other parties is reliable. A further difficult methodological issue would be whether and to which degree non-monetary resources (Soviet heritage, access to government officials and to

electronic media, Western support, perhaps even pressure through mafiotic structures) can be transformed into equivalent numerical financial data. For instance, a part of Zhirinovskii's 1993 electronic media election campaign was not financed properly, but due to his ability to fake *Progress-bank* financial documents to 'pay' for his appearances on radio *Maiak* (light-house) and *Galaktika*, and to 'convince' the major Russian TV station Ostankino to provide air-time for him without immediate payment, but on credit which, according to different source, meant that, after the elections, the LDPR owed Ostankino between Rbls200 million and Rbls1 billion, or even US\$600,000; the latter amounts, to be sure, appear as much too high (S, nos. 41 [148], 48 [155], 1994; Timtschenko 1994, 124; Oshlies 1995, 54).⁶⁷ In sum, comparisons between the officially declared amounts of financial resources mobilized only indicate partly what mattered most in the 1993 electoral campaign.

Zhirinovskii's official income was Rbls27,375,936 in 1994, and Rbls29,462,417 in 1995 which was higher than the official income of President El'tsin during these years (AiF, no. 15, 1996, 2). At one point in 1994, the information was given that Zhirinovskii's as well as the LDPR's funds under his or his relatives' control deposited at Moscow's *Progress-bank* included US\$130,000, DM20,770 and Rbls57 million (*Focus*, 6 June 1994; *Gubernskie vedomosti* [Nizhnii Novgorod], no. 19 [26], 1994). A former LDPR headquarters employee, details that, in 1995, Zhirinovskii rented the A.S. Pushkin Motor Ship for a Volga trip from Moscow to Astrakhan for Rbls400 million, sold Rbls1,500-pastry for Rbls50 at meetings, paid US\$500 to LDPR State Duma Deputies for their voting to his liking, entertained 1,000 guest on his 1995 birthday party at the Moscow *Rossia* restaurant, and placed Ural Car Factory vans (*UAZ-furgony*) to the disposal of the LDPR regional organizations, including the one in Belarus. Referring to the party's publication activities, the same author described Zhirinovskii as 'a new Russian "Murdoch-Publisher"' who has bought a lot of real estate and publishing houses in the regions (Orlov 1996, 204-205, 225). According to the Moscow Panorama Agency, in 1995, the LDPR had 70 regional newspapers, and all LDPR newspapers had an overall circulation of approx. 500,000 (Verkhovskii, Pribylovskii and Papp 1996, 107, 109; Further Reading: Primary Literature).

⁶⁷ This led some observers to speculate that Zhirinovskii had some high-standing godparents in the El'tsin administration.

Apart from the expenses for party activities, Zhirinovskii also had expenditures as a benefactor. For instance, Zhirinovskii was reported to have performed as a 'sponsor' at the Founding Congress of the abortive Movement for the USSR, a small umbrella organization of imperialist parties, on January 18, 1992 (*Khronika mnogopartiinosti*, no. 1 [3], January-March 1992, 11-12). According to A. Arkhipov (sec. 3.5.), Zhirinovskii payed for the major tribune of the big March 17, 1992 joint opposition rally in the Moscow city centre although Zhirinovskii himself was, paradoxically, not allowed to speak (Limonov 1994a, 56). He also financed, according to Sazhi Umalatova (b. 1953), a Chechen pro-Soviet Moscow-based *Soiuz* activist, another major right-wing gathering - the so called Sixth Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, on December 30, 1992 (Pribylovskii 1995b, 52). In summer 1992, Zhirinovskii sent, according to an LDPR functionary, several transports of medicine to the Russian-speakers secessionist movement and their Moldovan Dniestr Republic (V. Ivanov 1996, 79). In June 1993, he presented to a number of graduates of the Khimki School No. 16 premiums of up to Rbls10,000 (*Partinform*, no. 25 [46], 17-23 June 1993, 9). The popular Moscow daily *Vecherniaia Moskva* reported on 30 May 1994 that the LDPR pays all expenses for falcons at the Moscow Zoo - an action apparently connected to the central role the falcon plays as a symbol for the LDPR (Kartsev 1995, 15).

The Red Millions

Further questions would be: Are his initial and more recent patrons largely the same people or groupings? What is the rationale for their support to him? Do they want Zhirinovskii to become the Russian president, or is he simply thought of as an instrument to exercise influence on high office holders? How significant is it that Zhirinovskii very probably received help from abroad (sec. 3.4.)? Maybe he does not only collect money from occasional promoters, but has a coherent secret grouping behind him? In view of the enormous amounts Zhirinovskii needed for his election campaigns in 1993, 1995 and 1996, the probability of some kind of plot, involving, perhaps, former *KGB* structures, parts of the military-industrial complex and new entrepreneurs, cannot be discarded. Although some possible sources are mentioned below, there is little proven information about who actually paid how much of the giant bills of the LDP. Apparently, Zhirinovskii made concerted efforts to hide his sponsors. There

has been, for instance, an information that a large part of the LDPR funds for the December 1993 electoral campaign were paid on the party's Moscow *Progress-bank* account in cash (*Gubernskie vedomosti* [Nizhnii Novgorod], no. 19 [26], 1994). A former LDPR employee, reported that there was a secret operation between 20 October and 5 November 1995 in the LDPR headquarters in which fictitious documents of alleged donations were signed by LDPR Moscow ranks for money which, according to the employee, had criminal origins (Orlov 1996, 225). Further, according to the National Security Issues editor for the Moscow weekly *Moskovskie novosti*,

[former *KGB* staff officer Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail] Valentinov noted that the sources of the LDPR's financing are so well hidden that not even the tax police and other fiscal structures have access to the information. He points out that only the security services could so effectively bury all data on the LDPR's financial sources [and that o]nly a few people in the security services have access to the information on the LDPR's finances, a fact which distinguishes it from all other political parties. (Zhilin 1995, 2)

Therefore, with one or two exceptions, my conclusions about the possible sources of Zhirinovskii's finances are still speculative.

The only properly documented report explains, at least partly, how he financed his presidential campaign in 1991. It appears that Zhirinovskii's vice-presidential running mate, Andrei Fëdorovich Zavidiiia (b. 1952), whom the LDP leader met at the celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution in the Kremlin in November 1990, played a vital role in raising the necessary money. Although Zavidiiia proclaimed himself a candidate for the post of the President of the Soviet Union, he has remained practically unknown as a politician (Berezovskii 1994, 102). He is a graduate of the Leningrad Institute of Trade and a former employee (or, according to some sources, even the former director) of the Soviet Travel Agency *Intourist* who started his entrepreneurial activity as a florist, and then computer merchant (Makarkin 1994, 66; Conradi 1995, 101). Later he mysteriously advanced to the chairmanship of the board of directors of a large industrial empire which he called *Galand* and

which included the firm *Zavidiia*. This gave him reportedly already by 1991 control over hundreds of millions of roubles, then a considerable amount of money (Berezovskii 1994, 102).

Galand is believed to be an invention of the CPSU. It incorporates, according to Zavidii's own words, 600 enterprises (or, according to another source, even 1,500 independent enterprises), and employed about 180,000 people in 1991 (though these figures may well be conscious exaggerations). The so called 'Red Millionaire' Zavidii is said to be a close friend of former Soviet Prime-Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov. He is known to have at different times heavily subsidized the two most important right-wing publications with mass-circulation in post-Soviet Russia, the weekly *Den'* (The Day) and the daily *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (Soviet Russia) (D, no. 21, 1991, 3, and no. 27 [107], 1993, 8; Berezovskii *et al.* 1992, 26-27; Verkhovskii 1994, 25, 29-30; Conradi 1995, 101).

Zavidii has despite his commercial activities made it known that he remains a communist because of communism's 'universal human values'. However, there seems to be also another reason for the entrepreneur's conspicuous 'leftism'. A copy of an February 1991 agreement between the administrative department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the *RSFSR* (or *RKP*, today the *KPRF*), represented by the Head of the Central Committee's Management Department Igor' Mikhailovich Golovkov (involved in many other shadowy financial actions of the *RKP*), and the firm *Zavidiia* has been found (Bunich 1992, 301-302; Bakshutov 1994, 82). The document reveals that

'[t]he administration' grants 'the Firm' temporarily free means (a credit bearing no interest) in the sum of Rbls3 (three) million until 31 December 1991. (O, no. 2 1992, 23)

At that time this was not a small amount - DM9.6 million according to one source (Timtschenko 1994, 126) -, and, because of already heavily present inflationary tendencies, *de facto* partly a gift. In view of Zavidii's later activities, it is obvious that the interest-free loan to Zavidii was, if at that point not directly related to Zhirinovskii's and Zavidii's election campaign, specifically intended for the support of anti-democratic groupings.

Somewhat paradoxically, the *RKP* thus helped via Zavidii to finance the campaign of one of the Communist Party's competitors in the 1991 presidential elections. Zavidii, for instance, detailed

that he paid Rbls26,000 for the printing of the LDPSU programme written by Zagorodnikov (an action which was above related to an intervention by CPSU Central Committee Ideology Secretary Dzasokhov), and Rbls10,000 for posters (Morrison 1994, 14). The then chairman of the *RKP*, Ivan Polozkov, confirmed later: 'We helped him [Zhirinovskii].' (as quoted in Barinova 1994, 10)

In 1992, the former vice-presidential candidate conceded that his alliance with Zhirinovskii had been a mistake. Zavidia then announced his own candidacy for the offices of the President of Russia, the President of the USSR, and the Mayor of Moscow. At about the same time, he also became a member of the Central Committee of one of the less influential CPSU successor organisations, the so called 'CPSU-2' led by Sergei Skvortsov. In addition, the entrepreneur was reportedly a member of the leading bodies of the dwarf-group 'Left Russia', and of the misnamed, miniscule Majority Party. Notwithstanding, according to Zavidia, he again became one of the LDP's major sources and organizers of financial support in the 1993 parliamentary elections. He stated that *Galand* contributed Rbls3 billion to Zhirinovskii's election campaign (Verkhovskii 1994, 29-30). Another source details that the entrepreneur had, according to his own words, created as many as 3,500 'committees' all over the country on the eve of the elections in order to channel money to the Zhirinovskii party (Oschlies 1995, 54).

It seems that the December 1993 elections represent, notwithstanding, the endpoint of Zavidia's association with Zhirinovskii. Zhirinovskii affronted Zavidia by removing, shortly before the elections, his name without the entrepreneur's knowledge from the all-federal LDP list where Zavidia had been on position 20. This meant that the 'Red Millionaire' did not, in spite of his seemingly enormous efforts, become a member of the Fifth State Duma. Thus Zavidia laid an information against Zhirinovskii in 1994, and demanded his reinstatement on the LDPR list for the 1993 elections (i.e. his entrance into the Duma), and the return of Rbls1,500,000,000 as a compensation for *Galand's* (according to Abramov and Golovina: *GOLAN's* [?]) lost income because of *Galand's* pre-occupation with the LDPR's electoral campaign. The juridical proceedings were still continuing in 1996 because of default of the defendant for which Zhirinovskii was fined by the court. In December 1995, a Committee for the Collection of Signatures for the Nomination of Andrei Zavidia as Presidential Candidate was

registered, yet Zavidiiia did not participate in the June 1996 elections (Abramov and Golovina 1996, 232).

A possible, somewhat similar source of funding for the LDPR could have been notorious Aleksei Vedenkin (b. 1966) who, apart from being involved in the CPSU financial matters, is said to have also 'organized a number of foreign trips and fund-raising campaigns for Vladimir Zhirinovskii' (Reznik 1995, 246; sec. 3.4.). Vedenkin is one of the several openly neo-Nazi Russian political figures who were proven to have had, at least for some time, links to Zhirinovskii.⁶⁸ He is said to like Nazi songs such as the Horst Wessel Song, and to be called *Brigadenführer* which is a high SS grade comparable to the military rank of a General. There were also rumours that he is or was a member of an Argentine-based Society of SS Troops Veterans 'Command K-4' (OG, no. 10 [86], 1995, 8).

Semyon Reznik details that, in 1981, young Vedenkin founded in his high school an organisation called New National-Socialist Workers Party of Russia which had its own membership cards with a swastika and Hitler's profile on it (1995, 245). After his military service until 1984, he applied for the second time unsuccessful at the All-Union Institute of Legal Studies by Correspondence. Although Vedenkin had during his army service been found guilty of forgery of documents, he was subsequently employed by the Moscow City Administration for Internal Affairs (*GUVD*) in 1984-86 (Belin 1995, 13), and by the Moscow *milititsia* from where he was soon fired for inadequate behaviour in May 1987 after only four months of work. Vedenkin claimed that he was hired as *KGB*-agent in 1986, and by *Moskovskii ugolovnyi rozysk MUR* (Moscow Criminal Investigation Department) in 1987 (MN, no. 36, 1994; Pribylovskii 1995b, 37). According to his own information, he wrote, among others, reports about homosexuals. Whether all this was really the case is unclear. What became known is that, in 1989, he tried to extort Rbls100,000 from the famous pop-singer Andrei Razin whose homosexuality he threatend to reveal. Razin, however, turned to the police, and Vedenkin was caught and indicted for blackmail, forgery of a *KGB* passport, and larceny. In spite of this record and his pending conviction, in 1990, Vedenkin became co-founder of the so called Center for Investigation and Criminal Search which was renamed into Security Service in 1991, and officially

⁶⁸ On this aspect of Zhirinovskii's political profile; see secs. 3.3. (on Iakushev) and 3.5. (on Zharikov, Arkhipov, Batogov, and Prussakov).

instituted by the *Moskovia* Municipal Corporation for Professional Development of the Moscow Mayor Office and the Frunze Rayon *Komsomol* Committee (Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 239). At the beginning of August 1991, Vedenkin's Security Service and the CPSU Central Committee concluded a contract concerning the protection of the Committee's Moscow headquarters on Old Square. Vedenkin became, as the building's Deputy Commandant, acquainted with the Central Committee apparatchik in charge of the CPSU finances, the late Nikolai E. Kruchina (Kruchina 1991; Stepankov and Lisov 1992, 233-236). Semyon Reznik gives the following picture:

In 1991, Aleksei Vedenkin worked for the Managing Department of the Communist Party Central Committee where he headed a security division. The Department controlled all Communist Party finances. When it became evident that the Party was losing its monopoly of power, Vedenkin's job was to channel the party money abroad and deposit it in different foreign banks. The head of the management, Nikolai Kruchina, authorized this secret operation. In August 1991, after the failure of the coup against democracy, Kruchina committed suicide. Vedenkin was the first to come to his office and remove all secret documents from his safe. (Reznik 1995, 245-246; name-transliteration adapted)

After the coup, Vedenkin was again indicted for forgery of documents (permits of the KGB, Procuracy, Defense Ministry), yet not convicted because of a 1992 presidential amnesty. According to some reports, he was hired by the Security Division of the Russian Presidential Administration in February 1991 (MN, no. 36, 1994; OG, no. 10 [86], 1995, 8). Whereas other sources alleged that Vedenkin had simply again forged documents which identified him as a staff member of the Presidential Administration, the Moscow daily *Kuranty* came to the conclusion that Vedenkin had indeed received documents with state symbols from the then Deputy Management Head of the Russian Presidential Administration, Fëdor Morshchakov, and had been able to use these documents until they were withdrawn in summer 1993, i.e. until after he had already left the Presidential Administration (*Russkaia mysl'*, no. 4068, 1995, 2). When Vedenkin's Division in the Presidential Administration was dissolved

in June 1992, he became a co-founder of a security firm called *Argus* attached to the so called Foundation for the Development of an International University headed by Moscow's then Mayor Gavril Popov. Until its dissolution in February 1993, *Argus's* headquarters had been located in the Moscow suburban district *Kuntsevo*, an area known for its summer-houses of the former CPSU leadership. Between November 1992 and September 1993, Vedenkin was according to Baranovskii, president and stock-holder of the *Vozrozhdenie* (Rebirth) Plc (MN, no. 36, 1994), and, according to Reznik, financial manager or adviser for the *Vozrozhdenie* Foundation headed by the Russian Federation's then Vice-President and later leading ultra-nationalist politician Aleksandr Rutskoi (Reznik 1995, 245-246). According to another source, the Rebirth Public Limited Company and the Foundation are separate institutions so that both or only one of these informations might be true (MN, no. 29, 1995, 15). During the September-October 1993 mutiny, Vedenkin was an assistant to the ultra-nationalist General Vladislav Achalov who was made 'Minister of Defense' by 'President' Rutskoi in the Moscow White House (the former House of Soviets, and House of Government of the Russian Federation) in late September 1993. Apparently, it was after the mutiny when Vedenkin became Vice-President of Achalov's *Bratstvo* (Brotherhood) Foundation (Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 239).

When exactly Vedenkin and Zhirinovskii became acquainted, and whether Vedenkin was ever an LDPR member has remained unknown. It is known that Vedenkin 'has a very high opinion of Zhirinovskii' (Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 241). Although Vedenkin seems to have always been a relatively independent political figure, documents seem to prove that his contact to the LDPR was a continuous and multifarious one as, for instance, exemplified by the existence of several photographs showing Vedenkin and Zhirinovskii together (MN, no. 36, 1994, 1 & 11; TV programme 'Russian Fascism: Who?', *Rossiiskaia teleradiokompaniia*, 22 February 1995). According to the information which a former consultant to Vedenkin, Iurii Ianushevich, a Russian Black Sea Navy officer, gave to the Moscow weekly *Moskovskie novosti*, Vedenkin went in March 1992 as a representative of Zhirinovskii via Nal'chik to Chechnia where he and a representative of the large *Mosbiznesbank* (Moscow Business Bank) had talks with Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev and Georgian ex-President Zviad Gamzakhurdia (who have both been killed in the meantime). According

to Ianushevich, Vedenkin discussed with Dudaev and his associates (who did not hide their ties to organized crime) 'topics ranging from international bank transfers to planning how Russia and the world would be changed after the LDP came to power' (Belin 1995, 13). Ianushevich reported that Gamzakhurdia handed over to Vedenkin 'private letters addressed to Boris El'tsin' (MN, no. 29, 1995, 15). Allegedly, Dudaev and Vedenkin had serious plans to bring African dictator Mobutu of Zaire to Chechnia for asylum. According to Ianushevich, the Austrian businessmen Josef Hambrusch had communicated to Vedenkin that Mobutu is looking for a country to settle, and Vedenkin and Ianushevich flew from Munich to Kinshasa in April 1993 to prepare Mobutu's arrival in Chechnia. However, then the September-October 1993 events in Moscow prevented the realization of the plan (MN, no. 29, 1995, 15).

In autumn 1993, Vedenkin went as an LDPR representative to Germany where he met an administrator of property of the former East German communist party (sec. 3.4.). In December 1993, he accompanied Zhirinovskii on a trip to Austria (sec. 3.4.). In September 1994, *Moskovskie novosti* published an official LDPR document signed by Zhirinovskii in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, on January 26, 1994, and called General Authorization (*general'naiia doverennost'*). The document gave Vedenkin the power to sign agreements in the name of the LDPR Central Committee, to take independently decisions in 'financial-commercial activities' related to the party, to open in European countries official missions of the LDPR Central Committee, to make statements in the name of the LDPR State Duma faction and leader, to hire and fire staff, and to create, register and chair a V.V. Zhirinovskii Foundation for Russia's Rebirth in Europe (MN, no. 36, 1994, 11).

Further, at some point in 1993 or 1994, Vedenkin became acquainted with Janusz Bryczkowski, leader of the miniscule ultra-nationalist party Polish National Front which has become another foreign partner of Zhirinovskii in 1994 (sec. 3.4.). Vedenkin has, according to one source, also met Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, another Zhirinovskii-acquaintant, several times (MN, no. 36, 1994; OG, no. 9 [85], 1995, 13; sec. 3.4.). In 1994-95, finally, Vedenkin worked as an assistant to the leading LDPR Deputy and Vice-Speaker of the State Duma, Aleksandr Vengerovskii, who reportedly nearly succeeded in making Vedenkin director of the most important Russian international airport, Moscow's

Sheremet'ev-2 (Pribylovskii 1995b, 38; Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 239; sec. 3.6.). A later official LDPR statement reported in *Moskovskii komsomolets* admitted that Vedenkin had indeed for some time been in contact with Zhirinovskii, accompanied him on a trip to Iraq, and allegedly been fired by Vengerovskii after only one month of work as an assistant in 1994 (MK, 4 March 1995).

According to the LDPR pronouncement, Vedenkin was fired by Vengerovskii because the State Duma Deputy Speaker got to know about Vedenkin's links to the by far most significant Russian neo-Nazi party *Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo RNE* (Russian National Unity) led by Aleksandr P. Barkashov (b. 1953). In spite of the publication of several official 1994-95 *RNE* documents proving Vedenkin's membership in *RNE* (even in a leading position), Barkashov and his press-service and lawyer denied, after some scandalous pronouncements by Vedenkin in February 1995, that Vedenkin had ever been linked to *RNE* (MK, 4 March 1995, 3; S, 4 March 1995; *Golos*, no. 10, 1995, 3; ROL, no. 4, 30 March 1995, 3). In early 1995, Vedenkin claimed in an interview to *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (10 February 1995, 1-2) that he has bought for *RNE* over 20% of stocks of an international technological corporation *Sirena-3* which was involved in the development of an automated air traffic control and management system for Russia. Vedenkin announced that the party 'will have 70% of the project's shares' by the end of 1995. He disclosed that he was given the money to buy the shares 'by some former leaders of Soviet republics, patriotic businessmen and friendly parties from the US and Argentina', and alleged that *RNE* 'has established mutually beneficial contacts with IBM, which is the largest of [*Sirena's*] founders' (ROL, no. 3, 7 March 1995).⁶⁹ Although the latter claim seems to be an exaggeration, in March 1995, Andrei Romanchenko, Vice-President of the *Aeroflot* Bank, confirmed the fact that Vedenkin had indeed become a co-owner of *Sirena-3* through his acquisition of the Foreign Economic Agency *Aeroflot*, an *Aeroflot* subsidiary company which owns a parcel of shares of *Sirena-3*. Romanchenko also confirmed that IBM is another major shareholder of *Sirena-3*, and explained that *Aeroflot* was happy to sell its shares to Vedenkin, the only bidder, because the international *Sirena-3* Project had been in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis its major Russian competitor called *Polët* (Flight) Project. The business department of the Moscow weekly *Moskovskie novosti* gave the

⁶⁹ On *RNE*, see the useful, but unfortunately so far unpublished analysis and documentation by Richter (1996).

information that the US consulting firm Alfa Investment (apparently related to IBM) had subsequently offered Vedenkin to buy the *Sirena-3* shares with a premium of US\$2,000,000, yet that Vedenkin was demanding a surcharge of US\$15,000,000 (MN, no. 21, 1995, 27). Another source details that Vedenkin has for some time been buying up the shares of the large Russian truck producer *Kamskii avtomobil'nyi zavod KAMAZ* (Kama Car Factory), and confirmed that Vedenkin possessed shares of *Vozrozhdenie Plc* (OG, no. 9 [85], 1995, 13).

In February 1995, Vedenkin became known beyond Russia's borders when he stated in an interview with Russian television that he would 'personally execute' the democratic State Duma deputies Sergei Kovalëv and Sergei Iushenkov for their consistent criticism of the military campaign against Chechnia, that he has collected a list of 150 other liberals, and that he proposes to erect a statue to Defense Minister Pavel Grachëv for leading the War in Chechnia (Belin 1995, 13). For this statement, Vedenkin was jailed on February 28, 1995. Shortly after his release on March 23, 1995 (paradoxically the very day on which President El'tsin issued a special Decree on the Fight against Symptoms of Fascism and Political Extremism), he stood as candidate in the Kolomna by-elections to the State Duma on May 14, 1995, and lost with 3.06% of the vote (*OMRI Daily Report*, 1 March, 12 May, 15 May, 16 May, 1995).⁷⁰

Although documents and photographs have been published proving unequivocally that Vedenkin was an *RNE* member (MK, 4 March 1995; *Russkaia mysl'*, no. 4068, 1995, 2) and in contact with Zhirinovskii and at least one of Zhirinovskii's foreign partners (Edwin Neuwirth; see 3.4.), it should be, in conclusion, noted that it is difficult to say which of the information provided by Vedenkin about himself is correct in as far as he has the reputation of a notorious impostor. *Obshchaia gazeta* journalist Nikolai Gorbatov furthermore detailed that Aleksandr Khinshtein the *Moskovskii komsomolets* journalist who mainly reported on the Vedenkin affair in 1995, worked at this time as an

⁷⁰ For further details on Vedenkin's activities until 1995, see Belin 1995, 13. For further details, see especially the detailed, yet partly inaccurate report of Igor' Baranovskii in MN, no. 36, 1994, 1, 11, and also MN, no. 15, 1995, 21; S, 1 March 1995; MK, 1 March 1995; I, 2 March 1995; S, 4 March 1995; MK, 4 March 1995, 3; AiF, no. 9, 1995, 7; OG, no. 9 (85), 1995, 13, and no. 10 (86), 1995, 8; RM, no. 4068, 1995, 1-2; MN, no. 21, 1995, 17, no. 29, 1995, 15, and no. 47, 1995, 21; RG, 13 May 1995; OG, no. 29 (105), 1995, 2; and Oschlies 1995, 55-56.

assistant to (apparently Aleksandr) Filatov (b. 1967), a member of the LDPR State Duma faction (OG, no. 29 [105], 1995, 2). Finally, it should be noted that, in contrast to Zavidia's case, no documents indicating whether or how much money was transferred from or through Vedenkin to the LDPR have been published.

LDPR, Inc.

Zhirinovskii, according to some reports, also tried to earn money himself. Vladimir Berezovskii details that, in 1991, the LDP-leader was one of the owners of a commodity market operating under the cover of the Moscow City Public Inquiry Office *Mosgorspravka* the staff of which belonged, as mentioned above, via the Popular Information Party, to the Centrist Bloc (Berezovskii 1994, 103; sec. 1.3.). During a visit Krasnoiarsk in Siberia in early 1992, he asked for material support for his party. According to a newspaper report, he proposed as possibilities to do this to use the 'economic structures of the LDPR' for doing business in general, and specifically for the export of Siberian nonferrous metals. He proposed as a further possibility to 'get a part of the wood for sale to Turkey, for the Turkish firm "Passage"' (as quoted in I, 12 February 1992, 3). Russian right-wing author Ultra-nationalist sources detailed that Zhirinovskii owns a stock-market on Tverskaia Street 5, in the Moscow city centre (LR, no. 4, 28 January 1994, 4; Bakshutov 1994, 91). Other observers noted that Zhirinovskii leased some kiosks on the *Kazanskii* railway station and across Moscow to re-sell commodities (MK, 28 October 1994, 1; Orlov 1996, 206). Leonid Ivanov reported that the LDPR has founded its own oil company *Iugraneft'* which tries to get extraction licenses for a large Russian oil field (1996, 251). One observers reported that, in June 1993, Zhirinovskii demanded DM300,- for a one-hour interview without a microphone; although, in August 1993, I took, after introducing myself as a student, an interview with microphone for free (Oschlies 1995, 36; Umland 1994a). Timtschenko stated that Zhirinovskii asked US\$100 per minute for an interview to both, foreign and Russian journalists (1994, 111) - a charge confirmed in another report (Z, no. 10, 4 March 1994). According to a later report, Zhirinovskii demanded as much as US\$15,000 for an interview to a foreigner (MN, no. 9, 5-12 November 1995, 1).

Another likely and practically official source of the party finances were the firms belonging to a certain Viktor Bogatyĭ, until 1992 one of the members of the leading body of the LDP, the Highest Council. Bogatyĭ who, according to Timtschenko, might be the brother of a former KGB-officer who defected to the United States in 1982 (1994, 131), is a former member of the Soviet trade agency in Great Britain, and of the editorial board of the journal *Vneshniaia torgovlia* (Foreign Trade). He is now reported to be the president of a company called *Eksodin* (insurance, real estate, commerce), the owner of seven similar firms, a timber merchant, and involved in building houses around the central Moscow pedestrian precinct *Arbat* (S, 22 December 1993; V. Ivanov 1996, 67). Aleksandr Vengerovskii, another high LDPR functionary until 1996 (sec. 3.5.), was also mentioned by several observers as an important sponsor of Zhirinovskii (e.g. Limonov 1994, 101-102; Morrison 1994, 13). According to a Russian weekly, Vengerovskii had, for instance, to commit himself to pay US\$600,000 in the LDP electoral fund to acquire the third position on the party's list for the December 1995 State Duma elections (OG, no. 31 [107], 3-9 August 1995, 8).

Further, a Dutch-Russian joint financial corporation called GMM (Global Money Management Trust Financial Services BV) and owned by Anton Nenakhov (b. 1967) contributed, according to different sources, either US\$50,000 or US\$800,000 to Zhirinovskii's election campaign (P, 4 January 1994; S, 29 December 1993; S, 31 December 1993).⁷¹ GMM, the advertisements of which were heavily present in Russian media in 1993-1994, strongly rejected such accusations (S, 6 January 1994). Nenakhov stated in an interview for Russian State Television and at a press-conference in Brussels that such an involvement in Russian politics would have been foolish as it could discourage his customers from investing their money with GMM. 'The support of such a party [...] would be similar to committing suicide.' (as quoted in Timtschenko 1994, 130). However, these statements not only depart from an official confirmation of GMM's LDPR support which made by GMM's Amsterdam employee Mr. van der Meier (or Meer?) who mentioned the amount of US\$50,000, and detailed that

⁷¹ Nenakhov became director of the GMM Holding in 1993, and is the President of the Russian Equestrian Sports Association. Before this he was the manager of a showgroup called 'Lefortovo', from 1990 to 1992 director of the Commercial and Industrial Holding 'Rossiia', and from 1992 to 1993 director of a bank and of the Dutch commercial enterprise Salamander Holdings. According to Timtschenko, it is unclear where his capital comes from (1994, 129).

Nenakhov personally supported further candidates (S, 4 January, and 16 April 1994; Verkhovskii 1994, 24). They also contradict the fact that Aleksei A. Zuev (b. 1970), who was officially described as an aide to GMM's president, had appeared on position 53 of the LDP all-federal list for the 1993 elections, and was thus elected to the State Duma (IuG, no. 40-41 [110-111], 1993, 6; *Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 2nd vol., 60).⁷² Zuev has also become a member of LDPR shadow cabinet where he occupies a post in Zhirinovskii's would-be presidential apparatus (*LDPR*, no. 6 [26], 1996, 2). GMM, in turn, denied that Zuev has worked for Nenakhov (Verkhovskii 1994, 24), after which the LDPR State Duma faction publicly expressed its 'amazement' that the leadership of GMM '[...] does not understand its benefit [from cooperating with the LDPR]', and that it continues to refuse to acknowledge the fact that it is financing Zhirinovskii's party (as quoted in Solovei 1994, 3). According to further information, Zhirinovskii actually met Nenakhov himself in Austria in December 1993, and actively lobbied for GMM after he had entered the State Duma (I, 13 January 1994; S, 10 June 1994; Oschlies 1995, 56). For instance, in 1994, Russia's Ministry of Finance declared GMM's activities unlawful, its TV advertisements were banned, and the Russian press accused it of laundering Russian criminal money in the West (Morrison 1994, 15). Following this Zhirinovskii wrote a letter to Prime-Minister Chernomyrdin on 15 May 1994 asking '[...] to promote the soonest solution of the problem of regulation of relationships [...] between GMM and the Financial Organs, and also to further the renewal of the TV advertisement on the state-owned channels.' (as quoted in Solovei 1994, 3). According to Timtschenko, this resulted in the recovery of GMM's licence for financial activities (1994, 130). Although the exact amount of GMM's support remains unknown, it seems thus probable that GMM supported Zhirinovskii's party in one way or another.

Apart from Zuev's case, there were apparently several other deals in which financial support from enterprises or banks was exchanged for parliamentary seats or even State Duma committee leadership for persons previously not associated to (or, at least, did not play a prominent role in) the

⁷² In this context, I am referring not to the numbering on the LDP list published in the *Juridical Newspaper* (IuG, no. 40-41 [110-111], 1993, 6-7) which included Zhirinovskii himself, but to the re-numbering introduced later without counting Zhirinovskii himself (*Vlast'*... 1994 [1995]). That means that Zuev's original position on the list was 54, and not 53.

LDP. It was, in general, a peculiar feature of Zhirinovskii's party that only 54.4% of the 59 deputies elected to the Fifth State Duma on its all-federal list were members of the LDPR (Luchterhandt 1994, 131). Some of the most obvious examples in December 1993 included, first, Sergei V. Kalashnikov (b. 1951), President of the *AO Torgovyi Dom 'Neftekhim'* (Oil-Chem Trading Corporation Plc) and Chairman of the Council of Directors of the *AO Russkaia toplivnaia kompaniia* (Russian Fuel Corporation Plc), who was number 19 on the LDP all-federal list for the 1993 elections and became the chairman of the Fifth State Duma Committee for Labour and Social Support as well as the 'Minister of Social Support' of the LDPR shadow cabinet (*Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 2nd vol., 78; *LDPR*, no. 6 [26], 1996, 2); second, Edvard G. Zhuk (b. 1960), Deputy Chairman of the Moscow *Aura-Bank* and apparently also linked to *Neftekhimbank* (V. Mikhcev in *Kto est' kto*, no. 11, 1994), who was number 50 on the LDP list, and became Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee for the Budget, Taxes, Banks and Finances (*Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 2nd vol., 35); third, Vladimir A. Lisichkin (b. 1941), President of the Scientific-Productive Combine '*Futurum*', who was number 13 on the list and became Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Property, Privatization and Economic Activity; fourth, Vladimir K. Gusev (b. 1932), Vice-President of the Scientific-Technological Corporation '*Promyshlennik*' (Industrialist), who was number 10 on the all-federal list and became Chairman of the Committee for Industry, Building, Transport and Energy; and, fifth, Iurii E. Buzov (b. 1955), Regional Director of the Moscow *AO 'Neva-Chups-Chups'*, who was number 11 on the 1993 LDP list and became Chairman of the State Duma Sub-Committee for Foreign Economic and Scientific-Technological Cooperation (*Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 1st vol., 67; <http://www.nns.ru/persons>).

The cases of two further Fifth State Duma deputies differ in so far as these men were in December 1993 both, full members of the LDPR and managers of seemingly significant enterprises. Vladimir Z. Gvozdarev (b. 1951), Director of a firm for the introduction of scientific findings called '*SET*', had become an LDP member as early as 1991, and, moreover, was made LDPR Deputy Chairman for Economic Issues in April 1993. He became the number 6 on the LDPR all-federal list, and Chairman of the Sub-Committee for Organizational Matters of the Fifth State Duma Committee for Industry, Building, Transport and Energy. In 1996, Ivan Orlov reported that a firm owned by

Zhirinovskii was operated by Gvozdev, and traded in busses, sugar, alcohol, vodka, computers, flat-irons, etc. (Orlov 1996, 206). Evgenii A. Bol'shakov (b. 1949), General Director of the Vladivostok AO 'Ob''edinenie avtovokzalov i avtostantsii' (Association of Motor Car Terminals and Stations Plc), had become an LDPR member in 1992, was number 39 on the all-federal list, and became a member of the Committee for Property, Privatization and Economic Activity. In addition, one could add at least one further example of an individual who entered the State Duma not in 1993, but in 1995, yet had been already before December 1993 simultaneously linked to the LDP and to a significant enterprise. LDPR Deputy Aleksandr I. Zhukovskii's (b. 1949) employment record since 1990 includes deputy general director of Joint-Venture, president of a scientific-technological firm, and Chairman of the Council of Directors of *Voenkombank* (Military Commercial Bank). Zhukovskii entered the State Duma only in December 1995, yet had already been a member of the LDP since 1991 (<http://www.ldpr.org/russian/head>). In addition, it should be mentioned that the amount which the parties registered for proportional voting received in 1993 was Rbls100 million (Morrison 1994, 13).

In his book published in 1996, the former major LDP representative in Siberia, Vladimir Ivanov from Krasnoiarsk, claimed that in December 1995 one LDPR State Duma seat - i.e. to obtain a high position on the list for the proportional voting - cost Rbls100 million. Ivanov further detailed that the current State Duma Deputy-Speaker representing the LDPR in the parliamentary presidium, the general director of the St. Petersburg Industrial-Financial Company *BIN* Mikhail S. Gutseriev (b. 1958), had paid not less than US\$1 million for his post (V. Ivanov 1996, 280, 287). According to another source, in summer 1995, LDPR Deputy Chairman Vengerovskii obliged himself to contribute US\$600,000 to the party electoral fund in order to obtain an appropriate position on the party's list for the 1995 State Duma elections (OG, no. 31 [107], 3-9 August 1995, 8). The well-informed independent Moscow Panorama Agency confirmed that '[t]here is an information' that, in the 1995 State Duma elections, candidates for the 8th til 12th position on the all-federal list and for the first two positions on a regional list⁷³ of the LDPR had to pay US\$300,000 (Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 109).

⁷³ The regional lists were introduced through a 1995 modification to the Electoral Law which aimed at promoting the election of more MPs from outside Moscow.

In his book, LDPR insider Vladimir Ivanov also explicitly confirmed previous speculations by many journalists that Zhirinovskii has ties to the criminal world (1996). Eduard Limonov (sec. 3.3.), for instance, specifies that a certain Sergei Gorshkov financed the LDPR delegation's trip to Paris in September 1992 (1994a, 80). Oschlies identifies Gorshkov as a mafia godfather who laundered millions of roubles through the LDPR which received a premium of 10%. Oschlies further quotes a *Segodnia* article which also classifies as criminals the brothers Vladimir, Aleksei and Evgenii Orlov from Lipetsk who supported the LDPR financially (1995, 56-57). In June 1994, there was an information that a prominent LDPR functionary was arrested who tried in May 1994 to withdraw from Perm and Samara banks Rbls600 billion using false documents of the First Federal Bank and Trans-Credit-Bank. At the arrest of the LDPR man and his companion in Moscow's South-East district, US\$230,000 and guns were confiscated (NG, 18 June 1994, 1). In early 1995, the issue of Zhirinovskii's criminal ties was in the headlines when LDPR State Duma faction member and Zarsk *Raduga* Plc General Director, Sergei G. Skorochkin (b. 1961), was shot apparently in connection with some shadowy business issues. Until then, the Moscow *oblast'* State Prosecutor Office had been conducting investigations concerning Skorochkin's shooting of two persons in 1994 (*Duma*, no. 6, 1995). A November 1995 issue of the Moscow weekly *Moskovskie novosti* showed Zhirinovskii with five criminals from the city of Staryi Oskol who were then searched for (Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1995, 107). An especially notorious case is Mikhail L'vovich Monastyrskii (b. 1945) who was the number 7 on the December 1995 LDPR all-federal list for the election of the Sixth State Duma, had been reportedly sentenced four times, and is suspected by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs of belonging to the criminal world (Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 107; McFaul and Petrov 1996, 102). Finally, it might be worth-mentioning that alleged criminal ties of Viktor Kobelev, the below described Number 2 on the LDPR's 1993 list for the State Duma elections and chief manager of Zhirinovskii's 1993 electoral campaign (sec. 3.6.), may have contributed to a major crisis in the Russian Right on the eve of the December 1995 State Duma elections. Kobelev had by then changed his allegiance to former Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi who made him the Number 2 on the list of his *Derzhava* (Great Power) Movement. This and other alleged inclusions of criminals on *Derzhava*'s list led to the enstrangement

between Rutskoi and some of his most prominent right-wing allies such as Viktor Alsknis (sec. 1.3.), Mikhail Astaf'ev, chairman of the so called Constitutional-Democratic Party, and Viktor Aksiuchits, chairman of the Russian Christian-Democratic Movement, who, with reference to the criminals' presence, demonstratively withdrew their candidacy for the State Duma on *Derzhava's* list in early September 1995 (*OMRI Daily Report*, 11 September 1995).

In addition, one could refer to the growing membership numbers of the party and rising subscriptions revenues,⁷⁴ the sale of party literature and of Zhirinovskii's numerous books (see 'Further Reading' list), compensation payments from the numerous libel cases which Zhirinovskii won, and the foreign partners of Zhirinovskii scrutinized below.⁷⁵ However, it is unlikely that the latter well-springs and the 1993 state-established campaign pool for each registered party of Rbls50 million were sufficient to cover the enormous expenditures Zhirinovskii must have had during the first post-Soviet State Duma elections and his numerous travels abroad. In early December 1995, it was reported that '[m]ore than 700 people have donated a total of Rbls1 billion (about US\$222,222) to the LDPR campaign' for the elections to the Sixth State Duma on December 12, 1995 (ITAR-TASS, 1 December 1995, quoted by *OMRI Daily Report*, 4 December 1995). Such a high number though might be connected to an LDPR headquarters secret operation on the eve of the elections in which LDPR Moscow members had to sign fictitious documents about donations which may have had criminal origins

⁷⁴ LDP Krasnoiarsk functionary V. Ivanov though stated that 'on average 1 among 20' LDP members paid his or her membership duties (1996, 43).

⁷⁵ Besides the below mentioned foreign partners of Zhirinovskii such as the German right-wing extremist Dr. Gerhard Frey, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, and an East German firm administering funds of the former communist party of the German Democratic Republic, Valerii Solovei also mentions (as an exotic version though) possible support for the LDP from the Japan-based League of Korean Citizens which supports the North Korean regime (1994, 2).

I have chosen to deal with Zhirinovskii's putative foreign financial sources not in this section, but in sec. 3.4. That is because an extensive treatment of possible, for instance, German or Iraqi monetary support under the heading 'Finances' might give the wrong impression that non-Russian factors had a decisive influence on the rise of the LDP. (Such an interpretation could, in fact, be seen as supporting some Russian anti-semites who see in the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' the most recent variety of the age-old anti-Russian 'Judeo-Masonic' plot.) Instead, Zhirinovskii's relations to foreign partners seem to me of interest in that they constitute an important characteristic of the LDP setting it markedly apart from most of his right-wing competitors. All foreign relations - including the more commercial ones - are, therefore, brought together in an extra section below.

(Orlov 1996, 225). According to other information, there may have been some prominent personalities or institutions among them.

Zhirinovskii and Big Business

Zhirinovskii did not hide his appetite for financial support. When the LDPR funds were in a critical situation after the December 1993 electoral campaign he invited, among others, representatives of 80 Moscow banks to a press-conference especially designed to attract sponsors in March 1994 (S, 16 March 1994, 1). At least some large Russian corporations seemed to have supported him already before this. The LDP's Deputy Head of the Ideological Department, Sergei Putin, *de facto* acknowledged that Zhirinovskii is financed by the Military-Industrial Complex although he did not specify by which corporations exactly (I, 1 January 1994; Verkhovskii 1994, 8). A former repairsman at the LDP Moscow headquarters, accused the Russian *Biznesbank* (Business Bank), and the former Soviet Airlines monopoly and today major Russian company *Aeroflot* (which was, according to Al'bats, in Soviet times used as a cover for *KGB* agents) of financially supporting the LDP (Orlov 1996, 207; Al'bats 1995, 54). Several sources stated that the notoriously fraudulent financial company *AO MMM* (MMM Plc) gave money to Zhirinovskii's party. The LDPR Faction lobbied actively for *MMM* in the State Duma. For instance, in August 1994, it wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor Aleksei Iliushenko asking to release arrested *MMM* boss Sergei Mavrodi, and suggested that the LDPR State Duma Deputies would take him under their trusteeship (<http://www.nns.ru/persons>). In autumn 1994, it supported the successful electoral campaign of Mavrodi in by-elections to the State Duma (I, 10 September 1994, 4; Orlov 1996, 207; V. Ivanov 1996, 75, 230). When Mavrodi was elected, LDPR Deputy Chairman Vengerovskii offered in November 1994:

If Mavrodi expresses the desire to register a Deputy Group, the LDPR Faction could, under certain conditions, help him as far as we have now a sufficient amount of deputies to share. (as quoted in: <http://www.nns.ru/persons/venger.htm>)

Indeed, shortly afterwards another LDPR deputy, Aleksei Mitrofanov, announced his initiation of a new Deputy Group People's Capital which would include 16 deputies, among them Sergei Mavrodi, and be neither a mere LDPR branch nor a group especially designed for Mavrodi (<http://www.nns.ru/persons/mitrofan.htm>).

The *Strategiia* research center of former Russian Secretary of State, Gennadii Burbulis, mentioned, according to Lenoid Ivanov, *Germes* (Hermes) Bank as a sponsor of Zhirinovskii (L. Ivanov 1996, 250).⁷⁶ The large *Germes* combine became notorious all over Russia in 1994 when it put on the air a xenophobic 'Slavic Cycle' TV advertisement series. It is chaired by Valerii Neverov, a nationalist oil magnate (*Nash sovremennik*, nos. 5, 6, 9, 1993) who unsuccessfully tried to participate in the 1993 State Duma elections as candidate of the miniscule Consolidation Party, and has apparently been a major sponsor for several ultra-nationalist print media to which he frequently gave interviews.

The journalist Viktor Timtschenko and the former LDP employee Ivan Orlov listed among possible sources of financial support two of the biggest Russian banks with otherwise good reputations: *Stolichnyi* (now *Stolichnyi Bank Sberezhnii* or The Capital's Bank of Savings)⁷⁷, and *Inkombank* (Orlov 1996, 207; Timtschenko 1994, 128). Other authors mentioned, in addition, a further large Russian bank - *Menatep* the chairman of which (meaning apparently Mikhail Khodorkovskii⁷⁸) has allegedly even been seen at a birthday party of Zhirinovskii (*Focus*, no. 51, 1993, 165; Luchterhandt 1994, 133; L. Ivanov 1996, 250).⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Another source identified *Germes* as a sponsor of the 'centrist' Civic Union and the abortive, ultra-nationalist *Otechestvo* bloc in December 1993 (Kovler 1994, 113).

⁷⁷ However, it should be noted that when Zhirinovskii hinted to somebody that his party had received money from *Stolichnyi* (which is one of the most successful post-Soviet Russian enterprises with the special merit of, apparently, not being an invention of former *nomenklatura* members) the bank's president, Aleksandr Smolenskii, not only denied financial assistance to the LDPR. He also ordered explicitly not to let any Zhirinovskiiites set foot on *Stolichnyi* property (MN, no. 36, 1993).

⁷⁸ After the allegations against the *Menatep* Combine, however, its chairman stated that the assertion of Zhirinovskii has damaged the firm morally and financially (Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 105).

⁷⁹ In July 1, 1995 ranking of the Moscow Information Center 'Rating' ranked *Inkombank* 5th, *Menatep* 10th, and *Stolichnyi* 15th (*Finansovye izvestiia*, 10 August 1995). A British financial publication ranked *Inkombank* 850th of the world's 1,000 top financial institutions (*Finansovye izvestiia*, 18 July 1995). It should be also noted that *Stolichnyi* and *Menatep* were, on the other hand, among those banks which were especially closely connected to Egor Gaidar's Russia's Choice Bloc in 1993 (Kovler 1994, 113).

If the above allegation were right with regard to *Inkombank*, there might have been an operation similar to that involving the *RKP* and *Zavidiia* which was described above. Timtschenko asserts that the Criminal File no. 18/6220-91 'On the Financial-Economic Activities of the CPSU' says that, in 1990, the CPSU Central Committee deposited Rbls22.3 million - at that time a relatively high amount - on the *Inkombank* account no. 700632 (1994, 128-129). In connection with this, it might be recalled that Iurii Bokan', the chairman of the mysterious Blue Movement, a collective member-organization of the Centrist Bloc and saviour of the young Zhirinovskii party during its major crisis in October 1990 (sec. 2.3.), was by one well-informed observer classified as the founder and a 'co-owner' of *Inkombank* (Pribylovskii 1992b, 90, 119). As far as the Blue Movement (or a pre-decessor organization of the same name) was, according to its own information, founded as early as 1981 - that means during the Brezhnev era - this information could be seen as, perhaps, supporting Timtschenko's allegations (Bolgariu and Maslov 1981).⁸⁰ It might be finally worth-mentioning that, in 1996, there emerged apparently relatively close ties between nationalist presidential candidate Gen.(ret.) Aleksandr Lebed' and *Inkombank*. When Lebed' was made Security Council Secretary by El'tsin in June 1996, he quickly announced that he would make Vladimir Groshev, an *Inkombank* economist who had at that time 'prepared a plan for stabilizing Russia's market economy', his Deputy (*OMRI Daily Digest*, 12 July 1996).

In conclusion, it should be emphasized though that, to my knowledge, no documents supporting the assertion that such large and prestigious Russian companies as *Aeroflot*, *Stolychnyi*, *Menatep*, or *Inkombank* transferred money to the LDPR have been published.

⁸⁰ It should be noted though that a Russian publicist who, in 1992, published a book specifically on the transfer of CPSU assets to other organizations did *not* mention *Inkombank* among the 22 private enterprises owned by, or dependent from, the CPSU (Bunich 1992, 299-300).

In connection with this it might be finally noted that Leonid Ivanov mentioned 'rumours' that *Tokobank*, another very large depository (number 749th of the list of the world's top banks) which emerged during the last years of the USSR, supported Zhirinovskii (1996, 250). According to Bunich, in 1990-91, *Tokobank*, one of the 22 CPSU sponsored enterprises, received through CPSU Central Committee functionary Nikolai E. Kruchina 'Rbls150,000,000 as a 7%-interest loan + Rbls70,000,000 as capital invested [*paevoi vzos*]' (1992, 299).

Zhirinovskii and the 'Young Wolves'

The picture painted to this point is, because of its sketchiness, perhaps, confusing. There is no, and perhaps will never be any, proper documentation of these matters.⁸¹ A more illuminating and synthetic - yet also largely hypothetical - interpretation of the financial dimension of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' has been outlined in a short unpublished analysis by the well-informed Moscow political analyst Valerii Solovei (1994). Not only had the conservative part of the former Soviet political establishment, the *KGB*, or the military-industrial complex an obvious motive for sponsoring Zhirinovskii.⁸² According to Solovei, a considerable part of Zhirinovskii's financial support can also be traced back to his manipulating the specific economic circumstances of post-Soviet Russia. First, Zhirinovskii was in a position to perform as a commercial mediator who, because of his political domestic and international ties, could bring together Russian exporters (of, above all, natural resources)

⁸¹ Furthermore, Timtschenko mentions the notorious Russian businessman Iakubovskii as a possible sponsor (1994, 190). Orlov and Timtschenko both mention an Abakan meat-company called *Ekom-PAF* as financing the LDPR (Orlov 1996, 207; Timtschenko 1994, 128). Tel'man Gdlian, chairman of the Russian People's Party, claimed to have information that Zhirinovskii received financial support from Armenian businessmen based in both Armenia and Russia (Morrison 1994, 16). Several of the over 60 companies which officially supported the LDPR campaign for the State Duma elections in December 1995 have been listed by Abramov and Golovina (1996, 235-236).

The 'mafia' (even the 'Caucasian mafia') is also frequently referred to as financing Zhirinovskii (T. Gdlian as quoted by Morrison 1994, 16; MK, 12 October 1995; Orlov 1996, 220; Ivanov 1996, 173, 278, 290). That this suggestion may be not without foundation was suggested by the fact that, on 10 October 1995, no LDPR State Duma deputy voted for a law which would have lowered the status of the parliamentary deputies' immunity - a new legal device which had been designed to prevent criminals becoming members of the Federal Assembly (Abramov and Golovina 1996, 231).

⁸² Independently from the question of whether and to which degree Zhirinovskii was associated with the *KGB* before or at the beginning of his political career (sec. 1.2.), the special relationship between Zhirinovskii and the Soviet and later Russian so called 'power ministries' was evident at many points throughout the history of the LDP. Apart from the above mentioned connections of the LDPR to the *KGB* (secs. 1.2., 3.5. and 3.6.), one could also mention Minister of Defense Pavel Grachëv's obvious sympathy for Zhirinovskii. In April 1993, Zhirinovskii received a written birthday congratulation from Grachëv and in, March 1995, Grachëv promoted Zhirinovskii to the rank of reserve Lieutenant Colonel in recognition of his 'outstanding contribution to strengthening Russia's defense capacity [...]' (*OMRI Daily Report*, 30 March 1995). At the latter point, Grachëv had reason to be especially grateful. In October 1994, the LDPR faction members on the State Duma's Defense Committee submitted an appeal to the Duma that condemned media attacks on military leaders, including Grachëv, suspected by some of being involved in the assassination of newspaper reporter Dmitrii Kholodov. However, the draft appeal was rejected by the Duma (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 27 October 1994).

with potential Western clients (sec. 3.4.) - an activity for which he would have certainly received a brokerage. He may have been particularly able to help middle-size Russian enterprises to by-pass the unofficial or official export-monopolies of some large Russian enterprises which virtually controlled export markets through their ties to - especially the corrupt parts of - the government. Already in 1991, he had admitted: 'At one point I helped cooperatives [i.e. small businesses].' (IuG, no. 18, 1991, 7) Later he rejected claims that he is supported by large stock-market corporations or banks, and stated: 'Unfortunately nobody [in big business] gave [the LDPR] something. Only representatives of small and medium-size business provide help.' (as quoted in Plekhanov 1994, 66) Such a Moscow sponsor mentioned by a former LDPR headquarters employee is the businessman V.N. Shishelin who owns cars and parking-places, and transferred regularly Rbls10 million to Zhirinovskii (Orlov 1996, 207). Eduard Limonov speaks in his book on Zhirinovskii a lot about 'banker-boys in coloured jackets' around Zhirinovskii. Limonov had, on LDP press secretary Arkhipov's (sec. 3.5.) request, to assist Moscow entrepreneur Aleksandr A. Kovgan (b. 1958), a micro-biologist, in handling through banks the purchase of 20 cars (1994a, 102). During a joint trip to Krasnodar in summer 1992, Limonov observed how Zhirinovskii established contacts with Armenian businessmen, among other with a certain Garik Sarkisovich who proposed to trade with oil and oil-chemical products (1994a, 117). Another former associate of Zhirinovskii, right-wing publicist Plekhanov, accused, as others did, Zhirinovskii of being supported by Chechens, and referred to Zhirinovskii's personal meeting with Chechen President General Dzhokhar M. Dudaev (1944-95) in September 1993 in Grozny (1994, 66-67). Two examples of small provincial enterprises which were involved in the financing of Zhirinovskii's campaigns in the regions are the Nizhnii Novgorod firm *MONO*, and the Perm company *Santa*. *MONO*'s General Director Vadim G. Novikov and *Santa*'s President D. Chumachenko are both simultaneously LDPR activist (*Gubernskie vesti* [Perm], 1-7 February 1996).

In developing this approach further one should, secondly, point out that, in general, Zhirinovskii's social basis seems to encompass, among others, a considerable number of medium- and small-size businessmen - many of them of a young age - whom he explicitly addresses in his writings by promising to give the 'young wolves' their chance through his announced crack-down on non-Russian

competitors, the 'mafia [*sic!*]', and corrupt bureaucrats (Zhirinovskii 1994d). Solovei seems to assume that this second wave of especially ambitious 'New Russians' with no *nomenklatura*-background feel that, during the initial privatisation process, they have unjustifiedly not received a large enough share of control over Russian markets, real estate, natural resources, export licenses, etc., most of which were quickly seized by former governmental and party *apparatchiks*. These 'new' New Russians see in Zhirinovskii a chance for an advantageous, second redistribution of property, influence, and privileges (Solovei 1994).

Conclusions. In this chapter, some of the particular circumstances of Zhirinovskii's ascent into high politics in 1991 were shown, and the general issue of the financial sources of the LDP introduced. The question of his affiliation to the *KGB* had remained ultimately unsolved in the previous chapter. In contrast, the links between some official representatives and institutions of the *ancien regime*, and especially to the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, and the then still miniscule and obscure LDPSU during the early time of its development are documented, and their closeness is striking. The first press conferences of the LDPSU and the Centrist Bloc were held in the Central Committee owned hotel *Oktiabr'skaia*; the first longer LDPSU programme was prepared by the Central Committee publisher *Politizdat*, and printed by the Central Committee printing shop *Krasnyi proletarii* (Red Proletarian); and Zhirinovskii's running-mate in the presidential elections 1991, Andrei Zavidiiia, owned a firm supported by the *KPRF* Central Committee. Later moreover, Zhirinovskii was linked to Aleksei Vedenkin, a former assistant to CPSU Central Committee Head of Management and financial administrator, Nikolai Kruchina. Finally, there are indications that Zhirinovskii may have received further financial assets through banks dependent from, or created by, the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. The question to which degree the other member organizations of the Centrist Bloc were also supported by the *ancien regime* had only been dealt with here in passing.

Notably, all of the relevant politicians which were seemingly directly involved in the emergence of the LDPSU had in common that they were prominent CPSU Central Committee members.⁸³ This

⁸³ That a section of the CPSU Central Committee - and not the *KGB* - may have been the major driving force behind the creation and registration of the LDPSU is in agreement with a statement of the last *KGB*

indicates that, in spite of five years of cadre purges by Gorbachëv, the Central Committee apparatus still constituted a principal bastion of ultra-conservatism in 1990-91. Former LDPR functionary, V. Ivanov specifies that 1996 ultra-nationalist presidential candidate Iurii Vlasov told him he knows about a special Central Committee resolution concerning the creation of the LDP and the provision of accommodation and protection for it, and that former *KGB* Chairman Viktor Barannikov confirmed that such documents exist in the *KGB* archives (1996, 222). The first major contact-person for the LDPSU seems to have been Boris Oleinik (b. 1935), a poet from the Ukraine, Deputy Speaker of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities in 1989-1991, and CPSU Central Committee member in 1990-91 (*Kto est' kto...* 1993, 477). Oleinik organized the first LDPSU and Centrist Bloc press conferences and started the autumn 1990 talks between the authorities and some selected *informals*. Following this, Zhirinovskii participated in meetings between the 'centrists' USSR Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov (b. 1929), and *KGB* Chairman Vladimir Kriuchkov (b. 1924), both Central Committee members too, in autumn 1990 and January 1991 respectively. In spite of Gorbachëv's 'turn to the left' (i.e. to the democrats) in spring 1991, Politbureau member Aleksandr Dzasokhov seems to have played a special role in the appearance of the first long LDPSU programme in March 1991. At about the same time and following the March 17th, 1991 Referendum, the so called Sector of Political Analysis and Prognostication of the Humanitarian Department of the CPSU Central Committee (which must have been subordinate to Dzasokhov at that time) produced a recommendation concerning the 'aims and tactics' of the CPSU in the forthcoming presidential elections. Among others, the Sector recommended to consider the 'issue of those organizations which could put forward a candidate as an "Independent"' (as quoted in O, no. 2, 1992, 23; capital letter and quotation marks in original). In accordance with this, it seems to have been USSR Congress of People's Deputies Speaker Anatolii Luk'ianov (b. 1930), a former CPSU Central Committee Secretary and then member, who made secure

Chairman Vladimir Kriuchkov who strongly rejected in a talk to Eduard Limonov his agency's involvement. Kriuchkov explained that the *KGB* would, according to the law, have only since January 1992 been allowed to 'work' with parties (Limonov 1994a, 77).

that the LDPSU was registered in April 1991, and could thus participate in the June 1991 presidential elections.⁸⁴

Though there was, especially in the beginning of its existence, obviously a significant backing for the LDPSU from above, it would be, however, wrong to interpret the outlined events as a mere playing out of a precalculated scenario. Some vital initial steps were seemingly also Zhirinovskii's own initiative. So, for instance, the LDP was the first party which tried to register itself with the Soviet Ministry of Justice, and remained, apart from the CPSU, the only officially recorded Union-wide party of the USSR (Berezovskii 1994, 101). It seems to have been exactly this determination which made the old establishment wager upon *Zhirinovskii* and not on some other of the ambitious 'centrists' like Skurlatov, Voronin or Potëmkin (the latter two also self-proclaimed presidential candidates in 1991), and to promote him even more forcefully than before.⁸⁵ Already a 1990 CPSU Central Committee document in which the informal groups of this time were divided into, first, adversaries, second, potential partners, and, third, those 'which need to be supported' seems to give an indication of this. The latter category, groups worth of CPSU support, comprised only four parties - three socialist groups⁸⁶ and the LDPSU. Thus Zhirinovskii who had never been a CPSU member already then stood

⁸⁴ Already before this crucial support, Luk'ianov's political activities and those of the LDPSU had been connected. As will be recalled Luk'inaov, a prominent August 1991 coup participant and today *KPRF* State Duma deputy, had also met with the 'centrists' (although apparently not with Zhirinovskii personally) in autumn 1990 (Wishnevsky 1990, 6; Luchterhandt 1991, 4). Besides this he was, as the USSR's parliamentary chairman, also the major backstage driving force behind the formation of Viktor Alksnis' *Soiuz* faction with which he kept secret contact (Wishnevsky 1991; Reznik 1995, 194). This would suggest that he may also have been behind *Soiuz*' alliance with the Centrist Bloc in 1990-91. Certainly, he must have, at least, approved of the cooperation of *Soiuz* and the 'centrists'. In April 1994, finally, Luk'ianov, though officially allied to the Communist Party, participated in the Fifth LDPR congress, and even posed as a member of its presidium (MN, no. 14, 1994).

⁸⁵ The description of a German political scientist, Stefanie Babst, who observed Zhirinovskii's activities in summer 1990, gives an impression about Zhirinovskii's determination and working morale at a stage when the LDPSU existed only on paper (sec. 3.1.). Babst reports that Zhirinovskii then operated from a 10-sqm-bureau at *Mir* 'in which there was always a hectic chaos', roared on an old Lada car through Moscow, used sometimes the Metro to get to demonstrations and meetings, and was constantly 'on the search for contacts which could be advantageous for him' (as quoted in Leonhard 1994, 330).

⁸⁶ The three socialist groupings 'which need to be supported' according to the 1990 CPSU Central Committee document were the Socialist Party (B. Kagarlitskii and E. Ostrovskii), the Marxist Workers Party (Iu. Leont'ev), and the reactionary United Workers Front (V. Iarin and V. Iakushev [a namesake of neo-Nazi Viktor Iakushev]); as quoted in O, no. 2, 1992, 23.

apart from the other unofficial - above all the 'centrist' - groupings and parties created by, or with the active support of, the *ancien regime*. His - at least implicitly - anti-communist party was, according to this document, already in 1990 as important for the CPSU Central Committee and worth of promotion as some socialist parties (O, no. 2, 1992, 23).

In October 1995, Former *KGB* staff officer Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Valentinov put forward strong allegations against President El'tsin saying that Zhirinovskii was brought up by the successor organization of the *KGB* in 1992 in order to create a 'political scarecrow' the appearance of which should have presumably been advantageous to El'tsin. This allegation is not credible because Zhirinovskii had already entered national-level politics in the 1991 presidential elections. Although Zhirinovskii was certainly present in Russian and international mass media in 1992-93, he was *in this period* by no means the main Russian 'scarecrow' in domestic and international politics. His triumph in the 1993 elections was at least partly due to the specific political situation then, and clearly not in the interests of the pro-Western section of the El'tsin administration and democrats. However, another specification of the former *KGB* officer is, in connection with the present argument, of interest. Valentinov detailed that, in search for an 'odious pseudo-rival artificially created', the security organs 'examined' hundreds of people, and weighed the 'pros' and 'cons' of each carefully (Zhilin 1995, 2). Other observers mentioned that there are several new parties around which there were consistent rumours that they were given a start and financial backing 1989-91 (Maxiamow and Odesskij 1994, 112). Valentinov claims that the major criterion for picking up a particular 'scarecrow' was whether it could be held 'on tether' or not. Although the circumstances and time-period which Valentinov associated with the *KGB*'s scrutiny of Zhirinovskii's political potential sound improbable, his description of the mode of selection may well be an indication that the representatives of the *ancien regime* made a mindful decision in choosing Zhirinovskii. I would speculate that, given the desperate situation in which the old elites found themselves, a high manageableness of the figure was not the only, perhaps not even an important, criterion.

One wonders, therefore, whether it is actually serviceable to approach the - especially early - history of the LDP solely under the viewpoint of its admittedly ambiguous origins. To be sure, without

his high standing backers Zhirinovskii could not have made the crucial first leap from political obscurity to presidential candidacy in early summer 1991. Yet Zhirinovskii's own contributions were already at this early stage weighty. Concerning the enormous financial support he must have received even before December 1993, one should in future research, perhaps, not only wonder who might have given how much to him, but also ask how exactly he was able to raise it, and why he and his party were chosen by certain influential and/or financially potent economic groupings for advancing in public an agenda of nationalism, protectionism, militarism and expansionism. To sum up, there seems to have been, apart from an important feature of establishment promotion, a distinct element of independent activity and initiative in the LDP's rise. Zhirinovskii was then, it seems, basically doing the same as he is doing today - quickly adapting to changing situations and using all written and unwritten laws for his political advancement. As will be shown in Part II in more detail, this chameleon-like behaviour seems to constitute in general a major clue to the explanation of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon'.

3. The Men Behind the Leader

Beside the energetic organizational effort Zhirinovskii put into his ascent to national-level politics, his particular perseverance and circumspection had a further dimension. Most of the other prominent politicians were vacillating from one camp to another and sometimes even changing their party affiliation, or started only on the eve of the 1993 elections to create real parties with effective apparatuses. Zhirinovskii, in contrast, had by this time already been building up his own organization for over three years. A more careful look on the history of the LDPR, notwithstanding, reveals that, though its size has doubtlessly grown, this operation can be only partly described as a consistent and continuous party building process.

3.1. Membership Numbers

Wishful Counting

There have been plenty of different estimates about how many followers the LDP had at the various stages of its rise. More optimistic appraisals tended to come from the party leadership itself, which was apparently bluffing. When the LDPSU was founded on 31 March 1990, the official media announced that the party had 'more than 3,000 members from 31 regions of the country [...]' (as quoted in Medvedev 1993, 85). A few weeks later, Zhirinovskii claimed 4,000 members LDPSU members (MN, no. 17, 29 April 1990, 7). In June 1990, it was announced that the party had then already 5,000 members (Berezovskii 1994, 98). LDPSU coordinator Vladimir Bogachëv even claimed 15,000 members in July 1990 (MN, no. 28, 15 July 1990, 8). Although the party had split in October 1990, Zhirinovskii spoke at the end of 1990 of circa 10,000 members (*Politicheskie partii...* 1993, 251). In April 1991, a membership of 5,000 was, as will be recalled, one necessary prerequisite for the party's registration with the USSR's Ministry of Justice. Zhirinovskii, notwithstanding, spoke at this time already of about 10-15,000 members (Pribylovskii 1992a, 44-45), whereas LDP Press Secretary

Andrei Arkhipov stated that the party had 12,000 members at that moment (SR, 28 December 1991, 2). The long LDP programme published in March 1991 even claimed 15,000 members (*Liberal'no-demokraticheskaiia...* 1991, 23). When Zhirinovskii took the floor during the fourth RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies some weeks later, he was asked by Father Gleb Iakunin (*DemRossiia*) how many followers his party had. Zhirinovskii boasted: '17,000 basis organizations from Moldavia to Kamchatka. If you need the number [of members], we will count...' (O, no. 2, 1992, 22). Since the minimum membership figure of an LDP basis organization is three, this would have meant at least 51,000 members in the Soviet Union. According to then LPSU Organizational Department Head Aleksandr M. Zhemlo, the party had 15,000 members in March 1991, and already 63,000 members in September 1991 (*Kommersant*'' no. 40, 1991, 13; Berezovskii 1994, 103). Zhirinovskii declared on August 22, 1991 that the party has 'today more than 50,000 members' (IuG, no. 9, 1991, 3). At a press-conference in December 1991, Zhirinovskii spoke of more than 70,000 members (SR, 28 December 1991, 2). The neo-fascist writer, Eduard Limonov, who cooperated with Zhirinovskii for some time in 1992 (sec. 3.3.), reported that Zhirinovskii told him in February 1992 that the party had then 70,000 members (Limonov 1994, 13). This figure was also mentioned by LDP Press Secretary Andrei Arkhipov at about the same time. Arkhipov then also claimed that 'from 20 to 30 new members are joining [every day]' (Sloane 1992, 43). The first issue of the newspaper *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* which appeared in late March 1992 disclosed that the LDP had 72,143 members by March 15th, 1992 (SZh, no no., 1992, 3). Later in spring 1992, Zhirinovskii announced - somewhat consistently - that the party's size had by then risen to about 80,000 members. This number was, with reference to LDP membership in July 1992, also given in the third 1992 number of *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* (MN, no. 17, 1992; SZh, no. 3, 1992, 3). In October 1992, the LDP leadership spoke, according to one source, of 86,000 members (Berezovskii and Chervakov 1994), whereas, at a press-conference in early November 1992, Zhirinovskii talked about only approximately 80,000 associates (*Vecherniaia Moskva*, 13 November 1992, 1). At the moment of its re-registration on 14 December 1992, the 'liberal democrats' claimed a membership of 100,000 (Medvedev 1993, 84; *Politicheskie partii...* 1995, 35). The first 1993 issue of *Liberal*, another LDP newspaper, however, gave, rather inconsistently, the number of only 80,000, and also claimed that the party has basic organizations in 83

Russian cities (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 2). After the Fourth LDP Congress in April 1993, the party leadership spoke of 80-83,000 members (*Kto est' chto...* 1994, 147). In June 1993, Zhirinovskii gave the figure 100,000 including members in the Ukraine and Belarus (*Partinform*, no. 26 (47), 23-29 June 1993, 7). On November 1, 1993, the LDPR headquarters announced that 68,000 members from 71 regions were involved in collecting signatures for the LDPR's registration for the State Duma elections (*Vybory v Gosudarstvennuju dumu*, no. 3, 6 October-2 November 1993, 20). In December 1993, a membership figure of 176,000 was given (Spier 1994, 3).

Plausible Estimations

All of these figures were exaggerations. According to the Panorama Expert Group, '[i]n early 1990, the party [i.e. its organizational committee which was then identical with the party as a whole] had 13 members' (Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 103; Pribylovskii 1995a, 63). The Foundation Congress of the LDPSU on March 31, 1990 was allegedly attended by 215 'delegates'. This number, however, seemingly not only included all LDPSU members, but also everybody present and willing to participate in the gathering (Babkina 1991, 127). One of the most optimistic guesses by an independent source concerning the LDPSU's early years is that it had, for instance, about 40 'activists', and, in addition, 200-400 'members' in October 1990 (Berezovskii *et al.* 1991, 318). This, however, was just before the split of the LDP into two parties (sec. 3.2.). In consideration of this, a Russian journalist calculated less than 20 members of the Zhirinovskii party on the eve of the presidential elections in June 1991 (ME, no. 20, 1991). Another subsequent source spoke still of not more than 50 'liberal democrats' in 1992 (Pribylovskii 1992a, 45), and a an LDP staff worker detailed that, in early 1992, Zhirinovskii still personally interviewed every new LDP member, and advertised through the Manpower Office in order to expand his staff (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 99).

However, at least the latter figure seems to be, in turn, underestimation, as there must have been a more substantial growth after Zhirinovskii's success in the 1991 presidential elections and his alliance with solvent Andrei Zavidiiia. Otherwise the LDPR would not have been able to organize in such a professional way its 1993 State Duma elections campaign, and to collect in time the 100,000

signatures necessary for its inclusion on the all-federal ballots. The growth also could not have been an exclusively recent development. The data given by the well-informed Moscow Panorama Expert Group appears as more realistic: 146 members at the moment of the LDPSU's registration in April 1991, less than 200 members on the eve of the June 1991 presidential elections (see also Medvedev 1993, 85; Pribylovskii 1995a, 64), and approximately 1,000 members by 1992 (Verkhovskii 1994, 6; Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 103).⁸⁷ Another estimate of less than 600 members in December 1991 by the newspaper *Vecherniaia Moskva* (26 December 1991, 1) would seem to fit in the development suggested by Panorama. According to a further account, by the end of 1992, the membership number had then reached 1,500 (Medvedev 1993, 84).⁸⁸ An autumn 1992 Russian Justice Ministry inspection of the LDPR confirmed that it had then branches in 47 cities (Timtschenko 1994, 49).

In distinction to those autumn-winter 1993 membership figures given by Zhirinovskii and his assistants mentioned above, another October 1993 announcement of the LDP leader sounded more credible. Zhirinovskii spoke in this statement of over 40,000 members (RG, 15 October 1993; *Kto est' chto...* 1994, 148). The then head of the LDP apparatus, Viacheslav Kobelev, gave also the number 40,000 at the beginning of November 1993 (I, 2 November 1993; Mosina and Solodukhin 1993, 27). An independent source published in the same month stated that, according to the records of the LDPR's Moscow headquarters, the party had 'more than 40,000 members' (*Partinform*, no. 45 [66],

⁸⁷ This independent estimation differs from another independent source which gave the following picture of the development of the LDP's membership:

Its membership was at the moment of its first registration [in April 1991] about 12,000, has now [in 1993] fallen and did not exceed 4-6,000 in 1992. (*Partii i politicheskie bloki* 1993, 151)

However, not only seems the amount 12,000 very unlikely for April 1991. It seems inconceivable that the LDP's membership fell after Zhirinovskii's comparatively successful participation in the June 1991 elections. The overall trend in 1991-93 was probably rather a rise than a fall in membership.

⁸⁸ A further figure is provided in other directories where it was stated that over 625 delegates from over 40 regions were present at the Third LDP congress in April 1992 (Berezovskii and Chervakov 1994; *Kto est' chto...* 1994, 147). Yet this number should be handled again with caution as Zhirinovskii used to make, without asking, every registered visitor of LDP congresses a delegate of his organization (Orlov 1996, 215).

2-8 November 1993, 8). An announcement by the head of the party's administrative department, Viktor Kornienko, in late December 1993 seemed in line with the latter estimations. Kornienko stated that the subscription was rising rapidly since Zhirinovskii's victory in the parliamentary elections on 12 December, and that it had reached 50,000 by the end of 1993 (ME, no. 51, 1993). If this figure were correct, the LDPR had, in terms of formally registered members, at that moment become one of the most substantial party structures in Russia, surpassed only by the communists (*KPRF*) and the agrarians (*APR*) in this regard.⁸⁹

3.2. Splits

Notwithstanding the latter comparison, it should not be forgotten that the larger part of the party's early history was much less triumphant. If one looks at the initial stages of its development, it emerges that the LDP was for a considerable period just one of the dozens of Muscovite *divan* parties. This was not only due to its obscure origins, but also to splits, which gave birth to at least three political parties calling themselves 'liberal-democratic'.

The first split of the original *LDPSU* occurred in October 1990 when Zhirinovskii travelled abroad. Using his absence, *LDPSU* Coordinator V. Bogachëv, the Central Committee members K. Krivonosov and L. Narimanidze, the leader of the *LDPSU* youth section V. Tikhomirov and other *LDPSU* activists convened the Second Extra-Ordinary *LDPSU* Congress in the building of the Krasnopresnenskii Rayon Soviet of Moscow. The Congress was attended by some 40 delegates representing 19 regional organizations (Berezovskii *et al.* 1991, 317-318; IHT, 7 March 1994; Krasnov 1995, 129). They rejected the 'centrist' line of the *LDPSU*, and condemned Zhirinovskii's

⁸⁹ One should add though again that this evaluation may still include many only *formally* registered, and not active and politically relevant party members. An LDP insider who worked as a repairsman in the Moscow headquarters of the LDP between 1991 and 1995 writes that the LDP had 90,000 'members' on its records in May 1992. Yet, he adds, the party was giving out membership cards to everybody (including 'all kinds of riffraff') without restrictions or obligations. The insider, therefore, estimated that 90% of them were 'inert persons' (Orlov 1996, 194).

opportunistic line and unprincipled position, which had transformed the LDPSU into a 'pro-communist marionette grouping' (Conradi 1995, 87). The Congress, instead, called for a radicalisation of the political course, a denial of cooperation with the CPSU, support for the national movements in the republics, resignation of the Union government and parliament, and for new elections. It decided to remove from the party's name the words *Sovetskii Soiuz* and to rename the party simply *Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia* (LDP).

Two weeks later Zhirinovskii and his supporters organized, what they called, an 'All-Union Conference Bearing the Authority of a Congress' with, *according to their own information*, 151 delegates from 60 regions of nine Union republics. To achieve such a high amount of 'delegates' was, according to Pribylovskii, only possible because the Centrist Bloc's most mysterious collective participant, Iurii Bokan's Blue Movement, mobilized its members who attended the Conference as LDPSU delegates in order to secure a quorum (Pribylovskii 1992b). The 'delegates' resolved to expel Bogachëv, Krivonosov and their friends, and elected a new Central Committee consisting only of supporters of Zhirinovskii (26 members) and the Highest Council of the LDP which included, apart from Zhirinovskii, L. Alimov, V. Bogaty, S. Zhebrovskii and A. Khalitov (Krasnov 1995, 129-130).

The Bogachëv-Krivonosov-party continued to call itself Liberal-Democratic for a while, and added later 'Russian' as a prefix. In spring 1991 this *RLDP*, in turn, ousted Bogachëv, renamed itself the *RLP*. Subsequently, the *RLP* entered as a collective member a micro-organization called Party of Constitutional Democrats *PKD*, led by Viktor B. Zolotarëv (Prudkov and Bach 1992, 56-58). The *PKD*, in turn, was a collective member of *DemRossiia*, and formed the abortive liberal 'August Bloc' with Konstantin N. Borovoi's Party of Economic Freedom *PES* in 1993 (Pribylovskii 1992a, 65, 80; I, 28 October 1993; Verkhovskii 1994, 30-31).

After his expulsion from the *RLDP*, Bogachëv formed his third organization, the so-called European Liberal-Democratic Party *ELDP* which presented itself as strongly pro-Western. Eighty five delegates from 14 regions took reportedly part at its Second Foundation Congress on 27 April 1991 (Prudkov and Bach 1992, 92). Though the party claimed 5,790 members at the moment of its registration on 23 January 1992, a 1992 independent source spoke instead of only 5-6 members (Pribylovskii 1992b, 26). In any way, the *ELDP* did not even gain a minimal significance in post-Soviet

Russian public and political life (*Politicheskie partii...* 1995, 23). Neither the *RLP* nor its leaders were ever heard of again.

The outlined events had no particular importance for the further rise of Zhirinovskii's party. The later history of his former political associates seems to suggest that Krivonosov and his supporters were perhaps the only and last people in the LDP who took the idea of liberal democracy seriously. The splits and their circumstances hint how minute and fragile Zhirinovskii's LDP must have been during its earlier stages. Yet this is certainly not a peculiar phenomenon as most of the Russian proto-parties went through developments not dissimilar to what was described above.

3.3. Alignments

A much more distinct feature of the LDP's ascent was its comparatively high degree of isolation among all the other groupings from the westernist Left to the reactionary Right. The only lasting and close alliance with other parties was with the Centrist Bloc. As suggested above, one can, however, dismiss the possibility that the Bloc was a legitimate party as its constituent parts were of dubious origin and doubtful substance. If one still took the 'centrists' as a relatively authentic and influential political entity (Berezovskii *et al.* 1991, 238-240; Berezvoskii 1994, 100), one would probably come to the conclusion that the Bloc was dominated and oriented by the LDPSU, and correspondingly lost its relative relevance after the departure of the 'liberal democrats' in April 1991.

At about the same time, another more loose ally of the LDP, Viktor Alksnis's *Soiuz* Movement (which had, as will be recalled, been the most important anti-reformist force in winter 1990-91, and cooperated with the Centrist Bloc), began its downfall. To be sure, *Soiuz* continued to exist as a marginal political force and loose umbrella-organization (as did the Centrist Bloc), cooperated with the LDP in some actions. Especially former leading *Soiuz* spokesman Viktor Alksnis remained in contact and staged a number of political actions together with Zhirinovskii (Limonov 1994a, 94; Appendix). Moreover, two members of the Coordinating Council of the *Soiuz* People's Movement, Georgii G.

Lukava (b. 1925) and Viktor G. Vishniakov (b. 1931), entered the Fifth State Duma on the LDPR's all-federal list (positions 43 and 32). However, in December 1993, Lukava, a Georgian, was also a Secretary of the *KPRF* Leningrad Rayon Committee. Subsequently, he gave up this office and his *KPRF* membership, and became a full LDPR member. Thus his ties to the by then amorphous *Soiuz* grouping seemed looser than to other groupings. Vishniakov, a Professor of Law and instead a member of Aleksei Prigarin's *SKP-KPSS* (Union of Communist Parties - CPSU), on the other hand, seems to have joined the LDPR all-federal list rather as a member of a group of jurists associated with Oleg Fin'ko's ultra-right *Iuridicheskaia gazeta* (Juridical Newspaper) than in his capacity of a representative of *Soiuz*.⁹⁰ Thus, to see *Soiuz* as a permanent, close and full ally of the LDP would seem to be an exaggeration.

Another remark has to be made in order to explain an underlying assumption of this section. As already indicated, *Soiuz* had lost its relative importance by June 1991 when Zhirinovskii became a national-level politician through his surprising third place in Russia's first presidential elections. His cooperation with *Soiuz* and the Centrist Bloc when they were relatively prominent (though, in the case of the Centrist Bloc pseudo-significant) political forces between summer 1990 and spring 1991 had a different meaning than his alignments after he had become known all over the country in summer 1991. Because of his and his party's marginality and obscurity before the 1991 presidential elections, alliances until then were probably to larger degree determined by tactical rather than ideological and strategic motives than after his electoral success. Long-term considerations became more important after June 12, 1991. Alliances beyond and after this date would thus seem better suited to reveal something about the character of the LDP and its leader.⁹¹

⁹⁰ For Vishniakov's contributions to the Juridical Newspaper in 1993, see *IuG*, no. 14 (85), 12; no. 19-20 (90-91), 5; no. 31 (102), 4-5; no. 40-41 (110-111), 12.

⁹¹ Some sources indicated that, in 1990 or later, Zhirinovskii had links to an important Moscow right-wing *intelligentsiia* club called *Postperestroika* and led by Sergei Kurginian (*Svobodnaia mysl'*, no. 2, 1993, 102; Berezovskii 1994, 97). At that time the club mainly comprised writers, military men of the Academy of the Soviet Army's General Staff, researchers of an institute of the USSR Ministry of Interior, and the esoteric Movement of Conservative Intellectuals. The latter, it should be noted, is one of the oldest ultra-nationalist Russian groupings being founded in the mid-sixties. At that time, it was led by two prominent post-Soviet Russian right-wing publicists: Geidar Dzhemal, today the leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party, and Aleksandr Dugin, now editor-in-chief of the journal *Elementy: Evraziiskoe obozrenie* (Elements: 172

Liberalism Embraces Nazism

Zhirinovskii's first 1991 association with an already established (though also miniscule) independent political grouping is an ample illustration of how peculiar an understanding the LDP-leader had of his self-proclaimed 'centrism'. In early 1991, Zhirinovskii started to cooperate with Viktor M. Iakushev (b. 1963), the leader of the openly neo-Nazi Moscow micro-party *Natsional'no-sotsial'nyi soiuz NSS* (National-Social Union) which 'agitated [for the LDPSU] during the elections of the president of the Russian Federation [in May-June 1991]' (Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 311). Apparently in October 1991, Zhirinovskii went a step further and co-opted Iakushev as Head of the Youth Section of the LDP, and, apparently simultaneously, Chairman (or Deputy Chairman) of the Moscow organization of the LDP. In addition, Igor' Vagin, the Head of the Organizational Department of the NSS, became Deputy Business-Manager (*zamestitel' upravdelami*) of the LDPSU

Eurasian Review) who are now, however, ideological adversaries of Kurginian *within* the right-wing extremist camp as a whole (Berezovskii *et al.*, 1991, 42; Berezovskii *et al.*, 1992, 54; Hielscher 1993; Gestwa 1993).

Whereas Dugin has become one of the most prolific theoreticians of the conventional Right and has wholeheartedly embraced European proto-fascist writings ('conservative revolution', Ernst Jünger, Alain de Benoist, Julius Evola), Kurginian can be seen as being located on the borderline between the conventional and non-conventional Right as far as he cooperated with communist functionaries, worked together with anti-Western sections of the post-Soviet Russian government, and advocates explicitly a continuation of the technocratic and command-administrative modes of economic management of the Soviet Union. Further ideological guidelines of the *Postperestroika* club have mainly come from Kurginian's writings and above all from his book of the same name. They include, among others, Eurasianism, 'white communism', 'young patriotism', and 'state democracy'. Later, Kurginian added an emphasis on the importance of North-South relations which led one observer to conclude that his thought can be seen as an ideological source of Zhirinovskii's political ideas (Ignatow 1994a, 5). However, although some of Zhirinovskii's pronouncements are similar to those of Kurginian, no documents have been found describing the 'liberal democrats' contributions to this forum or indicating a direct relationship between Kurginian's and his group's writings, and the LDPR's programmatic guidelines. That seems to indicate that, apart from some surface resemblance, there was no closer link or ideological fruition between the two groupings.

(Luchterhandt 1993, 206; Wagner 1994, 251). The NSS-LDPSU liaison seems to have lasted until early 1992, i.e. approximately one year (Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 311-312).⁹²

Iakushev is a 1987 graduate in political economy of Moscow State University, and has become known in Moscow's neo-Nazi scene for his nationalist poems. His first political activities date back to 1980 when he organized a pro-Nazi gathering in front of the Moscow Synagoge. From 1989 to 1990, he was a member of the micro-party National-Patriotic Front '*Pamiat*' (Memory) - one of the many split-offs of Dmitrii Vasilev's (b. 1945) notoriously anti-Semitic original '*Pamiat*' group. At about the same time, Iakushev was related to a grouping called *Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe russkoe dvizhenie* (Russian National Liberation Movement) *NORD* (in German: North), and also co-editor of a newspaper called *III Rim* (The Third Rome).⁹³ In an interview for a Jewish newspaper in 1990, Iakushev described himself as a 'Russian Orthodox fascist' (*Vestnik evreiskoi sovetskoi kul'tury*, August 1990). However, later Iakushev came to despise the Russian Orthodox Church, and embraced, instead, a modernized version of Russian paganism which attempts to incorporate the ideas of Alfred Rosenberg (*Narodnoe delo*, no. 1 [1], 1991, 4, no. 2 [3], 1992, 3). Iakushev is one of the few Russian fascists who not only openly glorifies Nazi ideology, but also approves of the *Führer* himself.

I am following the path of Adolf Hitler, and, in doing so, I am opening [this path] for you. Hitlerism has to be positioned outside the ideological dogmas of the 20th century... That is because Hitlerism is not an ideology, but a world view, and even more so - it is a new religion with which humanity will enter the realities of the 21st century. What are the basic principles of

⁹² Another publication on Zhirinovskii by an expert intimate with post-Soviet party politics, Aleksandr Verkhovskii, dates the cooperation between the National-Social Union leader and Zhirinovskii to autumn 1992. This information, however, seems to contradict Verkhovskii's elaborations in the same source that Iakushev 'went into half-underground' after the arrest of other neo-Nazis in September-October 1992 (1994, 34). I have chosen to take the information in the text, i.e. October 1991 as the beginning of the alliance with the LDP (taken from Luchterhandt), because it has also been confirmed by Valerii Solovei in July 1996 (private conversation at Moscow).

⁹³ The title Third Rome refers to the widely held Russian nationalist idea that Russia has a specific mission in world history in that it has, after the fall of Rome and Constantinople, the second Rome, preserved original Christianity, and constitutes the endpoint in the development of particular Christian, statist, collectivist, popular Roman-Byzantine-Russian civilization.

Hitlerism? Above all, it is the aristocratic social structure of the society, i.e. the stake upon the best people in a racial and energetic [*energeticheskoi*] sense... And finally, it is the implementation of the principle of full worthiness [*polnotsenosti*] as the basic structural principle of the social order of society. (as quoted in Al'bats 1995, 66)⁹⁴

The National-Social Union emerged as a result of the split between Iakushev and Aleksandr Barkashov who had before this left together the above mentioned *Pamiat'* group in order to form a new party to be called National Unity. (Subsequently, Barkashov became the leader of the most powerful Russian neo-Nazi grouping called *Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo* [Russian National Unity] which publishes the comparatively influential newspaper *Russkii poriadok* [Russian Order]). Iakushev's organization was founded on November 9, 1990, i.e. at the 52nd anniversary of the so called *Reichskristallnacht* - the first big pogrom against Jews in Nazi Germany. The National-Social Union's symbol was a mirror imaged swastika, and its doctrine announced 'Germans and Russians belong genetically to one race'. It demanded, among others, that the '[g]enetically hostile opposition must be destroyed' (R, no. 25, 1992, 11; CDPSP, vol. XLIV, no. 25, 16). The grouping was reported to have had about 80 members in 1990-91. In November 1991, i.e. when it had already allied itself to the LDPSU, the Union took part in an abortive attempt to unite several more or less open neo-Nazi groupings in an umbrella organization called *Narodno-sotsial'noe dvizhenie* (Popular-Social Movement). Iakushev's short-term (and unfortunately only sparsely documented) association with Zhirinovskii in 1991-92 had been apparently among the National-Social Union's last serious actions before it sank into political oblivion in 1992 (Luchterhandt 1993, 228; Verkhovskii 1994, 34; Pribylovskii 1991b, 23). The latest news about Iakushev's grouping is that it had become an organization of racketeers who controlled a number of private kiosks selling foreign goods on Pushkin

⁹⁴ For similar statements as well as for some extremely anti-semitic and sexist pronouncements by Iakushev, see Pribylovskii 1991a, or his interview 'Hitler was a bit romantic' in NG, 14 November 1991 (reprinted in German in Luchterhandt 1993, 235-238). In this talk, Iakushev describes the LDP as an ally which also seems to support the date given by Luchterhandt for the start of a closer liaison between the National-Social Union and Zhirinovskii's party, i.e. October 1991 and not autumn 1992 (1993, 206).

Square in Moscow in 1993-95. In spring 1995, Iakushev was, apparently in connection with this activity, put in jail (Pribylovsky 1994, 30; private conversation with V. Solovei, summer 1996).

The Lone-Wolf Joins the Pack

As in the case of the National-Social Union, I have not found documents on Zhirinovskii's next association with an autonomous right-wing grouping during the 1991-1993 period. At least three observers have noted that he had, for some time, been a member of the ultimately not particularly eminent *Nashi* (Ours) group founded in St. Petersburg on November 30th, 1991 (Tolz and Teague 1992, 2; MM, April-May 1992, 44-45; Conradi 1995, 144).⁹⁵ Named after a documentary film of the same title on the January 1991 Lithuania events by the ultra-right TV journalist Aleksandr Nevzorov, *Nashi* was apparently merely a gathering of some prominent personalities, and mainly active in St. Petersburg from late 1991 to mid-1992 when it split. 'Ours' referred, above all, to the ethnic Russians outside the Russian Federation who were allegedly subject to repression and persecution. Ostensibly the group's name implied that the whole former Soviet Union is 'ours'. Besides Nevzorov himself, the grouping included the far right former presidential candidate and Gen. (ret.) Al'bert M. Makashov (b. 1938), Stanislav Kuniaev, editor-in-chief of the leading right-wing monthly *Nash sovremennik* (Our Contemporary)⁹⁶, and the already mentioned 'Black Colonels' Viktor Alksnis and Nikolai Petrushenko - the former major spokesmen of the People's Deputies association *Soiuz*. Two further founding members of *Nashi* were also closely associated to the LDP. The above mentioned political clown Viacheslav Marychev was then the administrator of the St. Petersburg Steel-Rolling Factory Club which advanced to a major meeting point of most of the northern capital's right-wing extremist scene (Plekhanov 1994, 103), and at which the foundation of *Nashi* took place. He later became the number 2 on the LDPR's list for the December 1993 elections. The other prominent LDP figure involved closely with *Nashi* was the fanatic anti-Semite and 'Black Admiral' Mikhail N. Ivanov (b. 1949) who in

⁹⁵ Eduard Limonov though explicitly rejected the information by a Western journalist that Zhirinovskii himself was a member of *Nashi* (1993b, 68). *Nashi* and Nevzorov should nevertheless been treated here shortly as far as there were, as will be shown, contacts between them and the LDPR.

⁹⁶ On the political profile of *Nash sovremennik*, see Brudny 1991, and Umland 1995b.

June 1992 was made 'Prime-Minister' in Zhirinovskii's shadow cabinet, became number 120 on the LDPR 1993 elections list, and later worked as an assistant to St. Petersburg State Duma deputy, irregular *Slovo Zhirinovskogo* editor-in-chief and major LDPR theoretician Iurii Kuznetsov.

Nashi's anthem was that most popular song 'Holy War' of World War II: 'Arise, huge country, arise for the last battle...' (Tolz and Teague 1992, 1-2; MM, April-May 1992, 44-45; Pribylovskii 1994, 10; Pribylovsky 1994, 31; Wagner 1994, 250). Although details on Zhirinovskii's apparently only short-term contributions to this organization's activities have remained unknown, several reports confirmed that a certain closeness between Nevzorov and Zhirinovskii has emerged already in 1991 and prevailed until today (e.g. Z, no. 10, 4 March 1994; Wagner 1994; Hielscher 1994, 57). The two men met first in early June 1991 when Zhirinovskii campaigned as presidential candidate in St. Petersburg. Nevzorov had already before Zhirinovskii's arrival agreed to devote a special issue of his notorious TV news programme '600 Seconds' to the LDP leader. According to Zhirinovskii's companion at the trip, Zhirinovskii impressed Nevzorov by his ability to start the shooting without much preparation. The apparently affirmative documentary and *de facto* advertising film they produced was reportedly of high quality (Plekhanov 1994, 96-97). Nevzorov has admitted close contacts to, among others, KGB Chairman Vladimir and Anatolii Luk'ianov who were also among Zhirinovskii's sponsors (Vandenko and Dodolev 1992, 83). He described his relationship to Zhirinovskii as 'friendly, complicated, but friendly' (Za, no. 7 [12], February 1994, 2; Bakshutov 1994, 103; Nevzorov 1995), and stated that he has is 'very interested' in Zhirinovskii.

Because he is, in spite of his minuses, an incredibly talented politician. He is unfortunately more talented than my friends and supporters - [Aleksandr] Barkashëv [*RNE*], [Aleksandr] Prokhanov [*Zavtra*], [Gennadii] Ziuganov [*KPRF*]. [...] I do not see in Zhirinovskii an extremist. In my view, he is, on the contrary, too soft and too neutral. (as quoted in Suetnov 1995, 3)

Anyway, *Nashi* began soon to lose its relative prominence and failed ultimately to gain significance among the Russian Right as a whole. Its place was taken by other extremist coalitions like Sterligov's *RNS* and the National Salvation Front, which included neither Zhirinovskii as an individual, nor the LDP as a collective member.

Vovka Meets Edichka

Zhirinovskii's following liaison with a prominent right winger, that with the novelist and publicist Eduard Limonov (b. 1943), is better known and documented. Limonov's perhaps best-known novel, *Eto ia, Edichka* (It's Me, Eddie), is known beyond Russia's borders for its frank descriptions of the author's sexual encounters especially with men. Limonov emigrated in 1974, and was resident in the United States and France. In 1990, he became a major contributor to the major ultra-nationalist daily *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (cf. 1992b, 33-198). In 1991, Limonov decided to become more than an ideologist, and announced: 'I am looking for a gang.' (as quoted in MN, no. 44, 1992, 20) Although he, before and after his permanent return to Russia in early February 1992, purposefully approached his friends in the leadership of the conventional and unconventional wings of the Right and told them that he wants 'to work', he was not able to enter the leading body of a major ultra-nationalist organization until summer 1992. It was apparently Zhirinovskii who, after several meetings between the two men in winter-spring 1992, made in early summer 1992 the first step, and offered to make Limonov a member of the LDP's shadow cabinet. The writer agreed and became the 'Director of the All-Russian Bureau of Investigation' in June 1992. However, the liaison proved to be loose and short-lived. The only major action, Zhirinovskii and Limonov undertook together was an important trip to Paris in September 1992, and a meeting with *Front National* leader Jean-Marie Le Pen mediated by Limonov there. Already in mid-November 1992, Limonov started to re-orient himself and initiated together with some other LDPR dissidents the creation of the National-Radical Party (Limonov 1994; sec. 3.5.; Appendix).

It should be noted that Limonov is one of the most up-to-date, non-conventional, shrill and belligerent post-Soviet Russian ultra-nationalist ideologues (Tobarkov 1992). For instance, in 1991-92, he stood out as being the only Russian extremely right-wing publicist who for longer periods took part - mainly as a journalist - in the ethno-religious secessionist wars in former Yugoslavia, Moldova and

Abkhazia. He made himself known in Russian politics in summer 1992 when his 'Manifesto of a Russian Nationalist' was published in *Sovetskaiia Rossiia* (12 July 1992). The Manifesto asserted that Russian nationalism is an heir to both Peter the Great and Lenin; that a Russian nationalist approves of the whole history of the Russian state, including the Soviet period, and does not acknowledge the destruction of the USSR; that the state borders of the communist period have to be revised; that Russia's future lies in an alliance with Islam; that the West has proven to be an enemy of Russia; that, in El'tsin's Russia, basic rules of democracy are not observed; that a 'popular economic revolution' is necessary; and that 'national forces' would have either to win in elections, or to stage a 'national revolution' (Pribylovskii 1995b, 67). In summer 1992, this was still a comparatively uncommon statement in that it constituted one of the first occasions of a merger of elements of the rhetoric of the, on the one hand, pro-Soviet ultra-conservative, and, on the other hand, openly fascist wings of the Russian extreme Right. Also, besides making suggestions which are rather customary among Russian nationalists like: 'Where Russian people live, there is Russian territory [...]', or: 'The state is above everything' (1993), Limonov shows a much more cynical and openly pugnacious approach to politics than the mainstream Russian conventional Right. He, for instance, during the Yugoslav war, stated that if he possessed a nuclear arsenal, he 'would give a part of it to the Serbs' (MN, no. 44, 1992, 20), and, at another place, asserted that, because there is an ineradicable 'aggressive instinct' in human nature, Russians would have to develop an 'aggressive relation to the surrounding world' in order to defend themselves against 'alien violence' (1993b, 29-30). Limonov's Manifesto of a Russian Nationalist is further exceptional in that it explicitly applies Western right-wing concepts like 'corporatism' or 'national revolution' to Russian conditions (SR, 12 July 1992). At other occasions, he also referred to modern leading Western, yet in Russia so far relatively unknown, proto-fascist thinkers, such as the Italian Julius Evola (1898-1974) and his radically anti-egalitarian, ascriptive views (Limonov 1993b, 17). This resembles partly the rhetoric of several up-to-date articles in especially Aleksandr Dugin's irregular, but influential journal *Elementy: Evraziiskoe obozrenie* (Elements: Eurasian Review), and also in Aleksandr Prokhanov's major right-wing weekly *Den'* (Day), which is now called *Zavtra* (Tomorrow).⁹⁷ Such

⁹⁷ On the profile of these publications, see Hielscher 1993; Gestwa 1993; Laqueur 1993, 139-142, 162-163

notions, to be sure, are discernible in the programmes of virtually all Russian reactionary or fascist groups. However, they are usually expressed in terms associated with indigenous Russian conservative discourse like *sobornost'* ('catholicity', togetherness; an untranslatable, specifically Russian concept denoting a peculiar form of authoritarian communitarianism), *narodnost'* ('peopleness', rootedness in one's national soil, populism, nationality, popularity), or *pochvennost'* ('soil-boundedness', indigeneousness, autochthonousness, nativism). Although Limonov refrains from open confessions to Nazism and the use of its symbols, he only thinly disguises his closeness to Hitler's ideas (Limonov 1994, 78, 92, 164), and describes himself as a 'national revolutionary' or 'national Bolshevik' (*Sovetskaiia Rossiia: Obozrenie*, no. 2, 1992; *Za*, no. 6 [14], 1994, and no. 25 [30], 1994). He is thus one of the most exemplary cases of a post-communist Russian fascist.

In another sense Limonov appears also as a, in the Russian context, peculiarly newfangled right-winger. He collaborated with Zhirinovskii, though he had, according to his own testimony, already from the outset, assumed that the LDP leader was half-Jewish. In view of Limonov's biography which included a marriage with a Jewish-Ukrainian women, this seems less a sign of Limonov's excessive opportunism as a newcomer to Moscow's right-wing extremist scene, but rather a proof of his distinctly pragmatic approach to politics in general, and an expression of the fact that he does not apply narrowly ethnic and racial criteria in defining the Russian 'we-group'. Limonov gave, when the two men finally split in late 1992, the impression that their estrangement after about five months of public cooperation had been a direct result of his political dogmatism, and his inability to tolerate any moderate or centrist-like rhetoric, even if it had been obvious that Zhirinovskii had advocated centrist-sounding ideas in a rather cynical way. The immediate reason for Limonov's subsequent fierce attacks against Zhirinovskii though was the publication of an article from which Limonov firstly learned about Zhirinovskii's activities in the Jewish society *Shalom* (RM, 15 January 1993; sec. 1.2.). However, the rift between the two colourful politicians had, for other reasons, occurred already before this incident. Limonov stated, in explaining the break, for instance, that although Zhirinovskii had for a long time proclaimed that he would protect the Russians in the 'near abroad' (i.e. in the CIS and the Baltics), the

and 266-267; Gebhard 1994, 35-78; Tsymburskii 1995; and Umland 1995b. On Limonov's background, see Laqueur 1993, 163-164; and the brochure of the right-wing extremist publicist Bondarenko (1992).

LDPR never engaged in corresponding activities, not even symbolically. Instead, Limonov complained, Zhirinovskii had used the party's money to improve the LDP's material basis (Limonov 1993a). In addition he was critical that Zhirinovskii had, in his view, moved back to the political centre in mid-1993 and taken part in El'tsin's Constitutional Assembly at that time. When, in Limonov's estimate, the pendulum of Zhirinovskii's rhetoric swung back to his former radical nationalist populism in August 1993, Limonov refused to cooperate, although Zhirinovskii's new advocacy of merging nationalism and socialism into 'national socialism' (1993c) came near to Limonov's and Aleksandr Dugin's (Limonov's new ally) 'national Bolshevism' (I, 11 September 1993).⁹⁸

After the electoral success of the LDPR in December 1993, Limonov did, at first, seemingly not change his mind. He branded Zhirinovskii as a 'populist and cunning manipulator, [...] a political businessman, [and] a False Dmitrii. [...] This "jurist" [...] with an Odessa [i.e. a Jewish - A.U.] accent [is] a slap in the face of the Russian people and Russia.' He is, Limonov scolds, 'an enemy of Russian nationalism, and just uses Russians and Russia for his personal aims.' (Za, no. 1 [6], 1994, 5). Subsequently, Limonov even wrote a special book against Zhirinovskii of which 200,000 copies were sold (1994).⁹⁹ In it, the writer called Zhirinovskii a 'False Ivanov' and usurper who, like the 'False Dmitriis' of the late 16th and early 17th century, wants to abjure his true origins, but whom his Jewish voice and appearance bespeak. Zhirinovskii's behaviour resembles that of a 'bazaar dealer' or of a 'director of a food storage'. He is not at all a fascist, but a coward who represents the interests of the *mal'chiki-bankirchiki*, the banker-boys (Limonov 1994, 182). He is rather more reminiscent of Hue Long, a US-American populist of the 1930s, than of the 'true revolutionary' Adolf Hitler. '[Zhirinovskii] only wants to become the Russian president, but he does not intend to change society.'

⁹⁸ On Limonov's further development, see, above all, his irregular four-page *Limonka: Gazeta priamogo deistviia* (Little Lemon: Newspaper of Direct Action) which has been appearing since November 1994. See, furthermore, *Elementy: Evraziiskoe obozrenie*, no. 4, 1993, 49-52; *IuG*, no. 27, 1993, 3; *AiF*, no. 32, 1993, 5; *SR*, 17 August 1993, 3; *Den'*, no. 3 (83), 1993, 2, no. 27 (107), 8, and no. 34 (114), 1993, 8; *Programma natsional-bol'shevistskoi...* N.d.; *Zavtra*, no. 6 (11), 1994, 6, no. 17 (22), 1994, 6, no. 25 (30), 1994, 8; *St*, no. 32, 1994, 9-11; *Novyi vzgliad*, no. 136, 1994, 3; *NG*, 23 November 1994; *LG*, no. 9 (5540), 1995, 11; and Verkhovskii 1996.

⁹⁹ On this book, see, for instance, *Utro Rossii*, no. 24 (32), 1994, 4; *NG*, 6 August 1994, 7; *P*, 25 June 1994, 2; *Al'-Kods*, no. 23 (44), 1994, 8; and Prussakov 1994a.

(Limonov 1994, 78) This insufficient revolutionarism was presented by Limonov as the main deficiency of the LDP-leader who is 'puffed up a hundred times' by comparing him to Hitler (Limonov 1994, 92-93, 164; Umland 1994b, 1129).

Despite this and other massive assaults on Zhirinovskii, and Limonov's previous showmanship as a nationalist too principled to cooperate with such a selfish populist, Limonov, in February 1995, sharply reversed his anti-Zhirinovskii course and started, instead, to beg for a meeting with Zhirinovskii 'in order to renew the personal contact with the LDP leader'. In spring 1995, he was, finally, granted an audience on which he apologized for his earlier behaviour, recognized his 'personal mistakes', promised his microscopic National-Bolshevist Party's (*NBP*) support for Zhirinovskii in the forthcoming presidential elections, and asked to include 5 to 7 of the *NBP* 'comrades' (*soratriki*) in the LDP all-federal list for the parliamentary elections in December 1995 (as quoted in *PER*, no. 1, 1995, 9). However, the latter request was not met by Zhirinovskii which may have been the reason why the *NBP* withdrew its support for Zhirinovskii's presidential candidacy. After a short flirt with the idea of supporting El'tsin (*OG*, no. 6 [134], 1996, 1; *MN*, no. 7, 1996, 6), Limonov lastly chose to call upon its followers to vote for the former weight-lifter and important proto-fascist writer Iurii P. Vlasov (b. 1935) in the first round of the Russian presidential election on 16 June 1996 (*OMRI Daily Digest*, 14 May 1996; *Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 1st vol., 90-91).

Pathology Befriends Psychology

Zhirinovskii's last close and official alignment with a prominent personality in Russian public life until 1993 - that with the famous, controversial television psychologist Anatolii Kashpirovskii (b. 1939) - has not been scrutinized in the course of this research. As with Limonov, Kashpirovskii has not become a party member although, already in 1992, Zhirinovskii had announced that the LDPR would not reject an application for membership by Kashpirovskii. Zhirinovskii stated that Kashpirovskii is a 'very good psychologist', and that he 'always saw Kashpirovskii's [TV] sessions although I do not suffer from the illnesses which he cures' (as quoted in Vadenko and Dodolev 1992, 46). At that time, Zhirinovskii's interest in Kashpirovskii had become known as the LDP leader publicly supported

Kashpirovskii's demand to send him on a space ship in cosmos on the orbit around earth (Vadenko and Dodolev 1992, 46-47).

Though Kashpirovskii had moved to the United States by 1993, he entered, in absentia, the Russian parliament on position 10 of the LDPR's all-federal list. Notwithstanding, he claimed immediately after the elections that he had never met Zhirinovskii and did not know him at all. He stated: 'I was compelled to become a State Duma deputy, because our [the Russian] state has forced me to do so.' To the question whether he knows anything about Zhirinovskii's programme Kashpirovskii responded: 'I acquainted them [the 'liberal democrats'] with my programme, [...].' He also confessed: 'To be honest I was always a man of risk.' (S, 22 December 1993, 2) However, subsequently, Kashpirovskii did, as an LDPR State Duma deputy, closely cooperate with Zhirinovskii for more than a year. The two telegenic men finally split only in June 1995 when Kashpirovskii had become increasingly estranged from Zhirinovskii, and chose, apparently in connection with the LDPR leader's aggressive statements during the Budënnovsk-Affair (the large-scale Chechen hostage-taking of Russians in Southern Russia), to officially distance himself from the 'liberal democrats' and leave the LDPR faction on 1 July 1997 (Timtschenko 1994, 27; Orlov 1995, 215; Abramov and Golovina 1996, 232; V. Ivanov 1996, 233, 261).

Populism Adjoins Conservatism

A last somewhat significant incident should be mentioned. When I visited the LDPR headquarters first in July 1993, I had a short talk with Sergei Fëdorovich Dergunov, who was on the staff of the party's central apparatus and by one observer described as 'one of the LDP's key ideologues' (Kipp 1994b, 79) which seems, however, to be an overstatement. To the question about possible allies of the party, Dergunov answered that there is an understanding between Zhirinovskii and a certain Mikhail Bocharov. This arrangement is apparently one in which Zhirinovskii and Bocharov would help each other in a second round of a presidential election. The LDP representative specified that Bocharov is a former member of the USSR and the RSFSR Congresses of People's Deputies, and the president of two large combines called *Butek* and *Ruso-Balt-West*. Therefore, there is no doubt to

whom Dergunov was referring. According to a press report Zhirinovskii had himself already in 1992 announced that, once he won the Russian presidential elections, he would make Bocharov, a jurist by profession, his prime-minister (*Situatsiia*, no. 4, 1993). In an interview for the German right-wing extremist DVU newspaper *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, Bocharov was asked what he thought about Zhirinovskii, and stated: 'He comes now and then to me. His is a very interesting personality.' (DN, 24 September 1993; N.N. 1994, 52).

If Dergunov's information were true, this could not only indicate a further source or channel for financial support for the LDPR. It would also upgrade the political weight of Zhirinovskii at that time. His so far mentioned prominent collaborators are politically comparatively insignificant, albeit in their peculiar way interesting actors in Russian politics. Mikhail Aleksandrovich Bocharov (b. 1941), in contrast, is not just a former Soviet deputy or a businessman. He was two times a candidate for no lesser an office than the Prime-Minister of the Russian Federation. The first time he stood against Ivan Silaev in 1990. At that moment Bocharov used the so called 'Iavlinskii-' or '500-days-plan' as his political platform, but was defeated by Silaev who later adopted the plan himself (Morrison 1991, 164). The second time, Bocharov was apparently considered as a possible leader of the Russian government's economic reform team in 1991. His platform, called 'Renaissance', however, lost the contest against Egor Gaidar's programme of radical economic reform (which has been unjustifiedly blamed to represent a 'shock therapy' agenda). Until September 1991, Bocharov had been a powerful political figure as he had headed, until its dissolution, the Highest Economic Council attached to the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet (St, no. 18, 1992). In 1991-92, Bocharov was a prominent member of the Industrialist Union, a significant 'moderately-conservative' faction of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies comprising directors of large industrial enterprises and scientific-industrial associations including the Military-Industrial Complex (Pribylovskii 1992b, 87). Later, he became the chairman of the Russian Association of Enterprise Managers, and the President of Slavic Pension Fond. On September 2, 1992, Bocharov was a co-founder and became the President of the International Russian Club, an influential association of prominent politicians, businessmen, scientists and artists, among them the (then) social-democratic Secretary of the Supreme Soviet Constitutional Commission Oleg Rumiantsev, famous eye-physician and (then) co-chairman of the Party of Economic

Freedom Sviatoslav Fëdorov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission on International Affairs Evgenii Ambartsumov, famous nationalist film-director Stanislav Govorukhin, General Konstantin Kobets, and Chairman of the Free Russia People's Party Vasilii Lipitskii (*Kto est' Kto...* 1993, 101-102; St, no. 13, 1993; *Partinform* no. 6, 3-9 September 1992, 8-9). In June 1993, Bocharov presented, in the name of the International Russian Club, his own constitutional project (*Partinform* 23 [44], 3-9 June 1993, 3). Also in 1993, he became a leading figure of the self-proclaimed 'centrist' *Novaya Rossiia* (New Russia) bloc, which, however, failed to collect the 100,000 signatures necessary to take part in the parliamentary elections (I, 28 October 1993).

Why such a well-connected figure in the centrist section of the Russian political establishment would cooperate with an outsider as Zhirinovskii, becomes clearer, if one adds that, paradoxically, Bocharov has for a long time been able to combine an openly anti-democratic political agenda with important offices in the new political system and emerging civil society. Already in April 1991, Bocharov, a former leading democratic activist and major economic consultant of Boris El'tsin, came out with an economic reform programme which proposed the transfer to the market through 'economic dictatorship' involving the suspension of all parliamentary and party activities for two years (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 2 May 1991).

In November 1994, Bocharov published a 67-page book called *The Dictator: A Political Fantasy* which was inspired by a 1907 book of the same title by Sergei Sharapov, and presented by its editor Al'fred Tul'chinskii as *de facto* outlining Bocharov's political agenda. In his 'fantasy', Bocharov describes a *coup d'état* in which 'Aleksandr Mikhailovich Ivanov', a sort of personification of 'common sense', is made the 'Highest Presidential Plenipotentiary' by an ailing Russian President on 15 September 1995. Entrusted with unrestricted power, this 'Highest Plenipotentiary' declares, among other things,:

What has happened during the years of 'democracy' is a result of activities of politicians - betrayers of the national interests of Russians [...]. Believe me, all cases of national treason will

be made public. This time nobody will escape from being held responsible for what has been set on foot against Russia. I personally guarantee this to the people! (Bocharov 1994, 17-18)

In order to preserve the country's 'economic self-sufficiency and national independence', the autonomous national republics would be abolished, regional governors appointed by the 'Plenipotentiary', the constitution repealed, a 'regime of political quarantine' established, all political organizations and trade unions banned, the legislative organs dissolved, a 'system of a non-tax state [*beznaologovoe gosudarstvo - sic!*]' introduced'¹⁰⁰, and all resistance to these measures dealt with as representing 'betrayal of national interests' (1994, 18-19). This situation would last 1,000 days after which the Russian social, economic and political problems would be solved. The 'Highest Presidential Plenipotentiary' would then announce elections of the president, the parliament, governors and regional legislatures, and the introduction of local self-government. The 'Plenipotentiary' would also announce that he will not stand as candidate for the post of the President (Bocharov 1994, 65-66).

Conclusions. Zhirinovskii was able to establish political alignments with several noteworthy personalities of the early post-Soviet Russian right-wing, and in one case centrist, political scene. However, these alliances were characterized by their shortness and looseness. It is in general striking how comparatively secluded the LDP remained throughout its early history. There are very few (if any) other significant Russian parties which have been neither a constituent member of a prominent political 'bloc' (the preferred term for a formal political coalition or union in Russia) nor in alliance with other more or less significant parties, trade unions, or professional associations, and, apart from this, which also have not become interpenetrated by personal influx from other political groupings between 1990 and 1993. One reason for this was that Zhirinovskii shielded his party against members who also participated in other nationalist groupings (IuG, no. 13, 1991, 14), and ruthlessly attacked all

¹⁰⁰ In a June 1993 economic programme, Bocharov explained that the 'non-tax state' would finance itself by keeping under its control the oil, gas, coal, power and metallurgical industries, and by establishing a monopoly on vodka and tobacco products (*Partinform* no. 25 [46], 17-23 June 1993, 2).

dissidence within the LDPSU (as was already indicated in section 3.2. and will further become clear in sections 3.5. and 3.6.).

However, as the alliances he did enter indicated, Zhirinovskii seems to have been not in principle against any coalitions or unifications. After his relatively successful performance in the June 1991 Russian presidential elections, Zhirinovskii for instance announced on July 10, 1991 that he intends to form a 'third force' around his LDPSU to challenge Soviet President Gorbachëv in the all-Union presidential elections which were planned for 1992. He said that, at the beginning of August 1991, a new powerful movement combining the LDPSU, *Soiuz* and similar organizations will be founded (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 12 July 1991). After the abortive August 1991 coup, he again proposed to create a larger organization, an All-Russian Movement of Patriotic Movements which would include the 'Inter-Movements', 'Inter-Fronts' and Russian centres in non-Russian regions of the USSR (IuG., no. 1991, 2). Some times later, he once more implied that the LDPSU which had become the 'only all-Union and only opposition party' after August 1991 might participate in a 'bloc of patriotic parties' (IuG., no. 13, 1991, 14). In January 1992, he took part at the Founding Conference of the Movement for the USSR chaired by S. Beliaev. Apart from the LDPSU, the United Workers Front and a so called Federal Democratic Party became founding collective members of the umbrella-organization. The Movement, however, was never heard of again (*Khronika mnogopartiinosti*, no. 1 [3], January-March 1992, 11-12).

When, on November 7 [1992], as head of a small LDP phalanx he linked up with a column of communists and socialists in the Red Square march, he was acting under the umbrella of the establishment opposition, secretly acquiring the legitimacy and prestige of which his party had been stripped at that time. (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 103)

One could put forward several explanations for Zhirinovskii's relative isolation in spite of his apparent rapprochement-attempts. One seems to be his relatively uncommon political style of making his announcements as scandalous as possible. It is, perhaps, not so much Zhirinovskii's excessive

populism and demagoguery themselves which were unacceptable for other extremists (because it occurs that there are highly demagogic traits in all programmes of the conventional and unconventional right-wingers). It seems to be rather the specific mix of deliberate militancy, originality, topicality and simplicity of Zhirinovskii's slogans, which made him such a peculiar phenomenon. The effect of this mode could have been a twofold one. On the one side, the LDPR's potential allies were, until December 1993, apparently afraid of being connected with somebody who was perceived by many as merely a political clown, or as a nationalist whose demands were clearly over the top. In addition to this, Zhirinovskii's possible partly Jewish origin might have discouraged potential far right allies from cooperation with the LDP (Berezovskii 1994, 104; V. Ivanov 1996, 63).¹⁰¹ On the other side, the conventional right-wingers and communists may also have been unwilling to enter an alliance with the LDP because they were unable to match Zhirinovskii's eccentric political and public relations approach. In other words, Zhirinovskii might have had no suitable companions because his singularity would have rated any other figure on his side as relatively pallid and of secondary importance (Luchterhandt 1994, 129). For instance, Zhirinovskii's official biographer argued that Zhirinovskii was manifestly avoided by the mainstream ultra-nationalist leaders in early 1992 because they were jealous that he had as early as winter 1991 started to demand openly the freeing from the *Matrosskaia tishina* (Sailors' Peace) prison of the August 1991 *GKChP* putschists. Zhirinovskii also condemned the Belovezh Agreement of December 7, 1991 dissolving the USSR without any hesitation. At that time many other opposition leaders were still intimidated by El'tsin's and his agenda's predominance on the political arena. When the rhetoric of these leaders became more aggressive in spring 1992 they appeared as following in Zhirinovskii's footsteps. When, on March 17, 1992 - the first anniversary of Gorbachëv's pro-USSR referendum - Zhirinovskii demanded to give an address at a large joint opposition meeting in the Moscow city centre, he was, according to Plekhanov, not allowed on the tribune because he

¹⁰¹ There were also speculations that Zhirinovskii is gay which, as the relative political isolation of the openly bi-sexual Limonov has shown, unacceptable to large sections of the Right. The publication of a photograph showing naked Zhirinovskii embracing a young unclothed man in a sauna in Serbia reportedly caused some trouble in Zhirinovskii's entourage (G, 31 January 1994, 8). Limonov and others even accused the LDP-leader of liking underage boys (1994a, 178; Kibalnik 1996, 17).

would have received cheers from the whole crowd assembled by the communists and their allies. And it were exactly these sympathies of the masses which the organizers of multiple shows [i.e. the other ultra-nationalists] did not want to share with Zhirinovskii. (Plekhanov 1994, 123)

Gen. (ret.) Al'bert Makashov's answer to Zhirinovskii's request to speak from the tribune - 'Its not [your] time, it is not [your] time [*Ne vremia, ne vremia*].' - has been since quoted often. Reportedly, other right-wing extremist leaders then unanimously agreed with Makashov's demonstrative refusal (Limonov 1994a, 27). Consequently, the LDP had to conduct its own separate meeting of several hundred people nearby. According to Plekhanov, accusations of Zionism 'were put forward [by the other leaders] later in order to explain their enmity against Zhirinovskii.' (1994, 122)

The mainstream Russian Right's and communists' apparent intention, for whatever reasons, to distance themselves from Zhirinovskii until December 1993 became manifest at several further points. Suetnov stated that, whereas an LDP delegation was present at a congress of the Russian National Assembly (*RNS*), the party was not invited to 'other unification conferences' (1995, 9). Limonov noted that when he had been recruited as a member of the LDPR's shadow cabinet in mid-1992, Zhirinovskii had also invited several other 'stars [of the right-wing scene], but they, cautiously [...], feared a compromise' (Limonov 1993a). For instance, it became known that the prominent ultra-nationalist economist Professor Tat'iana Koriagina (b. 1943), member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, had been offered a portfolio, yet apparently rejected it in June 1992 (*Partinform*, no. 1, 15-21 June 1992, 10). Zhirinovskii was, according to Limonov, in general shunned inside the opposition camp. On most opposition meetings, he had to give his addresses separately - as a 'pariah' - on his party's truck standing nearby the main rally (1994, 26). Limonov, furthermore, reports that, on 24 October 1992 when a congress of the major Russian ultra-nationalist umbrella organization, the National Salvation Front, was summoned in Moscow, Zhirinovskii attempted to become a member of this association (Limonov 1994, 147). In Semyon Reznik's words, Zhirinovskii

attended the Congress and was ready to sign any document to be among the leaders. He was ignored, however, and left the session during the intermission when forty members of the organizational committee [of the congress] quarreled behind closed doors for the limited number of leading positions. (1995, 222)

After the eklat, the LDPR's Organizational Department Head, Gennadii Kazantsev, had to give an explanation; he predicted correctly:

This Front has no prospects because there is no real power behind it, no social basis. It awaits the same fate as the Russian National Assembly [RNS, another abortive ultra-nationalist unification attempt in which Zhirinovskii had not participated - A.U.]. Actually, [in RNS and the Front,] the same people who change from one quality to another were assembled. Therefore, I repeat, the Front has with this composition no future. (as quoted in *Partinform* no. 13, 21-28 October 1992, 3)

In mid-1993, the LDP-Press complained that, at another National Salvation Front Congress, Zhirinovskii did not even get the floor (PZh, no. 6, 1993, 4). Equally, former LDP functionary, Vladimir Ivanov recollected that Zhirinovskii had been unwelcome at right-wing gatherings in Moscow, although he was in favour of creating a joint opposition coalition government (1996, 147, 90). In early June 1993, Zhirinovskii participated in the alternative All-Russian Constitutional Assembly of most conventional right-wing extremist groupings and several communist parties. In his speech, Zhirinovskii called for the unification of all oppositional groups (apparently including his LDPR), and the election of a single leader (*Partinform* no. 23 (44), 2-9 June 1993, 3). Yet, he remained excluded from all major umbrella organizations. Viktor Alksnis later conceded that it was a mistake of the opposition, and especially of the National Salvation Front to distance themselves from the LDPR (Luchterhandt 1994, 129).

For all that, there is no overall compelling reason to assume that a lasting partnership with other right-wingers was excluded from the outset. On the contrary, one could argue that such relations did not emerge as Zhirinovskii, perhaps, himself did not really want them, or was not ready to make the necessary concessions to build them (Berezovskii 1994, 104; Medvedev 1994). The short liaisons with Nevzorov and Kashpirovskii and especially the creation of the dubious Shadow Cabinet, including the famous writer Eduard Limonov and the popular music TV programme entertainer Ivan Demidov, could, from such a viewpoint, be seen as temporary tactical retreats to regain public attention in periods of meagre media presence (Limonov 1994a, 93).¹⁰² They could be interpreted as falling in one line with Zhirinovskii's highly publicized participation in El'tsin's Constitutional Assembly in June 1993, and charter flight to Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev in Grozny in September 1993 - actions, according to Zhirinovskii's official biographer, designed specifically to attract media attention (Plekhanov 1994, 125).

One could go even so far as to speculate that Zhirinovskii's peculiar conception of the LDP as an in-unison extremely nationalist, pseudo-centrist and even partly pro-Western party (cf. Part II) forbade a lasting cooperation with any moderates, anti-Westerners or anti-nationalists, i.e. with virtually all other parties. Zhirinovskii had to be 'Zhirinovskii' - nothing less, nothing more. A closeness with somebody else would have disturbed the unique picture.

This explanation for the LDP's isolation would link up with the description of Zhirinovskii's growing up, and psychopathological aspects of his entry into politics (sec. 1.1.). Perhaps the supreme 'liberal democrat' did not develop significant, lasting political friendships because he was not able to tolerate at his side anybody approaching his format and role as a leader. A strong competitor on the top of the LDP or of an alliance between the LDP and other organizations would have been a potential challenge to his position as the absolute party ruler. A sharing of authority was bound to mean less satisfaction derived from his pre-eminence in the party's rank-and-file (Laswell 1977). Plekhanov quotes him saying: 'In my party there is and can be no second individual. There can be only several

¹⁰² The Shadow Cabinet's creation in summer 1992 caused reportedly even trouble with the St. Petersburg LDPR activists who complained that Zhirinovskii was unable to introduce the Cabinet members properly to them (*Vecherniaia Moskva*, 16 July 1992; Limonov 1994a, 71).

persons equally removed from me.' (1994, 130) In the party, Zhirinovskii is called *vozhd'* (leader) and *papa* (dad or pope) (Limonov 1994; Plekhanov 1994, 148-149).

Apart from the effects of this approach on the internal party structure, this may have also determined Zhirinovskii's approach to alliances. In summer 1992, he reportedly stated that 'a consolidation of the LDP with other parties is impossible' (as quoted in Limonov 1994a, 71). At another point, Zhirinovskii complained about his bad experience with the Centrist Bloc in 1990-91, and the Bloc's chairman Vladimir Voronin's - supposedly unfounded - accusations against him that he had used the Bloc's membership lists to illegally register the LDPSU.

After this 'incident' the LDP left the Centrist Bloc. And I kept a ineradicable hostility to all sorts of blocs (possibly, here I am not right [though]). (Zhirinovskii 1995b, 8)

According to Limonov, at large joint opposition meetings, the LDP's truck was not only located separately because the other ultra-nationalists refused to cooperate with Zhirinovskii, but also because '[t]he LDP was a pocket- and cabinet-party.' (1994a, 93) When he, in June 1993, suggested to the joint opposition All-Russian Constitutional Assembly that it needs not only unification, but also a single leader, he might have had himself in mind (*Partinform*, no. 23 [44], 3-9 June 1993, 3); as far as this was not possible, he preferred relative isolation. Limonov noted that the LDP did not become a real party because 'a mass organization would, in the end, have shed its obedience to Zhirinovskii' (1994a, 93). The Moscow Panorama Agency concluded:

The LDPR does not enter lasting coalitions. Apparently, this [fact] is determined by the personal characteristics of the party leader because, in the regions, the LDPR does cooperate actively with the extremely right-wing, and sometimes with the extremely left-wing opposition. (Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii 1996, 107)

In connection with this one could add that the emerging, peculiar institutional character of Zhirinovskii's party made also a lasting alliance with other prominent figures less and less possible.

Though most particulars of the inner life of the party have remained hidden, it appears that, already in autumn 1990, Zhirinovskii started to transform the LDP gradually into a partial *Führer* party in which one of the members' main orientation and adherence is specifically to the party's leader and not only to its programme.¹⁰³ This process had been *de facto* completed at some point in the period 1991-92, and was *de jure* perfected on the LDPR's Fifth Congress in April 1994 when Zhirinovskii assumed dictatorial powers in the LDPSU. Under such circumstances, it would have been risky to allow the rise of a second leader with charismatic qualities or the close cooperation with another independent group.

¹⁰³ LDPR Krasnoïarsk functionary Vladimir Ivanov details that, in 1992, he tried to create an LDPR Business Barter Club which would use the regional party network to collect information on prices, connect business partners and guarantee business agreements accross Russia. The club was designed to do both, help enterprises which support the LDP and function as a model for solving Russia's economic problems. However, Zhirinovskii did not support this proposal.

A special displeasure for the leader and the Central Committee caused the circumstance that the regions would thus be directly linked among themselves - by-passing the Central Committee. This was strongly forbidden in the LDPR - a complete ban was imposed once and for all on all information about telephone numbers and headquarters of peripheral organizations. An Apparatus Chairman who, nevertheless, decided to occupy himself with this matter was fired from the Central Committee without any explanation. (V. Ivanov 1996, 45)

At another point V. Ivanov stated that Zhirinovskii consciously created a

powerful bureaucratic apparatus in which his role rose as a result of a constant replacement of 'oldies' with neophytes which prolonged the distance between him and his entourage [...]. (1996, 217)

Zhirinovskii confirmed in an interview that his party has its own intra-party security service taking care that 'nothing happens' in the LDPR (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 31 March 1994). Another temporary LDP insider, Eduard Limonov confirmed that

[...] his LDP is merely a bureaucratic organization, and not a party. V.V. Zhirinovskii did not want a party. [Andrei] Arkhipov and [Sergei] Zharikov wanted exactly a party, and to be Zhirinovskii's companions-in-arms. Zhirinovskii [by contrast] understands the leadership-figure in a Near Eastern sense, as a Messiah, or as a private businessman who praises HIS product. He does not need co-owners, and no companions, [they] are also not necessary, no [Iakov] Sverdlovs, [Rudolf] Hess, [Joseph] Goebbels, Arkhipovs, Zharikovs... (1994a, 92; emphases in original).

Solovoyv and Klepikova came also to the conclusion that Zhirinovskii 'has not seriously worked on party-building; rather he has used the party for endless campaigning' (1995, 98).

It could have meant a threat of splitting because a part of the party's rank-and-file may have decided to change their attachment to another magnetic personality.

In conclusion, on the one side, there might have been no 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' had the LDPR leader decided to share his peculiar role in Russian politics with somebody else. Not only might this have changed the LDPR's unique image of a 'third force' (Part II). It could have also dragged the party into the destructive rivalries between many of the ultra-nationalist activists who were close (if not identical) concerning their agendas, yet engaged in constant disputes about competence, and unable to come to an agreement about leadership offices and especially about the post of an identifiable supreme leader of their broad and potentially powerful coalitions such as the Russian National Assembly or the National Salvation Front. That Zhirinovskii seems to have understood this well is suggested by the fact that, after the rejection of his offer to participate in the National Salvation Front in 1992, he explained that the split of the National Salvation Front was pre-determined by the fact that neither he nor notorious radical communist Viktor Anpilov - another populist whose political potential has been underestimated before the December 1993 elections - had signed the Front's declaration (*Partinform*, no. 14, 4-11 October 1992, 4). In addition, Zhirinovskii may have preferred to keep a distance from the more militant and partly para-military right-wing groups in order to avoid violent conflicts with the federal and Moscow government. When, for instance, reactionary demonstrators clashed with Interior Ministry troops on the Moscow Lenin Avenue on May 1, 1993, Zhirinovskii held at the same time a peaceful rally in front of the Bol'shoi Theatre (Luchterhandt 1994, 128).

On the other side, Zhirinovskii's isolation from other politicians with a distinct profile and reputation in larger society seems to have been - and, to a lesser degree, still be - a handicap for the LDP (sec. 3.6.). For example, such gifted men as the writer Limonov or the psychologist Kashpirovskii could have been valuable assets in the LDPR's effort to preserve its dominant position on the Right after the triumph of December 1993.¹⁰⁴ As Walter Laqueur noted:

¹⁰⁴ This argument applies to some extent also to Zhirinovskii's alienation of the apparently talented journalists and election campaigners, the neo-Nazis Sergei Zharikov and Andrei Arkhipov, in autumn 1992 (sec. 3.5.). A further relevant case is the LDP's 1993-95 parliamentary Deputy Speaker, Aleksandr Vengerovskii who was one of the few relatively respected LDP deputies in the Fifth State Duma (private conversation with *LABloko* State Duma deputy Sergei Mitrokhin in summer 1995). In spite (or because?) of

[E]ven Hitler needed associates - [Joseph] Goebbels, [Hermann] Göring, [Heinrich] Himmler and many others. It is exactly the absence of such 'small leaders' which strongly weakens Zhirinovskii's movement. (Lakër 1994, 12)

3.4. Foreign Relations

'In the LDPR, there is no foreign currency.' (Zhirinovskii 1993e, 23)

It is telling that the LDP's distinctive political isolation in domestic politics (at least until 1993) correlated with another striking peculiarity of the Zhirinovskii party at that period: in comparison to most other relevant Russian political groups (even those in the democratic camp), it has managed to establish several lasting relationships with political and financial partners abroad already before the electoral triumph of December 1993.¹⁰⁵

this, Vengerovskii's position in the LDP and in the Russian parliament was drastically degraded by Zhirinovskii after the elections of the Sixth State Duma in December 1995. For a detailed introduction to Vengerovskii, see sec. 3.6.

¹⁰⁵ I am skipping in the following description Zhirinovskii's relationship to the German neo-Nazi terrorist Manfred Roeder who participated in the April 1993 LDPR congress in Moscow (Hirscher and Lange 1994, 74), the Polish National Front led by Janusz Bryczkowski, and to the Liberal-Democratic Party of Bulgaria led by Veselin Koshev. Although Zhirinovskii apparently established ties with them during the time period covered here (i.e. before December 1993), the groupings which these political activists represent are so miniscule that an extensive treatment of them and their links to the LDPR is of lesser interest. A closer look at the LDPR-LDPB relationship though would be warranted in as far as this connection seems to have been a relatively close and intensive one, and as the LDPB might, according to one-time LDPR Deputy Chairman Viktor Kobelev, have been among Zhirinovskii's sponsors (Oschlies 1995, 83). On the Polish National Front and the LDPB, see ME, no. 32, 18 August 1993, 3; MN, no. 3, 16-23 January 1994, 14; NV, no. 14, 1994, 38-39; *Interv'iu*, no. 5 (8), 1994, 7; Lancelle and Frazer 1994, 42-43; Oschlies 1995, 70, 83-84, 89.

Unfortunately, I have not found any substantial material on Zhirinovskii's especially well-established links to Serbian right-wing extremists, as for instance the Serbian nun Angelina, before December 1993. On their relationship *after* the LDPR's 1993 electoral success, see Oschlies 1995, 116-138.

The 'liberal democrats' involved themselves quite early in this kind of activity. In June 1990, less than three months after the foundation of the LDPSU, for instance, a delegation of the party visited Germany - allegedly by invitation of the *FDP*, the leading liberal democratic party of Germany. According to an article by former LDPSU 'coordinator' Bogachëv (sec. 3.2.), the delegation was met by *FDP* officials, and even promised financial help (MN, no. 28, 1990). In August 1990, Zhirinovskii attended the unification congress of the *FDP* in Hannover, and took part at a reception in a brewery. According to a newspaper report, he approached the *FDP* Chairman, Count Otto Lambsdorf, and presented him his business card. Reportedly, however, Zhirinovskii returned disillusioned to Russia as he brought with him back only some literature about liberalism in Germany instead of a *Volkswagen* bus with a megaphon he had hoped for (*Neue Ruhr-Zeitung*, 13 August 1990; Leonhard 1994, 330-331). In October 1990, Zhirinovskii was invited as an observer to the Helsinki congress of the Liberal International (founded 1947), and gave a speech there. He later even made the claim that the LDPSU had shortly after its foundation become a member of the Liberal International (Zhirinovskii 1996a, 51). These incidents as well as contacts to the Swedish liberal democrats later became a cause of embarrassment for the international liberal movement (S, 18 December 1993).¹⁰⁶

Iraq

One of the, among Russian rightists activists, most prestigious and durable foreign links Zhirinovskii has been able to establish is that with Saddam Hussein. The liaison apparently began when an LDP delegation went to Baghdad in mid-November 1992. The official aim of the visit was to break the political blockade of Saddam Hussein by the international community after Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. According to press reports Zhirinovskii met Iraqi dictator himself, and spoke with him for about four hours, which caused a strong reaction of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*MID*).

A further worth-mentioning, yet not scrutinized figure is the Fin Igor' Paile who, according to an LDPR functionary, was frequently present at the LDPR headquarters, and may have formerly been an employee of the British Moscow embassy and the Finish parliament (V. Ivanov 1996, 76).

¹⁰⁶ In connection with this, one observer noted that, in contrast to *DemRossiia*, the LDPSU had never suffered from attacks by the conservative press or the *KGB* for alleged cooperation with Western secret services, or for violations of the Law on Public Organizations which forbade the foreign support for Russian political parties (Luchterhandt 1991, 3).

The director of *MID*'s information department, Sergei Iastrzhembskii, declared at a briefing that these talks had been 'destructive for Russia' (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 122-127).

Besides supporting Iraq by political statements and meetings, Zhirinovskii caused for some time considerable international concern, when, in January 1993, he assembled some twenty five people, among them a dozen young men in blue uniforms and red berets accompanied by a former Red Army Colonel, on Moscow's airport *Sheremet'ev*-2, and sent via Amman, Jordan, a delegation to Baghdad. Zhirinovskii further announced that a second group of volunteers is due to leave for Iraq in February (AFP, 24 January 1993; Conradi 1995, 159), and it was reported that he had promised to set up a Russian battalion consisting of 400 men who would have fought on the side of Iraq against the multi-national forces in Kuwait. The LDPR press later denied that the men travelling to Iraq were fighters. It announced that those people seen in uniform at the airport did not go to Baghdad, but were just present as the party's bodyguards, and classified the event as an 'exchange of delegations' and a 'youth tourist programme'. This turned out to be apparently not far from the truth as it was reported that one of these groups came, for whatever reasons, back after only four days of 'fighting at banquets' (L, no. 2 [12], 1993; Appendix). The whole story seems to have been designed to stir up emotions among the Russian public and to bring Zhirinovskii into the headlines, rather than to provide any real help for Iraq.

The relationship between Saddam and the LDPR and also the emphasis on youth exchange, however, continued. For instance, a delegation of the LDPR youth section went to Baghdad in spring 1993. It took part in a so called General Conference of the Youth and Students of Non-Aligned Countries there. This conference resolved to set up a special international youth and student organization of non-alignment with headquarters in Baghdad, and an LDPR representative was elected vice-chairman. It was also announced that from September 1993 onwards an LDPR youth section representative would be permanently present in Baghdad (*Partinform*, no. 19 [49], 6-12 May 1993, 11).

Whether Saddam helped the LDPR financially is not exactly known. Former *KGB* Major General Oleg Kalugin claimed after the 1993 elections that 'several million US-Dollars had come from Saddam Hussein' (as quoted in Morrison 1994, 16) whereas Zhirinovskii's official biographer

Plekhanov spoke of 'many thousands of dollars' (1994, 66). A former LDPR headquarters employee confirmed that Zhirinovskii had 'every time brought a suitcase of dollars' with him from Iraq (Orlov 1996, 225). In addition, there were rumours about commercial exchanges, even about arms trade, and a KGB officer stated in late 1993 that the Russian security services are concerned about Zhirinovskii's cooperation with the Iraqis (Conradi 1995, 160). From the standpoint of Baghdad, it would have been probably a worthwhile venture, which could cause a considerable positive effect for Iraq's international standing. Notwithstanding, for Zhirinovskii too much help from this side would have been politically risky. To be sure, many mainstream organizations of the Russian Right are strongly pro-Iraqi, and some of them even established a special Society of Friends of the Iraqi People, chaired by the leading ultra-nationalist publicist Professor Eduard Volodin, in Moscow in June 1993 (*Partinform*, no. 24 [45], 10-16 June 1993, 8). However, the demonstrative sympathy for Saddam Hussein of many Rightists seems to be above all a function of their today perhaps most universally held attitude - a fundamental anti-Americanism. In the case of exposure of large Iraqi remittances to the LDPR, Zhirinovskii could, in spite of general support of Iraq from the whole Right, appear as a puppet of an Islamic leader, which could make an unfavourable impression on at least a part of his potential electorate.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, there have been so many contradictions in Zhirinovskii's political past, that he may well have taken the risk.

Germany/Austria

The LDPR's second major foreign link before December 1993 was that with the rich Bavarian publisher and notorious leader of the crypto-fascist¹⁰⁸ German People's Union *DPVU* Dr. Gerhard Frey

¹⁰⁷ It might be noted though that it is well-known that a Palestinian anti-Semite is the founder, sponsor and editor of *Al'-Kods*, a major post-Soviet Muscovite right-wing extremist weekly. In spite of the virulent anti-Islamism which Russian ultra-nationalists have expounded with reference to Bosnia, Chechnia or Central Asia, *Al'-Kods* was and is a fully accepted newspaper among most Russian right-wing extremists.

¹⁰⁸ 'Crypto-fascism [is meant to] refer to the latent ultra-nationalism contained within a number of pressure groups and political parties which, though they officially claim to be committed to liberal democracy and may explicitly dissociate themselves from inter-war fascist regimes, especially the Third Reich, recruit their former functionaries into executive positions, attract fascist members and funding, and through their publicist activities and affiliations, act as bridges between the far right and ultra-right.' (Griffin 1993, 166-167).

(b. 1933). Besides this, there was also an extensive media coverage of Zhirinovskii's September 1992 visit to France, and his meeting with Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the, in contrast to the *DVU*, extraordinarily successful ultra-right *Front National* (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 121). Yet in contrast to Zhirinovskii's visits to Germany, this event did *at that time* not develop into a closer relationship, and shall be therefore skipped here.¹⁰⁹

Frey whose fortune was recently estimated at DM500 million owns the by far largest right-radical West German press combine with a reported yearly profit of approx. DM8 million (*Stern*, no. 52, 1993, 106; Hirscher and Lange 1994, 46). In 1958, 25-year old Frey student of law founded the *Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung Druckschriften- und Zeitungsverlag* (German Soldiers Newspaper Printings and Newspaper Publishing House) in order to save from bankruptcy the *Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung* established in 1950 by former *NSDAP* district leader Helmut Damerau and *SS*-General Paul Steiner. The, in spite of German government and US-American support, unsuccessful Soldiers Newspaper played down the Nazi period and was officially designed to promote an 'anti-Bolshevist

¹⁰⁹ In stark contrast to Le Pen's 1992-93 tactics of refraining from publicly reacting to Zhirinovskii's offer of cooperation, the French ultra-nationalist officially re-animated the ties to Zhirinovskii in 1994. He, for example, sent the *Front National's* deputy chairman Bruno Gollnisch to the Fifth LDPR Congress in April 1994 (Conradi 1995, 243). In February 1996, Le Pen came with his wife to Moscow to contribute to one of Zhirinovskii's more peculiar election campaigning devices - the public celebration of his silver wedding anniversary in a sub-urban Orthodox Church (Sp, no. 8, 1996, 224). The French right-wing radical looked reportedly not very comfortable at this show though (G, 12 February 1996).

The grotesqueness of the event should not distract from its political substance. Because both Zhirinovskii and Le Pen seem to have relatively large cores of *constant* supporters, bizarre meetings such as this may at one time be seen as important stages in the development of post-Cold-War European right-wing extremism. Le Pen seems to be involved in a serious attempt to create a pan-European right-wing extremist alliance called Euronat. Limonov details that Le Pen has already for a long time been an acquaintant of the famous Russian ultra-nationalist painter Il'ia Glazunov (1994a, 136) whose Moscow exhibitions have been attended by thousands of visitors, among them Boris El'tsin. In March 1997, representatives of 15 European radically nationalist parties, among them the Belgian *Vlaams Blok*, *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Italian Social Movement) and *Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat* (German League for the Nation and Homeland), attended as guests a congress of the *Front National* at Strasbourg (*RFE/RL Newslines II*, no. 1, 1 April 1997; *Searchlight*, no. 263, May 1997, 16). Among other East European right-wing extremist parties to which Le Pen has established close contacts are Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party (also a partner of the LDPR), Vadim Tudor's Greater Romania Party, Krzysztof Kawecki's *Prawica Narodowa* (National Right) of Poland, and Jan Slota's Slovak National Party (*Searchlight*, no. 262, April 1997, 23; *RFE/RL Newslines II*, no. 9, 11 April 1997).

German defense contribution'. Under Frey, it was re-named National Newspaper and re-designed in order to address a broader right-radical readership. It continued to promote the 'historical truth' about Nazism, produced 'counter-proofs' for the Holocaust, and actively defamed German politicians such as social-democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt. Later, Frey founded another weekly newspaper which, since 1991, has been called *Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung* (German Weekly Newspaper). *Deutsche National-Zeitung* und *Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung* were at some point printed in 100,000 weekly copies. Around these newspapers and his publishing house Frey created a large multi-profile marketing corporation including, for instance, the *Deutsche Reisen* Travel Bureau which offered trips to 'South-West Africa' (i.e. former German colonies), South Africa, Chile, Taiwan, and recently also Russia. The Frey corporation sells also cassettes, medals, flags, videos (including, since 1994, a recording of a Zhirinovskii-speech), calendars and, above all, apologetic books on World War II and the Nazi period by, among others, the most notorious revisionist historian of Nazi Germany, David Irving. Since 1994, the corporation also offers a book on and by Zhirinovskii (Schirinowskij 1994). Frey's sophisticated mix up of political with commercial activities (something also discernible in Zhirinovskii's behaviour) have made him a disputed figure even in the German right-wing extremist scene.

Having been denied a nomination by the, in the 1960s, leading German neo-fascist group, the National-Democratic Party *NPD*, Frey founded the *DVU* in 1971 'in order to bring together all pro-constitutional forces from the Centre to the Right' (*Deutscher Anzeiger*, 1 February 1971). Notably, Frey did in the 1970s not refrain from open cooperation with some openly neo-Nazi activists such as former SS-member Thies Christophersen, or Uwe Rohwer and Karl-Heinz Hoffmann who were later convicted to high prison sentences for their statements. Frey himself survived untouched 120 sentences demanded by the public prosecutor (Lange 1993, 73). After his 1975-79 membership in the *NPD* and an attempt to create a joint right-wing extremist umbrella-organization had come to nothing, Frey was eventually able to establish a useful electoral alliance with the *NPD* called *DVU-Liste D* in 1987. Whereas the alliance had, in spite of costly propaganda campaigns, been largely unsuccessful in the September 1987 *Land* Bremen and June 1989 European parliamentary elections, it received a surprising 6.2% and six deputies in the September 1991 elections to the parliament of the *Land* Bremen - the smallest German federal state though. In the concurrent Bremen City Assembly elections,

the list even received 10.3% which established the *DVU* as the second major right-wing extremist party besides Franz Schönhuber's *Die Republikaner*. Although the alliance with the *NPD* had fallen apart in November 1991, Frey launched his greatest success in April 1992 when the *DVU-Liste D* received 6.3% in the elections of the *Land* Schleswig-Holstein parliament. After this triumph, the *DVU*, however, fell again to its usual results of less than 3% which is far too low to obtain a parliamentary seat and mainly due to the (fortunately) continuing quarrels between the *DVU*, *NPD* and *Die Republikaner*. The *DVU* - Frey's major, but not only organization - increased its membership from 12,000 in 1987 (when it formally became a party) to over 20,000 in 1994 (Assheuer and Sarkowicz 1992, 29-41; Haller and Deiters 1992, 265-270; Hundseder 1994, 228-232; Braasch 1996)

Zhirinovskii's connection with Frey began apparently in April 1992 when Frey's son was an official guest of the Third LDPR Congress. In August 1992, the LDPR leader in turn visited Germany. He took part in a conference of the *DVU* called: 'Germans and Russians - Enemies for Ever?' That was one of the early occasions on which Zhirinovskii himself publicly pronounced conventionally fascist-sounding slogans when he asserted that the mixture of cultures and races means the death of the people (*Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 15 January 1993). He provoked thunders of applause of the 500 Frey-followers by promising that 'the question of Northern Prussia and Königsberg [i.e. the Kaliningrad enclave]' would, 'in the case of mutual assistance', be 'by all means solved soon to the liking of Germany.' (DN, no. 16, 1993, 7; Sp, no. 1, 1993, 37) During a press-conference afterwards, Frey and Zhirinovskii proposed double citizenship for the population of the Kaliningrad *oblast'*. Notably, Zhirinovskii repeated these kind of proposals many times in later contributions to the *DVU*-press (Hirscher 1994); and the future of Königsberg - meaning its eventual return to Germany - was the major theme of his German book published by Frey's *FZ-Verlag* in 1994 (Schirinowskij 1994). After their initial acquaintance in 1992, Frey and Zhirinovskii took part in each other's party congresses and seem to have developed a lasting political friendship (PZh, no. 12, 1993, 2; Appendix). After his 1993 electoral success, Zhirinovskii granted Frey's weekly *Deutsche National-Zeitung* (German National Newspaper) his first interview to a foreign newspaper entitled 'Germans and Russians - Friends for Ever' (DN, no. 51, 1993).

In view of the intensive contacts between the LDPR and the *DVU*, and the financial standing of Frey, it seems not unlikely that Zhirinovskii received support from this side. A German weekly has claimed that Zhirinovskii secured US\$80,000 from Dr. Frey (*Stern*, no. 52, 1993, 106; Hirscher and Lange 1994, 9). A former LDPR headquarters repairsman confirmed that Frey '[s]ponsors Volodia' and '[h]elps him with hard currency' (Orlov 1996, 225). As in the Iraqi case, it is difficult to say whether, in the event of a possible future documentation of transfers, this would be problematic for Zhirinovskii or not. Common sense might suggest that financial support from a grouping propagating aggressively revisionist and apologetic explanations of Nazism and World War II, and expousing irredentist claims on Russian territory, would appear to be unacceptable to every Russian patriot. However, among most Russian politicians, Germany is one of the most preferred future partners for, if not *the* ideal ally of, Russia. For some reason, Germany is favoured especially by large sections of the convential and non-conventional Russian Right including even Ziuganov's *KPRF*.¹¹⁰ Frey himself had not only contacts to Zhirinovskii, but was also interviewed by the Russian ultra-nationalist mainstream weekly *Zavtra* (no. 15 [20], April 1994, 1, 5). His *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, in turn, was given interviews by, among others, Stanislav Terekhov, Chairman of the militant, right-radical Officers Union, Vladimir Isakov, tied to the *APR*, Sergei Volkov and Sergei Baburin, co-chairmen of the ultra-conservative Russian All-People's Union *ROS*, Viktor Iliukhin, a leading member of the *KPRF* State

¹¹⁰ The germanophile Russian 'patriots' seem in their enthusiasm for Germany and German thought to forget that an explicit anti-Slavism was a constituent part of most classic German nationalist *völkisch* ideologies, as well as, in general, of Russia-related utterances of German intellectual and political leaders from Karl Marx to Adolf Hitler. August Wilhelm Schlegel wrote that the 'Slavs are always and under all circumstances predestined for slavery', and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel called the Slavs 'peoples without history' although he made a certain exception for the Russians in that regard (as quoted in Wippermann 1996, 513). The by now widespread curious and largely benevolent interest among many Russian right-wing extremists for the doctrine and economic programme of Nazism should hopefully reveal to them that the Nazis regarded the Russians as 'Mongols', 'Asiatics' and 'asocial criminals' (Adolf Hitler as quoted in Hermand 1992, 270), and the Slavs in general as, in distinction to most West European peoples, 'biologically undesirable' sub-humans (Heinrich Himmler as quoted in Hermand 1992, 275). For a concise overview and further reading on pre-Nazi German anti-Slavism, see Wippermann 1996; and for the importance of the racial foundations of Nazism for its exterminational anti-Slavism, see Burleigh and Wippermann 1991.

Duma faction, and Sergei Glaz'ev and Dmitrii Rogozin of the Congress of Russian Communities (Schirinowskij 1994, 48-54).

In expousing such an, especially in Russian patriotic terms, bizarre foreign policy orientation, these Russian ultra-nationalists often refer to pre-revolutionary ties between Imperial Russia and Germany, and a mysterious 'kindredness of the Russian and German souls'. Explanations for the Russian Right's strange preference might include the peculiar interaction in the development of 19th- and 20th-century German and Russian romantic and nationalist thought, and the formative influence which some eminent German 19th- and 20th-century rightist thinkers, such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Johann Gottfried von Herder, Richard Wagner, Friedrich Nietzsche and Oswald Spengler, had on the emergence of modern Russian anti-democratic thought. (Internationalist Marxism, in contrast, has often been seen by the conventional Right as being of Jewish origin, and as constituting, along with liberalism, an import from an allegedly russophobic West, rather than from a supposedly pro-Russian Germany.) There seems to be also a strong element of cognitive dissonance in the Russian Right's idealization of Germany in that the current significance of once strong anti-Western, anti-liberal and anti-American streams in German politics and political culture are overestimated, and Germany's anchoring in the US-dominated Western community and Americanization underestimated.

From another point of view, money from Frey would appear as money from the West, and Western support has become a customary - and, perhaps, even to some extent prestigious - thing in Russian politics. Not only have the democratic parties profited from various kinds of assistance of their Western - mainly European - counterparts. It is also well-known that, for instance, a Greek communist millionaire has been financing *Pravda*, the formerly main CPSU daily newspaper, for a long time. On the other hand though, the ultra-Right sees Western support schemes (such as those of the Hungarian-British multi-billionaire George Soros) in general as an umbrella for Russia's infiltration by Western secret services or agents of a 'Judeo-Masonic conspiracy'. All things considered, I would nevertheless conclude that there would have been for Zhirinovskii less compelling reasons than in the Iraqi case to turn down a not improbable offer from his affluent German friend (Hirscher 1994, 166, 178).

Another partly documented connection existed between the LDPR and a Berlin firm called *TVO* which until 1993 administered former property of the *SED*, once the ruling communist party of the German Democratic Republic. *TVO* was founded in 1976 and belonged until 1990 to the Swiss holding *ORVAG* Plc which administered the *SED* funds at Liechtenstein and Switzerland (L. Ivanov 1996, 252). *TVO* was bought by a certain Werner Girke for DM29,500 on Mai 30, 1990 - one day before *ORVAG* and the *SED* property was put under the administration of the East German Public Trust Company. Until then, Girke had been one of the *SED* straw-men in charge of *ORVAG* and *Corefina* another similar *SED* firm. He reportedly assisted in the restitution of DM50 million of the *SED* funds, but apparently also secured some of these funds for himself. Another report said that, in early 1990, Girke had received in cash and without a receipt from *SED* Finances Administrator Langnitschke DM14.2 million which, together with some other funds, he, however, returned to the Public Trust Company in the summer 1993. It was believed though that Girke had not returned all of the money and that he belonged to a Berlin 'circle of friends' of Zhiriovskii who wanted to create his own 'forum' in Berlin (Timitschenko 1994, 110; Oshlies 1995, 55). According to statements of Josef Dierdorf, the Trust Company's responsible director, the (at this time) close assistant of Zhirinovskii, Aleksei Vedenkin (b. 1966), visited Berlin in late summer 1993 and spent six weeks there as a guest of *TVO*. As detailed above, Vedenkin has a profile somewhat similar to that of Girke in that he is apparently also in controll of some former communist money. In Germany, Vedenkin had already before his trip to *TVO* gained notoriety when he once announced that there was a *KGB*-spy sitting in the Office of Germany's Federal Chancellor. A former Deputy Head of the Security Guards at the Central Committee of the CPSU (sec. 2.3.), Vedenkin is said to have foreign contacts to Argentina, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Australia, Brazil and Poland, and to be a member of the Lions Club, and a confidant of a certain Nicholas Oman who is said to be an Australian multi-billionaire (MN, no. 36, 1994). According to his own report, from his hotel in Vienna, Vedenkin (a notorious impostor) had built up a network of companies all over Europe and subsidiaries of the LDPR in Austria, Germany, Italy, France, and Switzerland. Another information said that Zhirinovskii himself has created ten camouflaged firms in Germany, Italy, Holland and Switzerland (Hirscher and Lange 1994, 52). In Holland, Vedenkin was, according to one report, in contact with a certain Menkov who via a Dutch

firm (perhaps GMM) contributed to the financing of Zhirinovskii's 1993 election campaign (Oschlies 1995, 56).

The LDPR-TVO link was apparently also established by Vedenkin who, according to one report, had once - either in 1992 or 1993 - met Girke at Archila Gomeashvili's Moscow restaurant *Zolotoi Ostap* (Golden Ostap) which had then been guarded by Vedenkin (OG, no. 10 [86], 1995, 8). According to a source quoted by Oschlies, Vedenkin had come to Berlin in September 1993 in order to negotiate with Girke the establishment of a Moscow gambling casino which would financially support Zhirinovskii (1995, 55). Vedenkin confirmed the contact to TVO which, he complained, however, has not moved 'any millions around for us' (as quoted in Morrison 1994, 15-16). However, whereas Russian analyst Valerii Solovei, writes that it is proven that the LDPR received from TVO DM50,000 (1994, 3), a German official report of the Berlin Administrative Court says that, in 1993, Girke had granted three different loans to Prague and Moscow, and that Vedenkin had received DM63,600 'as a loan in cash' (as quoted in Z, no. 16, 15 April 1994, 22; see also Timtschenko 1994, 111). Oschlies even speaks of 'weighty indications' that Zhirinovskii may have received DM3 million from TVO via Prague and Moscow (1995, 55). Whereas there are no proofs for this presumption, it seems to be established that an amount of about DM3-4 million is missing from the SED's former external assets. After the location of the irregularities, Girke disappeared. One report suggested that he had gone to Moscow (taz, 8 January 1994; MN, no. 2, 1994) whereas a later source reported of a second Zhirinovskii-Girke meeting in Slovenia in mid-January 1994 (*Focus*, 21 February 1994).

Whereas there is no documentation for these information, it is an established fact that, on December 22, 1993, TVO's boss Werner Girke and employee Werner Neumann met Zhirinovskii personally at the Rheinsberg Hotel in Reichenfels, Kärnten, Austria. At the same occasion, Zhirinovskii met a number of other businessmen. Among them were, according to press-reports, the above described GMM-boss Anton Nenakhov, the Kärnten timber industrialist Edwin Neuwirth (b. 1926), a former *Waffen-SS* member and activist of the *Volkspartei* (People's Party), who performed as the host

of the meeting¹¹¹, as well as Dmitrii Klinkov (b. 1970), a financial representative of Zhirinovskii in Austria (*Bild*, 23 December 1993; Timtschenko 1994, 109). Klinkov was at that time simultaneously director of a firm called *IBS GmbH*, which in turn belongs to a certain Josef Hambrusch. It was reported that the latter had already before the December 1993 gathering in Austria close contacts to Aleksei Vedenkin. Hambrusch stated:

I take care that the party [the LDPR] has at its disposal enough millions of dollars. For this purpose we [the company] trade with [Russian] local merchants [...] oil, timber, and everything that makes profit. (I, 13 January 1994)

That Zhirinovskii's links to German and Austrian businessmen and his December 1993 trip to Austria might indeed have been fruitful is, for instance, suggested by the information that the LDPR leader deposited DM19,870 on his Moscow *Progress-bank* account on January 13, 1994 (*Focus*, 6 June 1994; *Gubernskie vedomosti* [Nizhnii Novgorod], no. 16 [26], 1994).

Further Sources of Foreign Financial Support

Other non-Russian entrepreneurs who were reported to be in close contact with Zhirinovskii, and apparently present at the mentioned meeting in Austria include Svetoslav Stoilov, a Bulgarian Mercedes-Benz dealer who had lived for thirty years in Austria and claimed to have at Bulgaria a 'four-storey palace with a cascade' (as quoted in Orlov 1996, 220). Reportedly, Stoilov had met Zhirionvoskii already six years ago during a business trip to Moscow. Zhirinovskii made him responsible for the LDP's 'European economic issues' and proposed him as the new Bulgarian

¹¹¹ Edwin Neuwirth from the Austrian city Reichenfels had, according to one information, allegedly the rank of an *SS Brigadenführer* (which perhaps means that he, like Vedenkin, likes to label himself in this way). On December 22, 1993, he, according to Baranovskii, presented Vedenkin on his birthday celebration in Barcelona a golden necklet with a plate with a portrait of Adolf Hitler on it 'worth, according to some estimates, US\$60,000' - an information which could be, however, a carnard as far as Neuwirth and Vedenkin should at that time have been meeting Zhirinovskii in Reichenfels, Austria (MN, no. 36, 1994, 11). Neuwirth stated on the occasion of his meeting with Zhirinovskii that he has 'enough money to buy the Russian parties' and that 'we have firms all over in Europe' (as quoted in Hirscher and Lange 1994, 51).

President (Hirscher and Lange 1994, 78). Petar Ivanovich, a Montenegrin owner of the Viennese company *Oveko-Petrol* accused of illegal commercial contacts to Serbia during the embargo, should be mentioned as having apparently been in close contact with Zhirinovskii already before the LDPR's electoral success in December 1993 (Hirscher and Lange 1994, 81; Oschlies 1995, 140-141; L. Ivanov 1996, 252). According to Aleksei Vedenkin, a certain French, Miriam Selen, allegedly one of the richest women of Europe, has either financially backed the LDPR herself, or performed as a mediator for Le Pen's sponsorship of the LDPR (Oschlies 1995, 54). However, as far as Vedenkin is not a very reliable source and the editors of the French daily *Le Figaro* and the German weekly *Der Spiegel* had never heard of this woman, this might be a canard (Morrison 1994, 16).

All in all, one can, regarding the real profitability of Zhirinovskii's foreign links, only repeat what was already said in the above section on financial issues (2.3.). Although the list gives an impressive picture of the contacts he has had abroad, there is no evidence whether or how much money these people actually provided to the Zhirinovskii party.

3.5. The First Enrolment

To the characteristics of the LDPR thus far described - relative domestic isolation, but comparatively well-developed contacts with right-wing politicians abroad - another peculiar feature of the LDP, Zhirinovskii's inner-party cadre policy, can be added. If one compares earlier listings of the staff of the LDP's ruling bodies, and of its shadow cabinet with the all-federal party list for the 1993 elections, one discovers a considerable change of personnel.

The Functionaries

After the break with Bogachëv and Krivonosov - i.e. Zhirinovskii's main competitors for the leadership of the party - four new members were elected to the Highest Council, the leading body of the LDP, in October 1990 (Berezovskii *et al.* 1991, 318).

The first of them, *Leonid Nikolaevich Alimov* (b. 1932), an electronic engineer by profession and since 1987 a pensioner. He stated that his 'liberal views' emerged during the early 1960s, i.e. Khrushchëv's 'thaw' (Verkhovskii 1994, 26). He was a member of the first LDPSU Central Committee elected in March 1990, and became, in October 1990, the party's Deputy Chairman and Coordinator of its Moscow organization (L, no. 2-3, 1990, 2). However, he temporarily left the LDPSU only half a year later, and in connection with this an interview detailing the context of his departure. He said, for instance, that the Moscow organization of the LDPSU, its largest sub-unit, had by then fallen apart, and that nearly all of its district coordinators had broken with Zhirinovskii. He denied the very existence of the party and stated that 'in reality there is Zhirinovskii and a few dozens of his followers' (St, no. 27, 1991, 11). Many party members had decided to voice their criticism at the April 1991 congress:

However, Zhirinovskii came to know about these plans and took the organization of the congress in his own hands. Naturally, he took care that only his adherents appeared there. The chairperson [at the congress] - V. Shliakhov, member of the central committee of the LDPSU - was not allowed to conduct the session. Zhirinovskii and his true companion-in-arms A. Khalitov snatched the microphone from him [Shliakhov], and made him sit down on his place by using force. (*Ibid.*)

In spite of this unfavourable account, Alimov apparently continued to be active in the LDP, and, only in late 1993, left its leadership because of age reasons (Verkhovskii 1994, 26).

Alimov's description leads to another important figure of the early LDP - *Akhmet Kharisovich Khalitov* (b. 1929), an agronomist who, in 1981, had found himself in serious trouble with the Soviet authorities because of his constant agrarian reform proposals (L, no. 2-3, 1990, 2). One would have expected to see Zhirinovskii's 'true companion' on the top of the party's all-federal list for the 1993 elections and, therefore, in the records of the Fifth State Duma. Yet Khalitov had been then only number 74 on this list, and thus did not become a parliamentarian as the party obtained only 59 seats by proportional vote (ITAR-TASS, 25 December 1993). It is even more strange that he was described in

this register as an 'agricultural worker' (IuG, no. 40-41, 1993, 6), without mentioning that Khalitov was, according to his own testimony, actually the LDPR's 'general secretary' whatever this title meant. In an interview Khalitov stated that, in 1991, he had originally been promised by Zhirinovskii to become the vice-presidential candidate. Perhaps Zhirinovskii had at this time no other choice than to opt finally for Zavidiiia as his running mate, because the electoral campaign was financed mainly by *Galand* (sec. 2.3.). Nonetheless, Khalitov remained Zhirinovskii's right hand, accompanied him during a trip to Iraq and became the 'Minister of Agriculture' of the LDP's shadow cabinet. His descent apparently began when he was not re-elected to the Highest Council, but only to the Central Committee (between 30 and 40 members) at the Fourth Congress of the LDPR in April 1993. He was also replaced as editor-in-chief of the weekly newspaper *Pravda Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Truth), which had become the main publication of the LDP in 1993 (PZh, no. 2 1993). The fall of the former 'true companion' could have been connected with his non-Russian - i.e. Tatar - ethnic background. Maybe it was simply due to his age of over 60. Still, according to a newspaper report, the mentioned incident with the party list seems to have been a major blow for Khalitov, and he apparently tried to explain it to himself as a technical mistake (I, 4 January 1994).¹¹²

The third member of the original Highest Council from 1990, who by 1993 had left this organ, the already mentioned *Viktor Nikolaevich Bogaty*i (b. 1948), remained a member of the party but did not take part in the 1993 elections (sec. 2.3.). Bogaty*i* resigned from the Highest Council and from his post as the shadow cabinet's 'Minister of Foreign Trade' because of health reasons in 1992, but he was still counted as a close associate of Zhirinovskii in 1993, and founded the (apparently abortive) LDPR

¹¹² For details of Khalitov's biography, see Berezovskii and Chervakov 1993, 73, and Verkhovskii 1994, 38. For Khalitov's later attempts to make (while remaining a member of the LDP) a political career in the major Russian Islamic association *Soiuz musul'man Rossii* (Union of Muslims of Russia), see S, 18 August 1995, and S, 2 September 1995. Curiously, Zhirinovskii also has contacts to the second largest Russian Muslim organization called *Obshcherossiiskoe musul'manskoe dvizhenie 'Nur'* (All-Russian Muslim Movement 'Light'). *Nur*'s chairman worked as an assistant to LDP State Duma deputy Aleksei Mitrofanov who is also the 'Minister of Foreign Affairs' in Zhirinovskii's shadow cabinet (MN, no. 53, 1995, 4). On Mitrofanov, see section 3.6. In view of the LDP's many explicitly anti-Islamic statements and Zhirinovskii's pathological anti-Turkishness (1993a), it is incomprehensible why the Russian Muslim organizations made contact with the 'liberal democrats'.

Moscow Organization newspaper *Na semi kholmakh* (On Seven Hills) in March 1993 (S, 22 December 1993; Verkhovskii 1994, 35; Pribylovskii 1995a, 66).

One of the two or three real confidants of the party leader throughout the years was *Stanislav Zhebrovskii* (b. 1942), who had been a close acquaintance of Zhirinovskii already before their political careers (Orlov 1996, 208).¹¹³ Zhebrovskii is, besides Zhirinovskii himself, the only member of the original Highest Council of 1990, who still belongs to this body today. In the party apparatus he is Zhirinovskii's deputy responsible for organizational work,¹¹⁴ and in the shadow cabinet he heads the 'Ministry of Economics'. One source called him the 'first deputy of the [party] chairman' (*Kto est' chto...* 1994, 149). Until 1993 he had also been the editor of *Pravda Zhirinovskogo* and *Liberal*, another main LDP organ which was - despite its name - marked by an equally bizarre personality cult as all other LDPR publications. In the Fifth State Duma 1993-95, he had first been a member of the Committee for Ownership, Privatization and Economic Activities until June 1994, and then switched to the Group for Economic Questions of the Committee for Industry, Building, Trade, Transport and Power Economy. In the Sixth State Duma, he has become a member of the dubious 'Committee for Geopolitical Affairs' (headed by Aleksei Mitrofanov; see below) which parallels the Committee for International Affairs, and had been created in early 1994 especially to accommodate the LDPR faction (<http://www.nns.ru/persons/zhebrov.htm>).

Zhebrovskii studied physics at Moscow State University (S, 22 December 1993), although his occupation mentioned in the 1993 all-federal party list for the elections (position no. 6) was specified as 'publishing house worker' (IuG, no. 40-41, 1993, 6). He has known Zhirinovskii since 1983, when

¹¹³ Besides several members of Zhirinovskii's family who increasingly seem to have been running the LDP headquarters (especially since December 1993), Valentin N. Minakov has to be singled out as another long-term acquaintance and confidant of Zhirinovskii who has reportedly known him since childhood (Orlov 1996, 197). Though apparently an important figure in Zhirinovskii's entourage, not much is known about Minakov. It is said that he worked as an officer for the KGB when he was serving as an official for *Intourist*, the Soviet Foreign Travel Agency, before he became an LDP functionary (Dunlop 1994, 30).

¹¹⁴ A further seemingly, for some time, important figure in the apparatus of the early LDP was its Organizational Department Head, A.M. Zhemlo, of whom, however, not much is known. An LDP insider has described Zhemlo as a former prison detainee. After having been one of the most powerful figures in the LDP apparatus for several months, Zhemlo disappeared in spring 1992, and, apparently, stole some of the LDP's funds. According to Orlov, Zhirinovskii subsequently searched for Zhemlo for some time (1996, 194-196).

they both worked at *Mir* Publishers. Zhebrovskii, who has an excellent command of French, led *Mir*'s physics editorial group, was the boss of the publisher's trade-union committee (Kartsev 1995, 20, 73), and was a member of the *Mir* CPSU Bureau. Before this Zhebrovskii had worked as a teacher of physics in Algeria from 1966 to 1970 where he reportedly read regularly the French conservative daily *Le Figaro* (Conradi 1995, 57). From 1976 to 1982 as a scientific editor for the *Sovetskaia entsiklopediia* publishing house (S, 22 December 1993; Verkhovskii 1994, 36; *Vlast...* 1994 [1995], 2nd vol., 30).

Though the cases of Bogatyi and, above all, Zhebrovskii suggest a certain continuity, there are several other people from the early inner party leadership circle who seemed to have vanished from sight by December 1993. Some of them reappeared later, others not. The, according to V. Ivanov (1996), influential head of the Organizational Department of the LDPSU A. Zhemlo had disappeared completely from the party records by 1993. Andrei N. Zagorodnikov, the principal author of the LDP's first longer programme (*Liberal'no-demokraticheskaiia...* 1991; sec. 2.1.) is in one source mentioned as a member of the early Highest Council of the LDP (Berezovskii and Cherviakov 1994; I, 14 April 1994). Yet, if he ever really belonged to this body, he not longer appears in the party press. The heads of the LDPSU Central Committee's Ideological and International Departments, Sergei Putin and Iurii Vasiutin (or Vasiukov) were for some reason not included in the party's lists of candidates for the 1993 elections (I, 4 January 1994). The one-time head of the LDP propaganda department, Viktor N. Balakhovskii, was no longer mentioned in relevant party reports in late 1993, and had apparently left the party in order to trade with vodka. Later, though he reappeared as editor of the LDPR newspaper and organizer of the LDPR section at Liubertsy near Moscow (Orlov 1996, 210). Equally, Mikhail Musatov (b. 1950), a former Strategic Rocket Forces and military cosmonautics officer, had been described in the party press as the head of the Moscow sub-organization of the LDPR, as well as a 'Deputy Minister of Defense' of its shadow cabinet (Limonov 1994, 186). Notwithstanding, in November 1993, he appeared neither on the list of the LDPR's all-federal or district nominees, nor on the listing of its regional activists and coordinators although, in December 1995, he became an LDPR State Duma deputy. Further, the 'Minister of Mineral Resources and Raw Materials' Aleksandr N.

Kurskii (b. 1949), a chemist and physicist by profession and member of the leading body of the nationalist micro-organisation *Slavianskii sobor* (Slavic Assembly)¹¹⁵, the 'Minister of Interior' Sergei Barskii, and the 'Minister of Science and Technology' Viktor Lymar' did not, for whatever reasons, appear in the above mentioned records lists (Limonov 1994, 185-186; SZh, no. 3, 1992; IuG, no. 40-41, 1993; Mosina and Solodukhin 1993, 6). The LDP's then would-be 'Vice Prime-Minister' Mikhail Ivanov (b. 1949), a former Naval Officer, was in the 1993 State Duma elections only on position 121 of the all-federal list, and, in the 208th electoral district in St. Petersburg, an unsuccessful single-mandate candidate.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Kurskii had been attached to a group of LDP dissidents (Zharikov, Mitrofanov, Limonov and Arkhipov) which left Zhirinovskii in November 1992 (Limonov 1994, 154), and is described in section 3.3., and below. In contrast to Mitrofanov who ultimately stayed with Zhirinovskii (sec. 3.6.), Kurskii has apparently cut his ties to the LDP, and may have become a permanent member of Zharikov's National-Radical (later Right-Radical) Party.

¹¹⁶ Mikhail Ivanov has to be singled out as a representative of the 'St. Petersburg Group' in the LDP leadership, which is not explored extensively here. The most influential figure of this LDP faction is the current State Duma Deputy Iurii Pavlovich Kuznetsov, editor-in-chief of the irregularly published St. Petersburg newspaper *Slovo Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Word) (Umland 1996). For an important contribution of Kuznetsov to a Moscow-based LDP-organ see, L, no. 2 (12), 1993 (reprinted in German in Hoppe and Genzer 1994, A237-A238).

This 'St. Petersburg Group' in the LDP is apparently linked to a mysterious supra-partisan association of extremely right-wing Russian publicists called 'The Inner Predictor'. To my knowledge, so far nothing has been published on this association which apparently tries to remain in secret. Its major programmatic document seems to be the abstruse proto-fascist three-volume writing *Dead Water* which is on sale at nationalist gatherings in Moscow (Vnutrennyi prediktor SSSR 1992 [1991]). Interestingly, a shortened version of the text appeared in a journal called *Business and Accountancy in Russia* (Vnutrennyi prediktor Rossii 1994). A further excerpt was published in a leading St. Petersburg right-wing periodical sponsored by Aleksandr Sterligov's fascist Russian National Assembly (Rabochaia gruppa Vnutrennogo prediktora Rossii 1993).

'The Inner Predictor's' LDP component led by Kuznetsov has distinguished itself by its attempts to develop a separate, relatively sophisticated fascist theoretical grounding for the generally unpretending nationalist-populist agenda of the LDP. Activities of the group included the production of internal LDP discussion papers (Sokolov, Ivanov and Kuznetsov 1992), as well as the publication of a number of articles in independent right-wing periodicals (Kuznetsov 1994, 1995), and in *Slovo Zhirinovskogo* (Umland 1996). Yet, Kuznetsov's and his colleagues' proto-fascist ideas, above all their notion of a 'conceptual power' in society which has been lost to the Jews and must be recaptured by the Russian nation, found, at least until 1993, only limited response in the central party press and documents.

Ivanov, it should be added, is simultaneously a member of the St. Petersburg branch of the ultra-nationalist *Otechestvo* (Fatherland) group, and of the *Nashi* Movement (sec. 3.3.). Known as the 'Black Captain' in Israel, Ivanov has put forward some of the most bizarre anti-semitic conspiracy theories in the

The Radicals

Another group of early LDP activists who had left the party by the time of its electoral success in 1993 include the two most notorious and in some respect most significant figures in Zhirinovskii's entourage during 1991-1992 - 'the well-known Rock-Nazis' (S, 22 December 1993) *Andrei V. Arkhipov* (b. 1954) and *Sergei A. Zharikov* (b. 1956 or 1958). According to a number of observers, these two men - especially Arkhipov - were very close to Zhirinovskii and, according to Limonov, together with Zhirinovskii's biographer Sergei Plekhanov, his best 'teachers' (1994a, 35-36). Another observer confirmed that they had a 'tremendous, very apparent influence' on the development of Zhirinovskii's views in that period (V. Ivanov 1996, 38). They played a crucial part in keeping the party going and present in the media during the difficult interregnum between the 1991 presidential and the 1993 parliamentary elections (Limonov 1994; Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 12; V. Ivanov 1996, 37-39).

Arkhipov graduated from the Moscow Aviation Institute as an aeronautical engineer and holds the degree of Candidate Master of Sports, a prestigious title in Russia, in apparatus gymnastics. In Soviet times, he worked for a secret arms factory as a specialist in aircraft engines (Timtschenko 1994, 67). Subsequently, he was a candidate for the elections to the Congress of Peoples Deputies of the RSFSR, and a journalist for the popular weekly newspaper *Argumenty i fakty* (Arguments and Facts) from 1989 until 1991 when he was fired for political reasons. He first met Zhirinovskii in 1990 (Verkhovskii 1994, 26). It is also known that, in 1989, Zhirinovskii was in contact with Sergei Plekhanov's organizational committee for a March of Solidarity with the Russian population of the

post-Soviet Russian right-wing scene (V. Ivanov 1996, 36-37). One of these says that the famous Russian 19th-century poet Alexander Pushkin intimates, in his poem 'Ruslan and Liudmilla', the existence of a Judeo-Masonic plot against the Russians (LG, no. 3 [5483], 1994, 2). For other such propositions by Ivanov, see, for instance, *Russischer Kurier*, no. 20, 1993, 5. One Russian political analyst wondered why M. Ivanov had never been under psychiatric treatment (Verkhovskii 1994, 30).

For examples of contributions from Ivanov to Moscow-based LDP newspapers, see his articles in the then neo-Nazi youth-organ *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Falcon) and in *Liberal* (Ivanov 1992; L, no. 8-9, 1992, 23). On *Sokol Zhirinovskogo*, see secs. 3.3. and 3.5. On M. Ivanov, see *Slovo Zhirinovskogo*, no. 3, 1993, 3, no. 8, 1993, 3.

Baltics in which Arkhipov was also involved (Plekhanov 1994, 67-71). In 1991, he became Zhirinovskii's press secretary, and fulfilled this role, according to several reports, very actively and professionally (e.g. V. Ivanov 1996, 40). In 1992, Arkhipov was described as the LDP shadow cabinet's 'Minister of Information'. Limonov singled him out as the creator of a multitude of canards which, in 1991 and 1992, bewildered the Russian and Western public and kept media attention to the LDP alive (1994, 128). LDP functionary, V. Ivanov called him the 'major figure' in Zhirinovskii's entourage until autumn 1992.¹¹⁷

Zharikov, a mathematician by profession, had, according to Limonov (1994a, 36), already in 1971, begun to play rock music in a school band called *Vtoroe prishestvie* (Second Coming) which was, in 1974, renamed in *Mlechnyi put'* (Milk Way), and has, since 1981, been called *DK* which, according to different sources, meant either *Devichii kal* (Virgin's Excrements) or *Dom kul'tury* (House of Culture). Between 1983 and 1989, the underground *DK* group produced not less than 33 music cassettes, among them 'I'll Take You to the Tundra' (1983), 'Little Prince' (1984), 'Kisil'ev' (1985), *DMB-85* (1985), and 'The Hellfire' (1986) a solo-project of Zharikov (Troitsky 1989, 183). The *New Musical Express* took in September 1987 an interview with Zharikov, and commented that 'DK, the most scandalous rock-band of Russia, is without doubt the leader in this musical mine-field' (as quoted in Limonov 1994a, 37). In the late eighties, Zharikov became one of the propagators of the idea of a specifically Russian 'national Rock [music]'. In particular, he became known to a larger public when he published two controversial articles on the importance of Rock for a Russian national rebirth in the first and ninth issues of the important ultra-right *Komsomol* 'thick journal' *Molodaia gvardiia* (Young Guard) in 1990. It should be noted that these articles were among the first publications in official party organs which did not hesitate to openly defend Nazi concepts like 'Aryan' or symbols like

¹¹⁷ For examples of Arkhipov's activities as the LDP press secretary, see, for instance, his frequent short articles in *Iuridicheskaya gazeta* (Juridical Newspaper), no. 11, 1991, 14, no. 14, 1991, 14, no. 15, 1991, 7, no. 3, 1992, 15, no. 6, 1992, 15. The former LDP representative at Krasnoiarsk, Vladimir Ivanov, furthermore, specifies that Arkhipov has close links to a small but notorious British publisher called Flegon Press. This publishing house is owned by a certain Alex Flegon whom the LDP-insider describes as a specialist in Russian literature. Allegedly, Flegon was the first to publish Alexander Solzhenitsyn in the West. Further, Flegon reportedly confessed that he is related to the KGB. For more details, see Ivanov 1996, 97-100.

the swastika.¹¹⁸ Zharikov also joined Zhirinovskii's party in about 1991, but seemingly after, and through the mediation of, Arkhipov. He became the LDP's 'Minister of Culture and Youth Affairs' in 1992 (Sloane 1992; *Panorama*, no. 1 [35], 1993, 11; I, 4 January 1994; Verkhovskii 1994, 26, 22, 28-29; Limonov 1994, 185; Umland 1996).

The main contribution these figures made to the building up of the LDP was their editing of the first four numbers of the youth-organ *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Falcon). The *Falcon* was at this time the most distinctly fascist, partly neo-Nazi newspaper of the LDP. As its content was theoretically richer than the LDP periodicals mentioned before, the newspaper acquired influence among the whole Russian right-wing extremist fringe (Umland 1996).¹¹⁹

Zharikov and Arkhipov claimed, apparently not entirely groundlessly, that they had been the authors of 'nearly all' of Zhirinovskii's most infamous slogans such as 'America, give Alaska back to

¹¹⁸ For additional articles by Zharikov (and some by Arkhipov), see, above all, the journals *K toporu* (To the Axe), and *Ataka* (Attack) both edited by Zharikov, as well as *Den'*, 1 July 1993, 8; *Den'*, no. 32 (112), 8; *Soglasie* (a special issue of *Den'*), no. 6, 1993, 8; *Russkii rok*, no. 1, 1993, 29-30; and *Zavtra*, no. 49 (54), 1994, 8. For further details on Zharikov, Arkhipov and their Right-Radical Party, see I, 23 January 1993; St, no. 48, 93, 37-39; I, 12 November 1993; CDPSP, vol. XLV, no. 46, 1993, 17; I, 4 January 1994; CDPSP, vol. XLVI, no. 1, 1994, 6.

¹¹⁹ See, for instance, Arkhipov's article *Novyi poriadok: parallel'nye tsivilizatsii* (The New Order: Parallel Civilizations) in: SZh, no. 2, 1992, 8-9, of which an English version is excerpted in the Oxford Reader *Fascism* (Griffin 1995a, 387-389), or Zharikov's *Vysshaia rasa* (The Higher Race) in: SZh, no. 2, 1992, 13. See also the contributions by Anatolii Ivanov, Aleksei Vinogradov, Igor' Minin, (SZh, no. 2, 1992, 5-6, 7, 10-12), Iurii Bekhchanov (1992), Igor' Diakov (see above), Mikhail Ivanov (see above), Leonid Gurchenko, and Aleksei Mitrofanov (sec. 3.6.) (SZh, no. 3, 1992, 4, 5-6, 10-12, 13, 14).

It should be emphasized at this point that Arkhipov and Zharikov were altogether untypical figures in Zhirinovskii's entourage, and that they, at this time, enjoyed relative freedom in designing *Sokol Zhirinovskogo*. For these reasons, not all of the articles referred to above can be seen as being representative of the LDP as a whole.

Whereas, for instance, the *Falcon's* authors Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksei Mitrofanov clearly belong to the LDP leadership and, in the case of Mitrofanov, even to its inner circle, I have in no other LDP publication come across the name of Igor' Minin. It seems, therefore, that it would be misleading to regard Minin's article 'Theoretical Foundations of National-Socialism' as a fully representative outline of the LDP ideology (Kipp 1995a, 8-8, and 1995b). Instead, it seems to represent exactly the conflict about the future profile of *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* which, among other things, contributed to the estrangement between Zhirinovskii and the Zharikov-Arkhipov group in autumn 1992. This led to the paradoxical appearance of two versions of *Sokol Zhirinovskogo's* fourth issue - one edited by Zharikov, and another by Zhirinovskii's confidant Akhmet Kh. Khalitov (Verkhovskii 1994, 22). On Khalitov, see section 3.5.

Russia!', 'Romanians are not a nation, but a profession', and 'For US negroes - a separate state!' (I, 4 January 1994; Al'bats 1995, 58). Although the 'Rock Nazis' had been those in the LDP leadership who deliberately introduced calling Zhirinovskii 'vozhd' (leader), they got into a fundamental disagreement with their *Führer* in autumn 1992, and ultimately left, together with Limonov, the LDP in November 1992. According to Limonov, at that moment, the estrangement between the party chairman and the two young radicals, who had until then been among the most effective LDP activists, was mutual.

On the one side, Zhirinovskii wanted to distance himself from Arkhipov and Zharikov, the overly outspoken ultra-nationalist publications of whom created a number of image problems for the LDP. More specifically, this move of Zhirinovskii may have been related to his conversation with Le Pen in France in September 1992 who warned the LDP-leader of associating himself too closely with openly neo-fascist forces. On the other side, Arkhipov and Zharikov reportedly had, already before the trip - i.e. since summer 1992 - ever more frequently been complaining that their *vozhd'* had started to think only of posts, power and money (Limonov 1994a, 137-138, 148, 152). Having left the LDP, Arkhipov, Zharikov, Limonov and some other ultra-nationalists (among them a few other former LDP men) created in November 1992 their own micro-organisation which they appropriately named *Natsional-* (later *Pravo-*) *radikal'naia partiia* (National- or Right-Radical Party), and which is openly neo-Nazi (D, no. 8, 1993; Verkhovskii 1994, 22; Pribylovsky 1994, 33; Timtschenko 1994, 118).¹²⁰

¹²⁰ It should be remarked in passing that Iakushev's (sec. 3.3.), Arkhipov's and Zharikov's departures in 1992 does, unfortunately, not mean that there are no longer any openly *neo-Nazi* tendencies in the LDPR leadership. This particular brand of fascism is now represented by, among others, Aleksei Maratovich Batogov (b. 1946), an international affairs journalist. In the late 1980s, Batogov wrote the programme for the notorious antisemitic Union for National-Proportional Representation of Konstantin Smirnov-Ostashvili ('Smirnov-Ostashvili's *Pamiat'*'), and, in the early 1990s, edited the (non-LDP) newspaper *Russkoe voskresenie* (Russian Resurrection) which openly propagated the ideas of Adolf Hitler and the annihilation of Jews as well as some other nationalities (Pribylovskii 1991c, 39). See, for instance, nos. 7 [15] and 8 [16], 1992. Batogov was shortly jailed for this activity in summer 1992 - an action against which the 'Shadow Cabinet of the National Government of the LDP' officially protested on July 30th, 1992 (SZh, no. 3, 1992, 2). See on this phase of Batogov's political career, *Russkaia gazeta*, no. 5, 1992, 1-2, *Literaturnye novosti*, no. 7, 1992, 11, Laqueur 1993, 270, and Al'bats 1995, 70. Batogov has been a visible member-of-staff of the LDPR Press Centre and Ideological Department since at least July 1994. See, for instance, *Al'-Kods*, no. 22 [45], 1994, and editorships listed in the section 'Primary Sources' of the 'Further Reading' list of this study. At one point he was described as the 'Deputy Chairman of the Press-

Service of the LDPR faction' (Zhirinovskii 1996a, 1), and at another as a 'Consultant at the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation'. He was also an LDP candidate in the 1995 State Duma elections; Batogov (rather cynically) headed the regional LDP list for the Jewish Autonomous District in Siberia (LDPR, no. 5, 1995, 4).

Another prominent Russian neo-Nazi who seems to be drawing closer to the LDPR is the prolific polyglot Moscow publicist Valentin Prussakov (b. 1943). A former editor for the *Nauka* (Science) Publishing House and author for the Moscow TV Station, Prussakov emigrated in 1972, lived in Germany, Italy and the US, and published in various Russian emigre and Western language newspapers and journals such as the American-based *Novoe russkoe slovo* (New Russian Word), *Russkaia mysl'* (Russian Thought), *Kontinent*, the London *Times*, the Rome *La Repubblica*, and the Sao Paulo *Journal de Brazil*. According to his own information, he published four books in the US: *Proshchai Akhinei!* (Farewell Akhinei!) in 1982, *Ni SSSR, Ni SShA* (Neither USSR, Nor USA) in 1983, *Postoronee* (Unrelated Things) in 1985, and *Adolf Gitler* in 1989 (Prussakov 1994d). In the late seventies, he was a close acquaintance of Eduard Limonov (sec. 3.3.) at their exile in New York where the two men wrote an open letter to Andrei Sakharov accusing the human-rights activist of naivety with regard to the West, and of inappropriate altruism in international relations (Limonov 1993, 1994, 172). Since his return to Russia in 1990, Prussakov contributed a considerable number of journalistic articles and pseudo-academic studies on German and other fascisms to various Russian right-wing newspapers and journals such as *Den'*, *Moskovskii komsomolets*, *Predprinimatel'stvo*, *Molodaia gvardiia*, and *Nash sovremennik* (e.g. 1993; 1994b; 1994c; 1995). Prussakov's influential book on Adolf Hitler *Okkul'tnyi messii i ego reikh* (The Occult Messiah and His Reich) was published with 'Shakur-2' Publishers which is owned by a former member of Zharikov's rock-group *DK*, and thus close to the Right-Radical Party (1992). See, *Panorama*, no. 1 (35), July 1993, 11; Verkhovskii 1994, 29; and PER, no. 6, 1995, 16.

Notably, Prussakov has also provided contributions to a number of organs of the most explicitly neo-Nazi Russian fringe-grouplets, e.g. the *Partiia 'Natsional'nyi front'* (National Front Party), the *Soiuz russkoi molodezhi* (Union of Russian Youth), and the *Front natsional'no-revolyutsionnogo deistviia* (Front of National-Revolutionary Action). See, for instance, the articles about SS-runes in *Narodnyi stroi* (no. 1-2 [2-3], 1995, 8-9), and about the Nuremberg trial in *Nash marsh* (no. 3 [5], 1993, 3), or the interview with the leading US-American neo-Nazi Gerhard Lauck also in *Nash marsh* (no. 2 [2], 1992, 1-2). (According to an important British anti-fascist journal, the Front of National-Revolutionary Action and *Nash marsh* were actually launched by Lauck's Nebraska-based NSDAP/AO. Lauck is also said to have influence on Zharikov's journal *K toporu*, the predecessor of Zharikov's neo-Nazi esoteric *Ataka*. See *Searchlight*, February 1994, 18.) Prussakov was at one point also mentioned as co-editor of Batogov's above mentioned *Russkoe voskresenie* (no. 8 [16], 1992, 4).

Since 1994, Prussakov has become a constant contributor to the weekly *Iuridicheskaiia gazeta* (Juridical Newspaper) which had been gradually transformed into an LDP newspaper by its editor-in-chief Oleg Fin'ko (today an LDPR State Duma deputy) in 1991-1993 (Umland 1996). It seems that it was Prussakov's pro-Zhirinovskii review of Limonov's book against Zhirinovskii (1994) in *Iuridicheskaiia gazeta* which set the beginning of this cooperation (1994a). For Prussakov's subsequent contributions to the newspaper, see, for instance, *IuG*, no. 28 (141), 1995, 5, 14; no. 31 (144), 1994, 1-2; no. 35 (148), 1994, 3, 12; no. 52 (165), 1994, 3; no. 1 (166), 1995, 9; no. 2 (167), 1995, 9; no. 5 (170), 1995, 13; no. 6 (171), 1995, 13; no. 7 (172), 1995, 13; no. 9 (174), 1995, 12; no. 11 (176), 1995, 13, 15; no. 14 (179), 1995, 4, 12; no. 15 (180), 1995, 1, 5; no. 17 (182), 1995, 1; no. 20 (185), 1995, 14; no. 23 (188), 1995, 13; no. 24

Up to the period covered so far, i.e. until approximately late 1992, the conclusion of a Russian journalist that Zhirinovskii was particularly closely linked to the military-industrial complex (S, 22 December 1993), was not, in view of the background of the LDP's initial leadership, self-evident. Yet, the fall of the young fanatics caused the emergence of a new group of professional technocrats who came to dominate the LDP in 1993 (Conradi 1995, 180). This new squad of functionaries who replaced most of the former leading officials during 1993, demonstrated amply the LDPR's closeness to the security services, the military, and the military-industrial complex.

3.6. The Leadership on the Eve of the 1993 Elections

The task of this section would normally be to establish a structured hierarchy of the most eminent personalities in the central party organs on the eve of the elections to the Fifth State Duma, and to scrutinize the personal characteristics, political profile and social background of these people. Yet, first, the data on the party's inner circles is relatively meagre. Second, as indicated above,

(189), 1995, 14; no. 42 (207), 1995, 14; no. 6 (223), 1996, 5, 14; no. 22 (239), 1996, 14. See also PER, no. 2, 1995, 11, 15.

In addition, a well-investigated essay on Zhirinovskii says that Arkhipov - though not officially returning to the LDP - started to work again for the LDP in 1994 (Timtschenko 1994, 188). Another analysis said that Zharikov too kept being an LDPR consultant on youth affairs after his official leave of the LDPR Shadow Cabinet in February 1993 (Yoffe 1994, 325). Even if these observations were not true, there is proof of continuing links between the LDPR and Zharikov's and Arkhipov's neo-Nazi Right-Radical Party after winter 1992-93. For instance, among notable 1994-95 contributors to Zharikov's journal *Ataka* was not only Hitler-admirer and later LDPR press officer Batogov, but also State Duma Deputy Speaker, and, until early 1996, leading LDPR functionary Aleksandr Vengerovskii (no. 72, 1994, 36; no. 9, 1995, 12-24; and no. 45, 1995, 27-28). In addition, Igor' D'iakov, a colleague of Zharikov and Arkhipov on the editorial board of *K toporu* (no. 5, 1993, 23-27, 34), co-director of the Publishing House *Russkoe slovo* (Russian Word) which publishes racist books and journals (MN, no. 21, 26 March-2 April 1995, 7), contributor to *Ataka* (no. 12, 1993, 43-47; no. 81, 1995, 4-6), and neo-Nazi ideologist (1994) has been recently introduced in an LDP publication as an 'expert of the LDPR faction [in the State Duma]' (Zhirinovskii 1996b, 1).

Zhirinovskii's party leadership seems to suffer from an enormous fluctuation. This, it appears, is to a certain degree a deliberate policy of Zhirinovskii to secure his control over the LDP apparatus (e.g. V. Ivanov 1996, 217). Already during the earlier periods of the party's rise he felt frequently obliged to announce publicly that any sort of factionalism is excluded. At a meeting called Conference of the LDPSU Moscow Regional Organization in September 1991, he warned that

to enter the party and to fight from within against it and its leadership - that is already treason, which it is impossible to tolerate.' (IuG, no. 13, 1991, 14)

In an interview later in 1991, he asserted:

Yes, there were traitors in the party, as in the whole of our society. Today too, there is an enormous amount of informers who are writing [reports] for the new organs of the *KGB*, *MVD* [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and mayors. In the Liberal-Democratic Party there is every half-year a coup attempt. (IuG, no. 18, 1991, 7)

Zhirinovskii's frequent regrouping in the LDPSU leadership makes it difficult to establish who had how much influence and when, or whether, indeed, there was any significant authority besides that of the party leader himself. Apart from some occasional newspaper reports, the all-federal party list for the State Duma elections is the major source for, at least, a partial answer to this question. Before turning to some particular personalities, several characteristics of this list as a whole published in Number 40-41 of the pro-Zhirinovskii *Juridical Newspaper* should be summarized.

Some Statistics

A first major characteristic of the list is that only nine (6%) of the total 147 'liberal democratic' candidates were female.¹²¹ Four of these women became LDPR State Duma deputies on the all-federal

¹²¹ The Russian agency *PostFactum*, for some reason, counted 10 women (Mosina and Solodukhina 1993, 5).

list, as they had been placed by Zhirinovskii before position 61.¹²² This seems, moreover, to be a general feature of the LDPR leadership, if not of the party as a whole. A survey at the Fourth LDPR Congress in April 1993 showed that about 90% of the delegates were male (NG, 18 December 1993; Klepikova and Solovyov 1995, 136). It should be noted though that poor representation of women was by itself not a peculiar feature in the context of the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections. A number of other 'electoral blocs' with a less 'masculine' image¹²³ had an equally low or even lower percentage of female candidates than the LDPR on their all-federal lists, among them, the Agrarians (APR), *Dostoinstvo i miloserdie* (Dignity and Charity), *Budushchee Rossii - novye imena* (Future of Russia - New Names), *Grazhdanskii soiuz* (Civic Union), and PRES (Sakwa 1995, 199-206). Also, the placement of women on the LDPR list was embarrassingly low, yet not peculiar in the Russian context. The first LDPR women came on position 31, whereas the first KPRF women came on position 32, the first PRES women was the party's 60th candidate, and the first APR women was on position 70. All in all, there were only 126 women among the 1,721 candidates for the Fifth State Duma, i.e. less than 10% although 53% of the Russian population are female (*Partinform*, no. 50 [71], 6-12 December 1993, 5).

A second feature of the list is that 40 (29%) of the 138 male candidates were born in 1960 or later, and 16 (11.5%) of them in 1965 or later. The youngest five LDPR State Duma nominees were born between 1970 and 1972, and one of them, born in 1970, became a parliamentarian (IuG, no. 40-41, 1993).¹²⁴ This meant that the candidates on the LDP list were on average considerably younger than the candidates of most of the other 'electoral blocs'. Thus the LDPR faction which, for instance in mid-1994, had an average age of 45 which was well below the respective figures for the KPRF (50) or

¹²² The first 61 candidates on the list entered the State Duma. That is because the LDP won 59 seats through proportional vote on the party lists, and two among these were parallelly elected in single-mandate districts (Zhirinovskii himself and the jurist Andrei M. Dorovskikh).

¹²³ The LDPR has the - partly self-styled - profile of being the mostly male-dominated relevant political force in Russia. Unfortunately, no exact data on the gender composition of the party as a whole has been found. The first principal Russian party directory of 1991, however, stated in that regard that '[there are] only very few women' (Berezovskii *et al.* 1991, 59).

¹²⁴ The agency PostFactum calculated: 15% were between 20 and 30, 25% between 30 and 40, 37% between 40 and 50, 5.6% between 50 and 60, and 6.1% between 60 and 70 years old (Mosina and Solodukhin 1993, 5).

the *APR* (51), the two other major opposition groupings (Schneider 1995a, 25). This reflects a general trend in the LDPR. John Dunlop noted that of the, in early 1994, the LDPR boasted 100,000 members and that one-third of them are under the age of 30, and half are between 30 and 50 (1994, 31). A source published in 1996 gives still the number of 100,000 members, and claims that 'nearly half' of them are between 16 and 29 (<http://www.nns.ru/parties/ldpr.htm>).

Third, concerning the candidates' occupational background, it is noteworthy that 15 (approx. 10%) of them were classified either as jurists by profession, or as being employed by legal services. Medvedev counted that the LDPR all-federal list contained, in comparison to the lists of the other 'electoral blocs', the highest number of lawyers (1994). However, to counter the impression that may arise from this, one should mention that, for instance, the *KPRF* State Duma faction's figure for those who have studied law - 8 (17.8%) of the faction members - was in absolute terms as high as, and by percentage even higher than, the respective LDPR faction figures: 8 (13.8%) of the faction members in mid-1994 (Luchterhandt 1994, 137; Schneider 1995a, 25). On the other hand, it is noteworthy though that six of the LDPR's legal experts occupied seemingly important offices or posts. They included: the editor-in-chief of *Iuridicheskaja gazeta* (Juridical Newspaper); a professor and senior researcher of the Moscow Institute of Legislation and Jurisprudence; a department head of the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Moscow *oblast'* (province); a professor and head of a department of the Ural State Academy of Law; a head of a jurist department of a news agency; a deputy chief-editor of an agency called *Iurinform*; and a head of a legal consultancy firm. All of these lawyers became deputies of the Fifth State Duma as they had been placed among the first 61 positions of the list.

Fourth, further noteworthy characteristics of the occupational background of the LDPR candidates include that 21 (approx. 14%) of them were described as 'economists',¹²⁵ 13 of whom became parliamentarians. Three candidates who became MPs were described as 'Academicians'. This refers to Professors A.S. Sidorov (no. 13), V.A. Lisichkin (no. 14), and A.A. Zviagin (no. 53) who have indeed impressive academic records (yet all related to economics which was not among the most

¹²⁵ PostFactum, in contrast, counted 15 (approx. 10%) economists (Mosina and Solodukhin 1993, 5).

developed academic fields in Soviet Russia).¹²⁶ All three men identified as psychologists on the list (including Kashpirovskii) became members of the lower house of the Federal Assembly in 1993. In addition to one policeman, nine (6%) of the candidates were classified as servicemen of either the army or the Ministry of Interior (Mosina and Solodukhin 1993, 5) - a figure which also appears high if compared to the respective numbers of the other 'electoral bloc' lists. Three of these servicemen entered the State Duma in 1993.¹²⁷

It should be mentioned in passing that somewhat different figures were given in a source quoted by Richard Sakwa. Professor Sakwa's source, for instance, counted 12 army men on the LDP all-federal list. Sakwa stated, on the basis of this, that the LDP list had the single largest number of military candidates standing of any association (1995, 207). Perhaps, the source he used also took into account non-official information about the professional background of LDP candidates on the all-federal list (although it would appear to me as not an easy task to collect reliable data on the more obscure LDP candidates on the lower positions of the list).

It is also not entirely clear how Sakwa's source counted 75 (i.e. 51%) 'academics' on the LDP list on the basis of which Sakwa came to the consistent conclusion that the LDP had the single largest proportion of academics (1995, 206). On the list itself, only 18 candidates were unequivocally classified as being employed in academia ('academicians', professors, lecturers, researchers). By contrast, the Russian agency PostFactum pointed to only 14 people who were 'Candidates of Science, lecturers, professors and Academicians of different academies of sciences'. At another point, PostFactum identified 25 candidates who were described as 'scientific workers and teachers at higher education

¹²⁶ It might be, in addition, worth mentioning that these 'Academicians' are not members of the Russian Academy of Sciences as, in Russia, would be normally implied by such a classification (without further specifications), but of a number of other scientific organizations also called 'Academies' (*Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 2nd vol., 52, 138, and 3rd vol., 127; Makarkin 1994, 69). Zhirinovskii, by the way, now also calls himself 'Academician' as he has been elected to the Russian 'Academy of Ecology' (*sic!*) in 1995 (AiF, no. 50, 1995, 6).

¹²⁷ Further characteristics of the LDP faction in the early Fifth State Duma included the following: 87.1% (54) of the LDP's MPs were ethnic Russians, 22.6% (14) engineers, and 19.4% (12) economists (Schneider 1994, 4).

institutions' (Mosina and Solodukhin 1993, 5). In addition, there are a few under- and post-graduate students.¹²⁸

Perhaps, Sakwa's source counted also those as 'academics' who were classified as 'historians', 'economists', 'jurists', 'teachers', 'sociologists', 'psychologists', etc. In a number of instances this was justified as, for instance, concerning the former pro-rector of an institute of further education Viktor V. Kobelev (see below) who was categorized simply as a 'sociologist', and the Professor of Economics Aleksandr I. Kozyrev, who was categorized just as an 'economist' on the party list (IuG, 40-41 [110-111], 6; *Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 2nd vol., 96, 103). However, in other cases this feature did not apply. Even a consideration of those cases where the highest previous or current academic rank or position is not reflected in the list does not substantiate the claim of an especially high percentage of academics among the LDPR candidates. There is also no evidence for a peculiarly high percentage of scholars in the LDPR leadership (as distinct from its list of candidates which included many people who were not members of the LDPR). A poll taken among the delegates at the Fourth LDPR Congress in April 1993 found that 'approximately every tenth' of the delegates was a scholar (*nauchnyi rabotnik*), and that 'more than two-thirds of the participants of the Congress have higher or an unfinished higher education' (NG, 18 August 1993; quoted in Vujacic 1994, 52-53).

To counter the impression which Sakwa's summary gives, one could, in addition, point out that among the 64 LDP candidates who finally entered the Fifth State Duma, there were seven deputies without higher education (*Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 1st vol., 60, 69; 2nd vol., 60; 3rd vol., 45, 101, 104, 110).¹²⁹ In contrast, all deputies not only of Iavlinskii's social-democratic *IABloko* and the pro-government national-liberal *PRES*, but also all representatives of the Agrarian Party (generally not regarded as a high-brow political organization) in the State Duma were higher educated (RF, no. 2, 1994, 8-13). Whereas Luchterhandt stated that, in early 1994, 20% of the LDPR faction members

¹²⁸ Former Speaker Rybkin specified that, in the Fifth State Duma 1993-95, there were all in all 'over one-third [with] the academic rank of a Doctor [or] Candidate of Science', and that 'nearly every tenth [was] a Professor, corresponding member or Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences' (1994, 55).

¹²⁹ This figure also seems to contradict another specification made by Sakwa with reference to data from the Central Electoral Commission that there were in all only two State Duma deputies without higher education (1995, 211). State Duma speaker Rybkin gave the information that 95% of the deputies have 'higher or unfinished higher education' (1994, 55).

were teachers at institutions of higher education or academic institutes (1994, 137), Eberhard Schneider counted that, in mid-1994, 24.1% (or 14 deputies) had had a career background in academia. In contrast, the corresponding figure, for instance, for the faction of the Communist Party was 26.7% (12 deputies) at that time (1995a, 26).

The New Inner Circle

There were, in addition to Zhebrovskii, four men among the 64 LDPR State Duma deputies who should be singled out for seeming to have a certain weight in the party-apparatus at this point:

Viktor Kobelev (b. 1943) appeared - after Zhirinovskii himself - on position two of the all-federal party list as it was published in the *Juridical Newspaper*. This indicated that he had probably been the second most important figure in the LDP in late 1993. He entered the LDP at some point in 1992 (Conradi 1995, 179), and was a member of the LDP's Highest Council, head of the party apparatus, and the shadow 'Minister of Labour' between April 1993 and early 1994. An LDP insider classified him as the major fundraiser, an able organizer and the 'secret engine of the party' with 'enormous influence' in 1993 (V. Ivanov 1996, 93, 147, 172). According to some sources Kobelev is an engineer by education, but worked as a sociologist (PZh, no. 8, 1993, 2). A directory of Duma deputies says that he holds a Candidate of Science in Technology degree. According to official information, Kobelev worked after his military service as a high-school teacher until 1980, and after this as the pro-rector of the Cadre Institute of the USSR Ministry of Heavy Machine Building, a principal management training centre of the Soviet military-industrial complex until 1992 (*Vlast*... 1994 [1995], 2nd vol., 96). However, the former assistant to Zhirinovskii, Sergei N. Plekhanov, claims that Kobelev worked five years in a department of the CPSU Central Committee dealing with the USSR's space program where he was responsible for economic matters. According to Plekhanov, Kobelev was accused of theft, and sentenced to eight years of prison. During *perestroika* he allegedly returned, and became the pro-rector for economic matters of the Moscow Motor-Road Institute. Plekhanov writes that he managed to form a business by leasing out the Institute's student dormitory accomodation to foreign firms. Later, this enterprise became a financial source of the LDP (1994, 132-133).

In early 1994, Kobelev became well-known when he and another LDPR deputy, Aleksandr Pronin (b. 1955; no. 41 on the all-federal list), announced their departure from the party's State Duma faction (whereas Zhirinovskii and Vengerovskii declared that they were expelled). Kobelev was reported to have said that Zhirinovskii's actions should be condemned at a party congress because they were not in accordance with the LDPR programme which makes no provision for extremism and interference in internal affairs of other countries (S, 17 February 1994).¹³⁰ However, it appears much more likely that Kobelev, who had been the LDP's major election campaign manager and fund raiser in 1993, came into conflict with Zhirinovskii about his position in the party's faction and in the State Duma organs after the LDPR's triumph in December 1993. It looks as though Zhirinovskii feared that Kobelev had become too influential during the election campaign. The LDP-leader, therefore, tried to diminish his key assistant's position in early 1994. He reportedly deliberately spread the rumour that Kobelev had for a longer period been in prison in Siberia (V. Ivanov 1996, 172), and, on the basis of this, cancelled Kobelev's initial nomination as the LDPR representative in the State Duma Presidium which led to the public confrontation between the two men (Morrison 1994, 65). According to V. Ivanov, there even occurred a 'small exchange of fire' in the LDPR headquarters (1996, 172). Subsequently, Kobelev headed the independent *Derzhava* (Great Power) group of five deputies in the Fifth State Duma until 1995, became active in the abortive successor organization of the once prominent National Salvation Front, and tied himself to Aleksandr Rutskoi's electoral bloc called *Derzhava* which, however, failed to enter the Sixth State Duma in December 1995.

The fall of Kobelev in the LDP coincided with the rise of *Aleksandr Dmitrievich Vengerovskii* (b. 1953). Vengerovskii had, according to one source, originally not been a member of the first LDP 'shadow cabinet' established in June 1992 (Limonov 1994, 152) although he was shortly afterwards described as the cabinets 'Minister of Scientific Affairs' (Timtschenko 1994, 68). According to one report, he had been invited by Zhebrovskii to enter the LDPR Shadow Cabinet in summer 1992

¹³⁰ To be sure, Kobelev seems to have been referring in this accusation to incidents like Zhirinovskii's demand to replace the Bulgarian president, rather than to the party leader's imperialist statements concerning the 'near abroad', i.e. the former Soviet republics, or the 'South', i.e. Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

(Conradi 1995, 179-180). Later, he was promoted to the position of the party's would-be 'Vice-Prime Minister' and 'Head of the Russian Intelligence Service' (Plekhanov 1994, 131; PZh, no. 10, 1993, 2). In December 1993, he occupied position 8 on the party's federal party list for the parliamentary elections. Once elected, he became, as the party's representative in the parliament's presidium, the Fifth State Duma's Deputy Speaker for Scientific Affairs. By early 1994, he had, in addition, become the shadow cabinet's 'Prime-Minister', a member of the party's Highest Council, and Zhirinovskii's deputy party-chairman. Some observers went so far as to call him 'the unofficial leader of the party' (S, 20 January 1994, 3), a 'serious competitor of Zhirinovskii [for the post of the leader of the LDPR]', and the party official who determines the 'collective [political] line' of the LDPR (<http://www.nns.ru/persons/venger.htm>, 2-4) which may, however, have been overstatements. Former LDP regional functionary, Vladimir Ivanov, detailed that, once elected to the State Duma, Vengerovskii established unofficial special ties to Viktor Stepashin who was then head of the Federal Service for Security, the major successor organization of the *KGB* (1996, 259), and has been made Russian Minister of Justice in summer 1997.

Vengerovskii is a graduate of the Faculty of Aircraft Radio-Electronics of the Moscow Aviation Institute and a former member of the CPSU. He had been for some time an officer of the Military Cosmonautics Main Administration working at the Centre for the Control over Cosmonautic Intelligence Satellites, and he was subsequently tied to the Military-Industrial Complex. As a computer specialist he was later promoted as Deputy Head of the Main Administration of the State Committee for Computer Technology and Information (I, 18 December 1993; AiF, no. 4, 1994; *Vlast*... 1994 [1995], 1st vol., 85). This background seems to give some credence to his claim to have 'the conceptual experience of a counter-intelligence agent' (S, 22 December 1993, 2). Plekhanov classifies him as 'one of the few people in the LDP leadership who had experience in state administration although not on a very high level.' (1994, 130) Before his association with Zhirinovskii, he had been the deputy director of the Moscow Computer Training Centre (Luchterhandt 1994, 132). He also revealed that he owns some restaurants (among them apparently the Moscow *Krutoi*) the profits of which he has used to finance the LDP since mid-1992 when he joined the party (Morrison 1994, 13; Plekhanov 1994, 131; Limonov 1994a, 93).

Vengerovskii's views as of early 1994 were close to those of other 'conventional rightists' of Russia. He spoke of a specifically 'Russian economic manner [*uklad*]' which entails a priority of production (of material goods), and an only 'secondary importance of credit and financial policies as means of the administration of the economy' (Vengerovskii 1994, 309). The overall direction of Russia's development should be a return to the 'imperial build-up' informed by a specifically 'Russian view' on the world entailing the idea of the service for the fatherland on the basis of Orthodoxy, and of the 'ideals of the good, truth, love, charitableness, sacrifice and empathy' (1994, 31). The Russian 'strictly centralized', unitary state would have to be restored in its 'natural borders' which means above all a re-incorporation of the Ukraine and Belarus. It also implies an 'effective control of the mass media [in order] to prevent their usage for anti-state and anti-social aims', a 'moral censorship', and the 'prohibition of the propaganda of views and teachings which undermine the traditional Russian family mores.' Vengerovskii comes to the conclusion that:

... true power in the modern world belongs not to those who hold in their hands the notorious red button, who have immediate control of the economy or the army, but to those who have the opportunity to form the consciousness of the masses, their world view. Therefore the battle line today goes through the minds of the people, and if we prevail, then Russia will not only be reborn in the interests of the people, but will become the strongest super-power of the 21st century. (Vengerovskii 1994, 31)

In April 1994, Vengerovskii participated in an LDPR delegation's visit to North Korea. Afterwards he proposed closer parliamentary ties between Russia and the People's Republic of Korea, announced that the North Korean leadership is interested to buy Russian weapons for hard (!) currency, and disclosed that the LDPR has signed cooperation agreements with the Toilers Party of Korea and the Social-Democratic Party of Korea (<http://www.nns.ru/persons/venger.htm>, 4). At other points he stated that Belorussian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka 'is an intelligent person with good experience' (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 12 July 1994).

In October 1995, Vengerovskii published a book (10,000 copies) in which he comprehensively outlined his background, political activities and views. He proposed, among other things, to transfer the Russian capital from Moscow to Nizhnii Novgorod or Novosibirsk, and the Kaliningrad *oblast'* (the former Königsberg) to Germany which, in the future, should become Greater Germany and embrace a population of 110 Million people (1995, 95, 161-162). He also continues to think that the pan-Slavic idea is not dead, and that there will be a Berlin-Moscow-Beijing (perhaps, including Teheran) axis in about 2020-2030 (1995, 210, 214). Before this, he had, after a visit of rump Yugoslavia, proposed to settle 200,000 Russians, mainly retired army officers, in the Serbian occupied territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina (*Die Welt*, 11 April 1994).

Another detail indicating his political views is that he had been involved in the foundation of the National- (later Right-) Radical Party, the above mentioned neo-Nazi split-off of the LDPR created by Arkhipov, Zharikov and Limonov in winter 1992-93. However, he either never fully left the LDPR and simply kept this activity secret from Zhirinovskii, or returned to the LDPR shortly afterwards. He, nevertheless, apparently preserved some ties to the Right-Radical Party, and published in Zharikov's esoteric-existentialist neo-Nazi journal *Ataka* (no. 9, 1995, 12-24; no. 45, 1995, 27-28).

In the Sixth Russian State Duma elected in December 1995, the Vengerovskii star seems to have began to sink which may have been connected to the fact that he had become a relatively influential and perhaps even partly independent figure in the LDPR (OG, no. 11 [139], 21-27 March 1996, 8). Although he had been number 3 on the all-federal party list, he lost his previous position as the LDPR's representative in the parliamentary presidium, and became instead only chairman of the Duma's Sub-Committee on Foreign Intelligence. In March 1996, he announced that he is voluntarily leaving the LDPR (ITAR-TASS, 22 March 1996). Somewhat mysteriously, Vengerovskii's fall was accompanied by two physical attacks on him in 1995-96 which may have been assassination attempts. Vladimir Ivanov, a former regional functionary of the LDP, implied that Vengerovskii left the party because of the second shooting in early 1996, and that Zhirinovskii wanted to have Vengerovskii either scared or even killed (1996, 290). However, in an interview apparently shortly after his announced departure from the LDPR in March 1996, Vengerovskii declared that he remains an LDPR member

although he was, at the same time, about to set up his own political organization called National Democratic Avantgarde Foundation (OG, no. 11 [139], 21-27 March 1996, 8).

A further significant figure in the party leadership seems to have been (and still to be) *Sergei Nikolaevich Abel'tsev* (b. 1961), the number nine on the LDPR's federal list in 1993, and member of the Highest Council as well as of the shadow cabinet in which he was first the 'Minister of National Security' and later the 'Deputy Minister of Interior' (LDPR, no. 6 [26], 1996, 2). He has been described as the 'Number Two of the LDPR', and indeed became the number two on the all-federal list of the LDPR for the 1995 State Duma elections. Already, in 1994, he became, besides Vengerovskii and Zhebrovskii, one of the three deputy chairmen of the LDPR. In the Sixth State Duma elected in December 1995, he has become Zhirinovskii's deputy head of the LDPR faction, and the Chair of the Sub-Committee for the Struggle Against Crime and Corruption (<http://www.nns.ru/persons/abeltsev.htm>).

Although he was described as an 'agricultural worker' in the official record for the 1993 elections, he seems to have far better qualifications for his would-be governmental posts. Reportedly, Abel'tsev, a graduate of the 'Supreme Soviet' Moscow Higher Troops Commander College (1982) and the Moscow Institute of Government (1988), had not only worked as a Captain for the *GRU* (the foreign intelligence service of the Soviet Army) during his military service from 1978 to 1985, but for the *KGB* as well (S, 22 December 1993). He has reportedly claimed to have been a member of the so called Alpha Unit, the USSR's special forces division created in 1974 by *KGB* Chairman Iurii Andropov, and employed in December 1979 in Kabul, in January 1991 in Vilnius and in October 1993 in Moscow (Timtschenko 1994, 138). Abel'tsev's ties to farming emerged apparently only later, when, according to a press report, he became the Deputy Director of the Lenin *Kolkhoz* in the town Lytkarino in the Liubertsy Rayon of the *Moskovskaia oblast'* (Moscow Region) - one of the largest agricultural stock corporations in the Moscow *oblast'* (I, 18 December 1993) with plans to create a net of fast-food restaurants in towns accross the region. In 1994, it was reported that Abel'tsev was then studying at the Academy of Foreign Trade (*Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 1st vol., 12).

Aleksei Valentinovich Mitrofanov (b. 1962) was the number 5 on the 1993 LDPR's all-federal list, and seems to have become one of the closest acquaintances of Zhirinovskii during the last years. This is exemplified by the fact that he was the principal producer of the documentary film 'Presidential Candidate - Mr. Zhirinovskii' (and of another piece on Kashpirovskii), and edited the first version of Zhirinovskii's principal political writing *The Last Dash to the South* (1993a). There have been consistent rumours about Mitrofanov's possible relations to former Soviet leaders. Some reports say that he is an illegitimate son of former CPSU General Secretary Iurii Andropov, others that he is tied in some way to former USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko (Verkhovskii 1994, 37). Mitrofanov is a graduate of Moscow's prestigious school of foreign affairs *MGIMO* (1983), and did a course on foreign relations under the auspices of the UN in Moscow (1983-85). During his employment at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1985-88, he was, reportedly for some time, the Ministry's representative at the Vienna International Nuclear Energy Agency. In 1988-91, he was employed at the prestigious USA/Canada Institute at Moscow (S, 22 December 1993; Timtschenko 1994, 137). He seems to have joined the LDP only in 1992. In November 1992, he was shortly associated with a group of mostly youthful, openly fascist LDP dissidents (Eduard Limonov, Sergei Zharikov, Andrei Arkhipov), and involved in the creation of the National-Radical Party.¹³¹ However, soon afterwards, he returned to Zhirinovskii.

He is reported to live in a former *dacha* for Politbureau members the rent for which is paid by a firm called *Agrokhim* (Plekhanov 1994, 132). In the Fifth State Duma, he became the Deputy Chairman of the Committee for International Relations, and in Zhirinovskii's shadow cabinet the 'Minister of Foreign Affairs' (*Vlast'*... 1994 [1995], 3rd vol., 32; *LDPR*, no. 6 [26], 1996, 2). Mitrofanov was the press-secretary of the LDPR State Duma faction until November 1994 when he became a co-founder of the apparently abortive Deputies Group 'People's Capital' including LDPR dissident Viktor Kobelev and the owner of *MMM*, Sergei Mavrodi. In the Sixth State Duma, he

¹³¹ The Russian agency Nation News Service states that Mitrofanov became a member of the Political Council of the new grouping New Regional Politics - abbreviated NRP - on 22 November 1992. It appears that this might be a mistake because the National-Radical Party - also abbreviated NRP - was founded at Mitrofanov's *dacha* on this day. See, <http://www.nns.ru/persons/mitrofan.htm>, 2.

became the Chairman of the notorious 'Committee on Geopolitics' (<http://www.nns.ru/persons/mitrofan.htm>).

Some aspects of Mitrofanov's biography may give the impression that, at least here, we are dealing with a well-educated, serious-to-be-taken politician in Zhirinovskii's entourage. However, not only has Mitrofanov distinguished himself by many scandalous announcements in the Fifth and Sixth State Dumas since 1993. Already in 1992, Mitrofanov had titled one of his contributions to an LDP newspaper 'Our Line - Reasonable Egoism, Our Aim - World Domination'. Characteristic phrases of the article included: 'Why should we rescue Negroes from hunger?', and: 'our girls will everywhere clean the pockets [of foreigners by prostitution]'. Mitrofanov also made clear that he is prepared to sell narcotics to Blacks (if, of course, they ask for this), or to lease Russian mercenary troops to, for instance, the Columbian mafia. Mitrofanov concluded: 'We will put everything in its place, and use whores according to their designation.' (SZh, no. 3, 1992, 14)

Conclusions. In spite of the latter passages, some of the facts contained in this chapter reveal that the LDPR's electoral successes can be, apart from Zhirionvskii's organizational and agitational capabilities, also traced back to some specific characteristics of the party leadership. This concerns above all the youthfulness of many LDP Duma candidates as well as the presence of well-known economics-professors, three psychologists, and numerous jurists in the party's State Duma faction. The *political* significance of the partly high professional and academic standard of the LDP faction - as distinct from their significance as constituting an additional electoral appeal and asset in parliamentary work - should, however, for the following reason not be overestimated.

It seems to be a fundamental problem of the development of the LDPR that there was - at least in the time period covered here - a sharp discrepancy between its claim to be a party with a particular ideology, and its second identity of being a distinctly pragmatic, populist, and ideologically flexible and hybrid *Führer* party. This meant that its public appeal was only partly related to many of its early official statements, and the values suggested in its name and first programmes.

This distinguishes the LDPR from , for example, the German National-Socialist Workers Party *NSDAP* of the inter-war period which, though being also a populist *Führer* party, proposed in its brutality a more or less coherent political agenda supported, moreover, by some pseudo-scientific theories and massive backing in academia. Though also often pragmatic, opportunistic, demagogic and only in an idiosyncratic sense a 'Socialist Workers' Party, Hitler's rhetoric and the Nazi's propaganda as a whole were, altogether, in line with the party's official documents. By contrast, there was - at least from 1990 to 1993 - a great degree of strain between, especially, Zhirinovskii's verbosity at public meetings and party conferences, on the one side, and the original programmes and articles, on the other side (Part II). These contradictions, in turn, left, especially in the early stages of the party's development, Zhirinovskii himself as *the* dominant factor in the formation of the LDP's profile, which was obviously enough for considerable successes in the highly personalized Russian elections between 1991 and 1995.

Yet it is difficult to discern what it was that made people join the LDPR, or to appear on its all-federal or regional lists for the 1993 elections. With regard to the LDP's less educated followers, one explanation would be that many of them had been captivated by Zhirinovskii's charisma, populism, and oratorical skills, and did not realize the - as shall be detailed in Part II - enormous ideological muddle presented to them. On the other hand, it would emerge that the more literate in the party leadership and parliamentary faction were mainly attracted by the opportunity to fill a political office. Their motivation could be seen as being a 'non-idealistic' one, and the LDP's primary appeal for them a non-ideological. Of course, some of the academics and professionals, such as the above mentioned jurists, were perhaps specifically attracted to Zhirinovskii's law-and-order rhetoric. Yet, this particular aspect of political discourse is, in the partially anarchic contemporary Russian social conditions, not as closely and obviously linked to a particular ideology as it would be under more stable circumstances. The probable connections of Zhirinovskii to the criminal world (sec. 2.3.), moreover, would seem to discredit greatly this emphasis in his rhetoric. Thus one wonders what these apparently highly educated people thought about the principal contradictions and frequent absurdities in their leader's statements. The obvious choice for a politically sensitive and genuinely committed Russian nationalist with higher (and even more so with post-graduate) education would seem to have been an association with the relatively

more coherent programmes of the conventional extreme Right, authentic political Centre, or with the (also ideologically confusing though) communists, and not with Zhirinovskii's eccentric (il)liberal (anti-)democratism and unstable behaviour.¹³²

A possible inference from this would be that it is important to have a close look at the LDP between 1990 and 1993 as an electoral campaigning machine. In this regard, certain characteristics of the party did matter. This includes membership numbers, newspaper circulation, and the presence of psychologists and businessmen in the LDPR State Duma faction. Yet, these aspects seem to be the limits within which the party as such significantly counted at the period under investigation here.¹³³ The really important thing about the LDP at this time was its leader, and the peculiar ideas and images he presented to the Russian and international public.

¹³² A poll at the Fourth LDPR Congress in April 1993 asked the delegates why they had become LDPR members, and provided several answers to choose from. 60% approved with the statement that they had been 'attracted by the personality of the leader', and an equal percentage confirmed that they entered the LDPR because they feel 'close to the programmatic provisions of the party'. 50% agreed that 'only the LDPR is capable of lead the country out of the crisis', and every tenth confirmed the motive that they wanted to 'take part in political activities as such' (NG, 18 December 1993). However, the educational background of the LDPR Congress and of the December 1993 all-federal list differed greatly, perhaps, not the least because many of the State Duma candidates were not LDPR members. This seems to have contributed to the fact that the educational standard and share of academics of those on the list - especially those on the first positions - was significantly higher than the respective percentages of the Congress delegates among whom only somewhat over one-third were with higher or unfinished higher education and ca. 10% were scholars. Zhirinovskii later complained that in 1991 when the first long programme of the party was published 'we [the "liberal democrats"] had not a enough of our own experienced theoreticians.' (1996a, 51)

¹³³ The conclusions of a Russian researcher of the emergence of regional and local LDPR organizations in the Urals in 1994-95 seem to be in accordance with my hypothesis:

It is exactly the success of the LDPR in the 1993 elections and the activity of V.V. Zhirinovskii which keep up the existence of the local organizations. A reverse effect [however] is absent. [...] The local organizations can be effective only at the time of all-federal elections [when they are used] for a deepening of the all-federal propaganda campaign of the Liberal-Democratic Party at the regional level. (Neganov 1995, 51-52).

An LDP insider who worked as a party functionary and election campaigner for Zhirinovskii for more than four years, moreover, asserts that there are serious plans of Zhirinovskii to ban also his own party after he has become the President of Russia (Ivanov 1996, 286).

PART II: Interpreting the Programme

4. Two Faces of Vladimir Zhirinovskii

A number of distinctly momentary psychological factors connected with Zhirinovskii's remarkable electoral campaign and its specific political context determined to a large degree his success in December 1993 (Davidheiser 1994; Skillen 1995; Zupko 1995, 80). In addition, the above considerations concerning possible non-ideological motivations to back Zhirinovskii remain relevant. On the other hand, his electoral appeal, and especially his ability to attract *active* support from many ordinary Russians as well as sponsorship from power-holders in the Russian private and state sectors can also be traced back to some more or less constantly recurring (if rather inconsistently presented) themes of what he stands for and against.

I shall concentrate here on two basic traits which could be discerned in Zhirinovskii's political profile until 1993 - the LDPR leader's steady insistence that he is a 'centrist', and his imperialist rhetoric which, as time went on, became more and more radical. Some other distinctive characteristics of Zhirinovskii as an election campaigner, in contrast, will be ignored or only dealt with in the context of his 'centrism' and imperialism here, e.g. his populism and demagogic stature, his peculiar style of giving speeches and interviews, his never-ending insistence that he is a 'true statesman', or his frequent sexist pronouncements.¹³⁴ These and other faces appeared as being specific devices for gaining attention from the media, and for pleasing, arousing or playing with the Russian and Western public, and, therefore, less relevant for locating Zhirinovskii on the political spectrum (for psychological analyses of him, they would appear to be highly relevant though). The listed ignored traits, it should be emphasized, nevertheless, constituted a principal component of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' as a whole.

¹³⁴ Examples for Zhirinovskii's sexism may be found in: L, no. 2-3, 1990, 3; L, no. 8-9, 1992, 3; L, no. 2 (12), 1993, 6-8; and L, no. 3 (13), 1993, 5.

In addition, it was, as mentioned in the Preface, my primary intent to find out not so much what made up Zhirinovskii's success in relation to the various democratic and pro-reform centrist groups, but rather how he and his party appeared against the background of the numerous other right-wing extremist leaders and their organizations. Thus the focus will only be on those points in Zhirinovskii's programme which, in my reading, set him somewhat apart from (what I have termed) the conventional Right, and the Stalinist communists. This means that a number of essential themes of Zhirinovskii in one way or another common to the whole right wing (Hielscher 1994) will be either skipped, or remarked upon only in passing, or dealt with in the framework of other themes. This includes Zhirinovskii's militant anti-Americanism¹³⁵; his (largely classically russophile) interpretation of Russian history (1993b); his slowly but steadily growing statism, corporatism and protectionism which will be mentioned, yet not explicitly scrutinized (Kipp 1994a, 1994b); his Euro-fascism (*L*, no. 1 [11], 1993, 7-9); his often outrageous anti-Semitic statements (Spier 1994; Korey 1995, 221-225); his (partly somewhat disguised) racist concepts (with reference to Africans, 'Southerners', Caucasians); or his occasional references to traditional Russian nationalist thought and patriarchic legacy when he, for instance, declares his readiness 'to become a strong father' (as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 32).¹³⁶

4.1. The Centrist

The LDPR's peculiar 'centrism' had been a feature passed over in many press reports, and analyses. It constituted nevertheless one of the more important attributes of Zhirinovskii's early political life (Laqueur 1993, 257-258), and had, moreover, several dimensions. It shall be, therefore, dealt with here extensively.

¹³⁵ Oddly, there is also an imperialist dimension to Zhirinovskii's anti-Americanism: his demand for a return of Alaska (which once belonged to the Tsarist Empire) to Russia. His sister, Liubov' Andreevna Zhirinovskaia, even suggested that California should belong to Russia (Reznik 1995, 237).

¹³⁶ For attempts to outline and interpret Zhirinovskii's and his party's ideology comprehensively, see Kipp 1994a, Lancelle and Frazer 1994, and Ignatow 1994a and 1994b.

The Liberal Democrat

Nowadays it may seem strange that most of Zhirinovskii's earlier statements in 1990 could at one time be actually classified as being indeed genuinely liberal:

[The Russian people] are tired of communism, of its empty phraseology, but they are also afraid of reactionary extremism and of xenophobia. After having experienced the right-wing dictatorship of Tsarism and the left-wing dictatorship of communism, I think, our future can be only centrist, as the international centrist liberalism is. (as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 43)

Even official LDPSU documents, as for instance the first short programme adopted by the party on its founding congress in March 1990, included phrases like:

[...] rule of law; [f]ull freedom for entrepreneurship [...]; [m]inistries and departments carry out only a coordinative-informative role [...]; [...] personal immunity; [f]ull freedom of [religious] activity; [f]reedom of emigration and return; [...] de-ideologization [...]; [and] [t]he party stands ever against personality cult, leaderism, [and] idolatry, [*sic!*] [...]. (Programma... 1990)

The economic programme of the liberal democrats of this time was accordingly superscribed: '[We] propose to everyone to become capitalists.' (Zhirinovskii 1990, 136)

Until approximately summer 1990, the LDP could, hence, have been seen as, in Western terms, a centrist party, inasmuch as the liberal democrats of many West European countries occupy the political centre between conservatives and social democrats. One could even argue that in a strange sense the early LDP may have also taken the centre position in the specific conditions of the late Soviet period. That is because it stood also between, albeit very different, conservatives on the one side (i.e. the communists), and social democrats on the other, to the extent that most of *DemRossiia*'s constituent parts began as - in West European terms - moderately leftish democratic groups. (Only

later did several of the democratic groups metamorphose from rather social-democratic into more liberal-democratic parties.)

In early 1991, for instance, the LDPSU leader still spoke about various paths of the further development of the Soviet Union. For example, he spoke of 'the Gorbachëv variant', which 'is, as one can see today, slipping', and the East European way proposed by *DemRossiia*, which is, however, 'feasible only in a small republic with a compact population'. Zhirinovskii proposed as his alternative '[...] to turn boldly to the European model of society: a free economy, human rights in the first place, [and] a civil society.' (as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 9) Oddly, this kind of rhetoric was at this time more radically liberal than the statements of many of the authentic democratic groupings.

The Moderate

In contradiction to the apparently strongly anti-communist implications of these pronouncements it was, notwithstanding, rather a self-made public image of 'moderation' that dominated the beginning of the party's public activities and its association with the Centrist Bloc since summer 1990. This meant that the Bloc and Zhirinovskii tried to distinguish themselves in Moscow's political scene by proposing a way out of the stalemate between the reactionary authorities and the radical democrats. The LDP's first programme of 1990 was superscribed: 'Neither with the Leftists nor with the Rightists.' (as quoted in Luchterhandt 1994, 122) An affirmative article elaborated on the party's credo at this time in the following way:

In the spectrum of the new political parties the LDP occupies a special place: it does not regard itself as anti-communist. [...] In the field of ideology the LDP [...] condemns right and 'left' radicalism, [...] and calls itself 'the party of good sense'. [...] From this position the LDP does not accept the tactics of civil disobedience of such an extremist party as the 'Democratic Union' [DS], or the demands for political strike of some 'left-wing' radicals. The ideologists of the LDP think that to its right are the Democratic Party [DPR], the Democratic Union, the national patriots, and the national democrats. To its left they [the 'liberal democrats'] see the

CPSU with all its platforms, the socialists and the social democrats. The LDP forms blocs with such, in its regard, moderate-centrist parties as the constitutional democrats, the christian democrats, 'the greens' and others.¹³⁷ (Fedorov 1991, 4)

On the eve of the presidential elections of June 1991, Zhirinovskii's views seemed to have also 'moderated' in that he qualified his previous radical economic liberalism. He, to be sure, still proposed in his electoral programme '[t]o remove all limitations from all forms of economic activity [...]', '[t]o guarantee the security of foreign investment', and '[t]o undertake a gradual elimination of universal military service [...]' (as quoted in Kartsev 1995, 82) However, he now conceded in public speeches that the implantation of 'healthy elements of the Western economy' into Russia should take into account '[...] our specifics. There should be a synthesis, a convergence, [and] a merging of the systems.' (*Cheliabinskii rabochii*, 7 June 1991; as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 31)

A last dimension of the LDP's 'moderation' was its self-styled image of being 'the party of the law', which stands not just between, but above all petty ideological clashes. In one of his first interviews as LDPSU Chairman, Zhirinovskii declared:

If one took the palette of colours, our colour [would be] - white: we are neutral in everything. [...] [W]e are against all '-isms' and ideologies - including the Marxist-Leninist one - as a basis for politics. (MN, 29 April 1990, 7)

The II'in-Admirer

In connection with Zhirinovskii's self-styled image of an anti-ideological down-to-earth pragmatist, it should be mentioned that this kind of approach to politics seems to have been, at least partly, inspired by the political thought of the eminent Russian right-wing emigree thinker Ivan

¹³⁷ That was of course not the case in reality. Coalitions between the LDP and moderate political organizations (apart from the pseudo-parties assembled in the Centrist Bloc) never materialized. Instead, the 'liberal democrats' associated themselves with several openly ultra-nationalist personalities. See sec.

Aleksandrovich Il'in (1883-1954) whom Zhirinovskii frequently mentioned as a major source of his ideas, and whose tomb in Zurich he reportedly visited (e.g. L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 9; Berezovskii and Cherviakov 1993, 28; DT, 23 December 1993; Hirscher and Lange 1994, 27; Maximow and Odesskij 1994, 113; PZh, no. 7 [30], 1994, 2, and no. 17 [64], 1995, 3).¹³⁸ The reprinted writings (e.g. 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996) of this productive scholar of law and politics, who is largely unknown outside Russia, have played a significant role in post-Soviet Russian political and intellectual debates, and were even by some democratic forces seen as a credible point of reference (e.g. NG, 30 December 1994; Laqueur 1993, 85, 282).¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Yet, at least two traits of Zhirinovskii's agenda, it should be noted, depart from Il'in's. First, whereas Zhirinovskii believes in a future special relationship between an anti-American Russia and Germany (Schirinowskij 1994), Il'in described Germany as the major national enemy of Russia (1992, 1st vol., 19-20). Second, Zhirinovskii's 'centrist' image included a demonstrative rejection of the idea of a 'persecution' of Communists (e.g. cf. Pyadyshev 1991, 109) whereas Il'in explicitly proposed to deprive communists temporary of some of their civil and political rights in a post-communist Russia.

¹³⁹ For unknown reasons, Solovyov and Klepikova use in their book on Zhirinovskii (1995, IX) Il'in's definition of fascism as a point of departure for their discussion of the threat of Russian fascism - a rather peculiar approach by which, however, they resemble many other Russian publicists. Il'in's line of reasoning is somewhat reminiscent the interpretation of fascism proposed by the disputed German historian-philosopher Ernst Nolte (1963, 1968, 1987, 1993). Il'in, like Nolte, portrays fascism as being primarily a reaction to Bolshevism. Because of its onslaught on leftist forces, fascism was, according to Il'in, partly 'inevitable', 'right', and 'healthy' (1992, 1st vol., 75-77). Yet, communism played only a secondary role in the enemy image of Adolf Hitler whose primary concern were the semitic race and a its conspiracy against Germany. Christianity, Judaism and Bolshevism were, in Hitler's view, all similar in that they were of Jewish origin (Waite 1993, 85-87, 117). At the same time, Stalin was, characteristically, admired by the *Führer* (Waite 1993, 76, 117). Benito Mussolini, himself a socialist renegade, identified Stalin's 'Bolshevism' as 'crypto-fascism' (as quoted in Gregor 1974, 17). An interpretation of fascism saying that its advent and success have to be traced back primarily to the rise of Bolshevism creates not only major problems in modern German and Italian historiography. It would also have peculiar implications for the interpretation of modern Russian history in relation to 20th century world history. Lenin and the original Bolsheviks would thus appear as being responsible not only for the emergence of Stalinism, but also for fascism.

What is even more disturbing is that some of Il'in's articles display a number of images which are themselves reminiscent of proto-fascist thought. In his essay 'On Russian Nationalism', Il'in writes that post-communist Russian nationalism will (after having gone under Soviet rule through the '*living school of a spiritual purification*') be of a 'new' kind (1992, 1st vol., 279, emphasis in original). In 'On the Main Question' (*O glavnom*) he concludes:

Russia needs a *new Russian man*: having been tried by the fires of seduction and trial, purified from weaknesses, aberrations and deformations of the past, and forming himself *in a new way*,

Characteristically, the two Russian scholars, who have studied (both from an affirmative point of view) Il'in's thought in depth thus far, are apparently in disagreement on what Il'in's major political objective was. Whereas Poltoratskii seems to see Il'in as an anti-Western monarchist whose anti-democratism he presents as being of a moderate kind (1989), Gusev describes him as somebody who was in principle in favour of democracy (1992a, 74), but made considerable qualifications with regard to democracy's appropriateness for the specific conditions of a post-totalitarian Russia (1992a, 75; 1992b, 67). On the basis of a fundamental anti-communism, Il'in did, on the one side, not overtly reject the principles of checks and balances, self-government and rule of law. On the other side, he rejected Western-type liberal democracy.

Both, Poltoratskii and Gusev, introduce Il'in as a sober analytic (which he clearly was not) who advocated an impartial choice of the political forms Russia would need after Bolshevism's fall (Poltoratskii 1989, 204; Gusev 1992b, 66). Yet, Il'in made some explicit provisions of what he saw as preferable for a post-communist Russia. Especially, he proposed a completely new political order which had existed nowhere before and which he called 'a purely Russian *people's monarchy*' (Il'in 1992, 1st vol., 75, emphasis in original). Whereas the meaning of this concept seems to have remained - as exemplified by the two different interpretations - elusive in his writings, Il'in has unequivocally advocated a dictatorship by personal rule for, at least, a transitional period after the demise of communism in Russia (1992, 2nd vol., 10-11). He repeatedly emphasised that his envisaged political

from a new spirit, for new great aims... This is the essential issue. Doing this we are building a new Russia. [...] The former Russia will not be [restored]. There will be a new Russia. Russia - as before; not the former collapsed one; but a new, renewed one for which dangers will not be dangerous and catastrophes will not be threatening. And for her [Russia] we have to prepare ourselves; and we have to prepare her - to nurture in ourselves, in all of us a new Russian spirit, Russian as before, but not the former Russian [spirit] (i.e. the sick, unrooted, weak, scattered). And that is the main [task].' (1992, 1st vol., 131, emphasis in original).

In view of such (and some other similar) pronouncements, the usage of Il'in's definition of fascism for analyses of Russian politics looks a bit like 'setting the fox to keep the geese'. On the nature of fascist ideology and the importance of a vision of a renewal and 'new man' to it, see Mosse 1979, and Griffin 1993a and 1995a.

order of post-communist Russia, its people, and its 'spirit' would have a distinctively novel - i.e. neither a pre-revolutionary Russian, nor a Western - character (1992, 1st vol., 75, 131-133, 283).¹⁴⁰

Il'in's thought appears as 'centrist' in that he portrays himself as ideologically adaptable, and as standing above parochial doctrinal fights about the merits of republicanism, democracy and monarchism, and their appropriateness for Russia (e.g. Il'in 1992, 2nd vol., 267). His ideas can also be seen as being peculiarly 'centrist' in that he seems to be in favour of a renewed and not a restored Russia which would, notwithstanding, distance herself explicitly from Western democratic models.¹⁴¹ Finally, he appears as standing apart from both the neo-Slavophiles and Westernizers in that he openly proposes a transitional one-man-dictatorship for post-communist Russia. As has been already indicated and will become clearer below, all of these features also played prominent roles in Zhirinovskii's showmanship between 1990 and 1993.

The Provisional Autocrat

As will be recalled, the Centrist Bloc changed its line in autumn 1990 for a second time, and started to propagate the introduction of a state of emergency, to demand the banning of all parties (including the CPSU) and to propose itself as the Committee of National Salvation (sec. 1.3.). At this

¹⁴⁰ On Il'in's thought, see also Laqueur 1993, 85, 282. Il'in's importance for Zhirinovskii's thought has been overlooked by many commentators. Notable exceptions are Hirscher and Lange (1994, 27).

¹⁴¹ Il'in's has continuously emphasised the historical novelty and international originality of his envisaged post-communist Russian political order, society and man. In view of this, the classifications of his thought by both Poltoratskii and Gusev appear as misleading. Although Il'in frequently uses 'monarchy' to describe his visions, it is obvious that, in fact, he is not a proponent of 'monarchism', if this label is meant to have any purpose as a generic concept (Poltoratskii 1989). This problem is reminiscent of the phenomenon of the so called 'Conservative Revolution' in inter-war Germany the proponents of which were, of course, by no means conservatives, but essentially anti-conservative. They instead represented a brand of non-Nazi German fascism which, though unintendedly, helped to pave the way for Hitler (Griffin 1993a, 91, 92, 168-169; 1995a, 96, 105-108).

By the same token, Gusev's talk about 'conservatism' with regard to Il'in's ideas and 'political science' is inappropriate. Il'in makes clear that he wants neither to preserve the Soviet Union, nor to return to pre-revolutionary Tsarism (1992a, 1992b). What he actually proposes is a new social and ethical revolution (although he does not use this term) the immediate aim of which would be the establishment of a dictatorship by personal rule as a transitional stage towards the development of a non-mechanical 'healthy creative democracy', whatever he may mean by this (Il'in 1992, 2nd vol., 10).

time parts of the genuinely democratic Russian public also discussed the possibility of a temporary 'enlightened' but absolute rule as, they argued, Russia was not ready for a political liberalization. The idea was basically that a strong state with a 'benevolent' pro-western ruler would not only 'stabilize' the political situation, but also quickly bring about capitalism, and create thus the social forces necessary for a functioning democracy (Teague 1990; Novikov 1992; Kliamkin 1993; Sautman 1995).

After the initial discussion of this variant by eminent social scientists like Igor' Kliamkin and Andranik Migranian, Alksnis and Zhirinovskii were among the first prominent non-communist politicians who, in late 1990, spoke loudly about a model which would save the Union and be based on allegedly applicable foreign experiences of building up effective market economies under protectionist right-wing dictatorships (Schneider 1991; Berezovskii *et al.* 1993, 18; Berezovskii 1994, 100).¹⁴² Alksnis, for instance, pronounced in February 1991 once more:

Today I'm contemplating the creation of a truly public salvation committee, one not designed to save socialism, like the Russian Communist Party's leader Ivan Polozkov wants. The committee I'm thinking of should save the Union as a state. If we don't stop the perilous degradation we will be plunged into civil war. A nationwide salvation committee is the way to do it [...]. But neither Gorbachëv nor El'tsin should be members. (as quoted in McFaul and Markov 1993, 14)

After Alksnis' and Zhirinovskii's original promotion of this scheme in late 1990, Zhirinovskii continued to make comparable statements. However, his justifications of the blueprint varied considerably. To one side of the scale of his pronouncements, Zhirinovskii, for instance, specified that, in principle, he prefers a parliamentary republic. However, as far as he does not think 'abstractly'

¹⁴² One should emphasize though once more that, in spite of the surface resemblance of their basic ideas, the underlying critical motivations of Migranian and Kliamkin were, of course, fundamentally different from those of Alksnis and Zhirinovskii. The social scientists were discussing how to manage successfully the transition from a very strong authoritarianism (or 'totalitarianism') to democracy. The right-wing politicians, in contrast, were concerned about how to adapt the empire to the new conditions in order that it would not fall apart.

about politics in Russia, he is in favour of a presidential republic (Ignatow 1994a, 2; Appendix II). The other extreme on the scale include the assertion that democracy is only possible in a small, rich and culturally developed states. 'In Russia, therefore, a strong authoritarian regime is necessary.' (as quoted in Ignatow 1994b, 5) At one point Zhirinovskii announced frankly: 'I say it quite plainly: when I come to power, there will be a dictatorship.' (AP, 18 March 1994) One of Zhirinovskii's clearest and most fundamental rejections of democracy for Russia was pronounced in a summer 1992 interview with the German neo-fascist publicist Wolfgang Strauß:

In a multi-ethnic state, as Russia [is], the parliamentary form of government is an utopia which is, moreover, dangerous for the lives of the nations [*narodov*]. The democratic inclination towards decay [*demokraticheskoe upadnichestvo*] opened the door to an overstrain [of society] with aliens. The establishment of a party democracy would be the end of my homeland. Russia can be saved only with an authoritarian regime. (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 8)

Most of Zhirinovskii's authoritarian statements were, however, in between a wholesale approval of democracy, and an unqualified call for a dictatorship, and repeated the more cautious line of a provisional authoritarianism which had emerged in late 1990. In an annotated interview published by the major LDP newspaper *Liberal* in spring 1992, Zhirinovskii was quoted as saying: 'I am in favour of an authoritarian regime.' (L, no. 4-5, 1992, 15) Yet, he then explicitly softens his anti-democratism.

I underline above all that this refers to a *temporary* authoritarian regime [*vlast'*] [a]nd to a transition toward it in a parliamentary way. [...] What type of an authoritarian regime do I mean? We don't need a dictator or repressions, but trust and understanding. (*Ibid.*; emphasis added)

In an attachment to this interview by the *Liberal* editorial-board, a distinction is further made between Lenin's concept of a dictatorship, i.e. 'power which is limited by nothing, by no laws, by absolutely no rules, [and] which is based immediately on force', on the one side, and an authoritarian regime, on the other. According to this definition, the latter is the opposite of dictatorial power because an authoritarian regime 'is completely based on the rule of law [*zakonnost'*] [and] demands the unconditional [*neukasnitel'noe*] compliance with laws passed.' (15)

In a 1992 report for the Moscow LDP organization, Zhirinovskii writes:

[W]e make the diagnosis that the country is ill [and] in a difficult state. Therefore we have to introduce a regime of personal power as was the case with de Gaulle in France. That wasn't a fascist dictatorship, was it? Roosevelt, Bismark in Germany and at the extreme even Pinochet in Chile - that is a regime of personal power under which the economy recovers, the people are soothed [and] order is restored. (L, no. 8-9, 1992, 8)

The peculiarly 'centrist' character of these statements was that Zhirinovskii and the other would-be 'provisional autocrats' were propagating a plan which, especially in 1990-91, would have supposedly represented a 'golden mean' between, on the one side, the gloomy prospects of further social stagnation under the *ancien regime*, and, on the other side, the threat of chaos should the old order collapse without having begat a new one.

The El'tsinite Democrat

After the open (if supposedly transitional) authoritarianism of winter 1990-1991, and the short-term ban of the LDP following its explicit approval of the *GKChP* in August 1991, the general thrust of the LDPR's official pronouncements was changing again after 1991. Although Zhirinovskii's continued to advocate occasionally a temporary dictatorship, the LDP documents did not switch from radical liberalism to manifest authoritarianism. Rather they became a mixture of, on the one side, a number of recurring liberal-democratic slogans, like 'rule of law' and 'multi-party system', and, on the

other side, certain phrases implying an unbalanced division of powers between the parliament and the president.

Zhirinovskii's proposal for a new constitution that was endorsed by the LDPR's Highest Council in April 1993 could, at a first glance, appear as in many ways corresponding to the Russian constitution adopted in December 1993 (NG, 8 December 1993; CDPSP, vol. XLV, no. 49, 1993, 5-6; Ignatow 1994a, 2). Russia is, for example, defined by Zhirinovskii and the LDPR as a presidential republic, with guaranteed human rights, the rule of law, and a two-chamber parliament called the State Assembly, which is in several respects similar to the existing Federal Assembly (*Proekt...* 1993, §§ 1, 3, 14, 15, 23, 24). In addition, Zhirinovskii's proposal makes - as the present legal Russian constitution does - the president the centrepiece of the overall power-structure.

However, whereas the extensive powers of the acting head of state are presently checked and balanced by a number of clearly defined prerogatives and responsibilities of the legislature, constitutional court, regions and public, Zhirinovskii's 'president' would be in a nearly invulnerable position.

First, this 'president' would be the *de facto* unrestricted chief of the executive power branch of the whole country. One should, in this connection, recall that El'tsin's constitution, which has been legal since December 1993, describes the president as the head of state, who appoints the prime minister in consent with the State Duma, and the ministers proposed by this prime minister (*Konstitutsiia...* 1993, §§ 80 & 82). In contrast, Zhirinovskii's constitution makes the president himself the head of government (*Proekt...* 1993, § 7). Another official LDPR document, in contrast, states that the president appoints a prime minister, but without having to consult the parliament (*Obrashchenie...* 1993, 5). According to one proposal for a new LDP programme, which was not, however, adopted, the president would hold all the executive power, and appoint the prime minister who would form the government which, in turn, would have to be approved by the president. In addition, this text states that the president has the right to dissolve the parliament, to schedule new elections, and to veto laws (L, no. 3 [13], 1993, 5). At another point, Zhirinovskii made clear once more: 'the president himself

forms the government without consulting the Duma' (I, 30 November 1993; *Kto est' chto...* 1994, 155).

According to the official 1993 LDPR constitutional draft, Zhirinovskii's president also nominates the *gubernatory*, the governors of the *gubernii* (provinces), meaning the heads of all regional administrations of a proposed unitary state (*Proekt...* 1993, § 7). The *gubernatory*, in turn, appoint in their *gubernii* the *gradonachal'niki*, the governors of towns (§ 20). In another document, Zhirinovskii mentions *starosty* (village elders) as the executive's rural equivalent of the governors of towns (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 3).

In conclusion, the latter regulations would mean a durable fixing and considerable extension of the tight hierarchical structure, which had been introduced by El'tsin in 1991 in order to push through the reforms on the regional and local level.¹⁴³ The new Russian constitution adopted in December 1993 does not declare anything specifically on the president's right to interfere with regional or local affairs. It says only that the president appoints his plenipotentiaries in the regions, and that the federal and regional organs of the executive form a united system of executive power (*Konstitutsiia...* 1993, §§ 77 & 83). This somewhat unclear situation has now been redressed. From late 1995 until spring 1997, nearly all appointed heads of regional administration were replaced by elected governors. Similarly, the previously appointed heads of the municipal and local executive organs have been in the process of replacement by elected mayors and administrators since 1995.¹⁴⁴

Second, the rights of the elected legislative organs are either openly restricted, or conspicuously vaguely defined in Zhirinovskii's proposed constitution. Concerning ordinary laws, Zhirinovskii's 'president' would be able to block these laws in a way similar to that of El'tsin today.

¹⁴³ In saying this, one has to remark that Moscow, St. Petersburg and the national republics - which means a large part of Russia - were, from an early point (i.e. since 1991), exceptions, and allowed to elect their own heads of the executive branches of power.

¹⁴⁴ Even if one regarded El'tsin's temporary system as authoritarian, a principal difference to the LDPR proposal would remain. The range of powers of Zhirinovskii's 'president' is considerably wider than that of El'tsin during even the most 'autocratic' periods of his reign in that the president under an LDPR constitution would also nominate the rulers of those subjects of the Russian federation which have had for a long time (i.e. since 1991) the right to elect or appoint their own heads of administration. This concerns the mayors of the two capitals (Moscow and St. Petersburg) and the presidents of the national republics, and their subordinates at the city district or local levels.

However, if the 'president' of the LDPR constitution rejected a law which had been promulgated by the parliament, or the State Assembly did not agree to a 'presidential' proposal, this would lead to either an undefined referendum to solve the conflict, or 'the proposed bill is removed from discussion' (§ 9). (The now existing lower house of the parliament, the State Duma, it should be noted, has, in contrast, the right to overrule the president by a two-thirds majority.) Having been unable to adopt an ordinary law, the next step of Zhirinovskii's State Assembly could then be to pass a constitutional law with a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Yet such a law would also have to be 'supported' by the 'president'. Alternatively, it might be adopted on a referendum by a majority of those who have the right to vote (*Ibid.*).

Third, to impeach the 'president', a four-fifths majority of the deputies in both chambers - and not two-thirds of them as in El'tsin's constitution - or, again, a not further specified referendum would be needed (§ 17).

Fourth, regulations promulgated by regional or local elected assemblies would, according to Zhirinovskii's constitution, only be enacted with the approval of the *gubernator* or the *gradonachal'nik*, meaning the appointees of the 'president' (§ 20).

Last but not least, it should be mentioned that in order to become the 'president' of Russia it would be, according to the LDPR manifesto, enough to get a plurality and not a majority of the votes in respective elections (§ 13).

To sum this agenda up: Zhirinovskii did not - as he often claimed - merely propose a shift from the existing semi-presidential and federal regime to a purely presidential and unitary, but still basically democratic, administrative and political system. Instead, Zhirinovskii's apparent understanding of 'democracy' would, as emerges from the separate articles of the constitutional proposal, imply the probability of a degeneration of genuine presidentialism to quasi-presidential rule - a regime which would be only *de jure*, but not *de facto* presidential, and thus essentially authoritarian. If one scrutinized the aggregate of his proposed amendments, one might, moreover, come to the conclusion that the project should be classified as pseudo- rather than proper presidentialism. In other words,

Zhirinovskii's 'presidentialist' reforms would, if carried out concurrently, result in the establishment of a dictatorship by personal rule and not of a presidentialist democracy (Riggs 1994, 78-79).

In conclusion, one could interpret Zhirinovskii's often contradictory program as a remarkable propagandistic stratagem. In contrast to some conventional rightists or the communists, Zhirinovskii apparently wanted to make his electorate believe that he was in principle in favour of a Western-inspired political modernization. What he pretended to do was merely to adapt this concept to Russia by inserting some supposedly necessary practical and specifically 'Russian' modifications (SR, 2 October 1991). At one point, for instance, he stated that the ideas of the post-Soviet reforms were good in principle, but executed by incompetent people (Ignatow 1994b, 5).

Other actions of Zhirinovskii were in accordance with this image. He did not only abstain from participation in the quarrels between the president and the so called 'irreconcilable opposition' in the former Supreme Soviet. He even occasionally made explicitly sympathetic statements towards El'tsin, although his activities in general were in agreement with those of the conventional Right. Further on, he distinguished himself by participating in the Constitutional Assembly organized by the democrats in summer 1993, and also by his endorsement of a quick adoption of El'tsin's final constitutional draft proposed after the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet 21 September 1993 (PI, no. 48 [69], 1993, 9). It has even been argued that without the LDPR's backing the constitution would not have passed during the recent referendum (Schmidt-Häuer 1993) which seems to be, however, an exaggeration (Sakwa 1995, 216).

All in all one can therefore, infer that this approach of Zhirinovskii, though looking perhaps bizarre to Western observers, represented in post-Soviet Russian conditions a further distinctive form of 'centrism'. The LDPR leader rejected neither the idea of a radical political modernization, nor the necessity of referring to Russia's heritage of an authoritarian and personalized rule. In so far as this mix distinguished him from, on the one side, the progressiveness of the democrats, and, on the other side, the various traits of conservatism, reaction and open fascism of the Right and conventional Centre, one could have seen Zhirinovskii's 1991-93 political programme as, in Russian conditions, a peculiar kind of 'third way'.

The Third Force

Consistent with the above suggestion was Zhirinovskii's insistence that he is neither a member of the old elites, nor a representative of the new political establishment, and thus in no respect, responsible for any of the hardships the Russians have experienced so far (SR, 2 October 1991). After the foundation of his party he declared: 'We [the liberal democrats] want to be a light, [and] a free party, we do not have any weight from the past.' (MN, 29 April 1990, 7) During his presidential election campaign Zhirinovskii announced: 'I have never held power, I am not to blame for the breakdown Russia is going through today.' (as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 11)

Commenting on the Movement 'For Democratic Reforms', an organization founded by some prominent former reformist members of the Soviet establishment, Zhirinovskii made this point again:

This is the only thing they can do - regrouping..., and they all were in the CPSU. And now they throw away the party tickets. How much can one betray! They have invented the 'Movement for Democratic Reforms'. Who prevented them from conducting them [the reforms] when they occupied leading posts in the CPSU? (as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 23)

In autumn 1991, Zhirinovskii summed up his contempt for the then ruling reformers:

[The democrats] will say: 'That is what we wanted. Now the country is free. [It is] hungry, but free! We have lost half of the country, [and] half of the population! [We have] lost power, [and] might! But in return we sit in the Kremlin'. Yet they are in the Kremlin [indeed]. That is what constitutes victory: they have got the posts. [Their] salary [is] five times higher. Staff, cars, summerhouses, flats - all, everything possible they seized from the communists [...]. And [they] are still capturing. (as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 76)

On the other side, Zhirinovskii was careful to distinguish himself explicitly from the conventional centre:

These are communists, rot, liars. They pretend to be centrists. The problem is that they are not centrists. Rutskoi [NPSR], Sterligov [RNS, in fact a fascist party - A.U.], Travkin [DPR] - all are former communists. This is disgusting. (from a personal conversation at the LDPR headquarters in Moscow, August 1993)

To solve Russia's many current problems, instead, 'a fresh man in the Kremlin' (as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 61), and a 'new political force' was needed (Programma... 1992, 93).

Thus Zhirinovskii's third force image meant not only that he was not burdened with the responsibility for past decisions. He also pretended to be a 'new' type of politician whose non-standard background somehow correlated with the new challenges Russia was facing then.

The Anti-Conservative

Until late 1993 Zhirinovskii had, apart from occasional invectives (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 110), largely refrained from massive attacks on the conventional Right or the neo-communists. Notwithstanding, there are various grounds to assume that he was not only different from other right-wingers, but also, on particular issues, in - partly open - opposition to them.

Although he occasionally announced that '[o]ne has to be a conservative [...]' (91)¹⁴⁵, the name of his party and its alleged plan to become part of the Liberal International were a clear challenge to traditional Russian nationalist thought. In addition to the anti-conservative points already listed (e.g. adoption of the European model, Western style rule of law etc.), Zhirinovskii has made a number of further characteristic statements in this vein in his major writing *The Last Dash to the South* (1993a).

First of all, Zhirinovskii was distinct in that he voiced a somewhat realistic view on the context of the fall of the Tsarist regime:

¹⁴⁵ From this point, again, numbers in brackets refer to Zhirinovskii 1993a.

[T]oday we are already willing to consider that the monarchy was good for Russia. But then, in February 1917, all [Russians] perceived the abdication of the Tsar from the throne with joy. Because they felt that the regime was rotten, that the Tsar was no longer able to rule [...]. (89).¹⁴⁶

Although only few contemporary nationalists propose a full-scale restoration of Tsarism, this statement was rather atypical and sounded, probably, blasphemous to many conventional rightists.

Second, Zhirinovskii was in friction with Stalinist national Bolshevism, though in line with some moderate rightists, when he now and then explicitly denounced the 'Stalinist-Brezhnevite system' (129). Zhirinovskii also accused Stalin, who is by many right-wingers cherished because he made the Soviet Union a first class military power, that he, as a Georgian, had laid the foundation for the spread of corruption over Russia from the 'South' (69).

Third, Zhirinovskii notably did not only largely avoid the sophisticated culturological concepts for Russia's future which are heavily used by the conventional right-wingers as, for instance, *sobornost'* (catholicity) or *pochvennost'* (nativism) (sec. 3.3.). He was even in open conflict with at least some of them when he repeatedly vocalized a strange enthusiasm about pluralist societies, multi-party systems and political opposition. All issues of the LDP-organ *Liberal* published between 1990 and 1993 were superscribed with the catch-phrase 'Through a Pluralism of Views to the Rule of Law' (*Cherez pluralizm mnenii k verkhovenstvu zakona*). In *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii elaborated:

The main thing [is] - pluralism in everything. Pluralism in democracy, in solving the national question, in educating children - everywhere a plurality of viewpoints. (81-82)¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ For a similar sounding assertion, see L, no. 3 (13), 1993, 2.

¹⁴⁷ One could remark in passing that Zhirinovskii is, of course, not the only contemporary European right-wing extremist who uses the otherwise distinctively liberal-democratic political concept of pluralism in such an 'unorthodox' way. The notorious intellectual leader of the French *Nouvelle Droite* Alain de Benoist, for instance, keeps calling his peculiar vision of a racial homogenization of European countries through repatriation of immigrants to their home countries 'ethnopluralism'. On Benoist, see Griffin, 1993b; and Herzinger and Stein, 1995.

This not being enough, the LDPR-leader advertised the advantages of political engagement, and used his peculiar ability for graphic comparisons:

This is a good tendency - to be a follower of one of the parties. [Y]et all this happens in the framework of a multi-party system [...]. Like in sports - [there exist] many teams, but from his early years the youth is tied, for instance, to '*Spartak*' [a Moscow soccer team - A.U.]. He always supports his team, he likes it. [...] The political life [is] a part of our social life, there exist personal tastes, viewpoints, [and] customs of one's own too. And therefore we need pluralism. (85-86)

In connection with this statement, it might be useful to recall the fundamental pattern of the social thought of the Slavophiles who were in some respects the predecessors of the modern Russian Right. Early Slavophilism's peculiarly communitarian socio-political doctrine envisaged that the Russian people would be free not *in* politics but *from* politics. Zhirinovskii's vision of making whole families fans of various competing parties (85) was thus at odds with the conservative ideal of an 'organic' and unanimous society (Bajohr 1995).

Fourth, some of Zhirinovskii's statements on sexual matters were a bit unusual for a traditional Russian nationalist. He suggested, for instance, that it is not absolutely necessary to be faithful to one's wife (84).¹⁴⁸ He also proposed that polygamy might be a solution for such problems as prostitution, loneliness, and children growing up without fathers (85).

Fifth, Zhirinovskii was, in Russian nationalist terms, eccentric when he referred to Russia's past and future. He stated, for instance, that Europe has brought to Russia civilization (albeit, he admits, also a corrupting element) (90). It is characteristically difficult to find in his simultaneously autobiographic and programmatic book *The Last Dash to the South* the terms 'renaissance', 'resurrection' or 'rebirth' - concepts which play a cardinal role in the documents of the conventional right wing, and even in those of some democratic groups. Already the 1992 LDPR programme, for

¹⁴⁸ For more undisguised sexism by Zhirinovskii, see L, no. 2-3, November 1990.

instance, portrayed the party instead as a force 'able to regenerate the country on a *new* basis and create the conditions for *progress*.' (Programma... 1992, 94; emphases added). Even more explicitly, in *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii speaks about a 'new Russia', which should be 'secular' and in a 'new costume' (104, 111-113).

He was also in contradiction to parts of the hard-line conservatives in that he explicitly denied that such a new state should be built upon the privations, heroism and aloofness of its subjects:

If we all sacrifice ourselves, who will then live in our country? Happiness and joy are exactly what constitute the well-being of a country. (108)

Zhirinovskii certainly insulted at least some conventional rightists when he stated: 'How do I see Russia? I don't see Russia as [a] weeping Berdiavite [country].' (110) The writings of the religious and historical philosopher Nicholas Berdiaev (1874-1948) have been a main source of inspiration and reference to significant parts of the New Russian Right since its emergence as an organized political force (Dunlop 1976; Yanov 1978).

Sixth, Zhirinovskii was peculiar when he defined himself and his party in the context of Russian history. Among the historical figures he named as his examples were, for instance, two men who would be looked upon with suspicion in the conventional right-wing camp: Boris Chicherin (1828-1904), who was a leading activist of the Russian liberal movement in the late 19th century, and Count Sergei Witte (1849-1915), once a Tsarist finance and prime minister who encouraged foreign investment to promote Russia's economic growth (Kulikova 1992, 73, 88).¹⁴⁹ In those days, the Union of the Russian People ('Black Hundreds') had singled out Witte as a traitor for 'extorting' the democratic 1905 October Manifesto from Tsar Nikolai II, and for imposing upon the country a 'Judeo-Masonic Constitution' (Korey 1995, 2).

Seventh, Zhirinovskii implied in some places that Russians are 'ordinary Europeans', or that Russia should become a part of an all-European house (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 118; L, no. 2 [12], 1993,

¹⁴⁹ Subsequently, the LDPR even published a special brochure on the history of Russian liberalism (cf. Mikhailov, Kulikova and Kolkotin 1994).

5). Many sections of the conventional Right and Centre, to be sure, would concur with Zhirinovskii Germanophilia, and also display a general predilection for deeper Russian-European - as opposed to Russian-American - relations. Yet, Russia would in their world view still be explicitly conceptualized as a specifically anti-liberal, anti-individualistic, 'organic' etc. society which distinct from American *and* West European liberal democracies.

Last but not least, parts of Zhirinovskii's agenda can be seen as being in conflict with the moderate nationalists' and statist's advocacy of a *de facto* continuation of the oligarchical aspects of the late Soviet mode of government, and the creation of some sort of corporatist 'state democracy'. Though, by 1993, largely in agreement with the economic policies proposed by the them (see following sub-section), Zhirinovskii departed the moderate rightists rhetoric about the necessity of professional pragmatism, a readiness to seek compromises, or a return to an evolutionary approach after the apparent failure of 'shock therapy'. Instead of discussing various alternative long-term prospects of an overcoming of the crisis, Zhirinovskii made an emphasis on quick solutions, and concrete immediate actions regarding, for instance, radical methods to fight the 'mafia'. Not only did the overt demagoguery of these statements dissent from the non-fascist rightists' self-styled image of being realists. His open proposition of a highly personalized and unchecked form of 'presidential' government, and the inherent danger of voluntarism implied by this plan were not compatible with the old industrialists' goal of securing vested interests. It was also in friction with the views of those conventional rightists who referred in their writings to the concept of *sobornost'* (catholicity), and showed distrust for a completely unbalanced authoritarianism. Such circumspection had developed even among many explicitly anti-democratic conservatives as a result of the disastrous effects of Stalin's policies and Khrushchev's campaigns for Russian culture and traditions.

The Conventional Centrist

Zhirinovskii's programme of a largely unrestricted one-man rule dissented markedly from the corporatist-oligarchical mode of government proposed by the anti-Western sections of the conventional centre, and the non-radical wing of the conventional Right. Yet regarding economics,

Zhirinovskii was slowly drawing closer to the proposals of the moderately nationalist statist between 1990 and 1993.

As will be recalled, his earliest testimonies on economic freedom were among the most radical - one is tempted to say 'Gaidarist' - in the late Soviet 'informal' political scene. The long party programme written by Zagorodnikov in early 1991, for instance, still included demands like:

[T]ransfer of human resources from the state to the private sector [...]. [A] high, but not full employment. [...] A consequent monetarist course, a reliable financial activity, [and] international monetary help [...]. An immediate and full integration of the USSR in the international economy [...]. [M]assive direct foreign investment. [...] [F]ull membership in all international economic organizations (IMF, EBRD, GATT). State regulation is extended only to those branches which cannot manage without it - defense [...], legal proceedings, medical care, science, education, [...]. [L]iquidation of the unnecessary bureaucratic state control of production, [...] introduction of self-rule at the enterprises. [...] [L]iberation of the economic forces, [...] fight against corporatism. (*Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia...* 1991, 27-31)

A certain shift from these positions was already discernible a few months later during the May-June 1991 presidential election campaign when Zhirinovskii stated:

We need a healthy economy. We did not have socialism, [and] neither will there be capitalism. We should take the healthy elements of capitalism and inculcate them, taking into account our specific character. This should be a synthesis, a merging of systems. (as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 31)

This development continued in the LDPR's new 1992 programme. The document still mentioned themes like privatization, 'freedom of economic choice', the 'overcoming of the alienation of the individual from [private] property' and 'of the century-old egalitarian [*uravnil'naia*]

psychology', or 'healthy competition' (Programma... 1992, 94-95). However, this should now happen in the context of a 'regulated market-', 'welfare oriented' and 'mixed economy' in which 'permanent state support' for agriculture, and the 'right for work and right for housing' would be preserved (*Ibid.*).

When a collection of LDPR documents was published on the eve of the parliamentary elections in 1993, the party's economic programme had transformed into a *de facto* denial of its former statements. Compare the following pronouncements with the respective points of some LDP documents of 1990 (Programma... 1990; Zhirinovskii 1990), or the above quoted early 1991 party (Zagorodnikov-) programme:

[One should] strengthen the state sector [of the economy]. [...] The population should not suffer from unemployment, and from the fear of it. [...] The land remains in the first stage in the possession of the state. [...] [Q]uick development of Russia's economy without prompting and cabala-credits 'from without'. [...] Privatization should during the first stage only apply to small enterprises and the service sector. The privatized enterprises must not be sold to outsiders, but should become the property of the collective [of the respective enterprise]. [...] Every kind of speculative resale must be intersected. [...] [T]he production of the state enterprises will be sold for fixed prices. At the expense of tax revenues key directions of the economy will be financed purposefully [...]. Restoration of the system of state orders in key directions of the economy [...]. Stoppage of 'the begging for debts' from foreign countries, and, where possible, lay-off of the payments for former debts. (*Obrashchenie...* 1993, 2, 5-7)

Thus the LDPR had, by mid-1993, basically taken over and in some regards radicalized the conventional centrists' allegedly 'evolutionary' etatist approach to economic reform which was at this time represented by politicians like Nikolai Travkin (*DPR*) or Arkadii Vol'skii (*RSPP*). This went so far that Zhirinovskii at one point openly stated: '[Aleksandr] Rutskoi [then associated with the centrist camp - A.U.] speaks about the same [as me].' (I, 11 September 1993, 8)

One could argue that the here emerging vision of a self-sufficient state-regulated economy is actually a typically right-wing programme in contemporary Russian politics. However, it should be

noted that at this time, in contrast to the communists and conventional rightists, Zhirinovskii did not make any serious attempts to provide sufficiently comprehensive and sophisticated ideological underpinnings for his economic views. In rejecting *laissez faire* capitalism, instead, his argumentation was primarily 'pragmatic' and populist; and he, only to a limited extent, referred to the heritage, or the provisions, of the 'Russian Idea' whether in its national Bolshevik or Slavophile variant.

Conclusions. The above considerations have not been made to seriously argue that Zhirinovskii and his party can, in any meaningful political sense, be classified as truly centrist. To be sure, to a certain degree he seemed to have resembled the Russian 'conventional Centre' in that the LDP also, in some respect, represented new interests of old, Soviet-constructed identities until 1993. This was in contrast to the democrats who represented new interests of new identities, and the communists who tried to promote old interests of the old identities (McFaul 1993, 207). Even if one acknowledges some similarities concerning this particular aspect of the LDP agenda and that of the 'conventional centrists', a fundamental difference remains. The Civic Union, the coalition of the 'conventional centrists', temporarily functioned as a vanguard in a non-democratic situation, and took advantage of the unconsolidated democratic institutions. It claimed to act as an intermediary for 'industrialists', 'workers' collectives' and other social forces vis-à-vis the state without any formal accountability to them (McFaul 1993, 209). In distinction to the Civic Union, Zhirinovskii had no permanent channel to the establishment (although there have been speculations about back-door consultations between the Russian government and the LDP, for example, in connection with the 1993 constitutional assembly, parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum). In contrast to the 'conventional centre', his only chance of gaining political positions and influence were elections.

In spite of this fundamental difference, it might, in order to fully appreciate the LDP's peculiar position in the political spectrum and electoral appeal, be revealing to take Zhirinovskii's claim to represent a centrist political force for a moment at face value. As has been shown, his 1990-1993 programmatic statements could be interpreted as being 'centrist' in various dimensions. Later this

pattern changed in so far as Zhirinovskii's rhetoric radicalized, and became much more explicitly anti-Western, ultra-nationalist, and, in general, aggressive during and after 1993. To be sure, Zhirinovskii *seemed*, at some points in 1993, to occupy again a sort of 'centrist' position. For example, he took part in El'tsin's Constitutional Assembly in early summer 1993, supported partly El'tsin's dissolution of the reactionary Congress of People's Deputies in late September 1993, did not take part in the nationalist-communist armed insurrection led by Aleksandr Rutskoi and Ruslan Khasbulatov, and supported El'tsin's constitutional referendum in December 1993. However, these actions can be easily explained in terms of political strategy and tactics. They were all conducive to, or even necessary conditions for, Zhirinovskii's successful participation in the first post-Soviet State Duma elections. His support for a constitution which strengthens the power of the president was equally rational. In contrast, his rhetoric became - as will become clear below - not only more radical, but also less ambiguous, less oblique, less vague, and less self-contradictory in 1993.

Notwithstanding, as late as in July 1996, a Russia-wide poll conducted by US-American researchers found that, among the leading presidential candidates, Zhirinovskii was by far most frequently classified as a 'centrist' by Russian respondents. El'tsin was regarded as a 'centrist' by only 3% (63 cases), Grigorii Iavlinskii by 5% (77), and Aleksandr Lebed' by 6% (118) which was notably the, after Zhirinovskii, second highest percentage among the five leading contenders (Ziuganov's percentage for this labelling was close to zero). In contrast to El'tsin, Iavlinskii and Lebed', Zhirinovskii was seen as a 'centrist' by as many as 21% (287) of those who chose to make a statement on his political profile (Zimmermann 1996, Table 1).¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰ The respondents could choose between six categories: 'Communist', 'Democrat', 'Centrist', 'Patriot', 'Reformer', and 'Socialist'. There are two further peculiar features of this poll. First, although Zhirinovskii is a well-known figure in Russia, many respondents chose not to classify him at all within these categories. Whereas Ziuganov was categorized in one way or another by 2,206 respondents, Boris El'tsin by 2,069, Aleksandr Lebed' by 1,954, and Grigorii Iavlinskii by 1,658, Zhirinovskii was labelled only by 1,338 of those asked (unfortunately the total N is not given in the paper quoted here). Second, an astonishing 28% (368) of these respondents put Zhirinovskii in the category 'Democrat', and only 19% (254) saw in him a 'Patriot', the label which probably comes closest to his actual political agenda. Further Zhirinovskii was labelled a 'Communist' by 6% (74), a 'Reformer' by 16% (219), and a 'Socialist' by 10% (136). Apart from Ziuganov, who was classified by 96% as a 'Communist', Lebed's profile can be seen as the one closest to Zhirinovskii's image among the relevant candidates at this moment. Lebed's respective

The main aspect of the LDPR's 'centrism' during the time-period covered here was not that it provided a coherent alternative to the ideologies of the democrats on the left, and of the conventional nationalist and communists on the right, but rather that it was in opposition to all of them, including the conventional centrists. Zhirinovskii was, on the one side, against real Westernization, and above all a division of power, checks and balances. On the other side, in fighting the democrats, he did also not refer extensively to classic Russian statist, or pre-revolutionary romantic right-wing thought; nor did he restate communist dogmas. The Russian sociologist Iurii Levada noted: 'He is both an anticommunist and an antidemocrat, a Westernizer and anti-Westernizer'. (MN, no. 51, 1993, A5; CDPSP, vol. XLV, no. 50, 1993, 15). Although the LDP stood, in some regards, between the two major camps, i.e. the reformers and the conservatives, it was not a force of moderation as had been sometimes claimed by its leader. Instead, Zhirinovskii might in some regards be better understood if he is seen as standing somewhat outside the traditional Russian political spectrum, or if the LDP is approached as representing a peculiarly supra-partisan movement (Conradi 1995, 17).

From another point of view one could interpose that the whole of the latter section should have been better incorporated in a chapter on Zhirinovskii's populism, psychopathology, and/or propagandistic stratagems. As far as he often denies or approves the same thing depending on the assumed preferences of the present audience, it would thus make no sense to give Zhirinovskii's quasi-centrist announcements any credence, and be vain to seek any serious interpretations of all this 'rubbish'. The only interesting question would be: Did he make these statements because he is a mad, or an especially cunning, politician, or both?

percentages were: 'Communist' 4% (77), 'Democrat' 36% (693), 'Centrist' 6% (118), 'Patriot' 48% (943), 'Reformer' 5% (104), and 'Socialist' 1% (19). See Zimmermann 1996, Table 1.

4.2. The Imperialist

In contrast to his pseudo-centrism, Zhirinovskii's imperialist statements constitute a relatively clear and straightforward line of argument, and provide reliable evidence for the legitimacy of classifying him as right-wing. For instance, Zhirinovskii, in a short biography introducing him to the reader of one of the first issues of the major LDP newspaper *Liberal* of November 1990, is presented as a politician 'orientated towards the Right [*pravoï orientatsii*]' who 'advocates [...] the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state.' (L, no. 2-3, 1990, 1) In general, restorationist imperialism represented, perhaps, the main glue holding together the otherwise dissimilar currents of the Russian Right, which were in this regard, moreover, to a certain degree joined by the conventional Centre. Yet, as I shall show, Zhirinovskii's imperialism goes beyond what would be regarded as an accurately conservative, irredentist Russian foreign policy.

The below description shows the gradual change in the official documents of the LDP, and in public pronouncements of Zhirinovskii as documented in, among others, the major LDP newspaper of 1990-93 *Liberal*. The publication of the first edition of Zhirinovskii's major book *The Last Dash to the South* in late September 1993 constituted a preliminary endpoint in this development (1993a). His party's imperialist agenda suggests that, in general, the LDP belongs to the empire-saving tendency of Russian nationalism, the basic idea of which was the preservation, and, since 1991, resurrection of the Russian Empire (Szporluk 1989). This classification is largely valid with regard to the basic thrust of the official LDP agenda during most of the time-period covered here. During 1993, however, Zhirinovskii's articles in *Liberal* and his book started to provide a non-restorationist synthesis of a number of so far isolated themes which had sprung up in various of his writings before: the preoccupation with foreign policy issues; the proposal of a change from East-West to North-South relations; the obsession with a threat from the 'South'; and the mentioning of the Indian Ocean as a demarcation of Russia's 'sphere of interests'. Once combined in a relatively consistent world-view and fused to a peculiar expansionist blueprint, these themes and their further elaboration began to set Zhirinovskii markedly apart from the mainstream nationalists. Although this development became

clearly discernible only during 1993, it should be mentioned that Zhirinovskii had orally mentioned these themes (allegedly special competence in foreign policy; North-South relations; the 'Southern' threat; and the Indian Ocean) together as early as in August 1990 - i.e. less than five months after the foundation of the LDP (cf. Pyadyshev 1991, 101).¹⁵¹ One could thus question again how useful it actually was to put him in one category with the conventional Right as the differences between their versions of imperialism may appear in some regards as more weighty than the similarities.

The Anti-Nationalist

During the time-period covered here, a number of reactionary and widely shared imperialist-nationalist themes constituted the main content of Zhirinovskii's talk and writings. His frequent advocacy of the restoration of the Soviet or Tsarist Russian empire, or his Russophile exlusionism, constituted approaches which were, in one way or another, favoured by, and common to, all currents of the Right, including some less moderate statists of the conventional Centre. The image of Zhirinovskii in both, Russia and the West, was heavily dominated by these aspects of his ideology. Although, the following outline will also scrutinize them, emphasis will be put on those features which deviate from routine categorizations of the LDPR.

Zhirinovskii and his assistants, for some time, increased the general confusion about the political agenda of the party when they occasionally harshly condemned nationalism, or spoke out against national intolerance. One of Zhirinovskii's spokeswomen stated in a widely circulated affirmative analysis of the LDP and its leader that they 'see in the stirring up of nationalism the major evil causing confrontations and crises on our recently peaceful earth.' (Kulikova 1992, 49) A spring 1992, declaration of the LDP Highest Council warned that, as a result of the disintegration of the unified state, 'nationalism will raise its head.' (L, no. 4-5, 1992, 2). Zhirinovskii himself made

¹⁵¹ Further, in an article in the November 1990 issue of *Liberal* titled 'Who Breaks the Vicious Circle' (L, no. 2-3, 1990, 4-5), and the author of which is not mentioned, but the style of which reminds Zhirinovskii's dictum, is devoted to, among others, the subject of the 'criminal-political Southern mafia' and its penetration to the 'North'. The author uses the words 'South' or 'Southern' here all in all eight times in the two text's column on the 'mafia'. The mafia presence in the 'South', 'the national question plus the Southern temper and the traditions of the South' have 'if taken together, created such a terrible and deadly situation which no other country has encountered so far.'

frequently similar statements. At one point, for example, he observed that nationalism is a 'political narcotic' (as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 51). At the press-conference after his electoral success in December 1993, he even stated that nationalism is as bad as fascism, and proposed that, until the end of this century, 'we' should 'put an end to this terrible disease of nationalism.' (as quoted in Conradi 1995, 212; *La Stampa*, 16 December 1993; Lancelle and Frazer 1994, 151).

Apart from this occasional pseudo-cosmopolitanism in LDP pronouncements, there was a more consistently voiced quasi-anti-nationalist proposal which had been constantly recurring in all LDP programmes from the party's foundation until 1993. Despite the otherwise partly striking differences of these documents, several of them proposed to 'abolish' national discrimination by means of terminating the specification of national origin in the passports of citizens of Zhirinovskii's novel and allegedly supra-national republic. The first March 1990 LDPSU programme, for instance, stated: 'The nationality [of a person] is not reported in any documents.' (Programma... 1990). In the first September 1993 edition of *The Last Dash to the South*, Zhirinovskii confirmed: '[O]n no account should the nationality of a human being be used as a discriminating factor.' (1993a, 142)

In making such pronouncements, the LDP leader seemingly referred to the specifically Soviet stigmatization of 'nationalism'. In the former USSR, the concept was primarily used to identify 'bourgeois' and - since Stalin by definition - *non- or anti-Russian* nationalism, secessionism, nativism and national-liberation movements (as well as Western anti-Soviet nationalism and ultra-nationalism, such as German fascism). These phenomena were portrayed as being detrimental to 'Soviet patriotism' - a notion which, in contrast to 'nationalism', denoted a 'positive' feeling of communal attachment. Since the mid-1930s, 'Soviet patriotism' gradually transformed into a code word for the expression of imperialist Russian nationalist sentiment and a convenient substitution for more openly supremacist and repressive sounding terminology. By contrast, the term 'nationalism' appeared to Russians as primarily referring to the nationalism of the 'others'.

In 'Soviet Patriotism', Russians ('elder brothers' of the Soviet nationalities) were portrayed as being entrusted with a world historic mission which implied that they stood above the *petit* bourgeois ideology of 'nationalism'. Characteristically, this was independent of whether emphasis was laid on Russia's role as the harbinger of a global revolution, or on the Russians' mission as the carriers of an

alternative civilizational idea designed to rescue the world from Western decadence, individualism, etc. (Spechler 1983).¹⁵² Consequently, in the post-War Soviet Union, the phrase 'Russian nationalism' was partly an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms.

In statements, such as those above, Zhirinovskii was consciously or subconsciously building upon this somewhat cryptic form of a civilizational racism or chauvinism (Morrison 1994, 32). Being an anti-nationalist in these terms did not prevent him from being an ultra-nationalist in a more conventional sense. On page two of a 1992 issue of *Liberal*, for instance, the LDP, in one statement, demanded 'to put an end once and for all to nationalism', and, in the next column, encouraged Russians 'to feel themselves as masters of the whole country, the former Soviet Union and today Russia [...]' (L, no. 8-9, 1992, 2). Similarly, in a 1993 modification of its political programme, the LDP, in a first step, explicitly called for a restoration of *Russia* '(not of the USSR or the CIS)' in the frontiers of the former USSR. The LDP-designed new Russian Empire, however, would allegedly be a state

where a national-territorial division as a source for discord between nations, [and] a ground for the glorification of one nation over the other nation [...] is precluded. (*Proekt...* 1993, 7)

The Nationalist

There are, on the other side, also many pronouncements of Zhirinovskii which allow one to classify him as a nationalist without much deciphering and contextualization. If nationalism is, for instance, understood 'primarily [as] a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (Gellner 1983, 1), a passage in Zhirinovskii's report to the Third Congress of the LDP in April 1992 appears as a text-book manifestation of nationalism.

¹⁵² As will be shown later, in 1993, Zhirinovskii formulated also a distinct saviour-mission for the supposedly non-nationalistic Russians which serves to legitimate for him a programme of territorial expansion, war and repression.

For us the most important thing is the TERRITORY of our state. Give us the historical boundaries and the name of our state back - we want only this! And monarchists, communists, anarchists, social democrats, christian democrats and liberal democrats [*sic!*] - patriotic forces of every direction - are welcome to live on our soil. (L, no. 6-7, 1992, 3; emphasis in original)

In an interview with a German neo-fascist publicist in summer 1992, Zhirinovskii did not have to take into account the Soviet, negative stigmatization of 'nationalism'.

Though threatened from outside and inside, the [national] consciousness of Russians grows nevertheless, and only Russian nationalism saves my people from disappearance. This [development] is getting a European dimension. Only the Russians, not the Germans, can accomplish the last national revolution. Nationalism is the only way to freedom, and I am convinced that the victory of Russian nationalism will also trigger the rebirth of Germany. (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 8)

When, during 1993, Zhirinovskii's rhetoric became more blatant with his Russian audience too, he did this by attacking, in the first instance, the previously cherished concept of 'internationalism', and then praising the merits of nationalism.

Internationalism - that is the common kettle, the dormitory. [...] Internationalism - that is the idea of mixture. Nationalism [by contrast] is the idea of quality. Nationalism - [this means] a separate flat - not a communal one and not a dormitory. [...] The build-up of a national state implies the build-up of a national ideology. (Zhirinovskii 1993c)

The Cautious

Yet, Vladimir Vol'fovich is in a difficult position because his distinctly non-Russian-sounding patronym makes him a 'mixture' too, and because he grew up not in Russia proper, but in

Kazakhstan.¹⁵³ Naturally, Zhirinovskii has thus refrained from radically ethno-centrist interpretations of what it means to be a Russian. True, at times, he makes unequivocal statements as in a passage in his major 1993 writing *The Last Dash to the South*: '[W]e have to become national thinking [people], we have to become Russians finally.' (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 118) However, he is then anxious to clarify to what group of people he actually refers to: 'By Russians we mean all those, who speak and think Russian, and who do not glorify their nation over other [nations] [...]' (*Ibid.*) He even seeks to balance nationalist exclusiveness with some brand of internationalism:

[A peaceful life] will become possible when Russia finds its national self-consciousness mixed up with a pan-national consciousness [*mezhnatsional'noe samosoznanie*] [...]. (126)

Notwithstanding such contradictions, the LDP has played an important role in the growth of post-Soviet Russian nationalism in several ways.

The Resentful

First, Zhirinovskii has brought forward his own distinct version of anti-Soviet Russian nationalist chauvinism. Unlike most of the conventional rightists, he made - at least until late 1993 - only partly the CPSU, the 'uprooted intelligentsia' or some 'Zionist [e.g. Jewish] plotters' responsible for the assaults of the Soviet leadership against the Russian nation and its cultural heritage. He largely refrained from dealing with the awkward issue of the place and role of the Soviet regime in Russian history. Instead, he directed his anger against the titular nations of the non-Russian republics of the USSR. By doing so, he seemed to appeal consciously to the lowest possible nationalist instincts of his audience. He based his rhetoric on, among other things, reference to his own experiences during his childhood in the capital of Kazakhstan, Almaty (then Alma-Ata). For instance, Kazakhs were allegedly given better marks in school:

¹⁵³ Though he is, as already indicated, in the latter respect actually similar to many citizens of the Russian Federation who would also regard themselves as proper Russians.

The reason [is that] national [non-Russian] cadres [were] needed. And Russians remained with bitterness outside the institutions of higher education. And the Kazakhs with insufficient knowledge studied because they were Kazakhs. Is this not national discrimination, is this not national oppression? (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 24)

At another place he pronounces the same argument in more general terms:

Discrimination of Russians, national persecution far and wide, [and] oppression everywhere - in the economy, [in] culture, [and in] matters of law. [...] I come to Moscow [for undergraduate studies], and, what do you think, I see again the *natsmeny*. I live in the student hostel - [whereas] they have parties and are showing off, money, wine, [and] girls. [...] First we permitted cooks to rule the state, and then [obviously non-Russian - A.U.] shepherds. (as quoted in Kulikova 1992, 47)

As indicated by the latter sentence, Zhirinovskii admits that there were also those who allowed the alleged oppression of Russians. Somewhat surprisingly he refers to these people as 'us'.

Such a treatment of the anti-Russian aspects of the Soviet national policy appeared then as relatively atypical in the context of traditional Russian nationalism. A mainstream conventional right-winger would rather blame the persecutions on an unspecified 'them', by whom he or she would mean certain alienated officials and decadent intellectuals who would be classified as 'cosmopolitans', 'Russophobes', 'agents of [Western] influence', and so on. Accordingly, she or he would primarily inveigh against such home-made traitors, and not against the 'younger brothers' of the Great Russian nation. Though the standard extreme Russian nationalist would also see other nationalities as major benefactors of Soviet national nihilism towards Russia, she or he would hardly regard them as factors worth mentioning in Soviet high politics (with the exception, of course, of the Jews). Consequently,

she or he would regard their privileges as an embarrassment for Russians rather than as an offense by these 'minor' ethnic entities to be taken seriously.¹⁵⁴

The Populist

Zhirinovskii has played in a further way an innovative role in the development of Russian nationalism in that he contributed to a shift in the emphases of its agenda, and to an increase in its degree of popularization. Although the problem of the 25 million Russians living outside the Russian Federation was already a matter of concern in many nationalist writings and programmes before the LDP entered politics, it was partly due to Zhirinovskii's purposeful propaganda that the theme has become such a central focus of Russian politics and public life since the early 1990s. In contrast to the pro- versus anti-reform rhetoric of his competitors during the presidential elections in 1991, Zhirinovskii was among the first prominent politicians to make the fate of Russians as well as that of the three million Russian-speakers in the other Union republics one of his central campaign themes (Berezvskii 1994, 101).

One of his central slogans in 1991 was: 'I will protect Russians and small peoples on the whole of the territory of Russia and the USSR!' (as quoted in Berezvskii *et al.* 1993, 23) By 'small peoples', he referred specifically to the non-titular ethnic and national groups of the Union republics which have no full statehood of their own (although it is unclear whether those of the Russian Federation were included - probably rather not). Though somewhat confusing at first glance for an outsider, Zhirinovskii's interest in these peoples fitted into his non-ethno-centrist empire-saving programme of 1991.¹⁵⁵ The 'small peoples' were seen by him (and also by the central Soviet authorities at this time) as valuable partners in the obstruction of the independence movements of the titular nations of the Union republics. Notably, his party was one of the very few relevant Union level political forces which openly supported the plotters of the 1991 August coup. Zhirinovskii's agenda coincided with the major

¹⁵⁴ However, one should mention, that this situation has partly changed since 1993. The non-Russian nations and especially the political elites of the former Soviet Union-republics have become major causes of concern for Russian nationalists, which leads to another point to be made here.

¹⁵⁵ On the distinction between the empire-saving and nation-building streams in Russian nationalism, see Szporluk 1989.

goal of the putschists of the *GKChP* (State Committee of Emergency) at that point: to prevent the USSR's transformation from a *de facto* unitary state into a genuine federation (with some characteristics of a confederation) - i.e. into what the Soviet Union had *de jure* always been. The signing of a corresponding treaty by at least nine of the Union republics had been scheduled for the 20 August 1991 which was the immediate motive for the coup attempt on 19 August 1991. After three days, the coup failed. In an odd way, the putschists reached their goal of obstructing a new union agreement. This did, however, not lead to the preservation, but instead to the total disintegration of the USSR.

The question of the Russians in the 'near abroad' - the '*sootchestvenniki*' (compatriots) - has by now emerged as a, if not *the*, pre-eminent problem of Russian foreign policy. The resurrection of some kind of ties between, or control of, the former USSR republics has become a major aim of most - and not only the hard - right-wing groupings. It is thus not surprising, that Zhirinovskii, who had started to employ purposefully these problems already *before* the break-up of the Soviet Union, earned a certain credibility in that regard. Vladimir Berezovskii, Vladimir Cherviakov and Valerii Solovei went so far to call Zhirinovskii - with reference to his presidential election campaign in May-June 1991 - 'the first mobilizer of [popular] Russian national self-consciousness.' (1993, 34)¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ To elucidate the weight and distinctiveness of this aspect of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon', one could contrast it with the behaviour of the former Russian vice-president, temporary self-styled centrist, later on open ultra-nationalist, and current governor of Kursk *oblast'*, Aleksandr Rutskoi. First, Rutskoi played a pivotal role in the suppression of the August 1991 coup. He then posed for some time as a moderate between the restorationism of the conventionally rightist and communist camp, and the anti-imperialism of the democratic camp. In September-October 1993, however, he became the leader of an insurrection which was not only distinctly violent, but the aims of which were in several respect similar to those of the 1991 putschists. Against the background of these vacillations, Zhirinovskii appears as rather astute in that he not only made the public aware of the explosiveness of these problems earlier than many other popular nationalist politicians, but even risked his political career by supporting the *GKChP*.

The Innovator

As indicated above, Zhirinovskii's imperialism could have been classified up to a certain point as belonging to the empire-saving current in Russian nationalism (Szporluk 1989). A turning point occurred at some time in 1992.¹⁵⁷

On its annual convention in that year, on 18-19 April 1992, the former LDPSU renamed itself the Liberal-Democratic Party of *Russia* LDPR. Subsequently, Zhirinovskii started to develop in public and party-convention speeches the concept of an 'advance to the South' as documented in the 1993 issues of the newspaper *Liberal* (nos. 1 [11], 2-3 [12], and 3 [13], 1993). Thence onwards Zhirinovskii's imperial ambitions could not be classified any longer as a backward-looking longing for the preservation of, or return to, past achievements. Instead, he emphasized the *novelty* of his vision of Russia which became another dimension of his self-styled 'third force' image mentioned in connection with his 'centrism' (sec. 4.1.). As time went on, he started to clarify that what he has in mind is even the creation of an entirely new 'geopolitical' unit, the name of which would be '*Rossiiia*' (Russia). In some respect, Zhirinovskii's '*Rossiiia*' would mean a return to the pre-1991 *status quo*. As Zhirinovskii emphasized himself, it would, however, in several dimensions, be a novel type of Russian state. The development of the concept of a new '*Rossiiia*' in Zhirinovskii's writings and LDP documents constitutes an revealing process by itself.

¹⁵⁷ According to Valerii Solovei, the initially somewhat hidden and then increasingly open radicalization of Zhirinovskii's agenda in 1992 might be connected to the fact that Zhirinovskii had by then come under the influence of a number of more or less openly fascist lunatics (private conversation with Valerii Solovei, Moscow, summer 1996). In late 1990 or early 1991, he was apparently first joined by Andrei Arkhipov who subsequently introduced Sergei Zharikov to the LDP leadership (sec. 3.5.). In autumn 1991, the LDP coopted Hitler-admirer Viktor Iakushev; and in mid-1992 Eduard Limonov had become a member of the LDP 'shadow cabinet' (sec. 3.3). This meant that, indeed, there were a lot 'resourceful' men in the LDPR headquarters by mid-1992. Although the daily contact with so many prolific fascist publicists had most probably a certain impact on Zhirinovskii's political thinking, the concluding section of this chapter (4.3.) proposes an essentially different interpretation of the emergence of the blueprint of an 'advance to the South'.

The Unitarian

Apparently, the formation of a unitary state is one of the few visions that, one can say with some certainty, has been a constant characteristic of Zhirinovskii's agenda throughout his political career. That is above all exemplified by the fact that Zhirinovskii's May 1988 draft for a political programme for a Social-Democratic Party of *Russia* (and not: of the USSR) already explicitly envisaged a transformation of the Soviet Union from a *de facto* into a *de jure* centralized state headed by a 'president'. The document says in its sections on 'State Order' and 'Administrative Division':

Russia [is] a democratic unitary republic. [...] The republic is divided into 50 gouvernements with a population of not less than 5 million people each. The heads of the gouvernements [are] governors with gouvernement administrations. The procedure of formation is the same as that of the highest echelons of power. (reprinted in Verkhovskii 1994, 39-40).¹⁵⁸

Fifty gouvernements with at least five million people each means more than 250 million people. This suggests that, already in 1988, Zhirinovskii had, when mentioning 'Russia', not the RSFSR with its approximately 150 million inhabitants, but the whole USSR (or, at least, the larger part of it) in mind. It implies that not only the non-Russian RSFSR autonomous republics, but also the Union republics - the today Newly Independent States - would cease to exist.¹⁵⁹

Notwithstanding, according to its first *official* programme, the LDP was, at the beginning of its political evolution, in favour of the preservation of the system of *oblasti* and republics, i.e. of a federation (Programma... 1990). A first public shift from this point of departure towards Zhirinovskii's original idea was discernible already in autumn 1990. At this time the Centrist Bloc distinguished itself by formulating the thesis that a president of the Russian Federation should be simultaneously the

¹⁵⁸ In an earlier German language article which summarizes parts of this study, I was mistaken in stating that Zhirinovskii only gradually developed the concept of a unitary state during his party's rise to prominence in the early 1990s (Umland 1994, 1126-1127).

¹⁵⁹ A significant detail which remained unclear in the programme is how the governors are to be appointed. Does 'unitary republic' mean that the president nominates them? Zhirinovskii answered this question in his April 1993 constitutional project described in detail above (sec. 4.1. 'The El'tsinite Democrat').

president of the USSR (Berezovskii *et al.* 1993, 24). Among prominent politicians, Colonel Alksnis was, in late 1990, one of the first to put forward a more or less coherent plan for a general restructuring of the whole Soviet Union and the creation of what he called a 'normal federative state'. In formulating this concept, Alksnis relied on a Union treaty proposal of the League of Independent Scholars (Dunlop 1993, 110). This dubious organisation belonged to the Centrist Bloc, and has been shortly introduced in the first chapter of the study (sec. 1.3.). The project proposed that the USSR should be re-named *Rossiiskaia respulika* (Russian Republic). The union-republics would have to be abolished and replaced by a system of *gubernii*, which would be administered by a governor, and have a legislature and even a guard of its own - provisions which bear a striking resemblance to the cited passages of the Zhirinovskii's 'social-democratic' programme of May 1988 (Dunlop 1991, 6).¹⁶⁰

An important further move in the evolution of this part of the LDP agenda constituted, in March 1991, the publication of the party's first longer programme. Although this document was, as described above (sec. 2.1.), largely written by Andrei Zagorodnikov, apparently an LDPSU-outsider, it was presented as a genuine party document by the LDP, and partly edited by Zhirinovskii (I, 14 April 1994). In contrast to most sections of this manifesto, the following passage is partly in congruence with Zhirinovskii's nationalist agenda:

Its [the USSR's] historical name - Russia - ought to be returned. In this union-formation the *RSFSR* shall be a united (unitarian) state. The union republics shall join it the legal framework of a federation or confederation [...]. (*Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia...* 1991, 40-41)

This is one of the first occasions that the LDP officially spoke out in favour of unitarianism, although the principle had here been still explicitly limited to the Russian Federation within the USSR. Zhirinovskii apparently tried to popularize slowly this notion when he constantly, without any substantiation or explanation spoke about the USSR during his campaign for the 1991 elections for the President of the *Russian* Federation (Berezovskii 1994, 101-102). Though written in a partly cryptic

¹⁶⁰ The idea of a Soviet *de jure* unitarism as such, to be sure, had circulated already for a long time in unofficial and official Russian ultra-nationalist circles. See Spechler 1983, 24,

manner, the relevant passages of his electoral programme made also clear indications in this direction. Zhirinovskii proposed

[t]o reject the policy by which Russia and the centre are placed in opposition to each other, to abolish the 'war of laws' [and] [t]o resolve national problems as they are resolved throughout the world; that is, by repudiating the division of the country on the basis of ethnic territories and switching instead to a system of division into regions and provinces. (as quoted in Kartsev 1995, 82)

During the following two years, Zhirinovskii gradually dropped all qualifications to this unitarian vision. Thus, in a speech at a meeting on 9 May 1993, Zhirinovskii made clear:

Russia should be one, indivisible state. [...] [There should be] one common Russia [...]. (1993d, 18; quoted in Koman 1996, 290)

Statements such as these constituted probably the most consistent and prominent feature in his political agenda between 1991 and 1993. It is noteworthy, however, that Zhirinovskii apparently still felt the need to be cautious, perhaps, for tactical reasons.

The Pseudo-Federalist

For instance, at the above mentioned 1992 party congress at which the former LDPSU became the LDPR, a new party programme was adopted in which there is, to some degree, a retreat from the previous explicit inclination towards unitarianism, back to federalism. To be sure, the LDPR confirmed that it thinks that

[t]he process of partition of the centralized state into a number of small sovereign states under the flag of self-determination is, under contemporary conditions, not an unreservedly progressive tendency. (Programma... 1992, 95)

However, the document not only approved explicitly 'equal rights of all nations and nationalities inhabiting our country', and 'national toleration' (e.g. *Programma...* 1992, 95, 96). It included an unusually far going positive evaluation of federalism.

We are convinced that the principle of a federal state does not contradict the interests of the citizens of all nations and nationalities, but promotes their quicker economic and cultural development. A federal economic space is beneficial for all and everyone. (*Programma...* 1992, 95)

The LDPR thus envisages the future creation of a 'Russian [*Rossiiskaia*] Democratic Federal Republic' (*Ibid.*). Yet, it is important to emphasize that this 'federalist enthusiasm' was conspicuously qualified by advocating a merely *economic* federal space, and that 'federalism' referred, by implication, only to territories *outside* the Russian Federation.

The partitioning of territories, all-Union property, and, as a consequence, the creation of customs, individual currencies etc. - this is a movement backwards [*vspiat'*], regress. Under the present conditions, the LDPR is against the creation of sovereign states and, on this basis, of the CIS. The party sees this as a transitional stage from the command-administrative system to the Russian Democratic Federal Republic. (*Programma...* 1992, 95)

In a spring 1992 article in *Liberal*, Zhirinovskii called for the resurrection of the Russian state in the borders of the USSR as they were in 1977 when the Brezhnev constitution had been adopted. Yet, here also he makes the altogether untypical qualification that a Russian state in these borders would be a federation because 'a unitary [structure] does not apply - I agree [with this].' (L, no. 4-5, 1992, 27)

In the following number of *Liberal* (which must have appeared in late spring/early summer 1992), finally, Zhirinovskii started an explicitly - yet still somewhat cryptic - return to the above

mentioned unitarianism in his 1988 programme for a Social-Democratic Party of Russia. After demanding again the 'restoration of the Russian state' in its 'historical boundaries', he contradicted his statements in the previous *Liberal* issue with astonishing clarity.

Russian Federation - that [is] from a legal point of view a slight absurdity. The shape of a state can be monarchic or republican. But the word 'federation' does not have any legal weight. True, in Germany the state bears the name Federal Republic of Germany, but with them [the Germans] that is an enforced measure. In principle, we are adherents of the simple name Russia. [...] We are [to be sure] in favour of self-government [for national minorities], but [only] in the fields of economy, culture, health [and] education, and under no circumstances in matters of state structure - that shall be eternal and inviolable (L, no. 6-7, 1992, 3)¹⁶¹

The Restorationist

In the following 1992 issues of *Liberal* the above qualifications and concessions were finally completely dropped. In its 'Programmatic Theses' the LDP announces that it

regards the creation of so called sovereign states on [the USSR's] territory as illegal. The only bearer of sovereignty is Russia. [...] [T]he LDPR advocates the abolition of the partition into republics which must be replaced by a territorial division. [...] The LDPR promises to restore the Great Power and to return to it all separated originally [*iskommo*] Russian territories. The separatists will be punished, and calls for the destruction of the unitary state will be dealt with as serious crimes. (L, no. 8-9, 1992, 2)

¹⁶¹ These and other statements of Zhirinovskii on the future administrative structure of Russia are reminiscent of Ivan Il'in's (sec. 4.1.) evaluation of federalism. See his essays 'On the Dividers of Russia', 'What Is a Federation' and 'On Pseudo-Federations' (1992, 1st vol., 163-171).

In other speeches during 1992-93, Zhirinovskii went even further by stating that what he actually envisages is the reestablishment of the Russian state 'at least' or 'at a minimum in the boundaries of the USSR' (e.g. L, no. 6-7, 1992, 5; L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 3; emphases added).

The public circulation of the already quoted LDP constitutional proposal approved in April 1993 can - as far as it represented an officially approved document - be seen as an endpoint in the development of this particular aspect of the LDPR agenda in the period until 1993. A short modification of its political programme attached to the proposal summarized:

The LDPR - [is] a party, which is [...] in support of a gradual restoration by economic and political means of the Russian state (not of the USSR or the CIS) in the frontiers of the former USSR. This should be a unitarian state (a Republic) [...]. (*Proekt...* 1993, 7)

The peak of the restorationist tendency in Zhirinovskii's pronouncements was reached when he started to propose explicitly to restore not only the Soviet, but the larger Tsarist Empire. In a summer 1993 article in the daily *Izvestiia* (1993c), Zhirinovskii stated: 'We need the Russia in the borders it had at the beginning of the century [...]' (as quoted in Koman 1996, 290)

The publication of Zhirinovskii's partly autobiographical book *The Last Dash to the South* in late September 1993 constituted a new stage in this development. It can be, in many regards, seen as his coming out as a Russian imperialist of a relatively novel type. In this volume, Zhirinovskii summarized his vision of a new, united and Russian-dominated 'geopolitical' unit on the Eurasian continent which would have no inside borders and, besides including the former USSR, range from the Mediterranean to the Indian ocean (1993a, 64). The book caused a shock in late 1993 because its circulation coincided with Zhirinovskii's unexpected electoral success. However, the basic ideas of the expansionist blueprint outlined in the book had been voiced by Zhirinovskii already before.

The Expansionist

In a press report translated into English and published (in, among others, *The Los Angeles Times*) in late 1991 and early 1992, Zhirinovskii was already quoted as announcing:

The Russians have the duty to resurrect their empire which was built during thousands of years [sic]. However, we have to change the direction of our movement; we were too much swallowed up by the assault on Europe. Our true path leads to the South, to the warm waters, to the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. We began in an absolutely right way by entering Afghanistan. However, we should not have done it under the Red flag; the people do not understand ideologies. (IuG, no. 3, 1992, 14)

At a public meeting on 9 May 1993 reprinted in the 1993 LDP publication *From My Point of View*, Zhirinovskii went a step further by indicating:

We do not need the USSR. We need to recreate the Russian state, a strong and powerful state which will have borders on the sea. At the North of us is an ocean, and at the Far East is an ocean. We have to restore the borders in the West. Without us the Baltics will not subsist. But the most important thing is to solve the problems in the South. (1993d, 18)

In the first 1993 issue of the party-organ *Liberal*, Zhirinovskii spoke not to the public, but to the LDP activists. Thus he not only demanded that Russia should 'return' to the places 'to which it must return', and specified that this includes the territories which were allotted to Russia in World War I - 'the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles [plus] Constantinople' (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 4). He also made a first indication of *how* such territories would be 'returned'.

We will come for the last time. We will come in a way that Russian troops will stand at the [shores of the] Indian Ocean. Only under this condition. [We will make sure] [t]hat to the South of us is the warm Indian Ocean. (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 4)

In the following, second 1993 issue of *Liberal*, Zhirinovskii crossed a further line in that he mentioned not any longer the Southern advance in passing. Instead the most important idea is written in capital letters.

[W]e have to go down [*spustit'sia*] to the Indian Ocean so that to the East of us lies India. We must return to the Tsarist foreign policy: TO GO DOWN TO THE SOUTH. [...] On the South we need warm seas, the Indian Ocean. (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4; emphasis in original)

However, Zhirinovskii, at this point, hesitated to call for an immediate implementation of his blueprint. Instead, he wrote that the 'going down to the South' will happen '[n]ot today, but in the future, in the next century' (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4). On the other hand, he made in this article one of the most explicit statements concerning the international implications of a realization of his plan:

[...] our model [entails] the dissolution of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan [...]. (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4)

In *The Last Dash*'s first edition (1993a), finally, Zhirinovskii drops most of his previous qualifications concerning, for instance, the timing and methods of realizing the 'last ''dash''. He now spoke of a 'shock-therapy' which is to be executed quickly, decisively and by military means. The rationale behind his plan is summarized in the sentence: 'Disaster for Russia has always come from the South.' (as quoted in Koman 1996, 284) Russia plays, according to Zhirinovskii, in world history the role of a saviour, a calling she fulfils every hundred years, and a deed for which the world should be thankful. Now, as new challenges have arisen, her time has come anew (1993a, 124). The core of his agenda is summarized in the passage:

The last surge to the South, Russia's reaching the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. This task is actually the salvation of the Russian nation. (as quoted in Koman 1996, 291)

It would lead to the creation of a new Russian-led domain 'from Istanbul to Kabul' (66), 'the last repartition of the world' (64) and an all-embracing and rapid appeasement of the Eurasian continent and the whole world.

The Versatile

One could finish scrutinizing Zhirinovskii's writings at this point, and simply summarize shortly the numerous following sub-sections. Only few additional substantive ideas were brought up in Zhirinovskii's speeches and writings in 1993. The development of his agenda of a 'going down to the Indian Ocean' had reached its peak with the publication of the three 1993 issues of *Liberal* (nos. 1 [11], 2 [12], 3 [13]), and in the first September 1993 edition of *The Last Dash* (1993a). Three states which had never belonged to Russia would be dissolved and - by implication - become parts of Russia which would be the 'salvation of the Russian nation'. However, in 'selling' his blueprint to his various audiences, as well as in presenting himself as its author, carrier and executioner, Zhirinovskii employed a wide variety of partly contradictory arguments, self-images, and rhetoric devices. These features deserve special attention.

The many-sidedness of his pronouncements in favour of the 'last dash', and of different ways to realize the blueprint was not only part of a strategy to attract people of different background to his ideas, and to make the ideas sound less radical. As should emerge below, Zhirinovskii's argumentative eclecticism and peculiar 'empathy' for other - including critical - perspectives on his ideas seemed to be by itself a significant part of his propaganda strategy. They fell within Zhirinovskii's larger, continuous long-time effort to be perceived by his audiences and the media as a modern, broad-minded and urbane statesman. For instance, his party-publications gave frequently detailed descriptions of his impressive educational record, and repeatedly emphasized his knowledge of foreign languages (which, actually, seems to be profound only in the case of Turkish) or his travel-experiences in- and outside the USSR.

The role-models Zhirinovskii chose, and the foundations of his blueprint he developed should be partly put under the heading 'political strategy', rather than 'political ideology'. There are two Zhirinovskii's here: Zhirinovskii himself and 'Zhirinovskii'. Zhirinovskii himself, on the one side, is the politician who outlines his attitudes and political views more or less openly. 'Zhirinovskii', on the other side, is a fictional politician which Zhirinovskii and his aides created to impress the Russian audience.¹⁶²

Several of his widely varying arguments and postures will be dealt with at some length because they frequently caused confusion among observers who only cared to read small sections of Zhirinovskii's writings. As I argue in the last section of the chapter, Zhirinovskii's idea that an advance to the Indian Ocean would be a panacea for Russia was one of his most important themes, at least during 1991-93. In view of this, many of Zhirinovskii's more or less self-contradictory statements can be, at least partially, explained, if interpreted as fulfilling certain functions *within* the framework of Zhirinovskii's advocacy of a 'last ``dash'''. They either played some role in substantiating the blueprint by putting forward certain more or less 'sensible' grounds or motives for its necessity. Or they were designed to present the blueprint and its implementation as, from different viewpoints, acceptable, attractive and feasible. Thus the below sub-sections will, in a first step, explicate the central implicit or explicit argument or image which Zhirinovskii chose in order to justify the 'last ``dash'''. In a second step, some characteristic examples of how they were communicated to the reader are assembled. As a result, it should be, hopefully, easier to make - at least some - sense of Zhirinovskii's outline.

The Alarmist

Zhirinovskii's 'advance to the Indian Ocean' is, as its author seems to understand himself, a distinctly drastic measure. To justify such unconventional a solution, Zhirinovskii used two, partly, contradictory arguments. On the one hand, he emphasized an ongoing rapid decline of Russia, and

¹⁶² A further confusing element in Zhirinovskii's behaviour seems to be that, when he behaves in an apparently typical way, he may not only simply be himself. As far as he realized that displaying his character is useful in attracting media coverage and attention of diverse audiences, Zhirinovskii seems at times also to play himself. To disentangle the various 'Zhirinovskii's' is obviously not an easy task.

partly also of the larger world. On the other hand, he spoke of the grave danger or inevitability of an imminent, yet still preventable catastrophe. I shall begin with illustrating the first line of reasoning.

Already in a 1992 *Liberal* issue, Zhirinovskii had claimed: 'It takes place - the [civil] war, unfortunately!' To end this 'civil war [...], if necessary, armed forces will be employed.' (L, no. 6-7, 1992, 3) A 'Declaration of the LDPR' in the first 1993 issue of *Liberal* spoke of the 'catastrophe of a great power' as a result of democratic government. 'Bloody national wars' are going on; the 'spectre of civil war' is 'materializing'; a 'so far unknown fall in production' can be observed; and the 'belief in the future' is waning. 'Russia is becoming enslaved to the USA and an object of undisguised separation into spheres of influence of the leading great powers of the West and the East', and so forth (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 30). In the following 1993 *Liberal* issue, Zhirinovskii complained that already 'our blood' and 'our tears' is flowing, 'our woman' are humiliated and forced to prostitution, and 'our sons' are beaten up and killed (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 3).

In *The Last Dash*, again, Zhirinovskii warns not only that there is instability in the 'near abroad' (i.e. in the former Soviet republics). He also comes to the conclusion: '[...] August 1991 in Moscow [the failure of the coup] - [t]his was the beginning of the civil war in Russia [i.e. on the territory of the Soviet Union - A.U.]' (110). On the one side, 'Russia's civil war' appears, Zhirinovskii writes, in an open form like in Tajikistan or in the Transcaucasus:

The territory from Leselidze to Dushanbe [is] covered with corpses. [...] Everywhere blood, dead bodies, whole families, whole nations are butchered. (67)

On the other side, there is also a covered and, therefore, even more dangerous civil war in the Baltics and the Ukraine, which could suddenly explode 'like a hidden underground fire' (93).

Zhirinovskii made one of the most far going statements in this regard in a speech at a public meeting on 9 May 1993 reprinted in a booklet called *From My Point of View* (1993d):

Today we are living through [civil war in Russia] mixed with World War III. It is happening today in the Balkans. It is happening in the Near East. It is happening in Southeast Asia. World

War III! The same number of countries and peoples are involved in this war today as were during World War II. (as quoted in Koman 1996, 319; partly reformulated)

The Seer

Zhirinovskii's alarmism about an already present Armageddon is one point of departure for justifying the 'last 'dash''. A somewhat contradictory line of rhetoric expresses a highly apocalyptic view of Russia's and, indeed, the world's *future*. Already before 1993, he had at various points warned that Russia stands on the brink of a military coup, a dictatorship, and 'Russian fascism [*sic!*]' (as quoted in Kulikova 1993, 9).

Not only Russia's, but also the larger world's survival is precarious. In an interview with the German neo-fascist publicist Wolfgang Strauß in summer 1992, Zhirinovskii had made the observation that

[o]ur continent [Europe] is threatened by the loss of its soul and its face. The white Europe is in a deadly danger. [...] It is at the eleventh hour. [...] I say this in all openness: the storm over Europe comes from the South and East, and advances from the deserts of Africa and Asia. The occupation of Europe and its submission is on full speed. Islam does not stand on Europe's threshold - it already marches through Europe's cities. Islam - whether yellow or black - is rolling over Christian Europe. (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 8)¹⁶³

In the first 1993 issue of *Liberal*, Zhirinovskii repeated that Turks and Arabs were already conquering Germany and France 'from inside' which means that 'France is perishing [*gibnet*]' (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 4). Although Zhirinovskii's overall conclusion seemed to be clear, some of his elaborations remain esoteric:

¹⁶³ The particular Euro-fascist blueprint emerging from this vision, and outlined in the mentioned interview with Wolfgang Strauß will be ignored here. See L, 1 (11), 1993, 7-9. On Euro-fascism, see Griffin 1993b.

The world is indeed experiencing a crisis. And some astrologists spoke rightly about the 'end of the world'. If that continues in our domain as well as in Europe, the world will explode indeed. The French, the Germans, the Russians, the white population of the South African Republic will not stand this; Somalia and Egypt will finally die from hunger. In China, events will occur [...]. (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 4)

In the same *Liberal* issue, Zhirinovskii dealt also explicitly with an anti-Russian 'aggression from the South'.¹⁶⁴

They have big plans - Greater Georgia. The Armenians also - Greater Armenia. [...] Azerbaijan has big plans as well - Greater Azerbaijan. The Turks have big plans - the Great Turkish State. (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 15)

At a meeting on 9 May 1993 (1993d), Zhirinovskii drew a historical parallel:

Where is the Byzantine Empire? The same bitter fate awaits the Russian nation, the Russian people, and our state if [...] the peoples in the South who are pressing us forge ahead. It will be the liquidation of Russia. (as quoted in Koman 1996, 287)

In *The Last Dash*, warnings such as these are reiterated several times. There is not only a general instability at the South of 'Russia [i.e. of the CIS]' (65), but also the possibility that the planet will become infected by a 'political AIDS', or a 'political Chernobyl' (123). More specifically, Zhirinovskii restates, a number of countries are preparing to attack 'Russia':

¹⁶⁴ In 1993, *Zhirinovskii's Truth* - the other major LDP newspaper besides *Liberal* at this time - also mentioned the menacing instability on the 'South' (e.g. PZh, no. 11, 1993, 4).

[The peril comes] from the side of Afghanistan, which is already assaulting Tajikistan; from Teheran, which makes pan-Islamic plans for an annexation of huge territories; [and] from Ankara, where for a long time there have been plans for a Great Turkish state. (129-130)

World War III also reappears in the *The Last Dash* (1993a):

The [present] war in the Near East will not end. In the final analysis it could be the cause of World War III. The last surge of Russia to the South will therefore prevent World War III. (65; as quoted in Koman 1996, 319)

To be sure, the programmes of the mainstream conventional right-wingers were characterized by considerable panic as well. However, their anxiety tended to be more inward looking, and focused on the domestic domain, and Russia's economic, cultural, social and demographic decline. Many of them would agree with Zhirinovskii's apprehensions about possible negative outcomes of instabilities to the South of the CIS. Most conventional rightists, however, would not argue that any of the Southern countries (except, perhaps, China which is only mentioned in passing by Zhirinovskii) represent serious-to-be-taken actual or potential enemies against which Russia would have to take decisive, immediate action.

The Prudent

The general thrust of Zhirinovskii's writings is that because the threats Russia is facing are imminent and serious, measures must be taken urgently and radically. Yet, sometimes, he also presented himself as a clever and patient international gambler. In a speech on 1 May 1993, reprinted in the booklet *From My Point of View*, he proposed:

You [the 'Southerners'] want to live independently? Be my guest. We will withdraw Russian troops and Russian technology and let you fight. One gang against another. [...] Now some

people say: let us send help from Moscow [...]. Why should WE save them? Save from who? (1993d, 32; as quoted in Koman 1996, 289; reformulated)

At a meeting a few days later, Zhirinovskii went even further:

Let the regimes in Kabul [Afghanistan], in Teheran [Iran], or in Ankara [Turkey] go in there. Let all of them fight. Let 15 or 20 years pass. Let them bomb Sukhumi, Tblisi, Kutaisi [all Georgia], Baku [Azerbaijan] and Tashkent [Uzbekistan]. Let them deal with this by themselves. (1993d, 18; as quoted in Koman 1996, 289)

In a summer 1993 *Izvestiia* article called 'The Collapse of the Fourth International' (1993c), Zhirinovskii repeated:

We need to cut away the Caucasus, to fence it off with a Berlin wall and just watch it while we sell weapons to everyone. (as quoted in Koman 1996, 289)

In the same article, he made clear what, he thinks, all that should ultimately lead to:

We will put out of Central Asia and the Caucasus and leave them to their military commanders and mullahs. [...] After a while they will come to us themselves. Well, they will not exactly come - they will crawl, beaten, hungry, sick, some on crutches, some on stretchers. They will ask us to give them some warm water to wash in. We will take some of them [...]. In the end, [Turkey, Iran and Pakistan] will lose their sovereignty. The Southern swamp of instability will suck them under. And then we will arrive. (1993c; as quoted in Koman 1996, 290-191)

In *The Last Dash*, he, at one point, also envisaged an evolutionary scenario:

We would concentrate our economic relations basically with Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey for as long as these countries still exist and do not fall into the orbit of Russia and do not become a part of the Russian state. (as quoted in Koman 1996, 314)

An underlying argument in statements such as these is that Russia would not voluntarily acquire new territories in the 'South' by annexing them through a military campaign. Instead these countries would inevitably sooner or later become parts of the Russian Empire which would have to bear 'the white man's burden' to accommodate the uncivilized tribes.

The Guardian

In spite of Zhirinovskii's low opinion about the 'Southern' nations' ability to organize their own life, a primary rationale for the necessity of the 'last dash' is to protect Russia from subversion and/or imminent assault by them. Already in a 1993 issue of *Liberal*, he had warned:

Among the peoples surrounding us are barbarians. And these barbarians should know that Russia cannot only defend itself, but also attack: [Russia] is able to destroy - exactly in order to defend itself. The Russians themselves had never been aggressive [and] never thought of attacking others first. [...] The Southern borders of Russia have to be made safe once and for all. That is our historic mission. (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4)

In *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii's argument started from his assertion that there was 'civil war in Russia' which is 'horrible'. Therefore '[w]e need measures that will let the country live in safety [...]' (110; as quoted in Koman 1996, 283) From this follows: 'Russia's going into the South - this is first of all a defensive [and] retaliatory measure, [...]' (129)

As far as Zhirinovskii apparently partly understands how phantastic his 'advance to the South' sounds, he repeated clarifying why his blueprint is concerned with Russia's most elementary national security interests.

If we do not pacify this region, then the unrest, the corruption, the diseases, and the wars will increase and seize all of Russia. (77; as quoted in Koman 1996, 310)

The Strategist

A closely related line of reasoning links up with the latter statement. In some statements, Zhirinovskii emphasized the *immediate* threat to Russia demanding protective measures. At other place, however, he saw the Russian-`Southern' confrontation rather as a historic dilemma which has to be solved in order to make Russia's future safe. In *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii wrote:

All the disasters of Russia are in the South. As long as we do not untie our Southern knot, we will not escape from the protracted crisis, which will periodically grow more acute. (45; as quoted in Koman 1996, 284)

This long-term problem of Russia has to be dealt with finally. This is possible, if Russia puts herself in a suitable geographic position which provides security.

When we open onto the Arctic Ocean in the North, the Pacific Ocean in the East, the Atlantic Ocean via the Black, Mediterranean, and Baltic Seas, and finally the Indian Ocean in the South, we will have peaceful neighbors. (64; as quoted in Koman 1996, 317)

Thus Russia would for ever be safeguarded against aggressions from abroad: 'We [will have] made ourselves secure once and for all [...]' (64) Especially, in the South, Russia would be finally insured as she would have mutual frontiers with 'the everlastingly friendly India, [and] Iraq', her 'strategic allies' (124).

The Physician

Closely linked to this argument is Zhirinovskii's presentation of the 'advance to the South' as a, perhaps, unpleasant or even painful, but necessary medical treatment or surgical operation. In *The Last Dash*, he not only proposed that the 'last repartition of the world' should be carried through in '[...] a state of shock therapy, suddenly, quickly, [and] effectively.' (64) Russia is ill, implied Zhirinovskii, and therefore the '[last ``dash``]' is exactly the medicine, which it is necessary to take.' (67) He also admitted though that

[t]he medicine will not always be sweet. Someone in Kabul, Teheran, or Ankara may not like it. But millions of people get better because of it. (67; as quoted in Koman 1996, 319)

He even indicates that there would be some unavoidable suffering and loss for Russia.

We will be in the position of a man whose finger must be removed because of gangrene infection. He does not want this to happen, but then he dies because the gangrene has spread throughout his whole body. That is how it is in human history. (77; as quoted in Koman 1996, 312)

The Realist

Another somewhat similar stratagem was employed by Zhirinovskii. From time to time, he openly voiced his expectation that the realization of the 'last ``dash``' will encounter criticism and resistance from the outside world. In these statements, Zhirinovskii appeared as a down-to-earth foreign affairs specialist who carefully considers possible reactions by the international community. Only after comprehensively weighing various pros and cons of his plan, he comes to the conclusion that the 'an advance to the Indian Ocean' would indeed be feasible and beneficial.

In *The Last Dash to the South*, he mentioned in the first instance a possible negative reaction from the United States:

The only one who might not like it would be America, but she would not begin to interfere [...]. There would be too many negative consequences if America began to interfere with the establishment of the Southern borders of Russia. (75; as quoted in Koman 1996, 292)

In balancing negative against positive effects, one has to keep the larger picture in mind, Zhirinovskii argued.

Everybody gets what he wants. True, there will be a little bit of dissatisfaction in Ankara. Yes, some [people] in Teheran and Kabul will be malcontent. But millions of people and the whole planet get a positive solution. (76)

Zhirinovskii also referred in this connection to his above quoted assertion that his plan has above all a 'defensive and retaliatory' purpose.

I know that in Kabul, Teheran and Ankara a storm of protest will ring out. But why should they think that we would have nothing against their plans to create a greater Turkish state? (128; as quoted in Koman 1996, 291)

Remarkably, Zhirinovskii does not avoid the tricky question of how realistic his plan appears against the background of the disastrous results of the Afghanistan adventure of the Soviet Union.

Someone may say: the peoples of the South do not need your help or your geopolitical ideas. They will resist you, they will fight with you, there will be an endless war, they will give you an endless Afghanistan. This is a mistake. From 1979 to 1989 the Red Army was in Afghanistan under Communist banners. If there had been a Tsarist foreign policy, all questions would have been decided long before. (126; as quoted in Koman 1996, 309)

The Sympathetic

Before outlining the substance of Zhirinovskii's vision, a last argument comparable to the above one should be mentioned. Zhirinovskii at some points also seemed to moderate consciously his anti-Islamic stance. In the following summer 1993 statement, he, for example, brought himself to speak positively about Islamic fundamentalism because it somewhat resembles his own world-view.

There is no need to fear Muslim fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is the establishment of order and the characteristic traditions of the Southern peoples. Polygamy, respect for elders, submission, traditional crafts, the Koran - what is bad in this for Russians? The Turkish 'democratic' way, through which the Turks crawled over all Europe - that is much worse for us. That is cominterism, but fundamentalism is nationalism. Let there be Muslim regimes from Kabul to Tashkent. (Zhirinovskii 1993c; as qutoed in Koman 1996, 310)

The Northerner

In spite of Zhirinovskii's apparent empathy even for the most extreme current in Muslim political culture, the central underlying, at times explicitly expressed foundation of his world-view was his contempt for those whom he identified as 'Southerners'. How important this theme for Zhirinovskii was only became fully clear with publication of the first edition of *The Last Dash* in late September 1993. Yet, already in a 1993 *Liberal* issue, he had declared:

[Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan] are essentially expansionist [*zakhvatnicheskie*] because they are eternally nomadic tribes. [T]here is never-ending robbery, attacks [*nabegi*], taking of prisoners [and] hostages, [and] violence. (L, 2 [12], 1993, 4)

In *The Last Dash* (1993a), Zhirinovskii repeated:

These peoples have fought each other so often that they have a blood feud. They can not calm down. They will fight forever. (65; as quoted in Koman 1996, 317)

The 'Southerners' are guilty of many Russian ills. Among other things,

[a]ll corruption began in the South, when Stalin created favorable conditions for his native Georgia. That despot ruled Russia for 30 years. During that time Georgia became perverted. It was staggered by corruption, which spread into Armenia and Azerbaijan. This filth spread to the East and to Central Asia. Then it moved up and finally enveloped the whole country. (69; as quoted in Koman 1996, 284-285)

The 'Southerners' are, in Zhirinovskii's view, a distinctly uncivilized sort of people. Thus nobody should be surprised, if they would be unable to cope with the consequences of Zhirinovskii's 'last dash':

Regrettably, part of the population will perish because in the South there is not enough medicine and culture. (71; as quoted in Koman 1996, 319)

The Expert

One of the most striking features of *The Last Dash to the South*, however, are Zhirinovskii's fanatically anti-Turkish statements (1993a, 130-131). It should, in this connection, be recalled that he is a Turkologist by profession, and had, as a student, spent eight months at the Turkish city of Iskenderun in 1969-70. Turkey is thus the foreign country Zhirinovskii knows best. Characteristically, Zhirinovskii combined his especially radical anti-Turkish statements with a seemingly conscious display of specialist knowledge which set this aspect of his general attack on the South somewhat apart.

At a meeting on 9 May 1993 Zhirinovskii gave a speech which was reprinted in the 1993 publication *From My Point of View* (1993d, 17). When it came to Turkey, Zhirinovskii referred more than he usually does to historic examples.

Long ago the Byzantine Empire fell. In Constantinople they speak Turkish today. But five centuries ago they spoke Greek, Italian, and Bulgarian there. Now everyone speaks Turkish. In 1915 the Turks cut one and a half million Armenians to pieces. That is what Turks do. Today, again, they are creeping into Central Asia, into the Caucasus and into Yugoslavia. (as quoted in Koman 1996, 287)

A few months later, he repeated in the first edition of *The Last Dash* (1993a):

Just remember how the Turks arrived at Asia Minor, how they barbarically conquered Constantinople and plundered it, how they slaughtered and subjugated all the peoples living in Asia Minor. Just remember how they slaughtered one and a half million Armenians in April 1915. Just remember that, and let the conscience of humanity tremble when a whole people is slaughtered in three nights. (130; as quoted in Koman 1996, 287)

Here too the historical analogy was the context for far-going allegations about Turkey's contemporary aims.

Turkey dreams of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus and Georgia too, to create a country on four seas - the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Caspian Sea, the Sea of Marmara, and even the Aegean Sea. Russia would lose in every way. The 'great and talented' Turkish people would deserve to live in the center of the world, in a sweet-smelling region on the shores of six seas, and the weak, impotent Russian people would deserve to perish. Is that what human history has ordained? No, it is no possible. (130; as quoted in Koman 1996, 311)

The Turks are, according to Zhirinovskii, a nation without its own culture:

What culture have the Turks brought to the territory of Asia Minor? Western tourists traveling to Turkey are shown the remnants of Byzantine culture. There is no Turkish culture. There can be no culture on a naked sword. (131; as quoted in Koman 1996, 288)

His conclusion from years of intensive study of Turkish language and history was: 'Nothing would happen in the world if the whole Turkish nation perished [...]' (130; as quoted in Koman 1996, 285)

The Geopolitician

A further important argument of Zhirinovskii to justify his plan of an 'advance to the South' emerged from his (and many other Russian rightists) obsession with 'geopolitics'. 'Geopolitics' is a science which had been originally developed by the Swedish far-right professor of political science Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922). Kjellens peculiarly social-Darwinistic approach to international relations was based on an interplay between geographic and political factors, asserted that nations have 'natural' boundaries, and justified the expansion of superpowers. Via the, perhaps, most important follower of Kjellen and well-known founder of German 'geopolitics', Karl Ernst Haushofer (1869-1946), the doctrine became the starting point of the Nazi's *Lebensraum* (living space) ideology which served as a justification for Hitler's expansionist wars (Rees 1990, 173, 210).¹⁶⁵

In Zhirinovskii's speech, 'geopolitics' plays a comparable role. At the Sixth Interregional Conference of the LDPR in early March 1993, Zhirinovskii gave a speech in which he laid out the core of his 'geopolitical' views:

Russia can only exist if its borders extend to the sea. [...] Let us take away the Baltic and Black Seas. Then we can only walk on crutches and the other leg, the Northern seas. This can not happen. It can not. Russia dreamed of reaching the warm seas, but now it is not just impossible

¹⁶⁵ 'Geopolitics' is the central post-Soviet Russian catchword with which imperialist plans in general are conceptualized (Eichwede 1994, 29). For an affirmative account of Zhirinovskii's 'geopolitical' views in a leading Russian social science journal, cf. Zimin 1994. On the history and current relevance of the label in international relations theory in general, see, for instance, *Geopolitik...* 1994.

to reach warm seas. They are driving us away from the Western seas. [...] Russia is withdrawing to the Urals, where no one can live [...]. It is a diseased place. You can not live there. The population would perish. To live normally we need the South and the West. (1993d, 5-6; as quoted in Koman 1996, 286-287)

In *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii developed similar arguments. For example, he asserted:

When other parties speak of cutting away Kazakhstan, Kirgistan, and Central Asia, they do not understand that we would be moving Russia into the tundra, where there are only mineral resources, where nothing can live and develop. (63-64; as quoted in Koman 1996, 313)

Thus Russia's 'natural' boundaries are beyond the borders of the current Russian Federation. In order to subsist, Russia needs access to Southern territories, the sea, and especially to 'warm waters'.

The Unorthodox

Zhirinovskii's 'geopolitics' for Russia are embedded in a larger 'geopolitical' scheme for the whole world. According to Zhirinovskii's version of a New World Order, all 'Northern' countries should redirect their foreign policy focuses towards the 'South' (Markov 1996, 95). Notably this idea had been discernible in the LDP's earliest documents. The short programme adopted at the LDPSU founding congress on 31 March 1990 had already mentioned the idea of a 'change from East-West to North-South relationships' (Programma... 1990). The foreign policy section of the LDP's long 1991 programme was, in distinction to its other sections (sec. 2.1.), written by Zhirinovskii himself. Consequently, it repeated:

The real implementation of the liberal principle of neutrality should be [...] *the change from East-West relations to North-South relations*. (*Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia...* 1991, 48; emphasis in original)

The section further specified that Russia should give up its engagement in Cuba, Afrika and Vietnam. Instead, Russia should, the document explicated cynically, establish 'new, close contacts with Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan' (*Liberal'no-demokraticheskaiia...* 1991, 48).

Although Zhirinovskii's blueprint has a number of points of contact with the programmes of the conventional Right and the communists, it was perceived by Zhirinovskii himself as a distinct and ingenious agenda. In a summer 1992 interview with the German neo-fascist publicist Wolfgang Strauß, for example, Zhirinovskii pointed out:

[T]he [Russian] communists are not able to understand the geopolitical factor, the current breaking point [*perelomlenie*] of what is in the West usually called the 'race problem'. (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 8)

In a 1993 collection of LDP documents, the above listed ideas were synthesized into a comprehensive vision of a re-structuring of the world into four domains commanded by the principal industrial centres:

It would be useful [to carry out] a change from the century-old East-West relations to more beneficial, prospective and less tense North-South contacts. For this it is necessary to reach an agreement with the leading great powers and the division of 'spheres of influence' (of economic interests). In this case the USA's sphere of influence - [which is carried out] by exclusively economic and political methods, but by no means by military ones - will be Latin America and the territory of the Caribbean Sea; for the European countries - West Africa; for Russia - Afghanistan, Iran, [and] Turkey; for Japan and China - South Asia, [and] Oceania. (*Obrashchenie...* 1993, 9)

Zhirinovskii's putting the USA, Western Europe, Japan and China on an equal foot with Russia seems to imply that these countries are expected to deal with their 'Southern' allotments in the same way Zhirinovskii wants Russia to deal with its 'Southern' backyard.

The Saviour

In the above image, the 'last 'dash'' appears as merely one segment of a larger plan to comprehensively repartition the world. In other statements of Zhirinovskii, however, Russia's 'going down to the Indian Ocean' was presented as being as such important to the outside world, and as even having an impact beyond the confines of the Eurasian continent.

Already in a 1993 issue of *Liberal*, Zhirinovskii had - then still somewhat cryptically - prophesied:

[H]umanity will be grateful to us. With our foreign policy concept we will save the world from war. [...] And our party will enter world history. (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 3)

A few months later, in the first edition of *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii repeated:

[...] Russia's last 'dash' to the South will [...] preclude World War III. This is not only a solution for the internal problems of Russia and the soothing of the peoples from Kabul to Istanbul. This is also the resolution of a global task of planetarian significance. (65-66)

The LDP leader also stated why exactly his blueprint would be advantageous to the larger world too:

For the bulk of mankind it will be beneficial, if the Muslim world is slashed. The Muslim danger must be suppressed. Other religions are [in contrast] today not able to bring about religious wars. The Turkish-speaking world must be cut away. (74; also quoted in Koman 1996, 285)

The world is fortunate to have the Russians who will solve this intractable problem of human history:

Russia will do only what is predestined, [it will] fulfil a great historical mission - to liberate the world from wars which always start in the South. (76)

At another point, he once more justified his blueprint by giving an unequivocal answer to the question:

[Would pan-Islamic ideas] present a threat to humanity? Yes, to all humanity. (129; as quoted in Koman 1996, 285)

The Peacemaker

In contradiction to the distinctly threatening image of the 'South' Zhirinovskii created in the statements above, he saw it in other passages as an unfortunate region which needed help from a benevolent 'civilized' super-power. In a 1993 *Liberal* issues he, for instance, concluded with regard to 'Southern' instability:

What is needed is a stabilizing factor. The participation of a great power is necessary. [...] A STABILIZING PARTICIPATION. And this country will be Russia. (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4; emphasis in original)

At this point, Zhirinovskii was cautious enough to emphasize that Russia's 'participation' in stabilizing the 'South' would be 'NOT A MILITARY ONE', but 'EXCLUDE THE USE OF FORCE' (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4; emphasis in original).

In *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii went into more detail why Russia's intervention was needed by the 'Southerners':

[The South] is loose and crumbling. It spits fire. It is gone berserk. The tribes there are pushing to the fore again. The Afghans on the Tajiks. The Iranians on the Turkmens. The Southern

Azeris on the Northern Azeris. On one side Azerbaijan presses on Armenia. Ossetia and Abkhazia are pressing Georgia. It is all unstable. It is all in a state of open war and hostility. (65; as quoted in Koman 1996, 317)

From this follows that the 'Southerners' should be grateful to Russia:

[The last 'dash' will ensure] the exclusion of the possibility of war between Iran and Iraq, Iran and Turkey, Afghanistan and Tajikistan, [and] Pakistan and India. Hundreds of millions of people, populating this region, will be able to avoid the sad fate of [becoming] refugees. (75)

Some people may object that establishing such a peace would be unjust and merely a disguise for colonialism. Not so according to Zhirinovskii:

It is not a question of enslaving other peoples or of conquering foreign territory [in the South]. All territories there are disputed. There is endless warfare. Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds [...]. Today these peoples there do not have clearly drawn borders. (104; as quoted in Koman 1996, 310)

The Liberator

At other places Zhirinovskii goes even further and asserts that the 'last 'dash'' would not only be a blessing for the region because it would bring peace. It would even have a 'liberating' dimension. Already in a 1993 issue of *Liberal*, Zhirinovskii had proposed that the 'South' needs Russia 'to guarantee [...] human rights' (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4). In *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii specified that his blueprint would especially promote the cause of its minorities that do not possess statehood.

[Russia's last 'dash' to the South means] freedom for 20 million Kurds, for hundreds of thousands of Baluchis, Pashtuns, Daris, [and] representatives of other peoples living in this region. (74-75)

Further, the liberating dimension of the 'last ``dash''' connects with Zhirinovskii's above mentioned, idiosyncratic brand of 'anti-nationalism':

The South should be released from this infection - nationalism, the chauvinism of a large nation in relation to a small [*sic!*] [...]. (106-107)

Thus, Zhirinovskii feels entitled to assert that, by 'going down to the Indian Ocean', Russia would help the people of the 'South' to achieve their 'real liberation' (124).

Russia cannot be reproached for anything. We are not preparing to punish the people of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. We want freedom for the peoples living in the South. The South today is swimming in blood. (133; as quoted in Koman 1996, 310)

The Pragmatic

The peculiarly 'multi-cultural' aspect of Zhirinovskii's approach to the 'South' was also prominent when he pointed to - what he saw as - the practical utilities of the 'last ``dash''''. In a number of statements, Zhirinovskii asserted that life in his 'geopolitical' unit would not only be more peaceful and free, but also easier and smoother. In a 1993 issue of *Liberal*, he, for instance, based his above quoted explicit proposal to dissolve Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan on the assertion that these are 'artificial states which have no prospects [...]' (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4) In a 1993 draft for a new programme, the LDP substantiated its proposal for a 'cardinal change in domestic and foreign policies' by the expectation that a switch from 'the century-old East-West relations' to links between the 'North' and the 'South' would mean 'more profitable, prospective and less tense contacts [...]' (L, no. 3 [13], 1993, 5-6; emphasis added)

As described in the above sub-section on the 'liberating' aspect of the 'last 'dash'', at the place of the vanished Muslim states, an entirely new political formation consisting of many peoples would emerge. It would have the following characteristics.

[A]ll [of these peoples] are united by the Russian language, the Russian rouble, the foreign policy of Russia, the Russian army [...]. (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4)

Thus, what Zhirinovskii proposed was not only the elimination of the Turkish, Iranian and Afghan states, and the annexation of their territories to a resurrected Russian Empire. He also openly proposed their Russification. Moreover, when he spoke about the 'Russian rouble' and the 'Russian army', Zhirinovskii used, characteristically, the terms *ruskii* or *ruskaia* which denote *ethnic* Russian. In Russian every-day and political language, the terms *rossiiskii* or *rossiiskaia* would usually appear in those phrases which do not refer to some aspect of Russian national culture or history. *Rossiiskii* or *rossiiskaia* are the terms which denote 'all-Russian' and refer to the Russian state and its citizens rather than to the Russian nation narrowly defined.¹⁶⁶ Notably, in *The Last Dash to the South*, Zhirinovskii not only repeated his proposal to russify the 'South', and to put it under the control of the '*ruskaia* *armia*' (1993a, 77). He also justified this proposal, and wrote that 'up to the shores of the Indian Ocean all people will speak Russian' because it would be '*easier* for everybody to speak Russian than to learn five languages.' (*Ibid.*, emphasis added) He further specified:

¹⁶⁶ In spite of the importance of the distinction between *ruskii* and *rossiiskii*, there is no widely recognized and applied distinction in the Russian language between Russia as the homeland of the ethnic Russians, and Russia as the Russian state. Both are usually referred to as *Rossia*. To be sure, there are Russian terms which could be employed to identify specifically the fatherland of ethnic Russians. One possibility would be to call it *Velikaia Rossiia* (Great Russia) in distinction to *Malaia Rossiia* (Small Russia, i.e. the Ukraine), *Belaia Rossiia* (White Russia, i.e. Belarus), or *Novaia Rossiia* (New - i.e. Southern - Russia). Another option might be *Rus'* which refers to the first Russian state called the Kievan Rus. However, both *Velikaia Rossiia* and *Rus'* are antiquated, and would today mostly indicate an ultra-nationalist, irredentist sentiment. Thus among conventional rightists this sort of terminology is partly used.

Each person [...] will be protected by the law [...] which will be in effect throughout the entire territory, from Kabul to Istanbul, from the Southern shores of the Indian Ocean to the shores of the Northern Arctic Ocean. From Murmansk to the shores of the Indian Ocean we would all be citizens of a single Russian state. (107; as quoted in Koman 1996, 292)

In connection with this, a specific permutation of Zhirinovskii's 'geopolitical' argument reappeared too. It reminds somewhat the way in which the Nazis had argued that the Germans had to go eastwards in 1939 to gain the *Lebensraum* (living space) without which they would not be able to subsist. The LDPR leader, in contrast, tried to persuade the Russians that - by 'advancing to the South' - they would finally get the *Erholungsraum* (resting space) they need to live:

[T]here, at the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, would be holiday centres, youth camps, sanatoriums, houses for recreation for the industrial North [...]. (66)

The Man of the World

The implementation of his scheme would, Zhirinovskii admitted, meet resistance not only from the Muslim world, but the West too. In view of this, the appearance *The Last Dash to the South* as such was paraded as Zhirinovskii's preliminary response to Western objections, and his offer to the Western countries to reform together the international system. Indeed, many ordinary Russian readers (and even some political observers) seemed to have been successfully made believing that Zhirinovskii had done a first step towards comprehensively re-negotiating Russian-Western relations after the end of the Cold War on the basis of equal status.¹⁶⁷ In accordance with this strategy, Zhirinovskii wrote as if rejoinding explicitly to some anticipated criticism by the West. He thus had to appear as a modern cosmopolitan with an understanding not only for the larger concerns of humanity, but also for what the essential national interests of Western countries come down to.

¹⁶⁷ An revised English version of *The Last Dash* has been published under the provocative title *My Struggle* (Zhirinovskii 1996).

At one point in *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii appealed to the common sense and interests of Russia and the world:

Humanity cannot allow wars always to go on to the South of Russia. In the Caucasus, in Central Asia, and in the Near East. [...] In this part of the world we must achieve peace. (65; as quoted in Koman 1996, 317)

At other points, Zhirinovskii dealt specifically with possible US-American disapproval, and once more stretched his hand out for collaboration.

[America's] idea of world domination is depraved. Regional cooperation is better. The creation of spheres of influence is better. If we start overlapping again, we will begin to cause each other trouble again. We must agree again, and it must be a world agreement [...]. And everything is equal. No one has predominance. The direction is one and the same to the South. The territories are continuous. (71-72; as quoted in Koman 1996, 314)

Zhirinovskii implied that the world around us is changing. Ultimately, the United States' approach to international affairs would have to adapt too, and to support more up-to-date solutions for topical problems.

In the end, the Americans will agree with our position and with our formula for the geopolitical development of the world. (123; as quoted in Koman 1996, 292)

Of course, Zhirinovskii acknowledged realistically, there are also those who - in spite of their imminent pacification and liberation - might disagree with the 'last 'dash''. Yet, one has to keep the larger picture in mind:

If we were to blockade Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, some of the people there might be unhappy. But the whole world would think that if Russia needs it, then it is good. You have to follow the will of the majority. It would be advantageous to most of humanity if the Muslim world was cut off. (74; as quoted in Koman 1996, 312-313)

The Warrior

A different aspect of Zhirinovskii's preoccupation with the outside world is his undisguised militarism, warmongering and bellicosity. In spite of Zhirinovskii's fullhearted advocacy of military measures as such, he sometimes felt the need to put forward justifications for rearmament and conduct of war. At an LDP conference on 7 March 1993, he chose, in doing so, to impute to the U.S. some of the central motives and reasoning which would later be used to rationalize the explicitly military character of the 'last `dash''':

[America does not] care about Kuwait. [...] Iraq can be accused of aggression, but what is the purpose of this? To provoke a war. What is the purpose of the war? To raise an army. America needs a strong army and strong armed forces. (Zhirinovskii 1993d, 6; as quoted in Koman 1996, 312)

In *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii proposed that the military campaign to reach the Indian Ocean would by itself be beneficial for Russia in a similar way the Kuwait campaign had been useful to the United States:

[The last `dash'] will be the means for the survival of the nation as a whole, [and] the foundation for a renaissance [*vozhrozhdenie*] of the Russian army. New armed forces can be reborn only as a result of a battle operation. The army cannot get stronger in registration offices and barracks. It needs an aim, a task. Such a task was the defeat of the threat of German occupation. Red regiments and divisions arose to struggle with foreign invaders. That is how the Red Army appeared. Today the Russian Army must revive if we are to finish things with

the fighters in Central Asia, in the Caucasus, and in Moldova, and if we are to complete the operation of establishing new Russian borders in the South. (70)

Thus the success of the 'last 'dash'' and its implementation by military means are interrelated: war-experience is necessary to create an effective army, and an effective army is the precondition to be victorious against the 'Southerners'. Accordingly, in December 1994, Zhirinovskii supported El'tsin's Chechnia campaign because, among others, 'a new Russian army is being created in the Caucasus.' (as quoted in Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, xxii)¹⁶⁸

It is, characteristically, in the very last passages of the first September 1993 edition of *The Last Dash* that Zhirinovskii expressed his perhaps most widely quoted bellicose vision:

Let Russia successfully realize her last 'dash' to the South. I see Russian soldiers setting for this last Southern journey. I see Russian commanders in headquarters of Russian divisions and armies who draw movement routes for combat units and the end points of these routes. I see airplanes on Air Force bases in Southern regions of Russia. I see submarines surfacing on the shores of the Indian Ocean and landing-crafts approaching the shores on which soldiers of the Russian army are already marching, armoured personnel carriers and huge masses of tanks are moving. Finally Russia will accomplish its last military campaign [voennyi pokhod]. (142-143; emphasis in original)

The Visionary

The last quotation indicates a further self-image, Zhirinovskii tried to communicate to his audience. He was not only the coolly calculating foreign policy expert, and undaunted future commander-in-chief of the Russian army. At times, Zhirinovskii also posed as a dreamer, an idealist, a

¹⁶⁸ At times Zhirinovskii went further and indicated that violent conflict is per se a good thing. For instance, he stated that the national self-consciousness of Russians has fallen so sharply that to 'awaken the Russian nation one may awaken her with blood' (1994a, 2). At another point, he concluded that '[p]atriotism needs war.' (S, 16 April 1994)

romantic who gets carried away by his visions of a newborn Russia, of a just punishment for Russia's enemies, and of an ultimately impartial re-ordering of the world system.

In a 1993 issue of *Liberal*, for example, Zhirinovskii complained about the conquest of the 'peaceful' Byzantine Empire by the 'barbarians [i.e. the Ottoman Turks]' which represented the 'occupation of foreign territory' and 'annexation'. His conclusion was:

It is necessary that everything returns to its place, that the Christian world re-unites again in Jerusalem, that the bells of the Christian-Orthodox Church ring again in Constantinople [...].
(L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4)

In a summer 1993 article in the daily *Izvestiia*, Zhirinovskii did also not suppress his weakness for obviously idealized visions:

Our soldiers will wash their boots in the waters of the warm Indian Ocean, and the local inhabitants will meet them with flowers. (1993c; as quoted in Koman 1996, 291)

A few weeks later, in *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii displayed again his enthusiastic side:

The sound bells of the Russian Orthodox Church on the shore of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea would ring out peace to the peoples of the region, the brotherhood of peoples, prosperity, well-being, tranquility, and an end to all military conflicts and ethnic strife.
(75; as quoted in Koman 1996, 315)

Towards the end of his treatise, Zhirinovskii drew once more a picture of harmony and fulfillment:

For the last time the Russian army is preparing for its Southern campaign and to establish itself finally on the shores of the Indian Ocean. It will not go further. Further are the warm waters of

the Indian Ocean, washing the shores of our old friends India and Iraq [...]. (124; as quoted in Koman 1996, 311-312)

The Pacifier

As outlined in the sub-sections on Zhirinovskii's 'realism', 'prudence' or 'cosmopolitanism', the LDP leader frequently exhibited a rational, down-to-earth and worldly approach to international affairs. As already indicated in the last sub-section, the altogether dominant impression of *The Last Dash* is nevertheless that of a rather esoteric-metaphysical text with rich psychopathological subtexts.

One of the striking peculiarities of Zhirinovskii's book is how often he speaks of the necessity of a 'soothing', 'calming', 'quieting', or 'settling down'.¹⁶⁹ In his major 1993 writing, there are at least 19 occurrences of terms like *uspokoenie* (soothing), *spokoino* (soothe) or *uspokoit'* (to soothe) (1993a, 65, 66, 75, 77, 87, 94, 102, 105, 107, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 137, 139). Apart from the practical advantages of the 'last 'dash'', its aim would also be to bring about a multifarious 'soothing' and 'pacification' of Russia and the outside world. Not only does this mean that 'Russia's last 'dash' to the South [...] is [...] the soothing of the peoples from Kabul to Istanbul.' (65-66) In America, it would also become 'sooth' once Russia has banished the Red and the Muslim threat (66). In order to 'calm down', the Russians have no other opportunity than to realize the last 'dash':

This is not my whim. This is Russia's predestination. This is fate. It is Russia's heroic deed. We have to do this because we have no choice. We cannot otherwise. [...] Our development demands this. (104)

Similarly (though not as often as 'soothing') reappearing terms are 'warm' or 'warmth' especially in connection with the sea, and here above all with the Indian Ocean:

¹⁶⁹ See also L, no. 2 (12), 1993, 4.

The warm breath of the ocean will calm all who live in this new geopolitical space, in these new frontiers of Russia. (124)

The Cleanser

Also in *The Last Dash*, there is a further pathological, recurring feature related to both, Zhirinovskii's above introduced self-image as a political physician and his esoteric train of thought: the metaphor of a cleansing or purgation of the nation. Alexander Motyl has rightly called attention to the general obsession of Zhirinovskii with water, baths, washing, and cleanliness, on the one side, and filth and dirt, on the other. It might not be by incident that these themes are prominent in both, the autobiographical and the political-programmatic parts of *The Last Dash* (cf. Motyl 1994, 12-13).¹⁷⁰ In the description of Zhirinovskii's childhood, for instance, the toilet, bad smell, or bathhouses are described in detail (10-13, 29-30). In the second, political part of the book, Russia's current Time of Troubles is accordingly pictured as a process of decontamination by way of a regenerating blood-letting and cleansing.

Sometimes [the nation's cleansing currently in process] causes blood [-shed]. That is bad. Yet, apparently that was necessary for us, for our bitter country, to finally wash down the disease, this satanic [thing] which has infected us since the beginning of the century, that has been unleashed in the centre of Russia by the West, to poison the country, to destruct it from inside - through communism, through nationalism [*sic!*], through cosmopolitanism, through the influence of alien religions, alien ideas, [and] an alien way of life. We will finish this. We will grow out from this as the most hardened nation. (117-118)

At other places in *The Last Dash*, Zhirinovskii ascribes a similar function to his blueprint: '[The last "dash"] would be a purification for all of us.' (75) Somehow it would also entail that '[t]he rivers will

¹⁷⁰ This, of course, reminds strongly Adolf Hitler's similar (apparently even more obsessive) fondness for pureness, and tidyness. For a comprehensive description and enlightening interpretation of Hitler's pathology, cf. Waite 1993.

become cleaner, the water we drink will become cleaner.' (125) The final result of all this would be that 'we [the Russians] will enter the 21st century as different, as clean [people].' (117)

Zhirinovskii and the Russian Past

It is not easy a task to conceptualize and contextualize the 'last ``dash``' in a way as to render it more comprehensible, and to show that it cannot be dismissed as merely a Freudian pamphlet. Yet, although perhaps looking bizarre at a first glance, the blueprint's aggressively messianistic and pathologically escapist traits should not be much of a surprise to students of Russian history and politics. Messianism and escapism have been central currents of Russian religious, monachist, romantic, utopian and nationalist thought since the 16th century. At some points, Zhirinovskii explicitly takes recourse to this tradition when he styles Russia's destination to bring 'peace' and 'liberation' to the nationalism-stricken 'South'. The Russians, he writes for example in *The Last Dash*, always

[...] carried the freedom on their shoulders, - in whichever uniform they have been dressed - of the Tsarist army, the Soviet army, [or] the Russian army. (124)

One should further not be misled by the apparent obsessiveness of Zhirinovskii's anti-Turkish utterances. Not only is there at least one important conventionally right-wing extremist group, the National-Republican Party of Russia (*NRPR*), the leader of which has made similarly sounding invectives against Turkey (Lysenko 1993). Alan Koman has rightly pointed out the deep historical roots, longevity and salience of the Russian-Turkish military and diplomatic conflict since the Ottoman Turks' capture of Constantinople - until then the center of Orthodoxy - in 1453. Koman counted twelve major wars between Russians and Turks from the 17th until the early 20th century. After the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, the Soviet Union and Turkey continued to confront each other during and after World War II. Moreover, as Koman also outlines, this conflict is only one - if the most important - aspect of a history of continuous Russian-Muslim clashes in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Crimea and Persia (Iran). The date of origin of this larger confrontation goes back as far as 1295 AD

when the Mongolian Great Khan adopted Islam. At that time, the Golden Horde had conquered most of Russia, and continued to control her until 1450-80 (Koman 1996, 293-309). The Soviet Union's aggression against Afghanistan 1979-1989, Russia's support for the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia in their war with Muslim Bosnians (as well as with Croatia) in 1991-95, and the El'tsin administration's intervention in Chechnia 1994-96 indicate that this conflict has not lost its topicality during the last 900 years.

Not only becomes Zhirinovskii's general focus on what he calls the 'South' less of an abnormality, if seen in this context. Neither the content nor the impetus of his particular blueprint are, in spite of the plan's apparent craziness, as eccentric as they may look. Some of the central aims and justifications of the *The Last Dash to the South* had already been present in Russian political and strategic thought long before Zhirinovskii.

First, Russian foreign policy makers had for centuries been preoccupied with the prospect of Constantinople's 'liberation'. This deed was seen as a special duty Russia owed to Orthodox Christianity; and Zhirinovskii occasionally explicitly referred to this particular heritage. Actually, during World War I, the *Entente* had, as Zhirinovskii also mentioned, promised Russia the Bosphorus as a bonus it could have once the Ottoman Turks surrendered (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 4).

Second, Koman details that, after two Russo-Persian wars in the early 19th century,

a strong school of thought within the Russian leadership held the view that all of Persia should eventually be included in the Russian Empire. (Koman 1996, 307)

Thus even the, perhaps, most phantastic aspect of Zhirinovskii blueprint - his explicit proposal to include whole countries in the 'South' into Russia - is not as unorthodox as it might have sounded.

Third, the idea of an advance to the Indian Ocean had been a recurring theme in Tsarist and Soviet geostrategic thought since the 19th century - and Zhirinovskii occasionally refers to this circumstance (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4; Zhirinovskii 1993a, 103). Russia had, in general, a long history of fighting for access to seas, among them the 'warm waters'. The reaching of the Indian Ocean would have been an, especially in military terms, important asset; and it has been proposed that this

consideration has played a not insignificant role in the Soviet leadership's decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979.

Fourth, what is, perhaps, most staggering, however, are the strident similarities between Zhirinovskii's agenda, and a certain train in Fëdor Dostoevskii's political thinking as documented in his *Diary of a Writer*. Dostoevskii proposed that Russia should direct its foreign policy efforts not to the West where she is seen as backward and barbarian. Instead, Russia should focus on the even more backward Asia where she can perform a civilizing role (Laqueur 1994, 53, 201; Koman 1996).

By turning to Asia [...] our country may experience something akin to what happened in Europe when America was discovered. For, in truth, Asia to us is like the then undiscovered America. With Asia as our aim, our spirit and forces will be regenerated [...]. In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, but we shall go to Asia as masters. (as quoted in Koman 1996, 304-305)

Shortly, before his death Dostoevskii made a statement which even more closely resembles those quoted above by Zhirinovskii:

Yes, the Golden Horn and Constantinople - all this will be ours. [...] [T]his will come to pass of its own accord, precisely because the time has come, and even if it has not yet arrived, indeed it is already near at hand; all signs point to this [...]. No matter what happens there - peace, or new concessions on the part of Russia - sooner or later Constantinople will be ours [...].

Yes it must be ours, not only because of the Traits, 'the center of the universe', 'the navel of the earth'; not from the standpoint of the long-conceived necessity for a tremendous giant like Russia to emerge at last from his locked room, in which he has already grown up to the ceiling, into the open spaces where he may breathe the free air of the seas and oceans [...]. Our task is deeper, immeasurably deeper. We, Russia, are really indispensable and inevitable,

both to all Eastern Christianity and to the whole future of Orthodoxy on earth, in order to achieve unity. This was always understood to be so by our people and their Tsars [...].

In brief, this dreadful Eastern Question constitutes almost our whole future destiny. Therein lie, as it were, all our problems [...]. Therein lies also our final conflict with Europe [...]. [S]ooner or later Constantinople must be ours, even if it should take another century! (as quoted in Koman 1996, 323)

Zhirinovskii and the Russian Present

Notwithstanding, in spite of a variety of historical reference points, the traditional character of Zhirinovskii's extremely expansionist imperialism should not be overdrawn. The socio-political conditions of post-Soviet Russia and the world differ radically from those of the historical periods to which one could refer in search for analogies. Therefore and in spite of such prominent forerunners as Dostoevskii, the 'advance to the South' stands markedly out from mainstream foreign policy agendas of the conventionally right-radical groupings (Kurashvili 1994, 137). In fact, a substantial part of the conventional Right has, in view of the Russian state's novel external and socio-economic environment, begun to drop its traditionally anti-Islamic orientation (and, in doing so, often referred to the early 20th century Russian school of 'Eurasianism'). Some sections of the New Right have even come out in favour of a close cooperation with Muslim countries in order to fight jointly the expansion of Western political ideas. For example, the leading right-wing publications *Elementy* (e.g. no. 1, 1992, 12-13) or *Den'* (e.g. no. 10 [90], 1993, 4) devoted special pages to the merits of Oriental political and religious thought (Gebhard 1994, 35-87).

Although perhaps less obvious, one can, for different reasons, make a largely similar argument concerning Zhirinovskii's irrendetism and restorationism, i.e. his proposal of a resurrection of the Russian Empire - the other major focus of his foreign policy agenda. Again, it might, even more so than above, appear that the introduction of a *de facto and de jure*, highly centralized unitarianism and purely administrative division of Russia is an essentially (ultra-) conservative programme. Above all, it seems to resemble the structure of the Tsarist Empire (Dunlop 1994, 28). At least at one point, Zhirinovskii

himself justified his project by explicitly presenting it as a return to a pre-revolutionary pattern (*Obrashchenie...* 1993, 2). If seen in combination with his proposal to remove the nationality section in the passports of citizens of his new 'Russian [*rossiiskaia*] Republic', the plan could also be interpreted as representing a specifically neo-Soviet brand of conservative Russian imperialism. Its pseudo-supra-national aspect somewhat reminds the Soviet patriotic variety of Russian nationalism, and a similar proposal regarding the abolition of the nationality-line in the Soviet passport made on the eve of the adoption of the Brezhnev constitution in 1977 (McAuley 1984, 193). As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the general proposal to restore at least partly the Russian Empire in one way or another is one of the most common and mainstream goals uniting most of the conventional Right with the neo-communists (the other major common idea being anti-Westernism).

Notwithstanding, Zhirinovskii's by 1993 unequivocal call for an immediate, wholesale and unqualified *de facto* and *de jure* abolition of the autonomous republics inside the Russian Federation and of the former Soviet Union republics is, if compared to the agendas of his rightist colleagues, relatively unique by its uncompromising tone. The proposal should also be seen in relation to Zhirinovskii's call for a chalybeate bath for the Russians, and in the context of his emphasis on the novelty of the Russian Empire he envisages. The major reason why his unconditionally centralist restorationism can only be partly classified as conservative is, however, a contextual.

A full resurrection of the pre-revolutionary unitarian administrative structure would only on the surface constitute a 'return' to the past. During the last eighty years, all larger ethnic groups and nationalities of the Tsarist Empire have developed into proper nations with definite political aspirations and distinct historical myths (Suny 1993). Paradoxically, the Soviet experience contributed to this process in two somewhat contradictory ways. On the one hand, it actively *promoted* the rise of the Soviet nations. It facilitated nationalism indirectly by rapid (if uneven and extremely violent) modernization; and it encouraged the Soviet nationalities directly by its quasi-multi-cultural policy of *korenizatsiia* (becoming rooted) especially in the 1920s and early 1930s. On the other hand, however, it also gave salience to national issues and grievances by the anti-nationalist impulse of many of its policies, and by the forcible Russification campaigns and assimilation drives especially under Stalin

1934-53. As a result the national self-consciousness even of the previously only rudimentarily developed Soviet nationalities rose constantly and transformed into more or less radical nationalism. Therefore, Zhirinovskii's alleged 'return' to the *de jure* centralism under Tsarism, or even to the pseudo-federalist, *de facto* unitarianism of the Soviet Union would meet large-scale, decisive, violent and organized resistance inside the Russian Federation (cf. Chechnia) and in the 'near abroad' (cf. Tajikistan).

Zhirinovskii's occasional accentuation that his would be a *New Russia* seems to be thus not entirely inadequate (although there may not be much left of the Russian state after an attempt to implement Zhirinovskii's 'innovations'). Some authors, such as Alexander Motyl (1994) or Alan Koman (1996), have, moreover, pointed out that Zhirinovskii's focus on the Muslim 'South' in some way remarkably parallels recent warnings by various prominent Western scholars concerning an imminent international turmoil after the end of the Cold War era, or 'civilizational clashes' in, among others, the post-Soviet hemisphere and the Middle East. To sum up, the various aspects of Zhirinovskii's agenda and propaganda appear as a series of strange mixtures: atavistic futurism, pre-modern post-modernism, nihilistic realism, reactionary utopianism, revolutionary imperialism. The presence of such contradictions should, however, not be taken as a reason for relaxation. Twentieth century history suggests that sometimes such oxymora - e.g. the 'conservative revolution' or 'national socialism' of inter-war Germany - not only reveal individual pathologies, but also entail enormous social energies.

Part III: Classifying the Documents

5. Fascist Tendencies in Zhirinovskii's Writings in the Newspaper Liberal

5.1. The Research Framework and Political Context of this Chapter

'I am not a fascist, am I?'

Vladimir Zhirinovskii at a juridical hearing concerning allegations against him that he is a fascist. (Z, 5 August 1994, 2)

Right-Wing Extremism and Peace Studies

The political circumstances of Chechnia's invasion by Russian troops in December 1994 have shown that a recent proposal by Berlin's politologist Ulrich Albrecht concerning research into contemporary ethno-social wars is of relevance for the study of Russian politics too. The specific character of these new conflicts in Europe is, according to Albrecht, that they can be neither conceptualized as intra-state or civil wars for control over a country; nor can they be described as inter-state wars. Instead, these conflicts appear as 'pluri-ethnic' identity conflicts which are settled by military means. In their extreme forms they arise as secessionist or anti-regime wars which have so far only been observed in the Third World. For an adequate consideration of this new type of confrontations, which can be also conceptualized as 'ethno-religious conflicts'¹⁷¹, Albrecht proposes to approach them in a novel way. He suggests to combine war, conflict and peace studies with international extremism studies (Albrecht 1994).

In the case of Russia the close connection between these two directions in political research

¹⁷¹ Though one has to add that, in Europe and the post-Soviet geographical space, religion plays more important a role as a factor which defines national identity, communal belonging and ethnic demarcation than as a basis of a politicized religious fundamentalism. On the ethno-religious conflict on the Balkans, see, for instance, the insightful study of Calic (1995).

has recently been demonstrated with textbook-clarity. The victory of the LDPR in the December 1993 parliamentary elections and the subsequent changes in the Russian political agenda should be seen as important determinants, if not necessary preconditions, of the Chechnia adventure of the 'party of war' in the El'tsin administration.¹⁷²

The focus of the following investigation will be an especially aggressive form of right-wing extremism: fascism. In line with Albrecht's proposal to regard international extremism studies as an early warning device for specific public addressees (1994), I shall show in this case study that there are, at least, two relatively consistent lines of thought in a particular series of Zhirinovskii's publications which should, in view of the relevant theoretical literature on comparative fascism, be classified as being essentially 'fascist'.¹⁷³ Among the addressees of such a message would be above

¹⁷² This was exemplified by the fact that, on 5 April 1995, 44 of the 56 State Duma deputies who voted against the Federal Law 'On measures for a Political [i.e. non-military] Regulation of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic' came from the LDPR faction, and two more (V.A. Marychev, L.S. Maksakova) had been elected to the State Duma on the LDPR list (AiF, no. 15, 1995). After the results of this voting were demonstratively published in the popular weekly *Argumenty i fakty* (Arguments and Facts), the LDPR did not take part at a second voting on this Law, and thus contributed to preventing it from becoming a Constitutional Law which could not have been vetoed by El'tsin (AiF, no. 16, 1995).

The above explanation for the start of the Chechen war has been also proposed by the leading Russian democrat Grigorii Iavlinskii in the TV news programme *Itogi* (NTV, 18 December 1995), and by the Russian emigrees Elena Klepikova and Vladimir Solovyov in their book on Zhirinovskii (1995, VII). To be sure, there had been already changes toward a more 'patriotic' line in Russian domestic and especially foreign policies before the electoral victory of Zhirinovskii (Crow 1994, 1-6). Yet, if Egor Gaidar and other democrats had remained members of government after December 1993, and the State Duma had taken a more explicitly negative stance on the military option to solve the Chechnia problem, it would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, for the so called 'war party' in the Russian government to have their way. On this so called 'Lobov-Grachëv-Korzhakov-Group', see Christian Schmidt-Häuer in: Z, 6 January 1995. The major representatives of the 'party of war' in the Russian executive had left the government by the end of 1996. They included the Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov, late Chief of Presidential Administration Nikolai Egorov, Minister of Defense Pavel Grachëv, Head of Federal Service of Security (former KGB) Mikhail Barsukov, Chief of Presidential Security Guard Aleksandr Korzhakov, and the First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets. Current Minister of Interior Kulikov seems to be the only belligerent militarist and racist left in the highest echelons of the El'tsin administration.

¹⁷³ Characteristically, it was in the last issue of *Liberal*, the LDP newspaper with (as I shall show) fascist tendencies under consideration here (L, no. 3 [13], 1993, 6), that the LDP Press Service boasted that Zhirinovskii had taken to court the newspaper *Moscow Guardian* (a subsidiary of the weekly *Kommersant* edited by Billy Rogers) for slanderous remarks on the Liberal-Democratic Party, i.e. for, among others, comparing it with classic fascism, in one of its issues (no. 41, 1992). This action was apparently the most successful of its kind. In late 1993, the *Moscow Guardian* was sentenced to pay Zhirinovskii 10 Million Roubles (then approximately DM 15,000) after which the newspaper had to close (N.N. 1994, 109; Lester 1994, 27; Plekhanov 1994, 35).

all those Russian courts which, during the last years, forced several Russian newspapers and democratic politicians to publicly apologize to Zhirinovskii, and even to pay him high compensations for comparisons of him and his party with inter-war fascisms.

Zhirinovskii versus Gaidar

Zhirinovskii's major juridicial confrontation on whether it is legitimate to call him a 'fascist' or not, and the trial to which I am refering here in the first instance was the one with former Prime-Minister and leading liberal-democratic politician Egor Gaidar. In April 1994, Gaidar had written a brilliant polemic against Zhirinovskii called 'A Stake on Rotters' for the daily *Izvestiia* in which he called the LDP-leader, among others, a 'populist fascist' and 'the most popular fascist leader of Russia' (1994). Zhirinovskii took Gaidar to court in summer 1994. In spite of Gaidar's lawyer Genri Reznik's demonstration of the presence of essential characteristics of fascism by comparing Zhirinovskii's major writing *The Last Dash to the South* (1993a) to Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, two of the three members of the Tver Inter-Municipal Court (L. Bykovskaia and V. Toropov) ruled that both, Gaidar and *Izvestiia* had in each case to pay Zhirinovskii the equivalent of approximately US\$250, and to publicly apologize for the above labellings (S, 9 September 1994). One of the Court's justifications of this decision was that

Further periodicals which Zhirinovskii, mostly more or less succesfully, took to court for alleged libels (among them, comparisons of him to Hitler) included *Rech'*, *Moskovskaia pravda*, *Stolitsa*, *Moskovskie novosti*, a Helsinki-based Swedish-language newspaper, and the major German tabloid *BILD*. Following Zhirinovskii's denouncement one court, for instance, forced the weekly *Stolitsa* to pay to Zhirinovskii Rbls. 5,000, and to apologize for having printed a collage showing together one half of Zhirinovskii's face, and one half of Hitler's physiognomy (Plekhanov 1994, 35). Zhirinovskii has also protested against the presentation of his person by a Finish theatre, and the Moscow press agency *Postfaktum*. See, IuG, no. 14, 1991, 9; St, no. 36 (42), 1991, no. 44, 1991, 5, and no. 5, 1992, 8-9; SR, 14 April 1992; St, no. 17, 1992, 1; *ITAR-TASS*, 31 May 1994; DNZ, 4 March 1994; N.N. 1994, 91, 109.

In early 1991, the LDP Juridicial Department Head V. Nedoshever boasted that the party is preparing 200 informations for Russian courts (IuG, no. 11, 1991, 14), whereas he in autumn 1992 announced that there were 80 denunciations, and another 123 in preparation (*Rabochaia tribuna*, 2 November 1992). In March 1994, Zhirinovskii's lawyer Sergei Beliak stated that 'Zhirinovskii has already laid approximately fourty times information [against various institutions and persons], and won practically all [processes].' (as quoted in N.N. 1994, 109) Timtschenko detailed that Zhirinovskii had instituted legal proceedings against six newspapers and journals - all of them succesful (1994, 72).

[n]one of the researchers studying the nature of fascism to whom the advocate [Reznik] of the author [Gaidar] referred in the juridical hearing has come to the conclusion that the ideology of Zhirinovskii is fascist. (as quoted in I, 16 November 1994, 2)

However, oddly neither the judges or the procuracy, nor the defense had asked for such a conclusion. To Gaidar and his advocate that seemed then simply unnecessary.

Of course, Reznik filed an appeal against this ruling to the Moscow City Court. In view of the above statement, Reznik this time enclosed to his motion a supporting analysis of the ideology of Zhirinovskii by Aleksandr Galkin, Professor of History and a leading Russian expert on fascism, and I. Levinskaia, Candidate of Science in History. However, the Moscow City Court refused leave to appeal, and argued, among others, that Galkin's and Levinskaia's statement represents their personal opinion (I, 16 November 1994; RV, 18 November 1994).¹⁷⁴

Thus it is one of the intentions of this study to question the justness of those rulings of Russian courts in which it is declared that it is in principal not legitimate to use the term 'fascism' to characterize Zhirinovskii and his party.

Besides such practical considerations, as I shall argue, more general arguments in favour of the purpose of this study can be put forward.

¹⁷⁴ For more details and references on this trial, as well as on a similar (but for the LDP unsuccessful) juridical conflict between the LDP organisation of Vologda and the local *DemRossiia* activist Iurii Nekrassov, Doctor of Science in History, see Umland 1994b, 1130-1131. A further analogous important trial between Zhirinovskii and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev has been apparently abandoned because Zhirinovskii refused to turn up to the hearings (R, no. 11 [225], 2 May 1995, 3; PZh, no. 9 [56], 1995; I, 21 December 1995; The Moscow Times, 21 December 1995).

5.2. The 'Whys' of Studying Fascism in Russia

5.2.1. The Significance of Zhirinovskii's Political Ideas

If one follows the suggestions on the importance of ideology of the Introduction ('Assumptions and Purposes') and acknowledges that the study of ideology is of importance to the explanation and understanding of politics in general, that does not by itself answer the question whether Zhirinovskii's ideology is sufficiently relevant to Russian politics to warrant its in-depth study, i.e. to justify an investigation which goes beyond the above tentative, grounded, non-systematic interpretation of the major LDPR-documents in Part II, Chapter 4. This question is, of course, a mere component part of the larger issue concerning the overall significance of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' in post-Soviet Russian society - a topic which will be referred to again in Part IV.

The LDPR's Direct Influence on Russian Politics

I will distinguish here between direct and indirect influences of Zhirinovskii's and his party's ideologism on Russian politics (as opposed to the impact of the LDP's opportunism and pragmatism).

To start with, Zhirinovskii has the possibility to *directly* influence Russian politics via his party's presence in the lower house of the parliament, the State Duma, and through its participation in elections as well as appearances in national media.

First, in the Fifth and Sixth Russian State Dumas, Zhirinovskii's major leverage was and is that the support of his faction is important or even pivotal in the adoption of those laws which had or have the support of only one of the two major voting coalitions. This refers to those moves which have the backing either from the oppositional communist-patriotic - sometimes misleadingly called 'left-wing' - alliance (*KPRF*, *APR* and Nikolai Ryzhkov's 'Power to the People!' Bloc), or, on the other side, from the more or less consistently pro-government and democratic factions or groups (Chernomyrdin's *NDR*, Russian Regions, Iavlinskii's *Iabloko*, 'Russia's Choice', etc.) which are often deludingly positioned on the 'right' part of the political spectrum (see my 'Introduction'). The LDP

won 22.92% on the party list, and was victorious in five one-mandate districts in December 1993 which gave it 64 of the 450 Duma seats. This number shrank because of death and defection of some deputies to 58 (or 13.1% of the seats) in mid-1994, and rose to 59 (or 13.4% of the seats) in January 1995 (Schneider 1995a, 24; *Vlast* '... 1994 [1995], 4th vol., 99).

In the December 1995 elections, the LDP won only 11.18% on the party list and secured only one one-mandate district. However, nearly half of the votes given in these elections' voting for the 225 Duma seats allocated proportionally were given to parties which did not pass the 5%-barrier. Thus the remaining ca. 50% of the votes given to those four bloc which did collect over 5% determined exclusively the distribution of those half of the lower house allocated for proportional representation of all-federal parties. In Russia in December 1995, the idea of 'proportional representation' led because of an unimaginative electoral law to 'disproportional representation'. This meant that the LDPR secured, in spite of its significantly worse performance, only a little less influence in the Sixth State Duma than in the Fifth State Duma - 51 seats (Orttung 1996).

In sum, however, the LDPR faction had only a small numerical strength in the Duma; the major reason for this was that it turned out to be a politically impotent force with regard to the voting for the 225 seats allocated to candidates from the single-mandate districts. Yet, the LDPR faction's occupies a peculiar position between the anti- and pro-reform groups - i.e. the democrats, such as the IaBLoko-faction, and reformist centrists such as 'Our Home is Russia', on the one side, and the ultra-conservative communists, agrarians and their allies, on the other side. As far as neither of these to major force commands an absolute majority, Zhirinovskii had and has, especially in the Sixth State Duma, a high bargaining capacity for influencing political processes. This peculiar constellation of forces, and the LDPR faction's location in it reminds somewhat the critical or even 'king-maker' role the (fundamentally different) German Free Democratic Party *FDP* has played in the case of stalemates between conservatives and social democrats in the *Bundestag*, the lower house of the German parliament for the last decades.

Of course, one can from this not conclude that Zhirinovskii's ideology and core ideas are thus determining today Russian politics. His personal ambition, psychological imbalances, ties to certain financial, industrial and criminal groups (V. Ivanov 1996), as well as tactical considerations, pragmatism and opportunism are also important determinants of the LDP faction's voting and

bargaining behaviour. Yet, ideologism will, with regard to at least some actions of the faction, still appear as a major explanatory factor. Besides this the LDP faction also exerts a less visible, but also critical influence on the formulation of law projects and on the State Duma's work schedule via its presence in the chamber's committees and presidium. Obviously, ideology functions in this context as a major determinant of the kind of influence which is exercised by the LDPR with regard to legislative work and pushing certain issue in Russia's lower house (Schneider 1995a).

Second, the LDP leadership has also the possibility to directly (though somewhat less manifestly) influence Russian politics through its media presence. By this I mean that Zhirinovskii and his assistants constitute one factor in the formation of the overall political agenda and of public opinion in Russia. Though the LDP plays certainly not a decisive role in these processes, it can also not be ignored completely. By the same token, Zhirinovskii's and his party's more or less successful participation in national and regional elections sends signals to decision makers in the executive branches of power. If these presidents, ministers, governors, mayors, etc. are, indeed, taking into account the rise, fall or persistence of Zhirinovskii's popularity, they will relate respective modifications of their policies to, among others, Zhirinovskii's ideology or, more precisely, to how and to which degree they comprehend and interpret his programmatic pronouncements and topical political statements. It should be noted finally, that, as already indicated, this kind of influence of Zhirinovskii on Russian politics might not always be an - in value-neutral terms - positive one. That means that Zhirinovskii's approval or disapproval of certain policies or decisions may well have the effect that the respective resolutions are deliberately modified to *contradict* Zhirinovskii's stand on them. But this would still mean that his ideology to a certain degree influences Russian politics.

The LDPR's Indirect Influence on Russian Politics

I here call *indirect* those influences of the LDPR which are a result of the grass-roots level activities of its apparatus and regional structures, rather than of the national-level motions of its Duma faction and leadership. In connection with this, one has to mention, above all, the vast amount of political literature and periodicals produced by the LDPR's central and local organizations over the last years. These publications are documented in the 'Further Reading' list's section 'Primary Literature'. A quantitative peak of this activity on record constituted apparently the publication of

number 5 (25) of the newspaper *LDPR* edited by V. Ivanov in mid-May 1996. According to the information given in the newspaper's imprint (p. 4), altogether seven million copies of this issue were printed in various editions. This is, because of the general decline of (especially central) post-Soviet Russian newspaper circulation (Porojkow, Porojkow and Burger 1995), a comparatively high figure.¹⁷⁵ In general, together with other agitation and propaganda material (VRC, posters, etc.), LDP publications have, according to my impressions from recent visits to Russian regions, become a visible component of - especially the provincial - newspaper- and book-market. Though no conclusions can be made about the degree of actual influence which Zhirinovskii's publications on the Russian population exercise, the mere presence of such high numbers of newspapers, brochures, books, leaflets as well as audio- and video-cassettes would suggest that the ideological guidelines of the LDP communicated through these propaganda efforts must have played and, probably, still play a certain role in the formation of Russian public opinion. This concerns, probably, especially remote regions and small cities where other sources of political information are less easily available than, for instance, in the national and regional capitals.

A second significant way of indirectly influencing Russian politics, as defined above, has been the LDP's nationwide active campaigning for joining the party, and, especially, its recruitment of hundreds of party functionaries and activists all over the country. It is for the argument of this section of exceptional importance that Zhirinovskii's special focus in this campaign has been the Russian youth. That is exemplified in a number of his writings and publications (e.g. 1994d, or the newspaper *Sokol Zhirinovskogo*) as well as by some of his activities as, for instance, the operation of a Heavy Metal music shop in the LDP's Moscow headquarters or his visits to Moscow Rock or Punk Clubs (*Russkii rok*, no. 1, 1993, 14-19; St, no. 10, 1993, 42-43). Accordingly, I got, while travelling in Russia (Moscow, Volgograd, Perm, Nizhnii Novgorod, Rybinsk, Iaroslavl'), the impression that there are especially many young males (i.e. men who are less than thirty years old) among Zhirinovskii's activists.

This observation can be set in relation to the scarce data on current membership, and the age-

¹⁷⁵ Further data on the circulation of LDP newspapers produced in Moscow and St. Petersburg between 1990 and 1996 is given in Umland 1996.

composition of the LDP and its supporters. Although this official data may (as in the case of the membership numbers until December 1993 given in Part I, sec. 3.1.) be only partly reliable, it is of a certain value as far as it probably still gives some general indication about proportions and trends in the composition of LDP followers. For instance, a survey at the Fourth LDP Congress in April 1993 showed that one third of its delegates were under the age of thirty, and 90% male (Solovoyov and Klepikova 1995, 136). In October 1993, the party had, according to a statement of the LDP leadership, 40,000 members half of which were between 16 and 29 years old (RG, 15 October 1993; Schneider 1995b, 11). In early 1994, the LDP boasted already 100,000 members of which one third were

under 30, and half [were] between 30 and 50. The average age of the voter (typically a male) who supported Zhirinovskii's slate at the time of the December [1993] elections was 41.6. (Dunlop 1994, 31)

An August 1994 newspaper analysis concluded that the LDP is today the 'youngest party [of Russia]', and that 'the average age [of its members] is progressively sinking below-30.' (Barinova 1994, 10). In mid-1995, Zhirinovskii spoke of 170,000 LDP members (P, 27 June 1995; PER, no. 3, 1995, 7). Finally, during the Seventh LDP Congress on 10 January 1996, it was announced that there are 200,000 LDP members which is an, in Russian terms, comparatively high figure (Zhirinovskii 1996b, 3). However, one has, as mentioned above (sec. 3.1.), to qualify the message emerging from this data and recall that all LDP membership numbers have to be handled with caution as far as the party leadership might be bluffing.

What, nevertheless, seems to remain the case is that the LDPR managed to more or less effectively organize its participation in the 1993, 1995 and 1996 federal and 1996-7 gubernatorial elections, e.g. to timely fulfill the registration requirements, to carry out election campaigns, to send election observers to polling stations and electoral commissions, etc. That means that the party must have, indeed, built up a relatively extensive Russia-wide network run by LDPR adherents who are motivated enough to do the necessary daily routine-work. With regard to, at least, these active functionaries and rank one can assume that not only the more populist, demagogic and primitive

aspects of Zhirinovskii's agenda presented in the media and its propaganda material for large consumption, but also the more detailed outlines of its domestic and foreign policies and their theoretical, philosophical (in the broadest sense of the word) and metaphysical foundations have been communicated.

If, to summarize, my above impression about an over-representation of (male) youth among LDP activists thus indeed reflected a real pattern, this would mean that the ideology of the LDP has been, probably, playing an important role in - what I would tentatively label here as - the 'political initiation' (i.e. an especially strong impact on the political outlook) of a large number of its functionaries and active supporters as far as these *younger* LDP activists had, probably, had only limited political experiences *before* their association with Zhirinovskii's party.

The latter assumptions would imply that this aspect of the dissemination of the LDP ideology may have certain long term consequences for Russian right-wing politics in general even if one supposes that the life-span of the LDP might be limited because of its at least partial character as a leader party, and that its existence and success thus depends to a large degree on the health, energy and motivation of its chairman who will, eventually, die. The questions of whether the party then finds an adequate replacement and how much institutionalized the party has become by then will influence whether it survives as a coherent political force (a topic which will be shortly dealt with in Part IV). In any way, what is important in this context is that even after a possible future decline or disappearance of the LDP, a part of its *younger* activists will most probably continue to be politically active, and, for instance, enter other right-wing groupings. The presumption suggests itself, that their future political behaviour will be, at least partly, related to their formative political experiences (i.e. to their political training, reading and practice) in the LDP, and, among this, to the the set of ideas by which this party posited, explained and justified the ends and means of its social and political actions - i.e. by its ideology (Seliger 1976, 14). In other words, should my above speculation about an especially deep influence of political ideas on people's minds during their political 'initiation' have some truth, the observation that among Zhirinovskii's activists and supporters are many young people suggests that studying Zhirinovskii's ideology might be relevant independently from whether the LDPR survives or not.

5.2.2. 'Fascism' - a Redundant Label?

Another contestuous issue of the approach of this inquiry is its usage of 'fascism' - a label which is extremely politicized and has a long history of unintended misuse (by the Left), conscious deflation (by the Right), and deliberate abuse (by left-wing and right-wing extremists with different intentions). That seems one of the reasons why, in mainstream contemporary Western political science, such issues as Zhirinovskii and his party would tend to be dealt with by using concepts like 'political extremism', 'right-wing radicalism' or 'populism', the 'New' and the 'Old Right', 'new' and 'old nationalism', etc. (e.g. Kowalsky and Schröder 1999a; Gärtner 1995) rather than 'proto-', 'crypto-', 'mimetic', 'democratic', etc. 'fascism' (e.g. Griffin 1993a, 1995a, 1996).¹⁷⁶ Among the peculiar concomitant symptoms of such an approach to the study of international, generic right-wing extremism is a distinctly sceptical stance towards the concept of fascism. That is exemplified in, for instance, some writings of Uwe Backes and Armin Pfahl-Traugber who are the authors of a number of influential German textbooks on contemporary Western and especially German 'political extremism'. Backes, characteristically, uses the term 'fascism' only in quotation marks (1989, 225-228),¹⁷⁷ whereas Pfahl-Traugber, in his recent study of contemporary German right-wing extremism, equates '*faschismustheoretischer Ansatz*' (an approach to right-wing extremism which employs theories of fascism) with a particular vulgar-Marxist school (e.g. R. Kühnl) in German politology (1995, 202-206).

However, as I shall argue here and in the below section on methodology, the above listed generic concepts - of which 'right-wing extremism' seems to be the most frequently used - are (with the exception of the very specific labels 'neo-Nazism' and '-Fascism') analytically and heuristicly of only limited value. That is because they are either, as in the case of 'New' or 'Old Nationalism', too

¹⁷⁶ Though one should add that right-wing extremism studies also uses 'neo-Nazism' and 'neo-Fascism' to designate those groupings which, in the formulation of their programmes and/or in their political practice, explicitly refer to the agendas of the inter-war German and Italian fascist regimes.

¹⁷⁷ Backes categorizes 'fascist' ideology as being a variety of anti-democratic conservatism ('in despair') rather than nationalism (1989, 178-188, 225-227). It seems thus that he sets the quotation marks because he thinks that there is no distinct fascist ideology. However, at another point, he writes that conservatism may, in other permutations, aim at precisely the protection of political freedom (1989, 179), and thus, by implication, function as an anti-fascist force. This makes his taxonomy somewhat confusing.

imprecise and idiosyncratic to be applicable in international comparative studies of party systems and ideologies. That means these concepts are supplanted by definitions which are less significant and useful in regions and contexts which are dissimilar from the particular historic, cultural and geographic context in which these categories have been originally developed, i.e. from post-war Western Europe. Or they represent, as in the case of 'right-wing extremism', too multifarious and broad notions of general 'syndroms' to sufficiently reveal what precisely the programmes of the respective groupings denote and with which generic ideologies they should be classed. Why exactly generic *fascism* is a concepts which can be of help in setting up a more illuminating and, in empirical analyses, serviceable taxonomy and - if further developed and structuralized - typology, will be shortly outlined in the next section following the subsequent note on 'fascism' in Russia.

5.2.3. 'Fascism' in Post-Soviet Russia

'Fascism' vs. 'Right-Wing Extremism'

The application of the concept of 'fascism' in this study has also another important - perhaps even more weighty - reason. That is the fact that this label *is* already a constituent part of the post-Soviet Russian political and social science discourse, and occupies a central place in a number of important political documents, and, at least, one approved relevant legal act, i.e. in a special Presidential Decree concerning the fight against fascism. Therefore, 'right-wing extremism' is, apart from its methodological-analytical and heuristic limitations, a notion which would - according to my impressions - be too new, abstract and empty for many Russians to denote anything beyond the 'neo-Nazi lunatic fringe'. Moreover, if the concept would be applied to Russian politics, and, in doing this, as broadly defined as that seems to be the case in Western political analyses, this would, probably, entail a labelling of a rather large part of the currently relevant Russian political groupings - perhaps more than half of the deputies of the Sixth Russian State Duma - as 'right-wing extremist' or, at least, 'right-wing radical' forces (a distinction partly used in Germany to differentiate between explicitly anti-democratic 'extremists' and less fundamentalist 'radicals'). Thus an application of 'right-wing extremism' to Russian conditions would not be very conclusive by itself. Even if one embarked on the difficult and, as German experience shows, tricky endeavour of distinguishing between Russian

'right-wing radicals' and 'extremists', this would, in my view, not be sufficiently informative. In addition, a probable close conjunction of Gennadii Ziuganov's Communist Party with Aleksandr Barkashov's neo-Nazi Russian National Unity (*RNE*) as a consequence of merely classifying both as being 'right-wing extremist', would as such be unacceptable for tens of millions of Russian citizens - i.e. to Ziuganov's voters of 1993, 1995 and 1996 (MN, no. 21, 26 March-2 April 1995, 7; O, no. 12, March 1995, 17).

I would speculate that things would be, in the latter case, different if, on the other hand, such a (by itself presumably justified) categorization as 'right-wing extremist' were *combined* with a subsequent differentiation of Russian right-wing extremism into further generically defined sub-types. That means that a classification of the current ideology of the Communist Party as anti-democratic and right-wing, *but not fascist* (or at least not largely similar to Barkashov's neo-Nazi *RNE*) would appear as much more allowable and easier defensible in the Russian context.

The pre-eminence of 'fascism' in the conceptualization and labelling of radically right-wing politics in post-Soviet Russia is a phenomenon which can, characteristically, be detected in several spheres of Russian public life. Not only have newspapers and academic journals become more and more filled with articles on what 'fascism' means, what the conditions in which it arises are, to which degree these conditions are present in post-Soviet Russia (e.g. whether one should speak of a 'Weimar Russia'), what 'fascism' would denote in the Russian context, and to which political

phenomena it can be applied.¹⁷⁸ The label has also intruded a number of official political documents¹⁷⁹, namings of organizations, and numerous juridicial hearings some of which (involving Zhirinovskii) have been mentioned above. Boris El'tsin himself was, for some time, involved in one of these trials as he was accused by the ultra-nationalist former Supreme Soviet Deputy Iona Andronov of unjustifiedly calling Andronov a 'fascist' (SR, 17 September 1994, 2; EKb, 29 August 1995; Vecherniaia Moskva, 6 September 1995; PER, no. 7, 1995, 17). Finally, 'fascism', and how to define it generically and with regard to Russia was discussed in the presidential apparatus, and the State Duma which has been dealing with these issues already several times.

The Moscow Anti-Fascist Centre

The example, I have chosen to shortly illustrate this phenomenon is one of the earliest and, as turned out later, most momentous (yet in the scholarly literature largely neglected) anti-ultra-nationalist initiatives in Russia. It had its beginning on 20 February 1989 when a micro-organization called All-Union Anti-Fascist Information and Publication Centre was set up in Moscow. This chronically underfunded grouping which later renamed itself into Moscow Anti-Fascist Centre (MAFC) was founded and is still headed by Evgenii Proshechkin (b. 1957).¹⁸⁰ Proshechkin, a Cossack

¹⁷⁸ For some arbitrary selected examples of articles and books illustrating this particular aspect of the rise of 'fascism' and related concepts such as 'Nazism', 'Red-Brown Coalition' or 'Weimar Russia' in the democratic Russian media, political debates, and academia, see MN, no. 30, 29 July 1990, 8; MN, no. 24, 16 June 1991, 10; St, no. 11, 1992, 1-3; *Svobodnaia mysl'*, no. 5, 1992, 14-23, and no. 4, 1993, 22-36; St, no. 40, 1993, 54-56; Samoilov 1993, 3rd vol.; R, no. 15 (125), 1993, 7-13 April 1993, 3; S, 16 October 1993, 8; Yanov 1993, 1994 and 1995; Iadov 1994; Galkin 1994 and 1995a; Kurashvili 1994; *Marksist*, no. 2, 1994, 26-57; *Novyi mir*, no. 6 (830), June 1994, 168-174, and no. 10 (834), 1994, 240-250; NEG, 17 August 1994, 4; AiF, no. 28, 1994, 2; NV, no. 16, 1994, 10-12; NRS, 30 September 1994, 6; *Vek XX i mir*, no. 5-6, 1994, 92-101; MN, no. 50, 23-30 October 1994, 1, 4; R, no. 46 (208), 30 November- 6 December 1994, 3; Solovei 1995; LG, no. 10 (5541), 8 March 1995, 3; MN, no. 21, 26 March-2 April 1995, 5; Latsis 1995; Pribylovsky 1995; Tolstykh, Galkin, Loginov and Buzgalin 1995; *O preduprezhdenii...* 1995; *Demokraticheskaiia Rossiia*, no. 4 (18), April 1995, 1; OG, no. 23 (151), 13-19 June 1996, 12. Many more examples could be found in nationalist periodicals and books.

¹⁷⁹ As early as in November 1991 *DemRossiia*, the movement which represented the political basis of El'tsin at this time, issued a declaration 'On the Fascist Threat' in Russia ('O fashistskoi...' 1991).

¹⁸⁰ Other leading activists of the MAFC include, among others, Pavel Liburkin (organizational issues), Viktor Iu. Dashevskii who holds a Candidate of Science in History degree and is the Deputy Chairman of MAFC (political issues and public relations), V. Gershberg (Monitoring Section), V. Ostrovskii and Igor' Ny (Legal Actions Section), Alla E. Gerber who was a member of the Fifth Russian State Duma 1993-95 (links with other democratic organizations), Petr Kaznacheev and K. Geiarov (youth section), and V. Sirotin who is a journalist

by descent, holds a degree in philosophy from Belarus State University, is a long-time activist of the Russian democratic movement, a member of the leading body of the important anti-Stalinist human-rights group *Memorial*, a former People's Deputy of the Tushinskii Rayon Soviet of Moscow, and today a deputy of the Moscow City Duma for Egor Gaidar's party 'Russia's Choice'.

Though Proshechkin's claims that his organization comprised, for instance, 120 activists the Moscow region in 1990 (MN, no. 27, 8 July 1990, 11), or 300 in 1991 (St, no. 27, 1991, 1) may have been exaggerations, a number of well-publicized actions of the Anti-Fascist Centre played subsequently insofar an important role as they seem to have been critical in triggering developments going beyond the scope of the MAFC's initial motions on the grass-roots level. At the beginning this included above all (rather unproportionally to its size) frequent interviews and quotations of the MAFC in the democratic media (e.g. MN, no. 24, 17 June 1990, 7, and no. 27, 8 July 1990, 11; ME, no. 29, 28 July 1993, 6), and its collection and subsequent publishing of information on Russian ultra-nationalist organizations and, especially, periodicals (*Rossia, kotoruiu my vibiraem*, no. 1, December 1993, 2-3; NV, no. 35, 1994; *Rußland liest*, no. 1, 1995, 38). But the activities of the MAFC's went from the outset beyond mere self-promotion. As they time went on, it became more and more involved in concrete political actions. It especially build up an impressive record of legal initiatives a number of which seem to have resulted into significant spill-over effects reaching even high-level politics.¹⁸¹

Among the first visible and relatively successful motions of the MAFC was, among other things, the participation in the organization of the 1990 trial against the late Konstantin V. Smirnov-Ostashvili, a notorious anti-semitic and leader of the *Pamiat*'s splitt-off and distinctly fascist dwarf-party Union for National-Proportional Representation (Deich and Zhuravlev 1991; Pribylovskii 1991c, 39-47; *Russkoe voskresenie*, nos. 1 [9] and 2 [10], N.d.). As a result, Smirnov-Ostashvili was tried to two years of imprisonment¹⁸² - a ruling representing so far the only case in which racist hate-

and publicist.

¹⁸¹ A peculiar proof of the MAFC's relative relevance in contemporary Russian politics are the frequent attacks on it (and especially on Proshechkin) in right-wing extremist publications - among them in the LDPR-press. See, for instance, *LDPR*, no. 1, 1995, 4, and no. 8 (28), 1996, 3.

¹⁸² In April 1991, Smirnov-Ostashvili was hanged or hanged himself in his prison cell. The circumstances of his death were never disclosed (Pribylovskii 1991c, 39).

speech has been adequately treated by a Russian court.

In 1992, the MAFC could register another significant success when the neo-Nazi newspaper *Russkoe voskresenie* (Russian Resurrection) edited by Aleskej Batogov (Part I, sec. 3.6.) was closed after the MAFC laid an information against it. This pattern was repeated with regard to the extremely anti-semitic Russian-Palestinian newspaper *Al'-Kods* in June 1994 (*Poka ne pozdno! Spetsial'nyi vypusk Moskovskogo antifashistskogo tsentra*, February 1995, 3, 4). Also in 1992, the MAFC supported Professor Herman Branover from Israel in his legal action against the Russian ultra-nationalist journal *Nash sovremennik* (Our Contemporary) which had misquoted Branover as having allegedly praised Jewish communists for exterminating Orthodox people (i.e. Russians).¹⁸³ In addition one could mention that the MAFC staged a press-conference revealing the identity and fascist ideology of the 'conservative revolutionary' Aleksandr Dugin as a result of which the showing of his five-piece documentary film 'The Secrets of the Century' on Ostankino TV was discontinued.¹⁸⁴ This list could go on.¹⁸⁵

These actions already indicate that the role Proshechkin's Anti-Fascist Centre plays in Russia differs in certain regard from the activities of a number of similarly named groupings in Western Europe (some of which have a dubious reputation). Yet, the MAFC's most important moves were those which initiated serious discussions of the fascist threat not only in the public, but ultimately also in the presidential apparatus and the State Duma.

'Fascism' as a Legal Term

The MAFC can take the credit for having introduced 'fascism' into legislature and legal system of Russia, and for having put considerable energy into reaching this aim as the following chronology indicates. In March 1994, it presented its project for a Federal Law 'On the Ban of Fascist and Extremist Organizations' for the first time at a press conference. On 22 June 1994, the MAFC

¹⁸³ Branover's advocate Genri M. Reznik's speech at this trial has been reprinted in Shmidt 1993, 92-101.

¹⁸⁴ On Dugin, Gebhard 1994, Hielscher 1994, Tsymburskii 1995, and Umland 1995b.

¹⁸⁵ The MAFC's official letters and inquiries concerning the above mentioned cases and a considerable number of further petitions to the procuracies of Moscow and Russia are summarized in an MAFC chronicle documenting its correspondence with the Russian legal organs from 1990 to 1994 (I, 2 December 1994).

held a meeting in front of the State Duma demanding the passing of legal acts for the fight against fascism. Its slogan at this picket was 'The Duma is not the *Reichstag*!'. On 29 November 1994, Proshechkin took part in a session of the Expert-Analytical Council of the President of the Russian Federation, and presented to the Council and the then Chief of the Presidential Apparatus Sergei Filatov the second version of the original law project against fascism. This revised and improved edition was published in December 1994, called Federal Law 'On the Ban of Activities of Extremist Public Organizations in Russia', and had a supplemental annex outlining two accompanying modifications of the Penal Code of the Russian Federation. On 8 December 1994, Proshechkin also met Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to discuss the project (*Poka ne pozdno!: spetsial'nyi vypusk Moskovskogo antifashistskogo tsentra*, February 1995, 2, 4). On 2 February 1995, the Moscow City Duma held on the motion of Deputy Proshechkin (assisted by MAFC Co-Chairman V. Dashevskii) a hearing 'On the Legislative Initiative of the Moscow City Duma to Put forward in the State Duma the [Federal] Law "On the Banning of Activities of Extremist Public Organizations in Russia"' (S, 3 February 1995, 2). On 14 February 1994, the State Duma staged an extensive hearing called 'On the Warning about Symptoms of a Fascist Threat in the Russian Federation' on the initiative of MAFC member, State Duma Deputy Alla Gerber (with, paradoxically, the support of the LDPR). The stenogramm of these hearings was published as a 95-page brochure (*O preduprezhdenii...* 1995).

As a result of the MAFC's successful campaign, on March 23, 1995, President El'tsin issued his widely commented Decree No. 310 'On Measures for Coordinated Actions of State Organs to Fight Symptoms of Fascism and Other Forms of Political Extremism in the Russian Federation' (RG, 25 March 1995, 4; IuG, no. 15, 1995, 7-8; NG, 24 March 1995, 1; I, 25 March 1995, 1, 2; Orttung 1995a). Besides ordering various state organs to act more decisively against fascist and other extremist groupings, the decree asked the Russian Academy of Sciences to produce a definition of fascism. On 6 April 1995, the President of the Russian Academy of Sciences academician Iu.S. Osipov presented a 6-page statement on the nature and characteristics of fascism prepared by the Academy's Institutes of State and Law, of World History, of Russian History and of Sociology (Z, no. 17, 21 April 1995, 3; *Neues Leben* [Moscow], no. 16, 28 April 1995; MN, no. 39, 4-11 June 1995, 14; Orttung 1995a, 5). On 22 April 1995, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Russian Federation Aleksei Iliushenko responded to El'tsin's Decree, and signed on his part the Decree 'On the

Intensification of the Public Prosecution Department's Monitoring in its Fight against Symptoms of Fascism and Political Extremism' (*Vecherniaia Moskva*, 22 April 1995, 1). On 6 July 1995, the Duma voted on three law-projects concerning the ban of fascism and political extremism in Russia. These were, first, the above mentioned Moscow City Duma project by Proshechkin the promotion of which had initiated the State Duma voting on this subject, second, an LDPR project put forward by State Duma Deputy Vitalii E. Zhuravlëv called Federal Law 'On the Responsibility for Dissemination of Fascist Ideology, and for the Political Practice and Organizational Activities of Fascist Organizations', and, third, the *KPRF* project Federal Law 'On the Banning of the Propaganda of Fascism in the Russian Federation' presented by Deputy Viktor I. Zorkal'tsev. None of these laws was adopted by the Fifth State Duma with the Communist Party project receiving the highest number of votes of 159 or 35.3% (*Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Biulleten'*, no. 115, 1995, 40-48). In the Sixth State Duma elected in December 1995, the correlation of forces changed significantly in favour of the communists and their allies. This meant that a revised version of the latter Communist Party project was, under the same name, adopted in the beginning of June 1996. However, El'tsin vetoed the law because, as he explained, it does not encompass non-fascist forms of political extremism (*OMRI Daily Digest*, no. 141, 23 July 1996).

'Fascism's' Pre-Eminence

The story of the Moscow Anti-Fascist Centre's early grass-roots initiatives, the cumulative growth of its influence on national-level politics, and the significant after-effects it managed to produce inspite of its slim financial and organizational foundations could be extended and outlined in more detail. Equally one could have focussed on activities of other human-rights activists, anti-fascist groupings, or social scientists. An in-depth analysis of several dozens of juridical processes initiated by Zhirinovskii and other right-wing extremist politicians, and related to their public labelling as 'fascists' or to comparisons of them with Hitler or Mussolini by democratic periodicals and politicians would reveal probably further interesting evidence for the importance of 'fascism' in post-Soviet Russia. In connection with the specific focus of this study, it would have been, moreover, revealing to thoroughly analyze the LDP's treatment of fascism, and its response to the democrats' allegations that the party is fascist. That is even more true as far as these issues seem to have been

of considerable concern to the LDPR leadership as exemplified in, for instance, the frequent discussion of 'fascism' in LDPR publications.¹⁸⁶

However, to make the latter kind of specifications is not any longer necessary at this point. What should have already become clear in the above sketch of the MAFC activities, is that 'fascism' has (in contrast to 'right-wing extremism') evolved into a critical label in post-Soviet Russian political discourse and legal language - whether we see this as an adequate or unfortunate development. Therefore, a politically sensitive analysis of Russian anti-democratism cannot leave out of consideration the concept of 'fascism' in its handling of the empirical evidence.

5.3. Identifying Fascism

5.3.1. Some Methodological Problems of Empirical Fascist Studies in Russia

'Fascism' a Specific Notion in Russia?

A major further argument against the meaningfulness of this chapter is related to the latter of the above considerations, i.e to the issue of the wide usage of 'fascism' in Russia. During the last years, a considerable number of Russian intellectuals and social scientists argued in the course of discussions of post-Soviet Russian right-wing extremism that the term 'fascism' has a special Russian denotation which is different from the Western one. In claiming this, these scholars and publicists typically refer to the fact that, in Russia, this label is above all associated with the mass murder, and atrocities of the Nazis among the peoples of the former USSR, and with the Soviet Union's victory over fascist Germany.¹⁸⁷ 'Fascism' is, it is said, thus a concept simultaneously

¹⁸⁶ 'Fascism' was, for instance, the principal subject of (at least) 11 articles in the 64 issues of the major LDPR newspaper *Pravda Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Truth) which appeared between January 1993 and November 1995.

¹⁸⁷ According to one of the latest estimations, the Soviet Union lost 43.3 Million people during the Great Patriotic War 1941-45 (MN, no. 26, April 1995, 11). A statement of Zhirinovskii related to this issue may be of interest to the Russian judges who sentenced Gaidar and others who had called Zhirinovskii a fascist. The (apparently partly Jewish) Russian Zhirinovskii asked his German readers in 1994:

related to one of the major national catastrophes in Russian history, and to a principal contribution of Russia to world history.¹⁸⁸ The frequent juridical hearings concerning the appropriateness of

When I learn that in Germany there are still thousands of pending legal proceedings because of war and NS crimes half a century ago I ask myself: What kind of purpose does this have? How can one come to just decisions such a long time after the alleged deeds? These defendants must be very old and seriously ill. How can such a clever and intelligent people as the Germans let do such things with itself? [...] That the great German people submits to such things as one-sided coming to terms with the past [*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*] and collective charges I cannot understand. Is befouling of his own nest such a nice thing? (Schirinowskij 1994, 141)

¹⁸⁸ A variation of this peculiarly Russian approach is the assertion pronounced by many Russian right-wingers explicitly as well as by some social scientists by implication that the Russians have (or, at least, had) because of their especially traumatic experiences in World War II acquired a kind of immunity against fascism. For a recent example, see Solovei 1995, 2. Perhaps, it was also this line of argument which led, among others, Alexander Solzhenitsyn to claim that there is no fascist threat in Russia (EKH, no. 1551, 1995; PER, no. 1, 1995, 25). The issue was also the subject of a debate between the German historian of European fascism, Prof. Wolfgang Wippermann, and the Russian sociologist Dr. Viktor Voronkov who dismissed the fascist danger in Russia on a 'Jour Fixe' on Russian right-wing radicalism on 7 December 1993 at Berlin (*Kontakty - Verein für Kontakte zu den Ländern der ehemaligen Sowjetunion e.V.: Rundbrief*, January 1994, 1). For an, in this regard, critical and more sober Russian voice, see Gurvich 1994, 128.

To be sure, Walter Laqueur, a leading Western historian, too recently concluded that, in Russia, Hitler's and the Nazi's atrocities are 'too deep in popular memory to permit a revival of Nazism at the present time.' However, he conceded that what

can be attempted (and it is attempted) is to introduce national socialism through back door, without reference to Hitler, Mussolini, and historical fascism. (Laqueur 1993, 291)

Thus Laqueur, firstly, seems to refer here rather to a particular sub-type of fascism, namely mimetic fascism, rather than to generic fascism as a whole. Second, he seems to admit that some kind of a crypto-Nazi activities are present in post-Soviet Russia.

In connection with this one could mention that it was more than three months *before* Zhirinovskii's major electoral success in December 1993 that he made the following statement in an article in *Izvestia*, the political daily with the by far highest circulation in Russia:

The blend of the most important principles of socialism with national ideas is what constitutes national-socialism. National-socialism does not have to do anything with Hitlerism. Hitler discredited the ideas of national-socialism. In [Hitler's] doctrines, [there was] more of the Komintern-idea of a world revolution [*sic!*]. (Zhirinovskii 1993c)

True national-socialism, instead, Zhirinovskii continues, is the philosophy of the average man or common people (*Ibid.*).

Laqueur, of course, also points out that, for the time being, fascism's chances in Russia are limited because of the Russian's fresh memory of the political practice of Stalinism which, in many regards, resembled Nazism (1993, 291-292). That is, however, an entirely different point which is, to my knowledge, only seldom brought up by Russian politicians or publicists.

labelling certain politicians as 'fascists' could appear as supporting such a view, i.e. the special weight this label has gained in Russian public discourse.

Although these considerations cannot be dismissed from the outset, they do, if scrutinized, however, not represent a sufficiently strong argument to justify a principally different approach to an application of the concept of fascism to the study of Russian politics. It is true that under the Soviet regime the more broadly used term 'fascism' was heavily applied to the specific German fascist regime of 1933-45 - a historical phenomenon which should have been more precisely characterized with the term which designates this peculiar variety of fascism, i.e. with 'Nazism'.¹⁸⁹ At the same time, however, Soviet propaganda used 'fascism' also for defamations of all kinds of non-fascist political enemies, including various West European and North American conservative groupings, the German Social-Democratic Party of the inter-war years - 'social-fascism' -, or the communist regime of China during the sixties (which, some would add, was in some regards actually not that far from the margin).¹⁹⁰

With regard to the usage of the 'fascist' label in Soviet social sciences and historical writing the above argument concerning a uniquely Russian connotation is also largely invalid. On the one side, one could argue that analyses of fascism in Soviet Russia were on the whole not numerous, extensive, deep and original enough to consider seriously the issue of a specific denotation developed there.¹⁹¹ On the other side, of course, a certain number of academic-style monographs and articles were published with a partly high circulation. With regard to these studies, in turn, one could mention that, although the Western discussion of generic fascism was not (and could not have been) taken up

¹⁸⁹ I suspect that it would be for some politicized Russians a revelation to be informed that the label 'Fascism' had actually a pejorative connotation in Nazi Germany in that it denoted a limitation of an uninhibited application of the *Führerprinzip* (leadership principle) by an upgrading of the prerogatives of the state in Italian Fascism (Waite 1993, 80).

¹⁹⁰ Plekhanov details that, during the Soviet period, 'fascism' was, furthermore, used to label, among others, General Franco's regime in Spain, the Greek 'Black Colonels' rule, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Chilean dictatorship of General Pinochet, USA President Harry Truman, and the Yugoslav leader Marshal Josip Broz Tito (1994, 47).

¹⁹¹ 'Soviet leaders, on the whole, shielded their people from a surfeit of information about Nazism and Italian fascism; for over half a century only a handful of books was published about this subject, none of them very illuminating, and many aspects of fascism were altogether taboo.' (Laqueur 1993, 291). '[...] Stalinism and fascism received little serious analysis in the Soviet Period, and it will be a challenge for the Union's successors to defend themselves against charismatic or demagogic usurpers.' (Miller 1993, 205)

by Soviet scholars sufficiently, the major West European writings published in the sixties and early seventies were, at least, noticed (e.g. Gossweiler 1971). From some publications, moreover, the impression arises that they were intensively studied and discussed in private (e.g. Rakhshmir 1971; Gintsberg 1971; Igritskii 1990). What is even more important, 'neo-fascism' was heavily applied in the framework of Soviet-Marxist analyses of 'correlations of forces' in post-war capitalist societies. Actually, it was - paralleling Soviet propaganda - in many of these works applied rather too broadly (cf., for instance, Galkin 1971; Mordzhinskaia 1976; Riabov 1990).

Whereas Soviet-Marxist studies of generic fascism were concerning their flaws (and also some merits) relatively uniform, the post-Soviet outlook of the discipline of fascist studies has become a more multifarious one. However this did, unfortunately, so far not result in the appearance of new larger studies that would have revised the old paradigm, and comprehensively introduced new Western and Russian research. Instead, the last three or four longer essays on fascism reprinted or firstly published during the late Soviet and early post-Soviet periods by Russian authors (and in one case by a Bulgarian) are all, for different reasons, of rather limited scholarly value.¹⁹² They even seem to fall below the standards of some of the, in Soviet terms, relatively sophisticated studies of the Brezhnev-era as, for instance, those by Rakhshmir (e.g. 1971), or Galkin (e.g. 1971).

The first book among these recent larger publications on fascism to be mentioned here, is the Russian translation of *Fascism: The Totalitarian State* by the former eminent dissident and later on first President of Bulgaria, Zhelju Zhelev. This serious academic study came out in 1991, and has certainly its merits. Yet, its first edition was completed in 1967. It is thus unfortunately in many regards already out of date today although it represents, because of the fascinating history of Zhelev's original 1967 manuscript, an important historical document by itself.

The largest publication on generic fascism in post-Soviet Russia until 1996 known to me is the three-volume work *Leaders: A General Theory of Fascism* (with 10,000 copies sold) which deals not only with Hitler and Mussolini, but also with Stalin and Mao. The author comes to the conclusion

¹⁹² This is in contrast to a number of shorter analyses of various theoretical aspects of radical right-wing politics (previously frequently equated with fascism) which made real contributions to Russian comparative ideology and political sociology. See, for instance, Galkin 1994 and 1995a, Solovei 1995, Podvinstev 1996, or Rakhshmir 1996a.

that Boris El'tsin and other democratic politicians are 'pro-' or 'half fascists' (Samoilov 1993, 3rd vol., 157-180). They are promoting a creeping fascistization of the country towards a "'soft", "clever" or "liberal" fascism' with a 'human face' of the 'Pinochet kind'. According to Samoilov's definition, fascism is 'pure striving for power' or 'the evil' expressed in political terms. He believes that El'tsin is creating a quasi-fascist regime under the cloak of the idea of liberty (1993, 3rd vol., 177). Such dubious conclusions would usually suggest refraining from the application to empirical studies of the theory proposed by Samoilov. However, his writing has since been quoted in some journalistic articles, and laymen analyses of Russian ultra-nationalism (a fact which is, probably, related to, among others, its comparatively high circulation). Because of the specific political importance the concept of fascism has acquired in post-Soviet Russia, it was in this case, perhaps, not an entirely appropriate behaviour by the majority of the Russian academic community of experts of fascism to distance itself from the book by simply ignoring it.¹⁹³

The latest quasi-academic publication on the subject, *Fascism: Ideology and Potlitics* by B. Bessonov (1995), is a slightly revised reprint of a two-volume study which came out for the first time in 1985. Its author is an Orthodox Soviet Marxist whose slender analysis is, rather astoundingly, still based on the crude and, in the meantime, heavily discredited classic Soviet definition of fascism formulated as early as 1933 (Griffin 1995a, 262-263, 283).

Oddly, moreover, the only post-1985 work, Bessonov refers to as an apparently serious-to-be-taken secondary source is a pamphlet on Hitler called *The Occult Messiah and His Reich* by Valentin Prussakov (1992) who was introduced in Part I, section 3.6. as having become close to Zhirinovskii during the mid-1990s. According to my impressions during recent visits to Moscow, the latter book printed in 50,000 copies - an in Russian terms relatively high number - has become a widely read and quoted writing on fascism in post-Soviet Russia. As far as the author is, as indicated Part I, section 3.6., himself a fascist with clearly neo-Nazi inclinations this is a distinctly unfortunate development. Moreover, Prussakov has during the last years become one of the most visible ultra-nationalist publicists in Russia, and a frequent contributor to various Russian right-wing extremist periodicals (e.g. Prussakov 1993, 1994b, 1994c, 1995). Since about mid-1994, he is one of the

¹⁹³ An exception is, for instance, a critical remark by Zamkovoï (1994, 4).

principal authors of the so called *Juridicial Newspaper* (Prussakov 1994a; Part I, sec. 3.6. of this study) - a grey, somewhat misleadingly named right-wing extremist weekly which has been close to Zhirinovskii since 1991 (Umland 1996).¹⁹⁴

In post-Soviet Russian daily politics, finally, 'fascism' has, as already indicated, suffered from an even higher deflation, and become an ubiquitously applied invective. This went so far that the above mentioned former Zhirinovskii-assistants', Andrei Arkhipov's and Sergei Sharikov's, Right-Wing Radical Party, the members of which openly call themselves *natsisty* (Nazis), set up a 'Russian Anti-Fascist Centre' (Pribylovskii 1995, 6-7).

To conclude, it appears in the light of this state of Russian publications on fascism and the especially wide-spread abuse of the label absurd to still argue seriously about a specifically Russian denotation of 'fascism'. What is needed instead, is the introduction of clearer definitions of generic fascism in the Russian academic and public debate.

Zhirinovskii a Fascist?: Pro and Cons

It is - in line with Albrecht's by way of introduction quoted demand to address research into political extremism to non-academic actors (1994) - one of the purposes of this study to, possibly, promote the above case, i.e. to try to frutify a more serious discussion of the concept fascism, and its application to the study of Russian politics.¹⁹⁵ However, that does not mean that the following

¹⁹⁴ A number of the *Juridicial Newspaper's* editors were members of the LDPR faction of the Fifth State Duma 1993-95, and have been also LDPR deputies in the Sixth State Duma since December 1995 (LDPR, no. 1 [21], 1996, 2).

¹⁹⁵ Several Russian area experts have recently in one way or another pointed out the need for more active and effective financial and intellectual Western support of not only economic, but also political reforms and democratization in Russia. Among them are Yanov, an outspoken long-term advocate of this case (1995, 26-112, 278-302), McFaul (1994, 42-45), Morrison (1994, 76-78), Carter (1995, 188), and myself (1995b, 921).

A scheme which follows these suggestions, and in the promotion of which I have been involved, is the translation into Russian and publication in the CIS of the two books by Griffin (1993a, 1995a) on which the operational definition of fascism for this study is based. This so far, unfortunately, unrealized project was advertised in, among others, *Osteuropa*, vol. 45, no. 7, 1995, A417; *Bundesverband deutscher Stiftungen e.V.: Mitteilungen*, no. 2, June 1995, 26; and *NewsNet: The Newsletter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies*, vol. 35, no. 5, November 1995, 10. A further book which would obviously be of use in the contemporary Russian political context is Uwe Backes' *Political Extremism in Constitutional-Democratic States: Elements of a Normative Framework-Theory* (1989).

There are several examples for initiatives which are in line with the above recommendations, closely

identification of fascist tendencies in the LDP would already mean its ultimate categorization as a fascist party.¹⁹⁶ Before such a labelling can be made, a number of unsolved questions would have to be answered at the outset. That concerns above all the relatively high inconsistency and arbitrariness in Zhirinovskii's programmatic as well as more general ideological statements.¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, there was, at least from 1990 to 1993, a recurring feature in Zhirinovskii's argument which could be seen as contradicting the allegation that he is a fascist. Namely, he has frequently claimed that he is only in favour of a *provisional* authoritarian regime in order to create a 'real' liberal democracy (though - as shall be shown - he, at other times, made statements contradicting this claim).¹⁹⁸ Thus Zhirinovskii is not only playing his German reader for a sucker when he in a publication of DVU-chairman Gerhard Frey's nationalist *FZ-Verlag* asks:

related to the intention of the mentioned two projects, and have, fortunately, received Western funding. This includes the establishment and publishing of the St. Petersburg anti-fascist journal *Barrier*, and of the immensely useful Moscow bulletin *Political Extremism in Russia* (see 'Further Reading', sec. 'Secondary Literature' of this study). Among them was also the publication of a short pamphlet on Nazism produced (on behalf of the Russian-American Foundation for Studies and Teaching about Trade Unions) especially for dissemination in Russian trade-unions. This brochure-size essay has been written by the leading Russian expert on German fascism Aleksandr Galkin, and is called *The Trap: The Story on What National-Socialism Brought for the German Workers* (1995b). That initiative seems to have been a timely undertaking as far as there emerged symptoms of a cohabitation between fascist groupings and trade unions at, for instance, the huge Cherepovets metallurgical stock-market company *Severstal'* (North-Steel) which is, according to the Central European Economic Review, among the 20 largest enterprises of Russia and employs over 50,000 people (S, 9 July 1996, 9). On the infiltration of a *Severstal'* trade-union by the neo-Nazi party *Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo* (Russian National Unity) led by notorious former *Pamiat'* activist Aleksandr Barkashëv, see I, no. 87, 11 May 1994, 5, and NEG, no. 154 (228), 17 August 1994, 5.

¹⁹⁶ Walter Laqueur (I, 18 December 1993, 3), Galkin and Krassin (1994), and Kurashvili (1994, 139) were among those who were cautious in that regard.

¹⁹⁷ The most obvious explanation of this phenomenon is that Zhirinovskii sought, by making unexpected statements, media coverage. Other reasons might be that he was trying to appeal to different potential electoral constituencies of the LDP, or to confuse his political enemies. I would add that Zhirinovskii might have been going through a genuine political evolution. Although all of these considerations to a certain degree qualify the significance of Zhirinovskii's public pronouncements, it seems to me far too simple to conclude - as one of his former colleagues at the publishing house *Mir* (where Zhirinovskii worked between 1983 and 1989) has done - that 'all his public pronouncements need not to be taken too seriously', or that his imperialist and racist statements, or meetings with East and West European right-wing extremists are as much 'utter nonsense' as his talk about his youthful sexual failure, or a new supersecret Russian weapon (Kartsev 1995, 164, 5).

¹⁹⁸ It should be repeated that, characteristically, the proposition of such an alternative way of a post-Soviet transformation of Russia was by no means restricted to Zhirinovskii and other right-wing extremist, but also seriously discussed in parts of the democratic camp. See Teague 1990; Novikov 1992; Sauter 1995; St, no. 1, 1994, 1,3; CDPSP, vol. XLVI, no. 3, 1994, 9; and sec. 4.1. of Part I of this study.

What do I have to do with Hitler [or] with National Socialism which has been dead since half a century? I have nothing to do with this. I have to ask the inventors of such defamations [that Zhirinovskii is a 'Russian Hitler']: Did Hitler really want a sovereign, lawful [*rechtsstaatlich*] and democratic, great and rich Russia? That is the total reversal of history as everybody knows. (Schirinowskij 1994, 127)

Accordingly, he introduced his official acquisition of dictatorial powers in the LDP on its Fifth congress in April 1994 as grounded not on ideological assumptions, that means on a genuine authoritarianism. Instead, he described it as a *temporary* pragmatic move to enhance the party's organizational effectivity and political flexibility in view of the challenges of the upcoming presidential election campaign (*Liberal 'no-demokraticeskaia...* 1994, 18). Furthermore, although corporatist, protectionist, statist and even autarcic approaches to the handling of the Russian economy have become heavily present in the LDP documents during the last years, Zhirinovskii continues to make distinctly pro-market statements when, in 1994, he, for instance, still announces: 'As much private initiative as possible, as much state intervention as necessary.' (Schirinowskij 1994, 143).

Yet, a more or less explicit anti-liberalism and (at least a garnished) anti-democratism have so far been counted among the essential or core-characteristics of the fascist movements' thrust towards an alternative modernity, as well as of their organizational structures.¹⁹⁹ This is, of course, only one aspect of the general question of which weight should be assigned and which kind of interpretation - e.g. pragmatism, strategy, ideologism, opportunism - applied to the different, often even more manifestly discrepant statements of Zhirinovskii.

A lump-sum discounting of pro-democratic and -market pronouncements and programmatic points of the LDP as demagoguery, tactical cautiousness or conscious misleading, and a following

¹⁹⁹ In an analysis of the language of Russian nationalism, the author Gassan Gussejnow is, in my opinion, not differentiating enough when he - apparently referring to a single statement by Zhirinovskii - says Zhirinovskii hopes for 'authoritarianism as a *protection against democracy*.' (1994, 91, emphasis in the original). It may well be that Gussejnow is in saying this right. Yet, it was, on the contrary, Zhirinovskii's repeated approval of a *provisional* authoritarianism in accordance with foreign models (South Korea, Chile, de Gaulle's France, etc.) which constituted for a long time a relevant specific characteristic of the LDP profile setting it apart from the agendas of other Russian extremely right-wing parties (Umland 1994b, 1122-23; Part I, sec. 4.1. of this study).

categorization of this party as 'fascist' or, more precisely, 'crypto-fascist' on the basis of the, as shall be shown, undoubtedly existent fascist tendencies may positively hit the bull's eye. However, it would be, in this form, a contestable line of argument.²⁰⁰ For instance, a glance on some of his interviews gives the impression that he seemed to tend to pronounce more extreme views in talks with right-wing interviewers.²⁰¹ In contrast, he was, during the period covered in this study, more moderate and sometimes even explicitly pro-Western in a number of talks with Russian democratic journalists (MN, no. 17, 29 April 1990; AiF, no. 12, 1993; SI, no. 7, 1993, 77-82; MN, no. 29, 18 July 1993). This approach was also to some degree characteristic of some of his encounters with representatives of Western press and academia (e.g. McFaul and Markov 1993, 146-253; Umland 1994a; Sp, no. 51, 1993; N.N. 1994, 68; IuG, no. 4 [169], 1995; Elliott and Stewart 1994).²⁰² Yet, at least the latter aspect of Zhirinovskii's conduct, i.e. his churning up to the West, is a comparatively unusual behaviour for the Russian Right. In addition, one should take into account that, in post-Soviet Russia, it was and is not particularly dangerous to pronounce openly ultra-nationalist, anti-semitic or racist ideas because, as indicated, parts of the Russian judiciary seem to be 'blind on the right-hand eye', and some of its representatives apparently even to some degree pro-fascist.²⁰³ That means that the

²⁰⁰ Critique on the usefulness of a categorization of Zhirinovskii as a fascist can be found in, for instance, Kartsev 1995, 10, and Fairbanks 1994.

²⁰¹ This tendency has been noted by Siegler and Maegerle (1993). They were referring to, among others, an interview of Zhirinovskii with Wolfgang Strauß, the editor of the important German neo-fascist intellectual monthly *Nation und Europa* (Lange 1993, 114-116). This talk will play an important role in the present study because it was reprinted in *Liberal* (no. 1 (11), 1993, 7-9). A further example is a widely quoted interview with the Russian right-wing political publicist A.K. Glivakovskii (Zhirinovskii, 1991). See, furthermore, some of Zhirinovskii's interviews to leading right-wing newspapers (1994a, 1994b, and 1994c).

²⁰² However, it should be mentioned that there are some cases which do not follow this pattern (e.g. Sp, no. 3, 1995, 114-117). Of course, the observation referred only to interviews and press-conferences with presumably democratic Western discussants and journalists, and not to his contribution to, for instance, West European right-wing extremist publications as *Nation und Europa* (Nation and Europe), or *Deutsche National-Zeitung*. See also Schirinowskij 1994.

²⁰³ Examples which would support such a characterization are the course and results of the trials against Viktor Korchagin and Viktor Bezverkhii, editors-in-chief of the newspaper *Russkie vedomosti* (Russian news) and the journal *Volchv* (an ancient Russian term for a wandering wise elder) respectively. These publications which are openly anti-semitic can be clearly classified as racist and, essentially, proto-fascist (Holm 1996, 27). The juridical processes are documented in, among others, S, 29 April 1995; I, 25 March 1993; CDPSP, vol. XLV, no. 12, 1993, 26; NRS, 13 March 1995; *Sovremennyi fashizm...* 1995, 100; and Korchagin 1996. Further examples of insufficiently consequent treatments of right-wing extremists by Russian officials, prosecutors and judges are given in, among others, Schmidt 1993; MN, no. 66, 25 December 1994 - 1 January 1995, and no. 1,

pronouncement of right-wing populist slogans concerning, for instance, Jews or Caucasians does not demand a particular, fanatically-ideologically motivated daring. In Russian conditions (as well as in similar situations in other countries), such rhetoric might instead be also prompted by some sort of 'pragmatic' - i.e. purely populist and electorally motivated - considerations. In view of the general eclecticism²⁰⁴ in Zhirinovskii's 'floods'²⁰⁵ one would, therefore, have to present, at first, a well-founded theoretical model, sufficiently convincing interpretation, and/or rigorous methodological procedure with which one could substantiate why certain categorizations of Zhirinovskii or the LDP as a whole should be applied, and others not. It would also demand an in-depth research into many different aspects of his political life and of the LDP's history over the past seven years, and eventually the LDP's analysis within a broad comparative framework.

In the present study such an effort will not be undertaken. Instead, the focus here are only a number of *singular* statements which shall be classified *as such*. That means that the respective texts themselves are the objects of analysis. They will not (yet) be dealt with as representing indicators of external matters (but can in the course of further research assume this status).

My Approach to Zhirinovskii's Fascism

Notwithstanding the above qualifications, a proof that certain lines of thought in Zhirinovskii's texts should be labelled 'fascist' would be sufficient to warrant the usage of the term 'fascist' for Zhirinovskii by politicians in the context of day-to-day politics.²⁰⁶ If the message of this study that some tendencies in Zhirinovskii's writings can be classified as being 'fascist' is accepted, such accusations cannot be contested justifiably as long as Zhirinovskii has not excused himself for the

8-15 January 1995; OG, no. 15 (91), 13-19 April 1995; and LG, no. 12 (5543), 22 March 1995, 10.

²⁰⁴ See Riabov, 1994; Igantow 1994a, 1, and 1994b, 1. It is true that ideological eclecticism has been listed as an important characteristic of fascism in general (Griffin 1995, 8). However, in connection with fascism this means a mechanical accumulation of various *ultra-nationalist* myths of rebirth, and not a general bringing together of all kind of ideological themes as in the case of Zhirinovskii.

²⁰⁵ This term - in Russian *polivy* - is used by the former Russian emigree writer and neo-fascist ideologist and activist Eduard Limonov in a widely distributed pamphlet (200,000 copies) against Zhirinovskii (Limonov 1994). The reading of Zhirinovskii's transcribed speeches which often lack an elementary logic and consistency have led me to adopt this term here.

²⁰⁶ The latter was done by, for instance, former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev last year and led, as happened before, on Zhirinovskii's initiative to a juridical conflict (R, no. 11 [225], 26 April - 2 March 1995).

respective textual segments, retracted his words, formally denied them, or disproved their authenticity with some plausability.²⁰⁷ It would be ridiculous to demand from the Russian public 'to forget' about one kind of public pronouncements of Zhirinovskii, and to refer, in assessing him, instead only to the more 'positive' and less aggressive aspects of his behaviour. After all, he has proclaimed himself as the future Russian president - a position that would give in his hands an amount weapons enough to eradicate all live on earth several times. Therefore, one would expect that he, at least, tries to show convincingly that his clearly fascist statements (which, as will be shown, to a large degree, coincide

²⁰⁷ The latter has been sometimes tried by Zhirinovskii and his aides. For instance, Stanislav Zhebrovskii denied that the following frequently quoted pronouncement of Zhirinovskii (firstly published in the Lithuanian newspaper *Respublika*) is authentic:

The Baltics are Russian land. I will destroy you. I will start burying nuclear waste in the border zone of Smolensk Oblast; the Semipalatinsk [atomic test zone] will be transferred to your area. You Lithuanians will die of disease and radiation. I will remove the Russians and the Poles. I am God. I am a tyrant. There will be no Lithuanians, Latvians, or Estonians in the Baltics. I will act like Hitler in 1932. The champagne you are quaffing today is your own wake. (I, 24 September 1991; *National Affairs*, 2 October 1991; Lancelle and Frazer 1994, 21; Conradi 1995, 123).

This passage might not be by Zhirinovskii, but it pretty much sounds like him.

Zhirinovskii's close long-term adviser Irina S. Kulikova (born in 1918) denied the accurateness of the rendering of a number of statements and emphases in the first edition (1993a) of Zhirinovskii's major autobiographical and programmatic writing *The Last Dash to the South* published in late September 1993 (I, no. 26, 10 February 1994). Although it is true that later editions of this book were revised substantially (e.g. 1996c), Kulikova's intervention is in so far not very plausible as she announced her objections more than four months after the publication and the LDP's active marketing of the 35,000 printed copies of the allegedly altered first version (in, among others, the State Duma). An example supporting such a rejoinder would be that one of Zhirinovskii's most frequently quoted mirages from the first September 1993 edition of *The Last Dash* (1993a, 66) crossed out in the respective part of the 1996 edition co-edited by Kulikova (1996c, 35-36) - namely: 'Russian soldiers washing their boots in the warm water of the Indian Ocean' - had already been, nearly word by word, articulated by Zhirinovskii in a newspaper-article published in *Izvestiia* in August 1993 (Zhirinovskii 1993c). Kulikova is a Doctor of Science, specialist on fine arts, and Professor of Aesthetics at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences. See, *The Independent Magazine*, 2 April 1994, 12-21, Timtschenko 1994, 116, and Kulikova 1995. For some reason, Kartsev has (rather ridiculously with explicit reference to the 'Russian soldiers washing their boots in the [...] Indian Ocean') also supported Zhirinovskii's claim that a forged version of his book had been printed in September 1993 (1995, 159).

It should be stated in advance that in the case of the object under investigation here, the newspaper *Liberal*, such denials of authenticity would hardly be credible because this periodical was one of the, and until mid-1993 the official LDP newspaper. In its imprint, Zhirinovskii himself is mentioned as the founder (*uchreditel'*) and one of his closest aides and long-term acquaintances, Stanislav Zhebrovskii, as editor-in-chief (I, no. 8-9, 1992, 32; no. 1 [11], 1993, 32; no. 2 [12], 1993, 32; no. 3 [13], 1993, 32). On Zhebrovskii, see S, 22 December 1993, Kartsev 1995, 4, 20, 71, 73, and Part I, sec. 3.5. of this study.

with explicit or implicit war-mongering) are not essential. Yet, he has not taken any relevant steps in that regard. As far as clearly fascist tendencies do, as will be shown, exist in his writings, there remains no serious justification for the Russian courts' ruling that Russian democratic politicians and newspapers should excuse and pay compensations to Zhirinovskii for calling him a 'fascist'.²⁰⁸

If the above approach concerning a focusing on only a limited part of the LDP publications would, therefore, be sufficient to classify the mentioned juridical rulings as inadequate, a relatively simple procedure emerges. At first the question has to be answered what fascism is or what constitutes its nature. In doing this, on the one hand, those criteria have to be established which delimitate fascism from other political phenomena, i.e. in this case from other ideologies. This refers especially to further forms of radical right-wing ideologies, as, for instance, ultra-conservatism, religious fundamentalism, or right-wing populism. On the other hand, it is necessary to formulate the smallest denominator which constitutes the common basis of various inter- and intra-national varieties of fascism, and which allows us to use this term in different civilizational contexts as well as for relatively dissimilar right-wing extremist groupings inside the polity of one country. It will not surprise that both operations - external demarcation and internal determination of an essential element - will have identical results in the process of depicting fascism's distinctiveness. On this basis, an operational definition shall be developed which clarifies the sufficient and necessary conditions for

²⁰⁸ I could imagine two possible lines of argument to warrant these decisions which, however, appear both as ultimately irrelevant. It might have, on the one hand, been that the judges had in mind the political aspects of such allegations, i.e. the question of whether they represented slander. However, if one acknowledged in principle the fascist character of some of his pronouncements, then the labelling of Zhirinovskii would be a cognitive problem. One can rank the relative importance of such statements as high or as low as one likes. That would appear as decision depending on individually preferences and not on a court-ruling.

If, on the other hand, an overall location of Zhirinovskii and his party in the post-Soviet political spectrum of Russia and an assignment of the LDP programme to a generic class of political ideologies was sought, the judges would appear as not competent enough to do this. Instead, they would have to base their decision on a relatively representative opinion of the 'scientific community' of Russian and international experts on Russian politics and right-wing extremism. Such a statement, however, was not in the hands of the judges and does, as far as I know, not exist to this day. A provisional future solution to this problem might be to refer instead to tentative ideological categorizations of Zhirinovskii and his party by competent academics. With regard to this one would have to mention that a considerable number of relevant contributions have already labelled Zhirinovskii 'fascist'. See, for instance, *The Economist*, 29th February 1992, 55; Yanov 1994, 215-226; J.F. Brown, 1994, 2; Iadov 1994, 13; Sestanovich 1994, 23-27; McFaul 1994; Dunlop 1995, 4; Latsis 1995; Carter 1995, 183; Schilling 1995, 31; or Talbott 1995.

an application of the fascist label. Finally, this definition has to be confronted with a sample of texts produced by Zhirinovskii as a result of which they would be classified as fascist or non-fascist depending of the applicability of the above criteria.

As outlined before, the purpose of this study does not imply that this sample should be statistically representative. But it would strengthen my case, if the sum of these texts comprehensively embraced one particular component of Zhirinovskii's publication activities with an unequivocally political designation during the larger part of the time period covered in this book. Such an approach, i.e. the analysis of an official LDP newspaper appearing from 1990 to 1993, would, for the following reasons, be more convincing than an arbitrary selection of texts or the review of a singular essay as, for instance, Zhirinovskii's major autobiographical writing *The Last Dash to the South* (1993a).

First, a longitudinal coverage of a specific kind of activity at various points between 1990 to 1993 would to a certain extent also reveal the context, trends, dynamics and tendencies of the evolution of Zhirinovskii's ideas, and their relation to each other. These aspects, in turn, would be of interest in an evaluation of the meaning, relevance and representativeness of these texts with regard to Zhirinovskii's overall agenda.

Second, the concentration on, and comprehensive treatment of, one particular series of publications would by itself to a large degree invalidate a possible reproach that those ideological outlines classified as fascist are taken out of context, or that their content has been wilfully constructed by assembling and/or conjuncting statements from disparate sources or of dissimilar designation. The treatment of a number of successive and inter-related texts produced for several newspaper-issues at various times would also largely undercut a possible rebuttal that the thrust of the general ideas outlined there had an experimental character, or that the content of the texts was of an only temporary relevance to Zhirinovskii and his party.

Third, it would be supportive to my argument, if this component could be classified as representing, in comparison to other activities, not only Zhirinovskii's day-to-day agitation and propaganda efforts, and public posture in media, but also his labour to form and develop his party and a pool of active supporters not officially associated with the LDP. This would signify that the respective statements have to be seen not only as indicators of Zhirinovskii's thought, as an 'output' of his belief system. Once pronounced in front of, or for the reading by, party members and

sympathizers, these ideas have also acquired the status of an input into the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon', and of being to a certain degree representative of the whole movement. In addition, one could hold that pragmatic, tactical and opportunist considerations will in communication with activists and supporters of the LDP to a lesser degree alter the expression of Zhirinovskii's ideology, than that would be, for instance, the case in talks with journalists or in articles written for consumption by readers of democratic newspapers who have, in their majority, probably a manifestly critical stance towards him and the LDP (e.g. Zhirinovskii 1993c and 1994d).

Finally, it would be important that the analyzed texts constitute unequivocally political (and not religious, metaphysical, artistic, etc.) statements, or pronouncements on primarily social, economic and legal issues, and that the publication in which they have appeared has a clearly political character and purpose.²⁰⁹

Thus the focus of this inquiry shall only be on those ideas which are discernible in texts meeting the above criteria, and which I will label here 'focus-texts'. Nevertheless, the following content analysis proceeds, on the other hand, also from the assumption that it is legitimate to partly depart from the above criteria, and also consult other types of writings by Zhirinovskii, if that appears as necessary in order to adequately clarify the con- and denotation of the ideas under consideration. That concerns above all those phrases or words of the focus-texts which seem to contradict each other, or the meaning of which is not entirely clear and cannot be explicated through narrow - that means intra-textual - contextualization. In other words, I shall confer to pronouncements of Zhirinovskii from other than the focus-texts, if a line of thought in them is not consistent, explicit and transparent enough to be adequately interpreted by merely relating its parts to each other, and by reformulating, summarizing and structuring it (Mayring 1995).

²⁰⁹ It has been, for instance, argued by Zhirinovskii's assistants (and some independent observers) with regard to the allegations of war-mongering in the first edition of *The Last Dash to the South* (1993a) that this is not an outline of a political programme, but a piece of literature which should not be taken too seriously. In early 1994 the then second most important figure in the LDP, Aleksandr Vengerovskii, for instance, stated:

The book of Zhirinovskii [i.e. the first edition of *The Last Dash to the South*] is merely a literary work. I can [only] discuss it in exactly this quality. The line of the party [in contrast] is something completely different. (as quoted in S, 20 January 1994, 2)

The Procedure of this Inquiry

As the latter consideration has indicated already, I have chosen to proceed here as in the broadest possible sense hermeneutically and not strictly empirically-analytically.²¹⁰ True, an interpretation aiming on an contextualized understanding may because of lacking procedural rigour and lesser inter-subjective evidence appear as less convincing an approach, than quantitative content analysis. Yet, firstly, qualitative aspects (and thus subjective influences) would in any way also play an important role in the course of the conceptualization, selection of indicators, formulation of correspondence rules, and coding of the texts for quantitative analysis.

Second, this study's specific focus are relatively short text segments rather than the messages of whole documents or their collections. In the present context, it is merely necessary to detect singular - if sufficiently comprehensive, manifest and coherent - fascist lines of thought. They do not have to be weighed against other characteristics of the texts and documents under investigation here. Thus quantitative inquiries would, for these purposes, not be significantly more revealing anyway. Moreover, because of the specific character of fascism, it would be difficult to exactly define what should be counted in the course of a systematic inquiry. The empirically detectable permutations of abstractly defined generic ideologies are in general similar only on a structural level, and have merely a 'mythical core',²¹¹ and much less surface characteristics or manifest contents in common. This universal rule applies even more to the various expressions of nationalism, and especially to the internationally extremely disparate varieties of the distinctly anti-rational ideology of fascism.²¹² That means that it would, in studies like this, be - regardless of the sample-size - necessary to try to 'delve into' the respective pronouncements as much as that is possible for a non-fascist. In other words, it would in any event be indispensable to heavily take into consideration the unique geographic, cultural, historical and political contexts as well as the specific personal (e.g. the psychological) characteristics

²¹⁰ Though my procedure does not closely follow its prescriptions, a book by Mayring on qualitative content analysis (1995) has been inspiring.

²¹¹ 'The term "political myth" in this context does not merely refer to specific historical myths to legitimate policies [...]. Rather it denotes the irrational mainspring of *all* ideologies irrespective of their surface rationality or apparent "common sense".' (Griffin 1993a, 27, emphasis in the original)

²¹² A comparison of the different permutations of fascism in Italian political thought and history has been provided by Lyttelton (1993). With regard to inter-war Germany, Griffin has emphasized the existence of non- and even anti-Nazi fascisms (1995a, 104-115).

of the respective authors. These issues are crucial in determining the appropriateness of certain classifications, and in appreciating the distinctiveness of the respective manifestation of fascism's mythical core. But they are difficult to operationalize in the framework of a systematic analysis.

In addition one should mention the fascist texts' often extremely esoteric character, their explicit anti-rationalism, and their interlarding with cryptic or coded messages with the latter phenomenon often related to self-censorship in order to avoid persecution by constitutional protection organs, or potentially dangerous counter-reactions by the democratic public. These factors complicate the erection of sufficiently rigorous schemes for adequate textual coding furthermore.²¹³ Notwithstanding, in future inquiries on right-wing extremism and populism an as wide as possible application of systematic methodologies would be, of course, preferable.²¹⁴ In the case of fascism, however, it will always be at best a matter of an as wide as possible merger of hermeneutic and formal approaches.²¹⁵

²¹³ Some problems which for, in some respect similar reasons, emerged for systematic text analysis in sovietology are summarized in Brown 1974, 41-42.

²¹⁴ Following, for instance, the seminal quantitative study of party manifestos edited by Budge, Robertson and Hearl (1987).

²¹⁵ One could add that hermeneutics - the technique to which the present treatment is most closely related - has, in an important post-sovietological textbook, been singled out as a procedure to be more extensively applied in studies of post-Soviet politics. Fleron and Hoffmann recommend:

Learn the principles of hermeneutic interpretation and apply them to theories of revolution and current experience in the former Soviet Union. The keys here may be the concept of preunderstanding and distinction between the meaning and significance of a text. Employ such concepts and distinctions if you agree that one needs to know much about Russian culture before one can really understand the transformation of the Soviet polity, economy, and society. Also, make your assumptions as explicit as possible so that they can be critically scrutinized by social scientists with diverse theoretical interests and by specialists in other geographical areas, thereby improving collective understanding of what we are doing and what we could and should be doing. (1993, 382)

5.3.2. Some Problems of a Theoretical Conceptualization of Fascism

Generic Fascism as a Sub-Type of Right-Wing Extremism

Unfortunately, a student of comparative right-wing extremism interested in empirical fascist studies cannot refrain from saying in advance of her or his theory-related investigation that the decade-long discussions on how to define fascism did for a long time not result in the formulation of a widely enough accepted taxonomic scheme for dealing with fascist groupings. On the contrary, partly such different concepts of generic fascism were pronounced and the term applied to such a wide variety of political phenomena that there were serious proposals to, at least temporarily, turn away from using 'fascism' as a generic label in social sciences and historical writing (Woolf 1981, 1; Allardyce 1979). Moreover, some historians have explicitly or by implication claimed that there is no such thing as an unequivocally identifiable fascist ideological core.²¹⁶ Schüddekopf (1973, 18), Trevor-Roper (1981, 20), Scruton (1982, 169), and Vivarelli (1991) seemed to be among the proponents of such a view. As far as it is exactly this aspect of the phenomenon of fascism with which I would like to deal here, the below investigation would be doomed from the outset.²¹⁷

Such scepticisms towards the possibility of an adequate conceptualization of fascism are in view of the 'deflation' (Allardyce 1979, 367), or 'inflation' (Griffin 1993a, 1) from which the label has suffered since World War II partly understandable. Yet, they are hardly tenable as guides to empirical right-wing extremism studies. Alone an inspection of the inter-war period in Europe shows that there were a number of radical political groupings and movements the basic ideas of which can be ascribed neither to the traditional right-wing authoritarian spectrum, nor to various types of left-wing extremism (Payne 1980b, 418). These parties and other political groupings were recognized not only by contemporaries as distinctive and, therefore, called 'fascist'. Many of these groups did at this

²¹⁶ This phenomenon has been recently noted by, among others, Galkin (1994, 21), Griffin (1995a, 1), and Eatwell (1995b, 3).

²¹⁷ The school which, on the other hand, takes fascism's ideas seriously as a key to understanding its characteristics, policies and institutions, and style of its politics seems to include, among others, Ernst Nolte (1963, 1968), Zeev Sternhell (e.g. 1986), Stanley Payne (1980a, 1980b, 1993, 1995), George Mosse (e.g. 1979), Emilio Gentile, A. James Gregor (1969, 1974, 1979), Alexander Galkin (e.g. 1994, 1995a), Roger Eatwell (1992, 1993, 1995a, 1995b), and Roger Griffin (1993a, 1995a, 1996). It should be added, though, that these theorists 'are far from seeing eye to eye on what these ideas actually are.' (Griffin 1995a, 2)

time (i.e. before the negative stigmatization of the mass crimes by - especially German - fascism), not hesitate to call themselves 'fascist' or even, with unveiled reference to Nazism, 'national-socialist'. In addition, they tended to explicitly delimitate their ideas from non-revolutionary forms of right-wing thought in general and ultra-nationalism in particular.²¹⁸

True, one should be careful with terms which such circles ascribe to themselves. Yet, to simply lump together all inter- and post-war right-wing anti-democratic movements, parties, political groups and politicians under the blanket term of 'right-wing extremism' without further discriminating typologization seems in view of the considerable differences between the ideological sub-classes dividing these groupings and personalities not sufficiently informative, and of an only limited analytical value.²¹⁹ That is even more so because 'right-wing extremism' is by many researchers used as a multi-dimensional umbrella category designed for classification of not only ideologies, but also of a number of other political phenomena, among them social attitudes, and political behaviour, institutions or sub-cultures (Stöss 1994, 27; Gärtner 1995, 254).²²⁰ Some scholars even go so far as to merge left-wing and right-wing extremism into a unified ideal-type category of 'political extremism' defined by supposedly common structural characteristics of all, in the contemporary Western context, as anti-constitutional regarded ideologies, and representing a kind of all-embracing counter-principle to the 'constitutional-democratic state' (Backes 1989; Schneider 1995b, 10). One should warn with regard to this approach that although it can, in a first step, be

[v]ery useful in designing a field for comparative research, a dichotomy may, when

²¹⁸ Connected with this phenomenon was the paradox of inter-war 'para-fascism'. That means that in view of the apparent success of fascist movements a number of European regimes emerging at this time copied consciously aspects of Italian Fascism and/or German Nazism. Yet, as far as their overall political agenda and, subsequently, their policies did not really entail the idea of a social and ethical rebirth, they remained nevertheless essentially non-fascist. See for an illuminating discussion of this curiosity Griffin 1993a, 120-28. The disagreements and quarrels about an adequate evaluation and classification of this particular type of regimes were important determinants of the terminological confusion in post-war fascist studies.

²¹⁹ In an essay on the prospects of post-Soviet studies Motyl reminds that '[t]ypologies are [...] the lifeblood of those who desire to engage in nomothetic work.' (1992, 308)

²²⁰ The problems connected with empirical applications of the concept of right-wing extremism to, for instance, comparative studies of ideologies of West European nationalist parties are amply illustrated in an article by Mudde (1995).

prematurely presented as a conclusion, induce detrimental simplifications or nourish a kind of 'manicheanism', far distant from what is expected in a sociological analysis. [...] For a dichotomy reduces everything. Never can two classes be as precise in their discriminating power as seven, nine, or twenty classes. (Dogan and Pelassy 1984, 144)

From the viewpoint of *political* expediency, it may in contemporary studies of Western polities, of course, suffice to simply distinguish between, on the one side, those political groupings which are merely located on the periphery of the democratic spectrum, from, on the other side, those which are beyond the limits of democratic politics. Such a differentiation informs, for instance, the 'anti-extremist' policies of the German *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution). In the Western context such an approach seems to be adequate because the degree of ideologisms' impact on policies, politics and societies can be seen as a function of, among others, the external constraints which a champion of a certain ideology encounters (Groth 1971, 12).

These intra- and international economic, political and social constraints have in post-war Western societies risen dramatically. They have narrowed the space for substantial political changes, and fundamental social and cultural engineering for representatives of *all* ideologies. In today Western Europe, for instance, it might thus, in political-practical terms, not terribly matter any longer whether a right-wing extremist is a fascist, ultra-conservative or fundamentalist, or whether he (less probable: she) should be seen as either a new Franco, or a new Mussolini, or whether the Austrian Jörg Haider and his (misnamed) *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, and the Italian Gianfranco Fini and his *Alleanza Nazionale* are genuinely ultra-nationalist or merely right-wing populist. Even if Haider or Fini become prime-ministers of their countries - which cannot be excluded from the outset in these two cases - the scope of their activities would be to such a degree limited that their policies would, probably, be hardly more than an expression of the fact that they represent the spectrum of far and ultra-right politics in general (i.e. including the anti-democrats). That means that even if there would be a hypothetical fascist president or prime-minister of a member-state of the European Union, he (less probable: she) would not be in a position to realize his vision of a political, social and ethical revolution, though he could try to shake or manipulate the democratic system in his (or her) country,

and might to some degree succeed in doing so. To that regard, it is politically useful to distinguish between those right-wing parties or groupings which accept, at least, the basic principles of modern Western political systems, but propagate non-moderate solutions on current issues (as, for instance, immigration), and, on the other side, those which question the legitimacy and merits of liberal-democratic constitutions in a more fundamental way. In Germany, the former would be classified as 'right-wing radical' (or 'populist'), and the latter as 'right-wing extremist' which would result in their surveillance and possible banning by the State. The discussion about neo-fascism is thus, in the Western context, an intellectually illuminating, heuristically appropriate and for further comparative purposes useful, but to a lesser degree a politically relevant matter.

The latter statement, however, does not apply to historical periods, geographical regions, civilizations or countries where the external constraints to the implementation of predominantly ideologically informed policies are, though certainly not completely absent, but significantly weaker. This was true of, among others, inter-war Western and Eastern Europe. While the military dictatorships of, for instance, the Generals Antonescu and Franco in Romania and Spain were certainly right-wing, ultra-nationalist, anti-democratic, authoritarian and thus extremist, they were not fascist, but, instead, essentially ultra-conservative or reactionary. They neither carried out, nor had they ever planned, a full-blown 'national rebirth' - i.e. a social and ethical revolution. Though they partly copied external trappings of Fascism and Nazism and could be thus called 'para-fascist', they essentially aimed and managed to preserve the status quo (Griffin 1993a, 120-124, and 1995a, 9). If, on the other hand, the major fascist political organizations of these two countries, i.e. the Iron Guard and the Falange respectively, had been as successful in their bid for power as their Italian and German counterparts, this, I speculate, would have not only resulted in some different nuances. Although the mode of legitimation, style of politics, domestic and foreign policies, as well as political and social institutions of such regimes under, for instance, the founder of the Romanian Iron Guard Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, or the leader of the Spanish Falange José Antonio Primo de Rivera, could have certainly also been classified as 'right-wing extremist', these regimes would have been in, at least in some regard, different from Antonescu's and Franco's. Probably, they would have, in a number of instances, been more similar to some core characteristics (yet much less to the surface traits) of Hitler's and Mussolini's programmes, rhetoric and behaviour.

A relative shortage of external constraints to the realization of ideologisms is also (though to a lesser degree than in inter-war Europe) a condition of post-Soviet Russia. To illustrate this situation one could, for instance, quote Prime-Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin who noted that there were about the same amount of foreign companies registered in Russia as in tiny Estonia in 1994. Another indication would be the fact that the by far 'oldest' of the three non-communist political parties crossing the 5%-barrier in the 1995 parliamentary elections was Zhirinovskii's LDPR which was then more than twice as old as the 'electoral association' *IaBLoko* led by the democrat Grigorii Iavlinskii, and more than four times older than the centrist bloc 'Our Home is Russia' *NDR* of Chernomyrdin. Furthermore, Russia is neither a member of the OECD, EU, NATO, GATT, ASEAN, nor of any other truly relevant international structure with the exception of the UN Security Council and Paris Club. Many ordinary Russians outside the capitals, I assume, still do not properly know what labels like 'Internet', 'World Wide Web', 'CNN', 'Amnesty International', etc. actually mean (though they may have heard about them already). This list could go on.

To sum up, in contemporary Russia, external constraints to radical translations of political and social ideas into reality have - in comparison to Soviet Russia of the mid-eighties - indeed become stronger. Yet, the current state of Russia's civil and political society, and her interpenetration with the outer world is still a far cry from the respective indicators of Western and some non-Western countries. The relevance of these factors is, moreover, further strengthened by the fact that Russia could, because of its richness of natural resources, at least temporarily, subsist autarchically. In the case of a right-wing takeover, it would be thus of considerable interest exactly which fundamental political myth or visionary principle the activists and supporters of the respective right-wing organization or grouping believe in (Griffin 1993a, 27-28), and what set of ideas the ruler of the day uses to posit, explain and justify the ends and means of his political and social actions (Seliger 1976, 14). Therefore, classifications of groupings or persons as merely 'right-wing extremist' appear, in the context of current Russia (as distinct from Western politics and society) as insufficiently informative.

For these reason, it seems to be imperative to take fascist ideology seriously, to attempt to define it, to delimitate it from other doctrines, to recognize it in its different permutations, and, thus, to, willy-nilly, enter the field of the highly disparate theories of fascism.

Concepts of Fascist Ideology

A primary reason for the problematic nature of the discussions of 'fascism', seems to be that this label is, in contrast to 'liberalism', 'socialism' or 'communism', etymologically not very predicative.²²¹ This may have also been a determinant of an absurd situation in comparative post-war fascist research. Large theoretical edifices were erected to explain inter-war fascism's emergence, success, psychology, social basis and function, or practice of government.²²² Yet, how to identify fascist movements and to distinguish them from other political groupings, i.e. what the concepts of 'fascism' actually means, remained often elusive - a defect that was noted by, among others, Payne (1980a, 14) and Eatwell (1992, 161-162). Characteristically, this kind of evasiveness was promoted by social scientists of rather different backgrounds. On the one side, Marxist researchers often succumbed to the temptation to include in their comparative studies of fascism in power also those right-wing authoritarian regimes which, today, would not any longer be called 'fascist' (and should have never been labelled this way).²²³ On the other side, the rise of the concept of totalitarianism led not only to some progress in the conceptualization of the distinctiveness of fascist and Stalinist practice of power. The notion of totalitarianism seems to have been by many misunderstood in the way that it was perceived as also denoting the existence of a common core of fascist and Marxist (and other radically left-wing) ideologies - a line of reasoning which led to grave simplifications and posed, in the end, more new questions than it answered old ones. Following the application of the regime-typological concept 'totalitarianism' to the field of political ideas, in Germany, moreover, an already mentioned sophisticated theory of an ideologically defined generic 'political extremism' has been developed.²²⁴ Because of the sweeping equation of right-wing extremist ideologies and radically left-

²²¹ According to Fritz Schotthöfer '[f]ascism has a name which by itself does not say anything about the spirit and the aims of the movement. A *fascio* is an association, a union, fascists are unionists [*Bündler*], and fascism would be unionism [*Bündlertum*].' As quoted in Wippermann 1991, 135; see also Wippermann 1983, 12.

²²² For useful recent overviews of these theories, see Gregor 1997 and Wippermann 1997.

²²³ This led a US-American historian to the laconic, but by no means only rhetoric advice that Marxist researchers of fascism should be studying communist regimes before they start writing on fascism (Allardyce 1979, 369).

²²⁴ This, I believe, misleading approach has been comprehensively presented in a, nevertheless, impressive monograph by Backes (1989). However, the fatal problem of lack of sufficient empirical substance which has been mentioned already in connection with insufficient conceptualizations of right-wing extremism applies for this concept (if conceived in ideological terms) even more.

wing ideas which underlies such a categorization, this approach was rightly rejected (e.g. Grebing 1971; Kowalsky and Schroeder 1994, 9-10; Stöss 1994, 24), and even harshly criticized (e.g. Wippermann 1990, 20-21) by a number of German students of historic and contemporary right-wing extremism.

Ernst Nolte has been generally given the credit of having triggered a serious rethinking of fascism and, above all, its ideology from a comparative perspective in the 1960s (1963, 1967, 1968). Nolte's theory has since then been often quoted and taken as a starting point for new theoretical research and discussions. However, it was only rarely applied in empirical studies of fascism - perhaps not the least because of its author's subsequently more and more obvious - to put it mildly - 'peculiar' view on Nazism's place in modern world history.²²⁵

Taking in many cases Nolte's *Faschismus in seiner Epoche* as a point of departure, an enormous theoretical literature on generic fascism emerged until the early eighties. Some works of Gregor (e.g. 1969, 1974, 1979), essays by Linz (1975, 1979, 1980), and, especially, a book by Payne (1980b) were among those writings which seem to have become influential.²²⁶ The special merit of these and some other approaches was that they tried to conceptualize the varieties of fascism as constituting a *generic* ideal-type political phenomenon characterized by a *common* ideological core. In connection with this, emphasis was often laid on the anti-dimensions of fascism, i.e. anti-liberalism, anti-communism, anti-conservatism, anti-parliamentarism, etc., which represented a heuristically important innovation in the conceptualization of fascist ideology.

However, the latter statement represents, at the same time, an indication of the major flaw of these attempts to define fascism. In many such theories, more or less long lists of criteria have been set up which have to be fulfilled to call a certain political grouping 'fascist'. True, these kind of

²²⁵ For recent restatements of Nolte's interpretation of Nazism's origins, rise and historical place see, for instance, Nolte 1987 and 1993, and Sp, no. 40, 1994, 83-103. For critiques of these aberrations, see, among others, Wehler 1994, Gorodetsky 1995, 8-9, and Griffin 1995a, 339-40.

²²⁶ However, although frequently quoted, all of these studies suffered from the significant defect to have remained largely silent concerning the phenomenon of neo-fascism, and the application of the concept of fascism to the post-war period - omissions which in view of recent developments in Eastern Europe appear as even more unfortunate. The subject of the relation between classic and post-war fascism has first been systematically covered (from a non-Marxist point of view) in the comparative studies by Thamer and Wippermann (1977) and Wippermann (1983) which, however, proceed from a real-type and not ideal-type definition of fascism.

concepts excell by recording virtually all relevant characteristics of fascism. Yet, if scrutinized they appear as in three respects unsatisfactory.

First, if understood as nominal definitions their practical usefulness is insofar limited as it remains unclear which of the points on the list are, on the one hand, of essential or primary importance for the delimitation of fascism from other political phenomena, and which traits should, on the other hand, be seen as being of peripheral or secondary significance. It follows that in the case of a lacking or only partial fulfilment of some criteria it is left to individual choice to categorize a certain grouping as non-fascist or not.

If one, secondly, comprehends the list-concepts as essentialist definitions (*Realdefinitionen*) one is struck by the problem, that there is neither an identifiable *definiens* (the element to be defined) nor a clear cut *definiendum* (the defining element). Therefore, it remains vague to which general class, *genus proximum*, of political phenomena fascism belongs, and what the singular features, the *differentia specifica*, setting fascism apart from other sub-classes of the respective *genus proximum* is.

If one, thirdly, pursued the (perhaps somewhat perverse) intention to put oneself into a the position of a convinced fascist, to 'understand' him (much less probable: her), the list-approaches are also not very serviceable. The core belief which led German fascists to do both, commit the most monstrous mass murder and atrocities in human history, and to sacrifice themselves for their 'case', remains hidden behind the multiplicity of attributes ascribed to them.²²⁷

²²⁷ For an illustrations of the problems connected with list-definitions in the case of the concept of right-wing extremism, see Mudde 1995.

5.3.3. An Operational Definition of Fascism

Griffin's 'Fascist Minimum'

An important move forward in the conceptualization of fascism has, it seems to me, occurred in 1991 when the first edition of Roger Griffin's *The Nature of Fascism* was published.²²⁸ In 1995, the concept proposed in this study has been concisely summarized and supported with empirical evidence by the same author's Oxford Reader *Fascism*, a collection of commented primary texts showing the different permutations of international fascism supplanted by some excerpts from relevant social science texts on fascism. The Reader is above all exceptional in that it for the first time provides a massive empirical verification of the existence of a common ideological core in a wide range of on the surface varying, yet essentially similar inter- and post-war right-wing extremisms which can be, therefore, summarized under the overall category of generic fascism. For this reason, the Reader seems to me to represent one of the most important contributions to fascist historiography since Nolte's *Faschismus in seiner Epoche* of 1963.

Griffin develops in these books, from a comparative perspective, an ideal-type definition of generic fascism, and takes in doing this the - as shall be shown - serviceable step of formulating a short and concise 'fascist minimum'. That means, he tries to unequivocally identify that smallest common denominator of the different articulations of fascist ideology which actually allows one to subsume these, on the surface, highly disparate varieties of thought under one heading. Thus fascism is, according to Griffin,

²²⁸ Further reference with regard to this book will be to its second edition of 1993. Explicitly affirmative evaluations, empirical applications of the theory advanced in it, or acknowledgements of its usefulness can be found so far in, among others, Prowe 1994, Copsey 1994, Baker 1996, 10-13, and, most importantly, Payne 1993, and 1995, 5. Ian Kershaw described the study as '[...] the most broad ranging, internally consistent and suggestive general book on the subject [of fascism] that has so far been published [...]' whereas George Mosse saw it as a '[...] good corrective for so many superficial opinions about fascism which are abroad today.' (Griffin 1993a, backcover)

a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism. (1993a, 26)²²⁹

Whereas 'populist' and 'ultra-nationalism' will have for many people a roughly similar meaning, other terms require clarification. As already mentioned above, 'mythic core' refers in this context less to the extreme utopianism and anti-rationalism of fascism, i.e. to the conjuring up of specific historical myths as a source of political legitimation. (In referring to George Sorel) Griffin rather assumes that the core of *every* ideology can be understood as a fundamental political myth. These simple visionary principles are *in general* of an irrational kind, and constitute the inspirational and revolutionary power which mobilizes the activists and followers of respective political movements (1993a, 27-28).

The term 'palingenesis'²³⁰ goes in this context beyond the idea of a rebirth in the sense of a mere restoration or revival. 'Palingenetic' implies here neither duplication or repetition of the past, nor relapse to a former era. In this connection it rather denotes a regenerative and cleansing renewal in the sense of a rejuvenation, or a resurrection on a *new* level.²³¹ That means that fascist thinking, though containing many ideological segments usually associated with ultra-conservatism (hierarchical thinking, sexism, elitism, traditionalism, etc.), envisages rather a revolutionary remake of society than a counter-revolutionary retrogression to a gone period.²³²

²²⁹ Griffin's starting point in developing his theory was an extensive reading of relevant Italian primary sources representing the highly disparate varieties of Fascism, including, among others, revolutionary *Risorgimento* nationalism, futurism, rightist syndicalism, Fascist racism, or universal Fascism (see Lyttelton 1973; Griffin 1993a, 56-84; 1995a, 15-89). He then moved forward to trace out whether his inductively derived concept of a 'palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism' is also applicable to other putative fascisms as, for instance, to a number of inter-war German varieties of ultra-nationalism, among them Nazism, the so called Conservative Revolution, National Bolshevism, 'soldier nationalism', etc. (1993a, 85-115; 1995a, 93-165).

²³⁰ 'Palingenesis [...]: *biology* Repetition of phylogenic [*stammesgeschichtlichen*] levels of development during germ formation - *geology* Rock reshaping through re-upmelting [*Wiederaufschmelzung*] - *religion* Rebirth; (ethical) renewal.' (*Kleines Fremdwörterbuch*, 1974, 263).

²³¹ 'palingenetic - expressing the myth of rebirth, regeneration. In a political context, embodying the aspiration to create a new order following a period of perceived decline or decadence.' (Griffin 1993a, 240)

²³² Though defining fascism rather as a form of thought forging a 'holistic-national radical Third Way', Eatwell has, with reference to Griffin, also come to the conclusion that the 'key metaphor' of fascist ideology is rebirth (1995b, 11, 290).

The fascist mentality is characterized by the sense of living through an imminent turning-point in contemporary history, when the dominance of the allegedly bankrupt or degenerate forces of conservatism, individualistic liberalism and materialist socialism is finally to give way to a new era in which vitalistic nationalism will triumph. (Griffin 1993a, 44).

For the purpose of simpler communication, Griffin extracts from his extensive discursive characterization of fascism a short formula - 'palingenetic ultra-nationalism' - which he conceives as the smallest common denominator of the various permutations in which fascism may appear.²³³ '[The] vision [...] of *the national community rising phoenix-like after a period of encroaching decadence which all but destroyed it*' - that is what constitutes, according to Griffin the core of the fascist imagination (1993a, 38, emphasis in the original).²³⁴

²³³ It appears to me for three reasons as legitimate to skip, at this point, the attribute 'populist' in order to make further elaborations less extensive. First, the implementation of populist policies can be seen as a necessary consequence of 'palingenetic ultra-nationalism'. The idea of an *ultra*-nationalist rebirth can be understood as suggesting by itself the (proclaimed) destruction of traditional elites, and the (alleged) establishment of a direct link between ruler(s) and ruled. A consequential exaltation of the ethnically defined community seems to be only possible, if accompanied by the celebration of the nation's 'simple people', and of 'people's power', 'direct democracy' and the idealization of mass passions, i.e. by the occurrence of those phenomena usually referred to in definitions of populism (if, of course, populism is not seen as only a narrowly agrarian-sociologically defined political movement) (Canovan 1981, 3-16). Equally, the idea of a palingenesis, i.e. a consistent execution of an ethical and social revolution, can be interpreted as implying as such the involvement of the whole people in the innovative effort.

Second, the generic concept of fascism would be too narrow, if it not incorporated proto-fascism - a phenomenon that can be perceived as a quasi-inconsequential form of 'palingenetic ultra-nationalism'. That means that in this form of fascism the idea of a newborn nation is certainly clearly present. Yet, 'proto-fascism' remains distinctly utopian and elitist meaning that it shrinks back from the populist radicalism which would be necessary to resolutely implement its vision. Thus the absence of explicitly populist ideas should by itself not be seen as a sufficient criterion for altogether abandoning the usage of the fascist label (Griffin 1993a, 50-51, 202-205, 212-215).

Third, and in the present context most significantly, it is here not necessary to provide a separate proof that the object of this study is a populist. In fact, Zhirinovskii is a populist *par excellence*. This characteristic of the LDPR represents an aspect of Zhirinovskii's political activity on which all observers, whether they see him as a fascist or not, seem to agree more or less unreservedly.

²³⁴ Interestingly, eminent Russian expert on fascism Alexander Galkin came recently, without knowing Griffin's writings and with an obviously very different background, to a conclusion about the essence of fascism not dissimilar to Griffin's concept. The Russian specialist defines generic fascism as 'right-wing conservative revolutionarism' (1995a). However, although pointing in the same direction as Griffin's definition, Galkin's formulation seems to be in two ways unfortunate. First, the combination of the concepts of revolutionarism and conservatism is insofar confusing as both of them should be seen as primarily positional categories which as such

In the framework of this study, Griffin's theory could only be presented in a selective-fragmented manner. It may have been, notwithstanding, already become clear that the above described deficiencies of the list-approaches to fascism are largely avoided in the latter conceptualization.

First, as a nominal definition Griffin's formula is insofar useful as the pivotal, i.e. the sufficient criteria for labelling a political grouping fascist are designated relatively unequivocally: the idea of new- or re-birth combined with integral nationalism. Though this does, of course, not solve all problems of a conjunction of theoretical and empirical fascist studies, Griffin's definition of a 'fascist minimum' represents a comparatively practical research tool with which one should be able to substantiate in a more intelligible way, than in the case of the list-approaches, for which reasons exactly this or that political grouping or document has been labelled 'fascist' or 'non-fascist'.

Second, as an essentialist definition (*Realdefinition*) Griffin's concept is valuable insofar as it becomes clear what the *definiens* and *definiendum* are. Generic fascism belongs to the category - the *genus proximum* - of ultra-nationalisms. It differentiates from other sub-classes of this super-ideology in that it is palingenetic or revolutionary - the attribute which represents fascism's *differentium specificum* in relation to other forms of extreme nationalism.

Third, Griffin's characterization seems also to facilitate an 'understanding' of fascism and its appeal, as far as that is possible for a non-fascist. Through the reduction of fascist ideology to its clearly defined 'mythical core' (as well as through Griffin's distinctly graphical discursive characterization of fascism only quoted in extracts here), the central motivation of the - to remain as neutral as possible - 'unconventional activities' of fascists appear, at least to me, more transparent.

In contrast to this, such was my impression, the list-approaches' mere enumeration of various more or less important characteristics and anti-dimensions of fascism was less helpful, and to some degree even confusing. The latter does, of course, not mean that they had not also their merits.

contradict each other. If, in turn, conservatism is seen as a non-positional ideology (which creates a number of tricky problems for its conceptualization), it appears that 'right-wing conservative' would be a more or less tautological formula. Second, Galkin's definition stretches 'fascism' to a notion which could be applied to any period of human history. Griffin's 'palingenetic ultra-nationalism', in contrast, locates fascism (by relating it to nationalism) unequivocally in modern and contemporary history which seems to be a useful limitation of its conceptual range.

Especially, it was by this mean possible to throw light on the many different aspects, implications as well as secondary features which are connected to, and may grow out from fascism's core belief. And Griffin has attempted to included this aspect in the introduction to his second book where he also presented a list of further traits of fascism as a supplement to his definition.²³⁵

Yet, the latter aspect does not have to be dealt with here in length before moving to the empirical part. That is because the basic requirements for an operational definition of fascism listed at the outset have been already met in the course of the outline presented so far. First, fascism has been defined internally. That means the essential core of fascism has been disclosed by identifying a 'fascist minimum' which must be discernible in those political agendas which are to be classified as 'fascist'. Second, fascism has been defined externally, i.e. demarcated from other political ideologies, by integrating it, in a first step, into a more encompassing category of ideologies (ultra-nationalisms), and by discriminating it, in a second step, inside this general class with the help of a specific property (being palingenetic). Third, the necessary criteria for calling a political doctrine fascist have been unmistakably named: nationalistic, anti-democratic (expressed by the prefix 'ultra-'), and palingenetic. A combination of these three necessary qualities, in turn, constitutes the sufficient criterion the presence of which would one allow to classify a statement or agenda, and subsequently (within the limits mentioned above with regard to Zhirinovskii) the political grouping standing behind such a pronouncement as 'fascist'.

A Note on Contemporary Russian Political Terminology

Finally, a specific contextual problem of an adequate application of Griffin's ideal-type concept in the present setting has to be mentioned. In the framework of the inquiry in hand 'palingenesis' will be used rather in the, somewhat awkward, translation 'new-birth' than 'rebirth'. That is because the latter word means in Russian *vozrozhdenie* which is a central term in post-Soviet Russian political discourse in general. On the one hand, the label appears in documents of democratic

²³⁵ Griffin's list includes, in this order, anti-liberalism, anti-conservatism, fascism's tendency to operate as a charismatic form of politics, its anti-rationalism, its idiosyncratic way of adopting socialism, its link to totalitarianism, the heterogeneity of its social support, and its racism, peculiar internationalism and ideological eclecticism (1995a, 4-8).

political forces. For instance, Boris El'tsin's political profile can be characterized as a mixture of palingenetic liberalism and nationalism. In the programmatic texts of former Finance Minister Boris Fëdorov's liberal-patriotic party *Vperëd Rossiia!* (Forward Russia!) an explicit rebirth-rhetoric even plays a central role (Fëdorov 1995). On the other hand, ultra-conservative party programmes, as, for instance, that of Sergei Baburin's All-Russian People's Union (*ROS*), are not less dominated by palingenetic formulas (Baburin 1995; *Programma i ustav...* 1995; *Za ediniu...* 1995; Khairiuzov 1996).²³⁶

Though 'rebirth' seems to refer in both, the democratic as well as the ultra-conservative sense, to certain notions of nation-building, the term has in the respective contexts two rather different connotations. In El'tsin's and Fëdorov's case, 'rebirth' means both, a return to the pre-revolutionary path of development, and democratic renewal. *Vozrozhdenie* contains thus, on the one side, the notion of a reintroduction of capitalism and Tsarist state-symbols as well as the continuation of the 19th century national-liberal tradition in Russian political thought and life. On the other side, it means democratization, and rapprochement to the European Union and other Western institutions. In the case of the ultra-conservatives, 'rebirth', instead, indicates the re-establishment of the great power status as well as the return to the Russian tradition of a dominance of the state in social life (*gosudarstvennichestvo*). In other words, in the democratic context 'rebirth' signifies a liberal-patriotic turning back, and, at the same time, a new Western-inspired beginning - *de facto* a liberal-democratic political and social revolution. In non-fascist right-wing manifestos, on the other hand, *vozhrozhdenie* denotes the idea of a revival of the Russian imperial-patriarchic legacy which represents essentially an outline for restorationist or reactionary policies (Ludin 1995, 36-42). One implication of this particular conceptualization is that the characterization of the right-wing extremist Baburin as, for instance, a 'Red Fascist' (Dunlop 1993, 169) would appear as (not only an unfortunate compound, but also as) partly imprecise.²³⁷ By the same token, a

²³⁶ Says Sergei Baburin (born in 1959) about the ideology of his organization: 'We are conservative, we are in favour of traditions.' (as quoted in N.N. 1994, 48)

²³⁷ To be sure, the ultra-conservative Baburin cooperated in many instances closely with the (essentially anti-conservative) Russian fascists (as, for instance, in the National Salvation Front), or wrote for clearly fascist journals as, for instance, for *Elementy: Evraziiskoe obozrenie*. See, Gebhard 1994, 64. This paradoxon is, however, a feature which has been widely anticipated in modern history, and especially in inter-war Europe

classification of the notorious anti-semitic *Pamiat'* groups as 'the extremely right wing of the conservative nationalists' (Dunlop N.d., 16) would (if that translation is correct) have to be rejected because the *Pamiat'* movement had already conveyed clearly proto-fascist and thus, by implication, anti-conservative traits by the late eighties (Solovei 1995, 2; Griffin 1995a, 374-376).

Somewhat paradoxically, the further usage of 'palingenesis' as an isolated concept will be, from a formal point of view, closer to its meaning in the democratic, rather than the ultra-conservative sense. As indicated in the above characterization, fascism is per definition anti-conservative because it is an essentially revolutionary ideology (though it by no means always explicitly represents itself as such). If discussion revolves around fascism, what is meant is not a backward-looking intention of a restoration of the 'lost' Russia whether the Tsarist or the Soviet one or, as in Baburin's case, a combination of both. Palingenesis as a fascist concept denotes the creation of a 'new' Russia. True, the 'greatness' of that newborn Russia will be measured by referring to national history meaning above all some popular myths about it. Yet, finally, palingenesis in the fascist sense intends to supersede all prevailing national achievements, and to bring the nation to a new level of existence. Because of the specific Russian context outlined here, palingenesis shall be especially seen as a concept of new- rather than of re-birth. The combination of this idea with ultra-nationalism shall be interpreted as a proof for the presence of fascist ideology.

5.4. Palingenetic Ultra-Nationalism in Zhirinovskii's Articles in *Liberal*

As already mentioned the operational definition to be used here implies that three conditions need to be satisfied in order to label a political statement as fascist. First, the respective political agenda emerging from the statement must be clearly (though not necessarily manifestly) nationalistic. Second, this nationalism has to be sufficiently extreme. In other words, an, at least, implicit rejection of liberal democracy should be unequivocally detectable which would lead to its classification as ultra-nationalism. And, third, this ultra-nationalism must be of a palingenetic kind meaning that the

(Blinkhorn 1990).

respective nation shall be in some way be 'born anew'. The strategy which emerges from this outline is to detect in a first step those statements of Zhirinovskii which can be classified as ultra-nationalist, and to check, in a second step, whether these statements can be described as palingenetic as defined above. As a short preface, the importance, position and overall character of the newspaper *Liberal* needs to be sketched out.

5.4.1. The Newspaper *Liberal*

The first reason, for selecting the newspaper *Liberal* for this analysis is that its production has apparently been discontinued in about mid-1993. Thus the time of its appearance can be seen as a relatively completed period in the development of the LDP press as a whole (Umland 1996). Second, Zhirinovskii's contributions to *Liberal* seem to fulfill the requirements set out for texts by the LDP leader above. That means that they cover the larger part of the time period which is of interest here, i.e. 1990-93, and represent one particular series of publications in an official political periodical of the LDPR. In distinction to the articles published in the other major LDP newspaper published before of the 1993 elections, *Pravda Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Truth), the contributions to *Liberal* had been written to a lesser degree for mass-consumption, than for reading by the party's functionaries, rank-and-file, and sympathizers (Luchterhandt 1994, 129). A review, therefore, seems to be appropriate.

To unequivocally classify *Liberal* is, as it is the case with the whole 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon', not an easy task. Because of reasons which to trace out is not possible here, Zhirinovskii's and his assistants' pronouncements on principal questions of Russia's future were, at least during the period under scrutiny here, extremely contradictory. Notwithstanding, one can easily observe a distinct long term tendency. Whereas the tenor of most of his speeches and articles at the beginning of his activities as the leader of the LDP (i.e. at least between March and September 1990) was indeed more or less liberal-democratic and centrist-like (Laqueur 1993, 257-8; Umland 1994b, 1122-24; Part II, sec. 4.1.) this changed gradually until mid-1993 when *Liberal* stopped its appearance. After a period of numerous switches from the Right to the Left and back in his day-to-

day political conduct²³⁸, the publication of Zhirinovskii's above introduced simultaneously autobiographic and programmatic writing *The Last Dash to the South* in late summer 1993 represented for the time being an endpoint in this development, and a kind of coming-out of the LDP leader as an ultra-nationalist imperialist.²³⁹

This evolution was also mirrored in the ten issues of *Liberal* which appeared between the foundation of the party and the supersession of the 32-page irregular *Liberal* by the fortnightly 4-page *Pravda Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Truth) in mid-1993 as the major central party organ. Until this *Liberal* was not the only relevant, but the most important LDP publication with the altogether highest number of copies.²⁴⁰

Unfortunately, the following inquiry suffers from the flaw that I was not able to obtain a copy of the first number of *Liberal* which must have appeared in either spring, or summer 1990. However, in accordance with the above described tendency in the development of the official LDP statements from 1990 to 1993, this failing is insofar insignificant as this study's purpose is the tracking down of fascist tendencies in Zhirinovskii's contributions to this newspaper. On the basis of my studies of the LDP so far, I would dare to assert that the first *Liberal* issue unknown to me does not contain any fascist, probably not even a properly nationalist pronouncement neither by Zhirinovskii nor by his party colleagues. This would not have fitted into the feature of Zhirinovskii's behaviour during the probable publication period of this number.

Thus the following issues (under the edition of the below persons as they are reported in the mastheads, and with the number of pages and of copies in parentheses) are the objects of the

²³⁸ The neo-fascist publicist and political activist Eduard Limonov who was associated to Zhirinovskii for some months in 1992-93 was among those who complained about these shifts and, finally, left Zhirinovskii because of this and some other reasons (Limonov 1993; I, 11 September 1993, 8).

²³⁹ On this book, see also NG, 20 January 1994; FAZ, no. 14, 18 January 1994; Umland 1994b, 1126-28; and Part I, sec. 4.2.

²⁴⁰ The above described tendency in the development of the official LDP line and in *Liberal*, it has to be added though, was not duplicated by other LDP organs appearing during the same period which raises further problems of interpretation. That is especially true of the four 1992 issues of the then important Moscow neo-Nazi youth newspaper *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Falcon) under the edition of Sergei Zharikov and Andrei Arkhipov. The same can be said about the equally neo-fascist St. Petersburg periodical *Slovo Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's Word) edited by Iurii Kuznetsov. A short summary of the variety of LDP newspapers is given in Umland 1996.

following inquiry:

- no. 2-3, November 1990, editor-in-chief A. Khalitov, 8 pp. (no number of copies given);
- no. 4-5, 1992, editor-in-chief S.M. Zhebrovskii, responsible editor A.M. Zheimo (*sic*; the correct spelling seems to be Zhemlo), 32 pp. (50,000);
- no. 6-7, 1992, -dito- (10,000).
- no. 8-9, 1992, responsible and editor-in-chief S.M. Zhebrovskii, 32 pp. (50,000);
- no. 10, 1992, editor-in-chief S.M. Zhebrovskii, 16 pp. (200,000);
- no. 1 (11), 1993, responsible and editor-in-chief S.M. Zhebrovskii, 32 pp. (55,000);
- no. 2 (12), 1993, -dito- (15,000); and
- no. 3 (13), 1993, -dito- (15,000).

This list contains some data which will be of relevance for the below investigation and its purpose. First, between the appearance of number 2-3 in November 1990 and the ensuing number 4-5 in February-March 1992 passed 16 to 17 months. This circumstance was apparently due to lacking funding which meant that the LDPSU, instead, rented a few columns of the right-wing *Iuridicheskaiia gazeta* (Juridicial Newspaper) where party pronouncements, interviews, documents and news during this time period were published (*Kommersant*''', no. 40, 1991, 13). Second, the issues from 1992 onwards were essentially edited by Stanislav Zhebrovskii - one of the closest assistants of Zhirinovskii and apparently the only high standing LDP figure who, without being his relative, had known Zhirinovskii already before his entry into politics in the late sixties (Kartsev 1995, 71 and 73). This fact is insofar of importance as the special closeness of the editor-in-chief to Zhirinovskii is a strong argument in favour of an incontestable authenticity of the articles by Zhirinovskii printed in *Liberal*.

Lastly it has to be remarked that I will omitt a specific series of Zhirinovskii's pieces in *Liberal* in the framework of the study. This concerns a number of articles superscribed with 'On Russia's Destinies' which contain Zhirinovskii's view on Russia's history as well as a short autobiographic sketch (no. 6-7, 1992, 18-20; no. 8-9, 1992, 18-20; no. 1 [11], 1993, 17-19; no. 2 [12], 1993, 18-20; no. 3 [13], 1993, 18-20). *Liberal* has been chosen as an object of investigation because of its capacity of representing a mouthpiece for the LDP as it related to topical issues of

Russian politics and social life. That means that although Zhirinovskii's historical interpretations is of potential interest to the focus of this study, an analysis of this aspect of Zhirinovskii's world view would be more revealing, if it also referred to further LDP documents dealing with this aspect of his thought (e.g. Zhirinovskii 1993b), and if it did not only focus on the *Liberal* articles.

5.4.2. Zhirinovskii's Articles in *Liberal*

Number 2-3, 1990

As mentioned above the Zhirinovskii group did between its foundation on 31 March 1990 until approximately the beginning of 1991 not represent an openly ultra-nationalist political gathering (the term 'party' would be an exaggeration with regard to this period of the LDP's evolution). The above described peculiar circumstances of its emergence and early activities (especially in the framework of its membership in a so called 'Centrist Bloc') though did already hint that this might not be a genuinely liberal-democratic political organization (Dunlop 1991; Luchterhandt 1991; Umland 1994b, 1119-20).

Further indications of the ambiguity of the LDP's ideology can be found in the only early issue of *Liberal* available for this study from November 1990. In this newspaper, one can, besides a lot of liberal-democratic slogans (human rights, free market economy, rule of law, etc.), find some concepts and themes which are not by themselves ultra-nationalist, but which deviate from the dominating liberal agenda and will reappear in later more extremist statements of Zhirinovskii in a new context. For instance, Zhirinovskii, in a short biography introducing him to the reader, is presented as a politician 'orientated towards the Right [*pravoï orientatsii*]' who 'advocates [...] the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state.' (1; this and the following numbers in parentheses refer to the pages in the respective *Liberal* issues). In his article '[We] propose to everybody to become capitalists: The economic programme of the Liberal-Democratic Party' (3; Zhirinovskii 1990) Zhirinovskii proposes among other things:

[a] maximum of advantages for men in the middle ages (20-55 years old) who earn well and

would be in a position to solve by themselves all questions connected with the maintenance of the wife, the children [and] the parents. [...] We would like to create a system of relations where the man is the head of the family and where he has the opportunity to acquire the means which are necessary to support the living standard for his family which he as a personality has determined for himself. He will be the one who decides whether his wife goes to work, how many children they have [...]. (3)

A further article which is titled 'Who Breaks the Vicious Circle' (4-5), and the author of which is not mentioned, but the style of which reminds Zhirinovskii's dictum, is devoted to, among others, the subject of the 'criminal-political Southern mafia' and its penetration to the 'North'. The author uses the words 'South' or 'Southern' here all in all eight times in the two text's column on the 'mafia'. The mafiotic character of the 'South', 'the national question plus the Southern temper and the traditions of the South' have 'if taken together, created such a terrible and deadly situation which no other country has encountered so far' (4). The civilizational racism already apparent in this stigmatization of the 'South' (i.e. of the Caucasian and Central Asian Soviet republics), constitutes - as will become clear later - an, if not *the*, central re-emerging feature in Zhirinovskii's political thought.

The references to the facts that Zhirinovskii's position is on the right wing of the political spectrum and that he supports the preservation of the Russian empire as well as his undisguised sexism²⁴¹, and the indications of a deep-seated racism represent only fragments from the second issue of *Liberal* in November 1990. They already suggest an inconsistency in the altogether indeed distinctly liberal-democratic thrust of this newspaper issue. One could describe this phenomenon as a contamination of an essentially liberal political programme with radical right-wing ideological

²⁴¹ Zhirinovskii makes in later *Liberal* issues a number of further distinctly sexist statements in which he assigns women ('special beings' who are 'higher' than men) to the role of housewives, and to the task of bringing up children. 'The Russian woman is in her essence the trusty friend and helper of her husband.' (L, no. 8-9, 1992, 3; see furthermore: L, 2 [12], 1993, 6-8, 9; L, no. 3 [13], 1993, 5) Although it would be possible to interpret these statements as falling within the framework of an ultra-nationalist world view they will not be dealt with in this study anymore. It seems that a separate in-depth study on Zhirinovskii's views on gender issues would be very revealing indeed.

segments.²⁴² The conclusion, therefore, is that, even if taken together, the above quotations do as such not represent a sufficiently coherent and unequivocally identifiable line of thought which would allow one to speak of a manifestly present variety of right-wing extremism or ultra-nationalism.

Number 4-5, 1992

The second issue of *Liberal* reviewed here appeared approximately 16 to 17 months after the number 2-3. As indicated, the LDP and its official line went from 1990 to 1993 through a process which can be called radicalization. It should, therefore, not surprise that the tenor of the issue published in February or March 1992 is different from the one from November 1990. Nationalist and extremist pronouncements by Zhirinovskii appear in the 1992 issue much more frequently than that was the case in 1990, and a relatively coherent ultra-nationalist argument begins to crystallize. The articles in this issue represent, if seen either separately or together, a bizarre mixture of liberal-democratic slogans, and essentially anti-liberal and anti-democratic statements.

The latter is already exemplified on the front cover sheet of the newspaper. As all other issues of *Liberal* dealt with here, the newspaper is superscribed with the catch-phrase 'Through a pluralism of views to the rule of law' (*Cherez pliuralizm mnenii k verkhovenstvu zakona*). Besides a picture of Zhirinovskii (also a characteristic of all issues under review), the coat of arms of the LDP appears here for the first time on *Liberal*'s first page. The coat contains an eagle with outstretched wings, a banner with the imprint 'Liberty, LDP, Law' and a map of Russia with the imprint *Rossia*. According to this map not only the former Soviet republics belong to Russia. Finland and Alaska which before the October Revolution were temporarily parts of the Tsarist Empire are also shown as Russian territories (1).

On page two, a short declaration of the Highest Council of the LDP appears.²⁴³ The document demands 'to solve the question of the state borders' and 'to defend the economic and political rights of the 25 Million Russians living outside the Russian federation'. To reach these goals

²⁴² On the phenomenon of contaminated liberalism in Western Europe, see Griffin 1995b.

²⁴³ This organ is not a genuinely leading body of the party, but simply a gathering of four to five of Zhirinovskii's closest confidants chosen by himself. Over the years, it has been characterized by a high degree of fluctuation.

'either new elections of the president of Russia or the formation of a military government' would be necessary. The CIS is branded as an 'imprudent anti-democratic step which disregards the will of the people'. As a result of the destruction of the 'unified political space' the 'contradictions between the republics will intensify'. 'Military confrontations' cannot be excluded. The document warns that 'local nationalism will rise its head'. Furthermore, the Highest Council writes that a wrong execution of the economic reforms 'will benefit the Southern mafia, foreign capital, and the criminalized bourgeoisie'. Finally, proposals of the Russian government for nuclear disarmament are described as having been put forward 'in the spirit of the usual anti-alcoholic campaign', and as being an expression of 'campaign voluntarism' and an 'unheard of recklessness of neo-Bolsheviks' (2).

In this statement, some of the principal recurring features in Zhirinovskii's texts are on display. Above all this refers to the resurrection of Russia in the borders of the former USSR. In justifications of this aim, one can discern at least three different lines of argumentation. First, the democratic or, at other places, juridical legitimacy of the dissolution of the USSR is rejected (Umland 1994a, 116). Second, the feeling of national solidarity of the Russians to their supposedly ruthlessly repressed compatriots in the so called 'near abroad' is invoked. Third, the picture of a serious security threat to Russia from its 'backyard' is painted. The repeating line of thought is that the backward 'Southern peoples' (i.e. above all the Caucasians and Central Asians) are not able to rule themselves and to live with each other in peace. Therefore a 'civilized' (i.e. Russian) power is necessary to restore order and to pacify these nomadic minorities - an argument which will reoccur in later analyses.

Interestingly, Zhirinovskii does in this connection not refrain from listing nationalism as a potential source of instability in the 'Southern area' - a diagnosis which is as such correct, but sounds from Zhirinovskii's mouth as inappropriate. At the press-conference after his electoral success in December 1993, he even stated that nationalism is as bad as fascism, and proposed that, until the end of this century, 'we' should 'put an end to this terrible disease of nationalism' (as quoted in Conradi 1995, 212; *La Stampa*, 16 December 1993; Lancelle and Frazer 1994, 151). In making such pronouncements, the LDP leader is seemingly referring to the specifically Soviet stigmatization of 'nationalism'. In the former USSR, this label was used to identify fanatical, 'bourgeois' and - since Stalin by definition - *non-Russian* secessionist and nativist national-liberation movements (as well as

Western ultra-nationalism such as German fascism). These phenomena were portrayed as being opposed to 'Soviet patriotism' - a notion which, in contrast to 'nationalism', denoted a 'positive' feeling of communal attachment. 'Soviet patriotism' represented to a high degree a code word for the expression of imperialist Russian nationalist sentiment and a convenient substitution for more openly suprematist and repressive sounding terminology. By contrast, the term 'nationalism' appeared to Russians as primarily referring to the nationalism of the 'others'. Russians ('elder brothers' of the Soviet nationalities) instead were portrayed as being entrusted with a world historic mission (Duncan 1990). That implied that they stood above the *petit* bourgeois ideology of 'nationalism'. Characteristically, this was independent of whether emphasis was laid on Russia's role as the harbinger of a global revolution by Orthodox Marxist-Leninists, on the one side, or on their mission as the carriers of an alternative civilizational idea designed to rescue the world from Western decadence and destructive individualism by the more 'rightish' Soviet publicists, on the other side (Spechler 1983). Consequently, the phrase 'Russian nationalism' was partly a contradiction in terms. As will be shown, Zhirinovskii formulates in *Liberal* also a distinct saviour-mission for the supposedly non-nationalistic Russians which served to legitimate for him a programme of territorial expansion, war and repression.

Following the statement of the Highest Council, Zhirinovskii's report to this body is enclosed (3-5). This is evidently an oral speech by Zhirinovskii, the first such text given in *Liberal*. Above I have already referred to the contradictions in many LDP documents and publications. The records of Zhirinovskii's oral statements which were by neo-fascist former LDP-ally Limonov (1993; 1994) appropriately called 'floods' (*polivy*) are characterized by an even greater irrationality, inconsistency and sometimes plain craziness. Comprehensive reproductions of their contents would be, therefore, of only limited value.

Besides some confused tirades against the West, and former Soviet and Russian autonomous republics, the text repeats a feature which in outlines appeared already above. Zhirinovskii writes with reference to the implosion of the country and the economic crisis:

If the price for democracy is the extermination of the Russian nation, I am against democracy.
I am saying straightforwardly: *GKChP*? [the 'State Committee of Emergency', i.e. the

putschist of August 1991 - A.U.] I am supporting the *GKChP*. True, there were communists; yes, many believe that there was the danger of a reversion to the old times. But what is happening now is worse than what would have happened, if the [coup on] 19th August had been successful. [...] I am announcing already now: if there is a military regime in spring, I will support it. There will be less democracy, but the state will remain. For us it is important that the state endures. But when democracy departs the state, this will end badly. (3)

Zhirinovskii's undisguised pro-authoritarian argumentation - one could interpret in his favour - consists in an only temporal rejection of democracy because, for post-Soviet Russia, democracy means anarchy, chaos and ruin - labels which appear as not entirely inappropriate with regard to contemporary Russian society and politics. As mentioned in chapter 2 he sometimes communicated such an argument to, among others, Western interviewers. As emerges from the above and other statements democracy meant, according to Zhirinovskii, above all the collapse of the 'state' or, as he says at other points, of 'Russia', i.e. of the Soviet Union - an event which may not only from a Russian imperialist point of view have been a regrettable development.

Yet, the decisive factor in the dissolution of the Union appeared to have been not too much democracy, but rather its opposite. In contrast to a widely-held belief in post-Soviet Russia that the reason for the complete disappearance of the Union of former Soviet Republics lied in the December 1991 Belovezh agreement between the heads of state of Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine (or, in Russian right-wing terms, in anti-Russian plots of Jews, the Free Masons, the West etc.) a comparison of the pre- and post-putsch Soviet polity suggests that it was rather the August 1991 coup-attempt which constituted the crucial determinant for the renunciation of most of the Republics to agree to a new kind of submission under a Moscow Centre. (The Baltic states though, it has to be mentioned, were going to leave the Soviet Union in any way). This is exemplified by the fact that all Union Republics (except for Russia and Uzbekistan) declared or re-declared their independence during the putsch or in its aftermath meaning *before* the Belovezh Agreement. Besides a referendum in Georgia, it was the anti-unionist vote in the Ukrainian referendum on December 1st, 1991 which made the final break up of the USSR inevitable. And the conclusion suggests itself that the Ukrainian voters' change in attitude concerning the preservation of the Union from their pro-USSR vote in March 1991 to the

opposite in December 1991 had been to a large degree due to the occurrence of the August 1991 putsch.

That means that if one scrutinizes the actual sequence of the 1991 events which finally led to the total break up, the conclusion suggests itself that the above quote of Zhirinovskii cannot be regarded as a valid reference to potentially disintegrative tendencies of democracy - at least with respect to the former USSR. Instead, if seen in the concrete historical context, Zhirinovskii's above and other similar statements indicate the existence of an anti-democratic tendency in his texts. If Zhirinovskii had indeed regretted the departure of the non-Russian republics, he should have denounced the *GKChP* in his statements on this question. Instead, his party was one of the very few political organizations which officially approved of the putschists on August 19th, 1991 (a decision though which the LDP leadership later on officially regretted). Zhirinovskii's argument that democracy has to be rejected because of its destructive potential does thus not apply to one of his most cherished themes. Not democracy, but an openly authoritarian action of the old centre and the republic's subsequent fear of repressions took away the last chance for the transformation of the *de facto* unitary state into a genuine federation or confederation, or a combination of both. Therefore, the above quotation, or other statements in a similar guise, cannot be regarded as representing convincing proof for the existence of an only *provisionally* anti-democratic line of argument in Zhirinovskii's thought. As shall be shown in further analyses, such a deduction will also not be defied by several other statements in *Liberal* which try to point in the same direction.

In another contribution by Zhirinovskii, a commented interview given by him to the newspaper (14-15), Zhirinovskii is quoted as having said: 'I am in favour of an authoritarian regime.' (15) And in this case he explicitly qualifies his apparent anti-democratism.

I underline above all that this refers to a *temporary* authoritarian regime [*vlast*] [a]nd to a transition toward it on a parliamentary way. [...] What an authoritarian regime do I mean? We do not need a dictator or repressions, but trust an understanding. (15; emphasis added)

In an attachment to this interview a distinction is furthermore made between Lenin's concept of a dictatorship, i.e. 'power which is limited by nothing, by no laws, by absolutely no rules, [and] which

is based immediately on force', on the one side, and an authoritarian regime, on the other. According to this definition, the latter is the opposite of dictatorial power because an authoritarian regime 'is completely based on the rule of law [*zakonnost'*] [and] demands the unconditional [*neukasnitel'noe*] compliance with laws passed.' (15)

Taken as such this clarification could be seen as evidence that, again, Zhirinovskii's agenda is not in principle, but because of concrete *ad hoc* considerations anti-democratic. However, such an argument would be only valid, if he adhered to it in a consequent way. That was clearly not the case. On the one hand, he was in later encounters with Western interviewers, positively ready to guarantee that his presidency would *not* mean authoritarianism (e.g. Umland 1994a). A possible conclusion from this would be, that if he in one statement qualifies the adherence to democratic rules which he affirms in other pronouncements, he may also be ready to reinterpret the above quotation, i.e. to alter the terms of his proposed provisional authoritarianism. He may, for instance, choose to prolong the period of the envisaged temporary restrictions to democracy, or to suspend certain laws restricting his power as Russian president. On the other hand, he openly contradicted his alleged advocacy of an only provisional and restricted authoritarianism during the time period covered in this analyses, i.e. between 1990 and 1993. It was, for instance, reported that he announced in a speech during his presidential campaign in 1991: 'I say it quite plainly: when I come to power, there will be a dictatorship.' (AP, 18 March 1994) With regard to repressions which he excluded above, Zhirinovskii reportedly said in the same speech in March 1991 that as a president he 'might have to shoot 100,000 people, but the other 300 Million will live peacefully.' (as quoted in Lancelle and Frazer 1994, 127) Further statements of this kind could be found, among them a number of explicitly anti-democratic phrases in *Liberal* which will be quoted below.

With regard to my latter arguments, two points already indicated in the introductory sections of this chapter shall be made again. First, one could regard these comparisons as insofar senseless as Zhirinovskii used to make, depending on the prevailing political climate and audience, all kinds of more or less contradictory and often even weird statements, and that one could, therefore, basically interpret whatever one wants. However, in the framework of this study it is only of relevance to show that *it is possible* that certain segments in Zhirinovskii's texts under review are an expression not just of a tactical-temporary, but of a deep-seated principal - i.e. an ideologically informed - anti-

democratism. What Mr. Zhirinovskii really thinks, or whether he actually possesses any consistent thoughts on this subject at all is not of concern here.

Second, one could argue that the above considerations (and a number of further reflections in this study) are fighting windmills. After all: Is it really necessary to discuss at length whether Zhirinovskii is against democracy or not? Media reports seem to give unequivocal answers to this question every other week. However, the concept of a transitional authoritarianism preceding the formation of genuine liberal democracy had to be dealt with here seriously.

That is because it represents (a) a scheme the proposition of which was by no means restricted to Zhirinovskii (see on this debate Teague 1990; Novikov 1992; Sautmann 1995). Indeed, as mentioned in Part II, its discussion, was started in 1989 by two prominent political analysts, Andranik Migranian and Igor' Kliamkin, who belong to the democratic camp.²⁴⁴

It had (b) to be mentioned because this plan is as such not that popular among Russian right-wing parties in general, and sets Zhirinovskii apart from them. Most of these groupings take a more principled stance against liberal democracy as it is defined in the West.

And (c), as was alluded in an above section, the pro-Zhirinovskii rulings of Russian courts in connection with allegations that he is a fascist seem to have partly been based on either the view that Zhirinovskii's party is a genuinely pro-democratic force, or on an acceptance of Zhirinovskii's claim not to question Russia's democratic constitutional order in principal. Although for a Western reader, probably, tiresome, somewhat pedantic comparisons and contextualizations such as those above seem to be, therefore, unavoidable.

Finally, it should be with regard to this *Liberal* issue mentioned that the LDP leader returns at various points to the idea of a unitary state which would comprise the former Soviet republics. He describes the CIS as being as 'illegal [*protivosakonen*]' as the USSR was '[b]ecause the law is not effective' (4). He calls the CIS a 'humbug [*lipa*]' because 'there are no unions [or] commonwealths

²⁴⁴ As a result of some further authoritarian and imperialist publications, there have arisen some serious doubts concerning Migranian's belonging to the democratic camp in the meantime (e.g. NG, 4 November 1993; Gussejnow 1994, 91). Leonid Radzikhovskii has been among those democratic publicists who later, seemingly, also advocated some kind of transitional authoritarianism (St, no. 1, 1994, 1, 3; CDPSP, vol. XLVI, no. 3, 1994, 9).

in the world' which, instead, consists of states (5). At another point he calls the CIS a 'terrible betrayal' (13), or an 'anti-Russian treaty' (14). He also demands the creation of united military forces, i.e. of an army which would comprise the territory of the whole former Soviet Union (13). Finally, he calls for the resurrection of the Russian state in the borders of the USSR as they were in 1977, i.e. at the moment of the adoption of the Brezhnev constitution (27). One should add though, that - in contrast to later statements - he makes at this point for some reason the (for him) altogether untypical qualification that a Russian state in these borders would be a federation because 'a unitary [structure] does not apply - I agree [with this].' (27)

The overall political agenda of Zhirinovskii's writings in the number 4-5 of *Liberal* do, if taken together and set in context, not represent any longer merely an example of contaminated liberalism as was the case with number 2-3. I would label Zhirinovskii's contributions to this issue as an expression of an 'implicit, restorationist ultra-nationalism' which is still surrounded by a large number of, at this point, unquoted pro-liberal-democratic statements. Zhirinovskii's nationalism appears as implicit in that he does not refer here explicitly to the role of the Russians in his envisaged re-united federal state. Nevertheless, these statements can be interpreted as being ultra-nationalist in that he proposed the creation of a federation called 'Russia'. This seems to entail the notion of a resurrected Soviet Russian Empire which would not any longer camouflage Russian domination by internationalist rhetoric.²⁴⁵ At the moment of the publication of this newspaper (i.e. in early 1992), the realization of this plan would have been only (if at all) possible by massively employing the Russian army against national liberation movements (such as in Chechnia), and by subsequently creating highly repressive Moscow-controlled marionette governments in the former Soviet republics (which would make Zhirinovskii's concession concerning a federal structure meaningless). This distinct 'ultra-' element is also present in the pseudo-provisional authoritarianism exemplified in the statements quoted above.

A further appropriate classification of these statements would be label them as, in the Russian context, 'restorationist' or 'reactionary'. That is because Zhirinovskii's plan essentially signifies an

²⁴⁵ For an extensive outline of Zhirinovskii's fundamental anti-internationalism during the time period covered in this study, see Zhirinovskii 1993c.

aspiration to return to a former condition.²⁴⁶

In line with the latter classification and notwithstanding its (here partly hidden, but already discernible) aggressiveness, this agenda does by itself not represent a permutation of fascist ideology. That is because the idea of a palingenesis - of a 'newborn Russia' - seems to be absent.

Number 6-7, 1992

In accordance with the above mentioned tendency of a gradual radicalization of Zhirinovskii's statements, the balance between liberal-democratic and ultra-nationalist statements shifts further to the benefit of the latter in the second 1992 *Liberal* issue. In addition, Zhirinovskii's ultra-nationalism becomes here far less disguised.

The first seven pages of the issue are devoted to reports about the Third Party Congress of the LDP at 18-20 April 1992 (a date given in L, no. 4-5, 1992, 2). Zhirinovskii's extensive political report to this forum (3-5) is, apart from two articles in the above mentioned historical 'On Russia's Destinies' series the only text by him in this issue.

Here, for the first time, the specific *domestic* dimension of Zhirinovskii's nationalism is outlined. After demanding again the 'restoration of the Russian state' in its 'historical boundaries', he also proposes a fundamental rethinking of the nature of this state, and of its designation.

Russian Federation - that [is] from a legal point of view a slight absurdity. The shape of a state can be monarchic or republican. But the word 'federation' does not have any legal weight. True, in Germany the state bears the name Federal Republic of Germany, but with

²⁴⁶ 'Former condition' refers in this setting to the 1977 USSR borders, and not to the re-annexation of Finland or Alaska. It is true that these states as well as Poland were not only in the LDP coat of arms, but also in some of Zhirinovskii's speeches regarded as belonging to Russia (e.g. L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 4; I, 4 January 1994). Nevertheless, if one assumed an elementary rationality in Zhirinovskii's schemes, I would make a special case here. In distinction to other statements of Zhirinovskii concerning Russia's enlargement (especially towards the 'South'), his indications about Finland and Alaska are motivated rather by the goal of attracting media attention and of allegorically expressing Russian grievances about the loss of the super power status (Crow 1994, 3). They do not represent serious-to-be-taken foreign policy outlines (Umland 1994b, 1122). Lancelle and Frazer make a similar clarification (1995, 39). Accordingly, such statements appeared only sporadically, and they were explicitly withdrawn by Zhirinovskii at some points, so, for instance, in some talks with Western interviewers (e.g. Sp, no. 51, 1993; Umland 1994a, 117).

them [the Germans] that is an enforced measure. In principle, we are adherents of the simple name Russia. (3)²⁴⁷

As emerges from a conjunction of this statement to many more of Zhirinovskii's pronouncements on the topic dealt with here, his focus is not just on the name of the future Russian state, but on the political and administrative realities in his new 'Russia'. In contrast to his statement in number 4-5, 1992, Zhirinovskii proposes - in this case by implication, in dozens of other statements explicitly - above all the abolition of the autonomous national republics of the Russian Federation, and the special prerogatives of these regions. In fact, he wants to replace the whole federal system by a purely unitary one. The president of this re-centralized state would - as the Tsars before the revolution - appoint governors for exclusively territorially defined Gouvernements of which Russia would then only consist. (Zhirinovskii assures, in contrast to other pronouncements, at this point though that some kind of autonomy, among them cultural, for the national minorities would be preserved.²⁴⁸) Besides the question of how democratic such a state structure would be, an allegation of ultra-nationalism emerges because of the following reasons.

Zhirinovskii would in the case of a realization of his plan not only abolish a system which is a result of long and difficult negotiations between the central and provincial political elites since 1990. This structure had in the case of most of the 21 Russian ethno-federal republics already *de jure* existed before, i.e. under Soviet rule (there were 16 Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics in the RSFSR in 1989). This historical rootedness of these territorial units in the Soviet structure of regional government gave legitimacy to the Autonomous Republics' post-communist claims to keep the title of the titular nation and the designation 'Republic' in the name of their newly defined 'federal subjects' (as all regions of Russia have come to be called for the last years). Already in Soviet times, this important symbolic distinction had led to certain economic benefits for the non-Russian repulics

²⁴⁷ These and other statements of Zhirinovskii on the future adiminstrative structure of Russia are reminiscent of Il'in's evaluation of federalism. See Il'in's essay's 'On the Dividers of Russia', 'What is a Federation' and 'On Pseudo-Federations' (1992, 1st vol., 163-171).

²⁴⁸ 'We are in favour of self-government, but in the fields of economy, culture, health [and] education, and under no circumstances in matters of state structure - that shall be eternal and inviolable.' (L, no. 6-7, 1992, 3)

and districts as compared to other administrative units of the Russian Federation (Spechler 1983, 17). It provided, after the demise of the USSR, the crucial justification of the republics', sometimes excessive, demands for the raising of their political status as compared to the *oblasti* and *kraia* of the Russian Federation (Umland 1994a, 1117).

According to Zhirinovskii, the elected presidents of the autonomous republics, their state symbols, governments etc. would now have to vanish. The national political leadership would be replaced by emissaries from Moscow. Tatarstan would be renamed into *Gouvernement Kazan*, the Republic of Bashkortostan in *Gouvernement Ufa*, and so on. On the surface, Zhirinovskii seems to be right in claiming that this would be simply a return to a pre-revolutionary pattern. One could interpret, that this reference is supposed to function as a justification for his proposal in that it such change is not only prescribed by Russian tradition of statehood. The proposal is also fashioned as feasible one because it would apparently follow the pattern of allegedly comparable other reintroductions of institutions or symbols of Tsarist Russia which have proved to be successful, e.g. the return to the name 'State Duma' for the lower house of the parliament, to the Tsarist coat of arms, etc. However, it is obvious that the pre- and post-Soviet situations are, especially with regard to the national question, not easily duplicable after seventy five years which have altered the society of Russia thoroughly. Above all the pre-revolutionary ethnic groups which contributed already in 1917 significantly to the end of the Tsarist Empire have during the Soviet period transformed themselves into proper nations with their own full-blown nationalisms and nationalist movements.²⁴⁹ Therefore, an attempt to realize Zhirinovskii's plan of political homogenization of the Russian Federation would imply a serious confrontation with the titular nations of the Autonomous Republics. As mentioned already above with regard to a forced federalization of the CIS, it would mean the employment of armed forces, or, perhaps, even Russia's entanglement in wars comparable to the Chechnia conflict.

Furthermore, what becomes more and more evident is that when Zhirinovskii envisages the 'restoration of the borders of the Russian state, at least in the boundaries of the former USSR according to the constitution of 1977' (5) he implies by this the extension of the idea of a resurrection

²⁴⁹ On this process, see Suny 1993.

of a unitary state to the whole territory of the former Soviet Union. (What 'at least' denotes for Zhirinovskii remains at this point nebulous, but will be explained by him in later issues.) That means that the federal model which he had explicitly endorsed in number 4-5 would not even apply to reintegrated Soviet republics. Zhirinovskii seems to be aware of the implications of the realization of such a plan, and demands therefore, among other things,

[t]he creation of a police which will completely guarantee internal security and forestall activities of any organization which directly or indirectly aims at the partition of the existing state. (5)

That entails that Zhirinovskii proposes the foundation of a new political police which would be especially responsible for dealing with minority nationalisms in his new Russian empire. That indicates that Zhirinovskii not only 'dreams' about a new Greater Russia, but that he has also concrete ideas about how to try to realize his utopia.

One can find a considerable number of other textual segments in Zhirinovskii's speech in the present newspaper providing further evidence for ultra-nationalist classifications. Yet, only some of the more relevant fragments shall be quoted here.

Zhirinovskii writes, for instance, that it would have been ideal to keep the title 'Russian Empire' a word, he confesses, he 'likes a lot.' (4) At another place, he presents the major justification for his sometimes open advocacy of military means for the solution of political conflicts. Use of force is necessary to end the 'civil war' (5). In this and other comparable statements, Zhirinovskii conjures up at length the picture of a supposedly ongoing civil war in the whole of Russia which he sometimes classifies as being a 'hidden' and, therefore, even more dangerous one (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 67, 93, 110). In doing this Zhirinovskii not only refers to the numerous separatist conflicts taking place in former Soviet Union Republics which he regards as being parts of Russia, and by reference to which he tries to mobilize feelings of national solidarity for the Russians who are involved in these conflicts. It appears to me that a further rationale for the usage of this peculiar rhetoric lies in Zhirinovskii's speculation with the term 'civil war' itself, and its specific meaning in post-Soviet Russia. His peculiar psychological device is to elevate metaphorical expressions like 'war of laws', 'trade wars', 'fights'

in politics and economy, or the daily 'fight for survival' etc. to the level of reality. Besides using 'civil war' as a term with a heavy historical connotation in Russia, he consciously speculates with the perception of many Russians to live, in comparison to their 'quiet' lives in the former Soviet Union²⁵⁰, in circumstances which they may allegorically well describe as a 'quasi-state-of-daily-war' today. Zhirinovskii claims: 'It takes place - the war, unfortunately!' (3) To end this 'civil war [...], if necessary, armed forces will be employed.' (3)

Finally, it should be mentioned that Zhirinovskii introduces here a noteworthy clarification concerning the issue of contradictions between his liberal-democratic and ultra-nationalist statements. If one sees nationalism as 'primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (Gellner 1983, 1; as quoted in Guibernau 1996, 48), then Zhirinovskii identifies himself unequivocally as a representative of this ideology in this *Liberal* issue.

For us the most important thing is the TERRITORY of our state. Give us the historical boundaries and the name of our state back - we want only this! And monarchists, communists, anarchists, social democrats, christian democrats and liberal democrats - patriotic forces of every direction - are welcome to live on our soil. (3; emphasis in original)

It is remarkable that Zhirinovskii links this confession to nationalism with a listing of all kind of other political movements in which he includes the 'liberal democrats' as just one group among others. This can be seen as a strong indication that the name 'Liberal-Democratic Party', and many respective slogans in his texts represent merely a cloak to hide the real ideological priorities of this party.

In conclusion one can state that Zhirinovskii has clearly moved towards a more illiberal and

²⁵⁰ A somewhat similar psychological technique which Zhirinovskii also frequently used in his major writing *The Last Dash to the South* is his constant talk about the necessity of an *uspokoenie*, i.e. of a 'soothing', 'calming', or 'quieting'. There are at least 19 occurrences of this word and its variations in this writing (1993a, 65, 66, 75, 77, 87, 94, 102, 105, 107, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 137, 139). My interpretation would be that, in this case, he speculates with the state of extreme stress which many Russians experience in connection with the abrupt cardinal changes in their daily life and surrounding nowadays. Zhirinovskii's solutions for this problem are the same as in the case of a stoppage of the 'civil war' - a military campaign (Umland 1994b, 1128).

anti-democratic, if still somewhat cryptic, nationalism in this *Liberal* issue. Yet, in spite of his increasing aggressiveness, only slightly disguised expansionism, and display of totalitarian impulses the here developed utopia has be classified as being essentially restorationist and not palingenetic as defined above. A realization of the vision exposed here would still 'only' amount to a return to the late Soviet status quo. That means that the fascist label would, again, not apply in this case.

Number 8-9, 1992

Whereas in the above dealings with textual fragments their ultra-nationalist potential had to be proved by, partly extensive, deductions, interpretations or contextualizations, one can observe in this issue a move towards a more open and not any longe cryptic ultra-nationalist line.

In a short contribution titled 'Programmatic Theses of the Liberal-Democratic Party', Zhirinovskii makes clear:

The LDPR does not accept the break up of the USSR and regards the creation of so called sovereign states on its territory as illegal. The only bearer of sovereignty is Russia (in the borders of the USSR). [...]

To put an end once and for all to nationalism and separatism, the LDPR advocates the abolition of the partition into republics which must be replaced by a territorial division (*oblasti, gubernii*). (2)

This now represents an undisguised rejection of the whole post-Soviet political, legal and state order. And an anonymous appeal 'To the Russian People!' at the same page goes even further. Not only are the Russians characterized as the people who suffered most in the former Soviet Union and who

should free themselves from the complexes that they were the occupants and oppressors of the so called 'small people', and feel themselves as masters of the whole country, the former Soviet Union and today Russia in the borders established in the constitution of 1977. (2)

The LDPR also formulates a concrete commitment to what it will do when it comes to power in Russia.

The LDPR promises to restore the Great Power and to return to it all separated originally [iskonno] Russian territories. The separatists will be punished, and calls for the destruction of the unitary state will be dealt with as serious crimes. (2)

Furthermore, 'a normal economic blockade' is identified as a means to realize the reunification. The LDP announces as its aim the abolition of all national-territorial units, and, once more, demands the cleansing of Russian cities from the 'Southern mafia' (2).

It seems justified to conclude that Zhirinovskii has thus completely thrown off his liberal-democratic mask. By openly announcing the persecution of the leaders of independence movements in the Autonomous and former Union Republics he has entered a course of uncompromising confrontation with the political elites of the post-Soviet national-territorial autonomous 'federal subjects' and independent states.

In a further article by Zhirinovskii, a report to his party's Moscow organization (6-9), the above themes are repeated. Besides this, some new nuances occur which make Zhirinovskii's ultra-nationalism appear more multifarious. The tirades against the West and especially the US in former issues of *Liberal* are now complemented with the bizarre proposal that Russian patriotic forces should not only 'liberate our country from American influence [and] from excessive influence of Zionism', but that they should against 'advance payments [sic!]' from France and German also free these countries 'from American influence, from the influence of Zionism.' (7) Thus Zhirinovskii's ultra-nationalism in *Liberal* is, first, not any longer limited to the post-Soviet region. It gets now, second, also an anti-American and anti-semitic flavour by which Zhirinovskii draws nearer to the mainstream of the New Russian Right.

Concerning Russia's future form of government Zhirinovskii writes in his report for the Moscow LDP organization:

[W]e make the diagnosis that the country is ill [and] in a difficult state. Therefore we have to

introduce a regime of personal power as was the case with de Gaulle in France. That wasn't a fascist dictatorship, was it? Roosevelt, Bismark in Germany and at the extreme even Pinochet in Chile - that is a regime of personal power under which the economy recovers, the people are soothed [and] order is restored. (8)

This confirms once more the existence of an explicitly expressed 'ultra-' element in Zhirinovskii's agenda. He tries again to balance his open anti-democratism - this time by reference to supposedly comparable examples from other countries. However, as has been shown in the treatment of Number 4-5, Zhirinovskii's underlying claim that his authoritarianism would be benevolent and of an only transitional kind stands in opposition to other statements which explicitly reject these qualifications. It is also in discrepancy with his far reaching expansionist aims (further developed in later issues) the execution of which would require a state of emergency and a militarized society. The mentioning of as disparate regimes as that of Bismarck, Roosevelt and Pinochet as possible models can also be seen as a sign for lacking seriousness of these assurances.

At a later point in this text, he announces the repatriation of foreigners and especially of Azeris who live in the Russian Federation, and demands 'foreigners should stay home.' (8) By this Zhirinovskii comes close to the rhetoric of Western extremist anti-immigrant leagues, and other ethno-centrist single-issue groups and parties. The cultural racism expressed in these demands, especially against Muslims, represents a basic explanation for his particular focus on the so called 'South' in his foreign policy statements more fully presented below.²⁵¹

To conclude, Zhirinovskii's ultra-nationalism is here significantly more aggressive than in the previous *Liberal* issues. In addition, an overview of this report and the two quoted LDP declarations reveals that the respective pronouncement are less balanced by liberal-democratic slogans than it used to be the case before. This could be seen as a rationale for the application of the fascist label in this

²⁵¹ In such and other similar sounding statements of Zhirinovskii (e.g. in connection with the 'Southern mafia'), a stark contradiction emerges to other pronouncement of him where he tries to assure his audience that there would be no discrimination on the basis of ethnicity in his envisaged Great Russian Empire. On the last pages of *The Last Dash to the South*, he, for instance, promises: 'And the crucial factor: - the nationality of an individual must under no circumstances be used as a discriminating factor.' (1993a, 142; cf. also Umland 1994b, 1127). Anyway, such incongruities do not affect the argument developed in this study.

case. In support of this one could also refer to, at least implicitly, appearing notions of a regeneration or cleansing when he for instance speaks about the necessity to free the Russian people from their 'complexes', or Russia from 'American and Zionist influences' and foreigners. Yet, these statements appeared relatively isolated and seldom. That means that although his statements here are highly irredentist, militaristic, ethno-centrist, and anti-democratic, the lack of a sufficiently elaborated concept of a newborn nation would entail that they should still not be classified as fascist.

Number 10, 1992

This issue (though representing the one with the largest number of copies) can be dealt with relatively shortly. That is because it represents merely a collection of leaflets dominated by large pictures of Zhirinovskii in different poses. The textual part is limited to some catch-phrases, and repeats some previously quoted features: the rebirth of Russia in the borders of the former Soviet Union, the ending of the 'civil war', the creation of a political police, the submission of the army under a united command (1), protection of Russians in the 'near abroad' (7), as well as revision of the conversion of the industrial complex (12) and the rebirth of the village as a way towards the spiritual regeneration of the Russian nation (13). New notions are presented by the proposal to apply criminal law in the case of non-compliance with presidential decrees (1), or by the accusations that 'Zionists' are destroying Russian mass media and that the humanitarian aid from the West represents a conspiracy of the CIA (8).

In the latter statements, Zhirinovskii paints anew, as in number 8-9, the picture of an infiltration by hostile aliens. Here again the association with the idea of a palingenesis through 'cleansing' and 'liberation' of the national organism suggests itself. In addition the term 'rebirth' appears several times. Notwithstanding, because of the only sporadic appearance of these elements, and absence of a fully developed alternative view of Russia's future, a fascist classification would be premature.

Number 1 (11), 1993

The first issue of 1993 which is superscribed with the motto 'I won't allow anybody to

humiliate Russians' (1) represents a further step in line with the already above illustrated development.

First, one can detect a change in Zhirinovskii's emphasis and style. Whereas the above attacks on the 'South' and the West formed relatively compact passages among others, his texts in the three 1993 issues of *Liberal* represent in their entirety awful, unsystematic and partly incomprehensible inflammatory speeches which are full of racist, militarist and anti-American statements a comprehensive rendering of which would go beyond the framework of this study.

Characteristically, the only liberal-democratic slogans which are still present in number 1 (11) appear in the following connection. On page 2 of the issue, a copy of the re-registration form of the party by the Russian Ministry of Justice on 14 December 1992 is reprinted.²⁵² This document contains, among others, an entry called the 'Most important aims of the activities' of the party. And in this record terms like 'rule of law' or 'liberal democracy' still appear as descriptions of the LDP agenda. However, they are in stark contrast to the rest of the newspaper which is dominated by more or less undisguised racist speech and war propaganda, irredentist demands as well as reports about LDP contacts with Iraq's Saddam Hussein and West European right-wing extremists.

A second fundamental change in number 1 (11) concerns Zhirinovskii's focal points in substance. In his extensive leader 'On the Prospects For the Year 1993' (according to its especially awkward style a transcribed oral text) he, for the first time, tries to formulate an exhaustive view of Russia's and the world's current situation in historical context (3-4). In doing this Zhirinovskii sketches a highly apocalyptic picture of Russia's near future and the vision of an imminent turning point in Russian history. If there is no cardinal change in the direction of Russia's and the world's development, the argument goes, this will have grave consequences for both.

Regarding Russia itself, a 'Declaration of the LDPR' (30-31) describes the 'catastrophe of a great power' as a result of democratic government. 'Bloody national wars' are going on, the 'spectre of civil war' is 'materializing', a 'so far unknown fall in production' can be observed, and the 'belief in the future' is waning. 'Russia is becoming enslaved to the USA and an object of

²⁵² The party had been banned in August 1992 because of the exposure of fraud in its original registration. See Part I, sec. 2.1.

undisguised separation into spheres of influence of the leading great powers of the West and the East', and so forth (30).

The solution is that Russia becomes accepted as a regional great power (as Zhirinovskii understands it) the existence of which would also be in the interests of the West. He claims that the 'Americans' have already agreed that Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran will belong to Russia's sphere of influence

because they understand that the fire they [the Americans] have set can develop to World War III, [a] thermonuclear [war] including the application of neutronic, bacteriological [and] chemical weapons. (3)

The outer world, Zhirinovskii warns, has to deal carefully with Russia.

That is because we do not have to arm ourselves. It is enough to strike a matchstick at one point, and the whole planet explodes - we have such a number of all kinds of weapons that it is enough to quiver once at one point. [That means] if there is an explosion only on our territory, the whole planet will be poisoned and die. (3)

A few lines later he comes to the conclusion: 'The destruction [*gibel*] of Russia - that is the end of Europe and the end of the whole world.' (3)

Yet, Zhirinovskii's apocalyptic visions do by no means result in a pleading for ideological moderateness, political prudence and international cooperation. On the contrary - they are seen as Russia's warrant to behave *vis a vis* other states however it pleases.

Because of this [the menacing apocalypse - A.U.] there is no risk for us. [...] America will not intermingle anywhere, [the US] will make off immediately [...] and not hinder the execution of an independent Russian foreign policy. (3)

At another point Zhirinovskii writes, that not only Russia faces destruction. Turks and Arabs

are conquering Germany and France 'from inside' which means that 'France is perishing [*gibnet*]' (4). Zhirinovskii's overall conclusion is clear, though his subsequent elaborations remain esoteric:

The world is indeed experiencing a crisis. And some astrologists spoke rightly about the 'end of the world'. If that continues in our domain as well as in Europe the world will explode indeed. The French, the Germans, the Russians, the white population of the South African Republic will not stand this; Somalia and Egypt will finally die from hunger. In China, events will occur [...]. (4)

It is difficult to know what Zhirinovskii exactly wanted to communicate with this. What, however, emerges clearly is a distinctly racist juxtaposition. The Turks and Arabs conquering Western Europe, on the one side, and the white population of South Africa which 'will not stand this', whatever *this* is, on the other.

This rhetoric now clearly conjures up the image of a turning-point or historical watershed. Although it is not by itself an expression of fascist ideology, its manifest presence represents an indicator for, and an important precondition and concomitant pattern to the development of palingenetic ideas. It is exactly the here manifest presentiment of a fateful decision between national disaster, on the one side, and salvation through a radical break with the past and cardinal change of course, on the other side. The world-wide crisis, the 'explosion', the 'end of the world' etc. as well as the 'catastrophy of the great power' and 'civil war' have to be prevented. It is absolutely imperative to restrain or bring under control those forces which promote decay in order to achieve recovery, rebirth and regeneration.

There is, Zhirinovskii writes, an assault on Russia going on which, as it was the case before, result into a world war. To prevent this, a new foreign policy is necessary.

Therefore humanity will be grateful to us. With our foreign policy concept we will save the world from war. [...] And our party will enter world history. (3)

Whereas, here, Zhirinovskii remains, with regard to Russia, ultimately cryptic about the

dangers threatening her and about her respective foreign policies, he is more concrete concerning Western Europe.

Western Europe groans under [the joke of] America and Israel. Russia will liberate them [the West Europeans] from American rule, from influence and Zionization. Therefore, the whole world will with gratefulness take notice of Russia's historical mission. We have liberated the world from the French [and] the German expansion. The third and last historical Role of Russia is to liberate the world from American expansion. (4)

In other words, Zhirinovskii, in a first step, raises the spectre of a mysterious (often as 'geopolitical' labelled) conflict between Europe, on the one side, and Israel and the United States, on the other. In a second step, he then presents Russia as an, in connection with this, vital international actor in that it is her which has the potential to save Western Europe from its imaginary infiltration and destruction by the US and Zionism.

This short statement is, in spite of its apparent mere absurdity, a first relatively clear indication of the presence of the idea of a palingenesis in Zhirinovskii's extremist pronouncements in *Liberal*. The statement is, though not very long, important in that it takes up a major theme in Russia's ultra-nationalist discourse of the last decades. To evaluate it properly its historical-intellectual setting has thus to be shortly taken into account.

If seen in the context of the contemporary Russian nationalist agenda as a whole, the above statement appears as less incomprehensible. Russia does, according to a general view held by the mainstream New Russian Right, not represent one European state among others. The Russians are not an ordinary people like others, but a nation entrusted with a historical mission going far beyond its borders. Other people are dependent on Russia's leadership and help - a destiny which is prescribed by historical examples.²⁵³ Russia's specific role especially in the post-war era is to embody the anti-principle to 'Americanism' and 'Zionism' - labels which like their synonyms as, for instance,

²⁵³ The idea of a cyclically recurring mission, the fulfilment of which is a Russian necessity of life, is further developed in Zhirinovskii 1993a, 74, 76, 104, 124.

'Western decadence', 'Atlanticism', and 'Mondialism', represent cryptograms for liberal democracy, cosmopolitanism and ethical universalism. Zhirinovskii's and his right-wing colleagues' either explicit argument or, as in the present case, implicit sub-text is that Russia represent the still largely unpoisoned incarnation of a 'healthy', 'continental', 'traditional' counter-principle to Anglo-Saxon and, above all, US-American 'Atlanticism', or, more blatantly, to 'Judeo-Masonic plutocracy' (Hielscher 1994). Russia's 'continental' anti-doctrine (sometimes referred to as the 'Russian Idea') is often associated with labels like 'collectivism', 'patriotism', 'distinctive national character', etc. Because of Russia's superior quality of being both, the most powerful, and the cleanest, most unfeigned, most authentic part inside Europe's imaginary anti-American and -Zionist coalition it is predestined to become the spearhead of a supra-national 'regeneration' and 'rebirth' by 'liberating' and 'cleansing' the Old World from American and Zionist influence. This would be neither a return to the Soviet Union's world-wide class struggle against international 'reaction' and capitalism, nor the continuation of the idea of a democratically newborn pro-western Russian Federation. As Europe's saviour from Americanization and Zionization, Russia appears in a new fantastic historical role which is in view of the dismal state of its economy and society even more surrealistic.

In short, Zhirinovskii proposes by implication the utopia of a newborn Russia which resurrects itself by obtaining a novel international gravity as a newly defined virile great power. It regenerates itself by fulfilling the historic assignment to promote an all-European rebirth. This mission, moreover, reveals itself (via the codewords like 'Americanism' and 'Zionism') as essentially anti-democratic and anti-liberal. If seen against a wider background, the above quoted somewhat evasive image thus basically fulfils the criterion of being simultaneously palingenetic and ultra-nationalist. Therefore, 'implicit' or 'crypto-fascism' would seem to be terms with which one can classify this peculiar idea.

Yet, the above quotation is still an isolated passage which by itself does not constitute a coherent pattern of thought. It was only through a short reference to the overall framework of Russian ultra-nationalist thought possible to interpret it in a, hopefully, more illuminating way. The crucial pace toward a fully developed and easily discernible palingenetic-ultra-nationalist concept (in which the above statement will partly fit in) is done in another contribution of Zhirinovskii to this *Liberal* issue.

It is already revealing that this text represents a Russian language re-print of an interview

which Zhirinovskii gave in summer 1992 to Wolfgang Strauß, editor of the journal *Nation und Europa: Deutsche Monatshefte* (Nation and Europe: A German Monthly) among the co-publishers of which is Zhirinovskii's above mentioned lateron major foreign partner, the chairman of the crypto-fascist German People's Union *DVU* Dr. Gerhard Frey (Part I, sec. 3.4.; Griffin 1993a, 167; Lange 1993, 140). This periodical - one of the most important German neo-fascist theoretical organs - was founded in 1951 by former *SS-Sturmbannführer* Arthur Ehrhardt and until 1991 called *Nation Europa: Monatsschrift im Dienst der europäischen Neuordnung* (Nation Europe: Monthly in Service of the New European Order) (Lange 1993, 114-116; Pfahl-Traughber 1995, 130-132). The Strauß-Zhirinovskii talk appeared at first in German language in this journal, and was apparently by Zhirinovskii and his assistants evaluated as being worth of translating and bringing it to the attention of the Russian reader (7-9).

The text is plainly superscribed with 'The Fight for a White Europe' (7). Whereas in the above quotation and its interpretation, the concepts of an 'infiltration', 'decadence', 'decline' or 'impurity' of the European civilization were related to US-American and Jewish influence, Zhirinovskii now swings to another geographical direction, and to an openly chauvinistic cultural or civilizational racism with, moreover, biologically racist undertones. The starting point is, as has been the case before, apocalypticism.

Our continent is threatened by the loss of its soul and its face. The white Europe is in a deadly danger. [...] It is at the eleventh hour. The need of this historical moment is the unification of all peoples that want to save the white Europe - our Europe. I say this in all openness: the storm over Europe comes from the South and East, and advances from the deserts of Africa and Asia. The occupation of Europe and its submission is on full speed. Islam does not stand on Europe's threshold - it already marches through Europe's cities. Islam - whether yellow or black - is rolling over Christian Europe. (8)

Here again, the vision of a turning-point, a crucial watershed emerges - this time with reference to the survival of the European civilization as distinct from the Islamic one. To prevent the crisis under way, efforts on an especially large scale are necessary.

This wave can only be prevented by a union of all European peoples, under the condition that the Russians and the Germans will play a special role in this defensive war. The fortress 'White Europe' stands or falls together with our two peoples. (8)

That is, concerning Russia, a variation of the messianistic idea presented before though Zhirinovskii seems to extend at this point the exclusiveness of the ability to save Europe from foreign invasion to the German people which are also adjudged to a leading role.

What follows is a grotesque discussion between Strauß and Zhirinovskii about what the exact circumstances and effects of the medieval Tatar-Mongolian attack on Europe, as well as of the fall of Constantinople were. Rather imbecilely, it is in connection with this argument, that Zhirinovskii develops further grounds for the rejection of the democratic model for Russia.

Their [Rom's and Constantinople's] grave-digger was decay. The degeneration of the democrats [of Rom and Constantinople!] opened the gates to the aliens [and] invited the conquerors; and that in turn is related to current affairs. In a multi-ethnic state, as Russia [is], the parliamentary form of government is an utopia which is, moreover, dangerous for the lives of the nations [*narody*]. The democratic inclination towards decay [*demokraticheskoe upadnichestvo*] opened the door to an overstrain [of society] with aliens. The establishment of a party democracy would be the end of my homeland. Russia can be saved only with an authoritarian regime. (8)

In spite of its weirdness, this statement is significant. Whereas Zhirinovskii in earlier statements in *Liberal* and other publications tended to speak of authoritarianism as a necessary transitional stage and represented this particular circumstance as a justification for his anti-democratism, the above statement represents a more fundamental rejection of democracy for Russia as well as for other multi-ethnic states. Moreover, because of democracy's general 'inclination towards decay' the statement seems, by implication, to be an inadvisable political order for other countries too.

Germany is certainly Zhirinovskii's favourite in this interview: 'I am going even further [and]

support a common German-Russian border.' (8)²⁵⁴ However, Germany - Zhirinovskii cautions - stands at a historical crossroads (as Russia does). Actually, its current state represents a warning for what may also happen to Russia.

But what depresses me is the obvious weakness of the German national feeling and will for self-preservation - probably a psychological result of two world wars which the German people have lost. Today Germany is not endangered by war: the major threat [is] the internal assimilation. In that regard, from my point of view, the Turkization is the greatest challenge. Ethnical and cultural assimilation leads to the destruction of the German spirit. As in the case of Constantinople of the year 1453, today the question will be decided: will the German people exist or not. (8)

Germany seems, according to Zhirinovskii's logic, for this reason to drop out as a reliable partner in the salvation of the European civilization. What remains are the Russians who a glorious future awaits.

Though threatened from outside and inside, the [national] consciousness of Russians grows nevertheless, and only Russian nationalism saves my people from disappearance. This [development] is getting a European dimension. Only the Russians, not the Germans, can accomplish the last national revolution. Nationalism is the only way to freedom, and I am convinced that the victory of Russian nationalism will also trigger the rebirth of Germany. (8)

²⁵⁴ His pro-German sentiments are summarized in a book published by the *FZ-Verlag*, a Munich-based right-wing publishing house (Schirinowskij 1994), and in several 1993-96 issues of the also Munich-based *Deutsche Nationalzeitung* (German National Newspaper) und *Deutsche Wochenzeitung* (German Weekly Newspaper) which all belong to Zhirinovskii's major political partner in Germany Dr. Gerhard Frey, chairman of the crypto-fascist party *Deutsche Volkunion* (German People's Union). It appears to me, however, that his sporadic announcements concerning the solution of the 'East Prussian question' (i.e. the transfer of the Kaliningrad *oblast'* to Germany) as well as his anti-Polish statements in connection with this should, as in the case of Alaska and Finland, be classed under the heading of day-to-day populist rhetoric, rather than seen as core components of the LDP foreign policy agenda.

To Strauß' reproach regarding Zhirinovskii's obvious messianism he replies:

You can call it as you please, but it [remains] a fact: the last chance of Europe [is] Russia. To protect the white Europe is Russia's predestination. (8)

The 'resurrection of Russia' (*voskreshchenie Rossii*) is - Zhirinovskii explicitly clarifies - not possible as a communist restoration.

Especially because the communists are not able to understand the geopolitical factor, the current breaking point [*perelomlenie*] is what is in the West usually called the 'race problem'. (8)

Strauß' objection that Russia is today 'in a - to put it mildly - sad state' (9) is accepted by Zhirinovskii:

You are right. My people are today similar to a man sentenced to death who is chained to two horses galloping in opposite directions. Russia has to be torn up, smashed to pieces and sold; that is what the enemies of Russia want. But Russia defends itself and fights. (9)

Here again, the idea of a watershed emerges. One should point to the peculiar view that current decay is a precondition and the best sign for future ascent - a typical trait of fascist ideology. It is exactly Russia's crisis that proves that the Russians are involved in a struggle in which they will be victorious. On the contrary, Germany is under threat.

It is the other way around with Germany, it does not fight - not yet. That is why your country is menaced with the fate of Constantinople, [i.e.] extinction [*zatukhanie*] of the national distinctiveness and state as a result of overstrain with aliens. A Germany the luck of which can be decided by Negroes, Arabs [and] Turks is not any longer a European country. We are tormented by physical needs, you - by surfeit with material affluence, luxury, pleasure-seeking

[and] a tendency towards decay [*upadnichestvo*]. Today the religion of the Germans is the economy. The battle spirit of Stalingrad is still awake in us. But in the Germans? (9)

Asked by Strauß about the relationship between Europe and Russia Zhirinovskii concludes:

One implies the other. My image and that of my party encompasses a Europe from Estramadur to the Urals, from Andalusia to the Kuban. We [are] Russian-Europeans and condemned to protect the white Europe up to the end, if necessary with the help of a European army. Constantinople 1453 must not repeat. (9)

In a later *Liberal* issue Zhirinovskii went even further in this regard, and envisaged Russia as part of an all-European house 'from La Mancha to Vladivostok':

This could be an all-European state in which there are strong states: Russia, Germany, France, Italy. They would be the foundation of this state. (L, 2 [12], 1993, 5)

It should be emphasized that Zhirinovskii is by no means original in tying up ultra-nationalist and pro-European-sounding ideas. Since the adoption of euro-fascist thought by Nazi Germany's SS at the latest, a peculiar notion of an alliance of European nations has been a constant feature of many West European fascisms, and there have been a wide variety of sophisticated, if distinctly surrealistic, fascist plans for a united Europe from 1945 until now. In view of the progress of European integration and of the Europeanization of the immigration problem, and as a result of the growing intellectualization of Western fascist discourse and of the setting up of international right-wing extremist networks, varieties of this theme have by now come to occupy a, if not *the*, central place in West - and increasingly East - European ultra-nationalist programs and discussion papers (Griffin 1993b, 1995a; Hafeneger 1994; Herzinger and Stein 1995).

This *Liberal* re-print from *Nation und Europa* has been reproduced here nearly completely because it represent a quasi-text-book demonstration of the core idea and inner 'logic' of fascist thought. Such explicit and, with regard to the various traits of fascist ideology, comprehensive

expositions have become less frequent in recent Western permutations of fascism (with the notable exception of, among others, openly neo-Nazi groupings). As will be recalled, the previously interpreted isolated quotation concerning Western Europe's 'liberation' from 'Americanism' and 'Zionism' by Russia needed some contextualization in order to justify the application of the fascist label. The above interview, in contrast, explicitly refers to the central images of fascism's vision of a national palingenesis: first, a long period of national (or civilizational) decay leads to a nearly full destruction by sick elements and hostile strangers; second, as a result of this the nation arrives at a historical watershed; third, the nation prevents further decadence and final decline through a phoenix-like resurrection via a radical national cleansing, ethical and cultural regeneration, and social and political transformation; fourth, the newborn nation thus enters an alternative civilizational path. Interestingly, Zhirinovskii, moreover, here manifestly skips his previously noted implicit definition of nationalism as a non-Russian phenomenon (L, no. 4-5, 1992, 2). He now uses the term without hesitation and with a distinctly positive connotation for the description of his image of Russia's and Europe's salvation and future. One could even see his description of nationalism as a mean of 'liberation' as some explanation of what the name of this party denotes.

The starting point of the fascist world view in general is the already noted presentiment of an imminent turning-point in contemporary history. The once homogeneous 'organism' of the respective 'we'-group - defined in either narrowly ethnic-nationalistic or, as in this case, in racial-civilizational terms ('white Europe') - stands on the abyss of a lethal internal decomposition and/or infiltration from 'alien' outsiders. The rhetoric used to describe this peril is not necessarily characterized by Nazi-inspired Newspeak meaning terms like 'purity', 'healthiness', 'genes' or 'blood'. Especially in post-war neo-fascisms the usage of expressions with a less extremist sounding, and even 'positive' connotation is equally important. That is, for instance, the case when regret is expressed about an ongoing loss of national 'self-determination' or 'freedom' (used by Zhirinovskii), or of national 'identity', 'authenticity', 'character' or 'consciousness' (used by Zhirinovskii). In the above interview, these ideas are linked to the image of a gradual intrusion by 'Southern' and 'Eastern' Muslims into 'white Europe'. Yet, this threat is not only seen as a deadly danger to the once homogenous national communities and the European civilization. In a psychologically peculiar way, deep pessimism and 'cultural despair' (Stern 1961) turn in fascist thinking into manic optimism (Griffin 1993a, 47). In

other words, the exceptional depth of the national crisis represents exactly the omen which signals the approaching national rebirth (Griffin 1993a, 44). In Zhirinovskii's above statements this notion appears shortly when he suggests that Russia is tormented, but that it is, in contrast to Germany, 'defending' itself and 'fighting' against the unnamed 'enemies', a process which will finally turn into a 'national revolution' (8-9). This feature was allusively also present in the previously quoted text where Zhirinovskii switched from warnings about the 'end of world' (because of a Russian catastrophe) to the predictions about the forthcoming 'liberation of the world' from American expansion by Russia and, eventually, the world's saving by the LDP (3-4).

A 'regeneration' will, according to fascist thought, not only avert national decay. It also means the nation's elevation to a new level of existence after it has radically shaken off all corrupt, poisoning, filthy, feeble, decadent parasitic etc. elements (Griffin 1993a, 36). With regard to Europe these elements are clearly defined as non-white non-European Muslim immigrants which have infiltrated West European nations and are threatening to undermine their identity whereas, referring to Russia, the 'aliens' still appear as undefined mysterious 'foes' tearing the nation apart. The palingenesis of Europe-Russia means not only that 'Russian nationalism' will save Russia, protect the 'white Europe', solve the 'race problem', and trigger a German rebirth. It is also the beginning of a new era - a 'union of all European people', and the creation of a European super-state which may even range to the Pacific Ocean.

Finally, it should be noted that Zhirinovskii explicitly claims that this 'national Revolution' is not possible as a communist restoration, i.e. a reactionary turning to Russia's recent past. Instead, it is presented as an up-to-date answer to the topical challenges of the post-communist world, i.e., in his words, to the 'geopolitical factor' and 'race problem' whatever this means. Parliamentary democracy too, is explicitly rejected as a possible answer to these questions (8).²⁵⁵

What, in conclusion, emerges is a far-going approximation of an empirical case to the ideal-type construct which is used as an operational definition here. An extensive interpretation or

²⁵⁵ As already mentioned in Part II, sec. 4.1., a return to Tsarist Russia too, is explicitly excluded by Zhirinovskii his book *The Last Dash to the South*. The LDPR does not idealize the pre-revolutionary past and 'understands the contradictory character of its development'. The party is orientated 'not towards the past', but, instead, 'towards the future, towards the high-tech third century.' (Zhirinovskii 1996b, 19)

contextualization is thus unnecessary. Not only is Griffin's fascist minimum 'palingenetic ultra-nationalism' manifestly present (e.g. 'national revolution'). The lists of secondary characteristics of fascism developed by other authors as well as by Griffin are to a high degree applicable too. This refers to the presence of racism ('white Europe'; 'race problem'); anti- (or at least an outspoken non-) communism ('one cannot discuss about Russia's resurrection under Red flags', p. 8) which, in the Russian context, in a peculiar way correlates with anti-conservatism ('the communists are not able to understand [...] the current breaking point'); anti-parliamentarianism and anti-liberalism ('parliamentarian form of government' as an 'utopia'; 'party-democracy would be the end for my homeland'); militarist-nationalist vitalism ('the spirit of Stalingrad'); ultra-nationalist ideological eclecticism (Russian 'national revolution' as well as all-European rebirth); authoritarianism; and the specifically fascist 'internationalism' (Linz 1979, 24-26; Payne 1980b, 6-8; Griffin 1995a, 4-12, 299-300, 304-5).

Zhirinovskii's political texts in this *Liberal* issue contain several further extremely aggressive and imperialist statements, and especially attacks on the 'South' and the United States. Though less coherent than the above outline in the interview, a selection of specific passages shall be quoted because they will be of relevance for further considerations.

Some statements in particular reveal what exactly Zhirinovskii's previously mentioned plan to make the 'South' (i.e., the Caucasian and Central Asian CIS members plus Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran) a zone of Russian influence means. He does not stop here with the demand that Russia should 'return' to the places 'to which it must return', meaning the territories which were, according to Zhirinovskii, allotted to Russia in World War I, i.e. 'the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles [including] Constantinople' (4). He goes beyond traditional focuses of Tsarist foreign policy (Kurashvili 1994, 137) and makes a first indication of *how* such territories would be 'returned'.

We will come for the last time. We will come in a way that Russian troops will stand at the [shores of the] Indian Ocean. Only under this condition. [We will make sure] [t]hat to the South of us is the warm Indian Ocean. (4)

In the following passages, Zhirinovskii is, at least, realistic enough to understand that the

world would not quietly agree to such a prospect. The above quoted vision is, however, of such a primary importance to him that he at once proposes a solution to this dilemma:

We can frighten them [the US-Americans]. And I am saying immediately: I will blackmail them. I tell them that, if you interfere with Russia's affairs in the South, we will take effective measures. [...] We are a huge country. We have already installed cosmic battle stations. They [the US-Americans] don't know where they [the battle stations] are. And [at these stations] are combat-ready weapons targeting on the USA. (4)²⁵⁶

Zhirinovskii's in this *Liberal* contribution emerging prophecy of a Russian military campaign towards the Indian Ocean can, in combination with his Star-Wars-Vision, be seen as representing a first step in the development of another peculiar variety of his palingenetic thought which has, in fact, been already outlined at length in the treatment of *The Last Dash to the South* (1993a) in section 4.2. of Part II. Although most of the following passages will appear as a mere repetition of the ideas already quoted there they should be paraphrased here again. That is because they, first, were published some time before the appearance of the above cited book, second, represent, in distinction to it, evidence from an official LDP document, and, third, shall be *as such* re-interpreted in the light of the above formulated definition of fascism.

An important further step in Zhirinovskii's putting forward of a new Russian foreign policy is done in another texts in this *Liberal* issue called 'On International Politics and the Relations to Iraq' (14-15). In this article, Zhirinovskii finally makes a more concrete statement on who the 'enemies' or what the 'perils' of Russia, he mentioned several times before, actually are. In a first step though he still remains cryptic when he mysteriously links not only the Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze, but also the Russian politician Aleksandr Iakovlev to a currently ongoing 'aggression from the South'. Subsequently, however, he becomes outspoken on whom he means when he speaks about 'them'.

²⁵⁶ On Zhirinovskii's plan to blackmail the West, see also Yanov 1995, 121-22.

They have big plans - Greater Georgia. The Armenians also - Greater Armenia. [...] Azerbaidzhan has big plans as well - Greater Azerbaidzhan. The Turks have big plans - the Great Turkish State. (15)

An adequate answer to these menacing threats is, according to Zhirinovskii, held in store by 'political forces' in Russia who 'think not simply about the security of its borders', but also 'about Greater Russia' (15).

Anyway, at this point, Zhirinovskii ultimately limits himself in his elaborations on the specific aims and grounds for his indicated Southern enlargement of Russia. Although his statements already sound partly fascistic, they occur only sporadic and remain as such too esoteric to be adequately interpreted. For this reason, I would classify the quoted latter pronouncements merely as further evidence for ultra-nationalist expansionism. In view of the criteria formulated in the outset, the images should insofar not be labelled 'fascist', as the concrete palingenetic vision underlying them remains too vague.

Number 2 (12), 1993

In this issue, among others, a stumbling poem is printed which should be reproduced here in literal translation.

To Vladimir Zhirinovskii

The people always need leaders [*vozhdī*],

The leader - is the one who leads us,

The leader - is for happiness and freedom,

The leader is the one who loves his people!

A leader is needed by the Russian people,

And I am not ashamed of these words,

Following him we'll go through fire and water,

To protect our Sacred Russia [*Rus*]!

Do you hear the people's voice?

Come sooner, our messiah.

A leader of the people [is who]

Humiliated Russia is waiting for!

V. ZHILNITSKAIA (9)

With the publication of the second 1993 issue of *Liberal* the process of a gradual change in the newspaper's political profile reaches its climax. Zhirinovskii's writings in number 1 (11) were characterized as especially aggressive, nationalistic, and racist. In spite of the frequency of respective passages, the fascist label was used sparingly, i.e. without reservations only for one text ('The Fight for a White Europe', pp. 7-9) which was, moreover, a re-print from another journal. A characterization of number 2 (12) would, if seen as one singular document, deviate from this feature. Because of a significant shift in emphasis and an increased coherence in Zhirinovskii's texts in this issue, this document can be as a whole characterized as being thoroughly fascist as defined above.

Such a classification is, to begin with, also supported by the fact that this publication is prefaced by a statement superscribed 'Russian Nationalism' by Iurii Pavlovich Kuznetsov (born in 1947), who is a teacher of history and, simultaneously, psychoanalyst by profession, and the editor-in-chief of the St. Petersburg-based newspaper *Slovo Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's word), an important LDP-ideologist, and a State Duma Deputy since December 1993.²⁵⁷ Without going into the details of Kuznetsov's argument, it should be here only noted that this is one of the rare occasions that a central LDP printing frankly advocates the 'rebirth of Great Russian nationalism in domestic and foreign policies' in order to achieve the 'restoration of the Russian people's full spiritual, political and economic command [*polnovlastiia*] in its country' (2). The article represents one of the few cases that the 'St. Petersburg Group' in the LDP leadership, as I would call it, came forward in the party's

²⁵⁷ A German translation of the article is excerpted in a documentation compiled by Hoppe and Genzer (1994, A237-A238).

Moscow-based official publications until 1993.²⁵⁸ This grouping, in turn, is apparently linked to a mysterious supra-partisan association of extremely right-wing Russian publicists called 'The Inner Predictor'.²⁵⁹ Its LDP component, the 'St. Petersburg Group' led by Kuznetsov, has distinguished itself by its attempts to develop a relatively sophisticated proto-fascist theoretical grounding for the, in general, unpretending nationalist-populist agenda of the LDP. Respective activities of the group included the production of internal LDP discussion papers (Sokolov, Ivanov and Kuznetsov 1992), as well as the publication of a number of articles in independent right-wing periodicals (Kuznetsov 1994, 1995), and in the irregularly appearing newspaper *Slovo Zhirinovskogo* (Umland 1996). Yet, Kuznetsov's and his colleagues' proto-fascist concepts, above all their notion of a 'conceptual power' in society which has been lost to the Jews and must be recaptured by the Russian nation, found, at least until 1993, only limited response in the central party press and documents.

Accordingly, the succeeding article on Russian foreign policy by Zhirinovskii (3-5), follows another line of thought than Kuznetsov's contribution with its orientation on a domestically defined national rebirth. In his text, Zhirinovskii finally develops the idea of a conquest of the 'South' frequently indicated in previous *Liberal* issues into an, in his terms, relatively clearly outlined and

²⁵⁸ Other examples of contributions from a member of the 'St. Petersburg Group' to Moscow-based LDP newspapers are the 1992 articles by Mikhail Nikolaevich Ivanov in the then neo-Nazi youth-organ *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's falcon) and in *Liberal* (Ivanov 1992; L, no. 8-9, 1992, 23). On *Sokol Zhirinovskogo*, see Part I, sec. 3.5. M. Ivanov (b. 1949), a former Naval Officer and for some time the LDP shadow cabinet's 'Vice-Prime-Minister', was an LDP candidate in the 1993 State Duma elections on position 121 of the all-federal list and in 208th electoral district in St. Petersburg. M. Ivanov is simultaneously a member of the St. Petersburg branch of the ultra-nationalist *Otechestvo* (Fatherland) group, and of the *Nashi* Movement. On the latter organization, see Part I, sec. 3.3. M. Ivanov is apparently known as the 'Black Captain' in Israel, and his anti-semitic conspiracy theories are among the most bizarre among post-Soviet Russian rightists (V. Ivanov 1996, 36-37). One of them says that, in his poem 'Ruslan and Liudmilla', Aleksandr Pushkin wanted to indicate the existence of a Judeo-Masonic plot against the Russians (LG, no. 3 [5483], 1994, 2). For other such propositions, see, for instance, *Russischer Kurier*, no. 20, 1993, 5. On M. Ivanov, see *Slovo Zhirinovskogo*, no. 3, 1993, 3, no. 8, 1993, 3. This led one Russian observer to wonder why M. Ivanov had never been under psychiatric treatment (Verkhovskii 1994, 30).

²⁵⁹ To my knowledge, so far nothing has been published on this grouping which apparently tries to remain in secret. Its major programmatic document seems to be the abstruse proto-fascist three-volume writing *Dead Water* which is on sale at nationalist gatherings in Moscow (Vnutrennyi prediktor SSSR 1992 [1991]). Interestingly, a shortened version of the text appeared in a journal called *Business and Accountancy in Russia* (Vnutrennyi prediktor Rossii 1994). A further excerpt was published in a leading St. Petersburg right-wing periodical sponsored by Aleksandr Sterligov's fascist Russian National Assembly (Rabochaia gruppa Vnutrennogo prediktora Rossii 1993).

comprehensive concept.

His starting point is again an apocalyptic view of current Russian and world affairs. 'Our blood' and 'our tears' flow, 'our women' are humiliated and forced to prostitution, and 'our sons' are beaten up and killed (3). As long as this state continues 'the Russian's heart will not calm down.' Therefore, the 'great nation has to regain its greatness.' To do this, Russia would, as it did before in its history, have to resort to the 'use of armed force', yet

[...] not for military aims, but in the field of economy [and] in the civilian sector, otherwise decline [*gibel*] awaits us - the fate of the Byzantine Empire that was conquered by barbarians, by Osmanic Turks. (3)

To prevent this, Zhirinovskii proposes the following measures. He starts by repeating his frequently mentioned plan of a 'restoration of Russia' as a unitary state (3), and writes that this 'would be a Russia for Russian citizens [*rossiiane*]' among whom he also counts 'Ukrainians, White Russians, Uzbeks, Tuvins and Tadzhiks' (4). However, he does now not any longer limit his vision to the territory of the former Soviet Union. Instead, he introduces his new locus by stating that Russia should be restored '*as a minimum* in the boundaries of the USSR' (3; emphasis added). Later in the text, he makes a short reference to Pan Slavism, but, in contrast to some other of his public appearances (especially in Eastern Europe), he does not develop this doctrine here as a an agenda for future Russian foreign policy (Oschlies 1995). Instead, he turns to the original, i.e. Southern, focus of his text:

We are a giant Eurasian great power. We should know who surrounds us. Among the peoples surrounding us are barbarians. And these barbarians should know that Russia cannot only defend itself, but also attack: [Russia] is able to destroy - exactly in order to defend itself. The Russians themselves had never been aggressive [and] never thought of attacking others first. [...] The Southern borders of Russia have to be made safe once and for all. That is our historic mission. (4)

Somewhat paradoxically, it is precisely the, according to Zhirinovskii, *defensiveness* of such a Russian 'attack' on the 'barbarians' which represents an important nuance allowing to set this statement in the context of fascist ideology. The 'barbarians' may be 'destroyed' not because of a simple drive towards territorial expansion. Instead, the rationale for an 'attack' on the 'barbarians' is an alleged deadly threat they pose to the otherwise peaceful Russians. It has by now also become clear that it is the 'Southerners' (*iuzhane*)²⁶⁰ who are seen by Zhirinovskii as those who are (apart from the US and 'Zionists') promoting 'civil war' in Russia, and, somehow, fostering its decline as a great power. If one tried to use a modern political concept to describe this idea, one could say that Zhirinovskii sees some unfortunate small 'Southern peoples' (who are either harassed by a multiplicity of internal problems in their countries or whose representatives constitute as immigrants a number of small politically under-represented divisions of the population of the Russian Federation) as representing a grave military and domestic security risk for the nuclear super-power Russia. Yet, such attempts to understand Zhirinovskii's ideology in rational terms, are in view of fascism's explicit anti-rationalism futile. To comprehend somehow what is going on, one has, instead, to try to enter into fascist 'logic' and language. Accordingly, one could reformulate Zhirinovskii's thought in that, first, these peoples are singled out as those 'parasites' at the Russian national 'organism', the 'blood-sucking' of which makes them responsible for Russia's national 'weaknesses', i.e. for her past failures, currently dismal state, and imminent national catastrophe. Their elimination or bringing under control by a military aggression is, second, not only a way towards restoration of former greatness. It is Russia's rebirth by *Wiederankn pfung nach vorw rts* (Moeller van den Bruck).²⁶¹ That means that a 'reconnection' with eternal values expressed in certain moments in Russia's historical development would allow society to be regenerated and progress 'forwards' (Griffin 1995c, 103).

²⁶⁰ *Iuzhane* has, as noted in Section 4.2. of Part II, a clearly pejorative quasi-racist connotation. Zhirinovskii has introduced the usage of this word in his *Last Dash to the South* (1993a, e.g. 117). Timtschenko argues that Zhirinovskii uses this term consciously to avoid persecution because 'Southerners' does not refer to a special people the insult of which is forbidden by law (1994, 149).

²⁶¹ Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (1876-1925) was the leading figure of the so called 'Conservative Revolution', an influential proto-fascist intellectual movement in Weimar Germany which, though distancing itself from Nazism's biological racism, helped significantly to pave the way for Hitler's 'Third Reich', a term introduced by Moeller. The quoted formula is an excellent illustration of the distinctive way of fascist thinking (Griffin 1995a, 104-115).

For the price of enormous efforts, for the price of Russian blood Russia has secured its borders by advancing [*vykhodila*] to the Northern seas, to the Baltic Sea, to the Caspian and Black Seas. Not today, but in the future, in the next century we have to go down [*spustit'sia*] to the Indian Ocean so that to the East of us lies India. [...] We must return to the Tsarist foreign policy: TO GO DOWN TO THE SOUTH. [...] On the South we need warm seas, the Indian Ocean. (4; emphasis in original)

Moreover, in following the above introduced messianistic trait in Russian thought, the 'going down to the South' has not only a narrowly nationalistic-imperialistic dimension. Zhirinovskii, an orientalist by profession, counts altogether eighteen different ethnic groups and national states to the South of Russia, i.e. from Iran to Greece. These intra- and international actors are involved in various kinds of conflicts with each other, some of them 'eternal wars'. The conclusion is:

What is needed is a stabilizing factor. The participation of a great power is necessary. NOT A MILITARY, BUT A STABILIZING PARTICIPATION. And this country will be Russia. (4; emphasis in original)

Perhaps, in order to anticipate a possible allegation of 'internationalism' bringing in mind the disastrous Afghanistan adventure of the Soviet leadership, Zhirinovskii feels obliged to make clear once more:

Yet, [Russia] will not only play this role to sooth all these peoples, to restore order, to guarantee EXCLUDING THE USE OF FORCE human rights, but also to protect its Southern border. That is our historic mission. (4; emphasis in original)

At this point, one could, as in the case of Zhirinovskii's authoritarianism, raise the objection that a fascist classification would be unjustified in view of Zhirinovskii's explicit qualifications. He speaks here, one could argue, explicitly about *peaceful* means for the 'soothing' of the 'South', and in addition he sees it as a task for the 21st century. However, such an apology would lack as much

plausibility as Zhirinovskii's occasional justifications of his advocacy of authoritarianism.

First, the postponement of the Southern advance to the 21st century or its presentation as a long-term process appears to be in contradiction to Zhirinovskii's many above-mentioned apocalyptic visions concerning the current state and near future of Russia, and his professed will to resolutely prevent the looming national catastrophe. Moreover, in his major book *The Last Dash to the South* in which he in more detail elaborates on his plan he sees this 'last repartition of the world' as having to be realized in '[...] a state of shock therapy, suddenly, quickly, [and] effectively.' (1993a, 64)

With regard to the second hypothetical objection, further narrow (i.e. intra-textual) contextualization of the above plan would support an allegation that it should be seen as an agenda not for 'regional cooperation', as Zhirinovskii sometimes labels his plans, but of Russian expansion and domination, and thus military conquest and war. In the present *Liberal* issue, for instance, Zhirinovskii specifies what would be the consequences of the 'going down' to the 'South':

[...] our model [implies] the dissolution of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan as artificial states which have no prospects and which are essentially expansionist [*zakhvatnicheskie*] because they are eternally nomadic tribes. [T]here is never-ending robbery, attacks [*nabegi*], taking of prisoners [and] hostages, [and] violence. (4)

What follows is again an attack on Turkey, and a comparison with the conquest of the peaceful Byzantine Empire by the 'barbarians' which represented the 'occupation of foreign territory' and 'annexation'.²⁶²

It is necessary that everything returns to its place, that the Christian world re-unites again in Jerusalem, that the bells of the Christian-Orthodox Church ring again in Constantinople [...].
(4)

²⁶² One of the most striking features of *The Last Dash to the South* is Zhirinovskii's fanatically anti-Turkish statements (1993a, 130-131).

Instead of the dissolved Muslim national states an entirely new political formation consisting of many peoples would emerge. It would have, however, the following characteristics.

But all [of these peoples] are united by the Russian language, the Russian ruble, the foreign policy of Russia, the Russian army [...]. (4)

These statements prove that what Zhirinovskii, in fact, proposes is the elimination of the Turkish, Iranian and Afghan states, the annexation of their territories to a resurrected Russian Empire, and, moreover, their Russification. In connection with the latter aspect, it should additionally be noted that when he speaks about the 'Russian rouble' and the 'Russian army' Zhirinovskii uses the term *russkii* or *rusaskaia* denoting ethnic Russian. Usually, one would use, in this context, instead *rossiiskii* or *rossiiskaia* denoting all-Russian and referring to the Russian state and its citizens rather than to the Russian nation narrowly defined. That could be seen as minor details, and his reference to the Russian language as 'uniting' the 'Southern' peoples as mere rhetoric. Yet, Zhirinovskii has at least once repeated this feature.²⁶³ In the context of Russian politics, matters such as the currency or the army, i.e. subjects that are related to the Russian state rather than to Russian culture, are by almost all mainstream political forces (including many right-wingers) referred to as *rossiiskii* (-*aia* or -*oe*) because the attribute *russkii* would bear in this connection a distinctly ethno-centrist connotation (and would be immediately understood as offensive by Tatars, Ingushs, Bashkirs, etc.). Therefore, these statements would support a dismissal of Zhirinovskii's occasional claims that his envisaged new 'geopolitical unit' would be a multi-cultural supra-national entity. According to the above statements, Zhirinovskii's new 'Russia' would not even pretend to be a federation of various peoples, as the Soviet Union did. It would be a *de facto* and *de jure* Russian dominated empire.

With regard to military means, he does *here* indeed assure that they would not be used, or employed only for economic and civilian aims whatever he implies by this. However, he occasionally gave interviews which raise serious doubts about his negative stance on war. For instance, he stated

²⁶³ In *The Last Dash to the South*, Zhirinovskii writes that 'up to the shores of the Indian Ocean all will speak Russian' because it would be 'easier for everybody to speak Russian than to learn five languages.' The army which would control this territory is called at this point again *rusaskaia* (1993a, 77).

that the national self-consciousness of Russians has fallen so sharply that to 'awaken the Russian nation one may [*sic*] awaken her with blood' (1994a, 2).²⁶⁴ At another point, he concluded that '[p]atriotism needs war.' (S, 16 April 1994) Furthermore, at other places his outline of 'the last "dash" to the South' as he later called this plan itself sounded rather differently. In the first edition of his major book bearing the same name and published only a few months after the appearance of this *Liberal* issue, he does not only, in line with the just quoted phrases, admit that the execution of this plan would have certain consequences which may at a first glance appear as unfortunate, but which are unavoidable and have a positive dimension too.

Sometimes this [the current national cleansing] causes blood [-shed]. That is bad. Yet, apparently that was necessary for us, for our bitter country, to finally wash down the disease, this satanic [thing] which has infected us since the beginning of the century, that has been unleashed in the centre of Russia by the West, to poison the country, to destruct it from inside - through communism, through nationalism, through cosmopolitanism, through the influence of alien religions, alien ideas, [and] an alien way of life. We will finish this. We will grow out from this as the most hardened nation. (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 117-118)

As already outlined in more detail in Part II, sec. 4.2., he does also not refrain in his book to describe the realization of the plan more concretely. In this text, the 'last "dash"' is named an 'operation', and Zhirinovskii leaves no doubt who will execute this 'operation', and in which way this will be done (which is the reason why this passage should be quoted here once more).

Our *army* will fulfil this task. It will be the means for the survival of the nation as a whole, [and] the foundation for the renaissance [*vozhrozhdenie*] of the Russian army. New armed forces can be reborn only as a result of a *combat operation*. An army cannot get stronger in registration offices and barracks. It needs an aim, a task. (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 70; emphasis

²⁶⁴ It was apparently this statement which led Timtschenko to mis-title his book on Zhirinovskii *I'll Awake Russia with Blood* (1994).

added)

That this formulation is not just a slip of the tongue is exemplified by the fact that Zhirinovskii concludes the first edition of his major political writing with the following - his, perhaps, most frequently recited - passage:

Let Russia successfully realize its last 'dash' to the South. I see Russian soldiers setting for this last Southern journey. I see Russian commanders in headquarters of Russian divisions and armies who draw movement routes for combat units and the end points of these routes. I see airplanes on Air Force bases in Southern regions of Russia. I see submarines surfacing on the shores of the Indian Ocean and landing-crafts approaching the shores on which soldiers of the Russian army are already marching, armoured personnel carriers and huge masses of tanks are moving. Finally Russia will accomplish its last military campaign [voenny pokhod]. (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 142-143; emphasis in original)

Zhirinovskii's dubious claim in this *Liberal* issue to plan a military conquest, but not a war appears in view of such pronouncements as possessing no whatsoever credibility. True, he wrote in capital letters that he would not use force. But he described in italics an explicitly military campaign to the South. True, *Liberal* was the official 'Publication of the Liberal-Democratic Party' until 1993. But *The Last Dash to the South* was called by Zhirinovskii 'the essence of my philosophical [and] geopolitical views on the contemporary world. This [is] - the juice of my brain [...]' (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 3; emphasis in original)

Thus the most favourable interpretation would be that (as in the case with his above assurances concerning the benevolence and temporality of an authoritarian regime) it is left in the dark which of his statements have what weight and represent truly relevant guidelines for future actions. It might, indeed, be that his militaristic dreams are essentially tactical. That means they might have merely populist dimension, and are only designed to attract malcontent professional soldiers and the increasing contingent of young men whose personality outlook and political views have been crucially formed by their war experience in Afghanistan, Tadzhikistan or Chechnia, or to simply appeal to

extremist youth. In other words, it *could* be that he was serious when he, in another publication, said that '[n]obody can be more in favour of peace than me.' (Schirinowskij 1994, 149) However, the overall picture of his public appearances and behaviour would in view of recent historical experience strongly suggest scepticism in that regard.²⁶⁵

Anyway, as indicated before, it is not the task of this study to give answers to these kind of questions. What should merely be kept for the record is that Zhirinovskii's above inserts concerning a peaceful execution of his plans are by no means sufficient to refute the allegation of, at the very least, implicit war propaganda in his writings in *Liberal*.

A last nuance should be mentioned although it is not directly linked to the argument put forward here. Concluding his article, he again expresses an awareness that besides the nations to whom he has given notice of their future incorporation into a Russian empire other international actors will also not agree to his plan.²⁶⁶ As will be recalled he had in an earlier text already announced that he would be prepared to blackmail the United States with nuclear weapons in the case that they try to interfere with Russia's 'independent foreign policy' (L, no. 1 [11], 1993, 4). At this point, he, interestingly, comes back to Russia's already extensively interpreted 'liberation mission' with regard to 'alien American and Zionist influence' in Europe and restates that

[a]mong the patriotic forces of France and Germany, there is the desire that Russia plays the role of a liberator of Europe. At one time Russia has freed Europe from Bonaparte, Hitler [as

²⁶⁵ For instance, Adolf Hitler (whose *Drang nach Osten* [urge to the East] plan and *Lebensraum* [living space] theory was, as indicated in section 4.2. of Part II, structurally somewhat similar to 'the last "dash" to the South') professed before World War II several times his deep desire for peace as, for instance, in a *Reichstag* speech on 21st May 1935:

What else could I wish than tranquillity and peace? But if one says that this is merely the aspiration of the leadership, I have to give the following answer: If only the leaders and governments [would] wish peace, the peoples themselves have never longed for war. Germany needs peace and it wants peace! (as quoted in Hofer 1957, 179)

²⁶⁶ In *The Last Dash to the South* he writes on this aspect of his plan:

Everybody gets what he wants. True, there will be a little bit of dissatisfaction in Ankara. Yes, some [people] in Teheran and Kabul will be malcontent. But millions of people and the whole planet get a positive solution. (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 76)

well as] from Swedish dominance, [and] saved Europe from the invasion of the Tatars [and] Mongols. And again Russia has the chance to rescue Europe from American influence. (4)

Up to this point Zhirinovskii basically repeats the content of statements he made in this regard in other publications. In connection with this the thought of a *Wiederanknüpfung nach vorwärts* ('reconnection forwards') reappears too - now with regard to Russia's recurring missions in Europe. What, however, follows could be seen as a proof that Zhirinovskii is apparently completely 'dead to the world'.

However, Europe has to *pay us* for this [the 'liberation' from American influence] by agreeing to our plan of an advance [*vykhod*] to the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. (4; emphasis added)

Moreover, Europe would, in the framework of Zhirinovskii's geopolitical deal, not only have to make over the 'South' in exchange for 'liberation' from 'Americanism' and 'Zionism'. According to Zhirinovskii's logic, West European states would also directly benefit from Russia's 'advance to the South'. From that follows:

Europe has to simply pay us *huge [amounts of] money* for the cardinal regulation of the situation in the Near East. And they [the Europeans] are in a position to do this. One has just to come to an understanding. (5; emphasis added)²⁶⁷

In conclusion, I would (with reference to a 1992 contributor to the LDP-newspaper *Zhirinovskii's Falcon*) tentatively conceptualize the comprehensive foreign policy agenda presented by Zhirinovskii in this *Liberal* issue as 'revolutionary imperialism' (Bekhchanov 1992).²⁶⁸ The plan

²⁶⁷ In an August 1993 interview, Zhirinovskii repeated this idea, and stated that the West would have to pay 'in cash' for the 'neutralization' of Islamic fundamentalism by Russia. See Umland 1994a, 117; reprinted here in English as Appendix II.

²⁶⁸ When using here 'imperialism' I am referring to the following scholarly definition of this term:

of a 'going down to the South' is represented as being both a creative continuation of Tsarist foreign policy - Russia's 'reconnection forwards' -, and an up-to-date response to distinctly topical issues of Russia's development. At first glance, such a plan could appear as falling within a century-old feature of continuous territorial expansion of the Russian state, i.e. as being essentially conservative.²⁶⁹ However, the world has changed dramatically since Russia's earlier drives towards annexation of surrounding territories. The mainstream Russian Right - even its extreme parts - seems to have acknowledged that Afghanistan was the last expansionist experiment. For most Russian politicians it is probably obvious that a continuation of this policy would lead to major war(s) between the Orthodox and Muslim civilizations, and, via Turkey, between Russia and NATO. The tenor of Zhirinovskii's grounding of the 'advance to the South' goes beyond a simple extrapolation of a formerly already present evolution. Though it refers to Russia's imperial tradition, the plan appears insofar as original and quasi-modern as it tries to relate to a set of real and fictitious dilemmas in today Russian politics and society which are reflected by Zhirinovskii in nationalistic-manichean terms (Kurashvili 1994, 137). In creating this association, Zhirinovskii presents the 'going down to the South', and Russia's reformation into a (sometimes pseudo-multicultural and sometimes openly russified) unitary state not just as a more advantageous prospect of the country's future than others. In other words, the plan is not the result of an intelligible weighing of pros and cons of various strategic, political and economic aspects of such a campaign. Instead, his paranoid claim of an existential threat to Russia by racially defined 'Southerners' who have been and are infiltrating and conspiring against the Russian nation in order to destroy it (and, by implication, other 'Northerners' too), represents the central rationale of his scheme. It is in view of this image, that the 'last ''dash''', as Zhirinovskii later named his scheme, plays the role of a panacea for Russia. It constitutes an utopia

Imperialism in the industrial era is a process whereby agents of an expanding society gain inordinate influence or control over the vitals of weaker societies by 'dollar' and 'gun-boat' diplomacy, ideological suasion, conquest and rule, or by planting colonies of its own people abroad. The object is to shape or reshape them in its own interest and more or less in its own image. It implies the exertion of power and transfer of economic resources [...]. (Robinson 1972, 118-119)

²⁶⁹ Walter Laqueur has remarked that Zhirinovskii has in fact reformulated an idea already put forward by, among others, Fëdor Dostoevskii (in his *Diary of a Writer*) who advocated a Russian advance into Asia where Russia could play a civilisatory role. Dostoevskii came close to proto-fascism when he put forward the argument that this would bring about a regeneration of the Russian national spirit (Laqueur 1994, 53, 201).

based on the manic optimism that the transformation of Russia from a federal nation-state into a huge, strictly centralized empire of so far unknown territorial dimensions would both, prevent an alien-inspired Russian national cataclysm, and usher in a new era in Russian (and world) history - a prophecy which appears in view of the disastrous results of the Afghanistan and Chechnia adventures as even more fantastic.²⁷⁰ The vision is, as outlined above, furthermore, supplanted by a set of distinctly anti-democratic and anti-liberal statements. In developing his idea further in his major book, Zhirinovskii, moreover, described 'the going down to the South' as a 'purification for all of us' (1993a, 75). By this and other comparable statements, he suggests that the execution of the 'last dash' as such would by itself already represent a first step towards a regeneration of Russia which adds a further peculiar aspect to his mirage of a Russian national rebirth.

If seen in the context of Russian history and contemporary politics, and if related to further pertinent statements of Zhirinovskii in previous *Liberal* issues and other publications, the mythical core of his here outlined revolutionary-imperialist blueprint of a 'going down to the South' can be categorized as both, 'palingenetic' (implying the idea of new- or rebirth), and 'ultra-nationalist' (implying the absolute dominance of the, however interpreted, interests of the nation over all other interests, values, and rights). In line with the here proposed conceptualizations of right-wing extremism it can, therefore, be classed with the generic ideal-type ideology of fascism.

Number 3 (13), 1993

As far as the last issue of *Liberal* which apparently appeared in spring or early summer 1993 does not develop further the above ideas, it can be dealt with here shortly. This issue is on the whole, for whatever reasons, less determined by fascist ideology than number 2 (12), and can be even seen as a relative calming down of the fanaticism Zhirinovskii showed in the previous issues.

²⁷⁰ Solovyov and Klepikova seem to agree with my assertion about the importance of imperialist policies Zhirinovskii assigns to the solution of Russia's problems, but they differ in that they apparently do not ascribe much significance to Zhirinovskii plan of a Southward expansion (1995, 111, 159). Consequently, they conclude: 'Imperial restoration is Zhirinovsky's *idée fixe*, a panacea for the collapse of the state and the demise of the Russian nation.' (1995, 154; emphasis added) As outlined above, I, in contrast, argue here that, only in a part of his writings, Zhirinovskii advocates (much in line with other Russian right-wingers) a mere restorationist return to the status quo. In other writings he ardently tries to introduce a relatively novel, and non-restorationist component in Russian imperialist thought.

One passage is insofar worth mentioning as it supports the characterization of Zhirinovskii's plan of an 'advance to the South' as being palingenetic in the sense of a revolutionary rather than restorationist rebirth. Though he claimed at other points that his plan represents a continuation of Tsarist foreign policy, Zhirinovskii describes in this newspaper the last Russian and meanwhile canonized Tsar Nikolai II as being implicated in Russia's misery in the 20th century (2; see also Part I, sec. 4.1.; and Sakwa 1995, 205). It should be noted that such an evaluation clearly runs counter the current Russian zeitgeist which tends to nostalgically illumine the memory of the reign of the Romanov dynasty, and especially that of its last representative. The statement can be thus seen as an additional proof for the presence of an anti-conservative dimension in Zhirinovskii's ideology.

At another point, Zhirinovskii's talk ones more confirms his uninhibited usage of racist stereotypes. Referring to as different Caucasians as (in this order) Ruslan Khasbulatov (speaker of the Russian parliament 1991-93), Stalin, Lavrentii Beria (Stalin's last Chief of Secret Police), Eduard Shevardnadze (former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs and current President of Georgia), and Geidar Aliev (former member of the CPSU Politbureau and today President of Azerbaidshan) Zhirinovskii writes:

We should in general not let Caucasians into the government of the country. Have the Russian's really not understood that the Caucasus - that is terrible! That is total corruption, destruction, [and] blood. (3)

Zhirinovskii's peculiar conclusion is:

The partition of the Caucasus must end. There should be one Gouvernement - the North Caucasian [Gouvernement]. As long as Chechnia, Ingushetia, Ossetia and Kabardinia are ruling there will be eternal war. The center of the North Caucasian Gouvernement should be Rostov [a Russian regional capital], the General-Governor - a Russian. If this [position] becomes [occupied by] a representative of one of the local nationalities, he will favour [*predostavliat' preimushchestva*] his nationality.

Although Zhirinovskii subsequently includes South Ossetia and Abkhazia (i.e. parts of Georgia) as well as Kazakhstan, Kirgistan, Belarus and the Ukraine in the Russian state which would have to be restored immediately (3), this programme represents a significant moderation of his ultra-nationalist imperialism in comparison to some of his foregoing ideas.

Some further formulas point in the direction of palingenetic thought, for example, when the project for a new LDP programme proposes a 'cardinal change in domestic and foreign policies' (5), or the 'transfer of the century-old East-West relations to more profitable, prospective and less tense contacts between the North and the South.' (6)²⁷¹ In the eyes of the international community Washington transforms itself, according to an LDP press release, 'more and more into an "evile empire" which threatens the world' (17). At another point, Zhirinovskii advocates the 'spiritual rebirth of Russia on the basis of Orthodoxy' (23).

Further passages could be quoted. However, they would only provide additional illustrations, and neither new evidence for the points made already before, nor novel ideas worth-analyzing. Thus number 3 (13) can on the sole basis of such statements not be classified as a fascist document as far as a sufficiently comprehensive palingenetic vision is absent.

²⁷¹ In this document, it remains unexplained what the rationale and exact content of Zhirinovskii's plan of a 'change to North-South relations' is. For an additional treatment of this vision which had appeared earlier in other LDPR documents, see Part II, sec. 4.2. of this study.

Part IV: Evaluating the Phenomenon

6. Some Provisional Inferences about the Nature of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon'

In this chapter and the following two chapters I shall, on the basis of the analyses of Parts I, II and III, try to outline my preliminary conclusions about the character and significance of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'. Partly, these conclusions parallel sub-sections of the Chapter 0. 'Introduction' and of Chapter 5 where I stated the rationale for (a) undertaking this study as a whole, and for (b) scrutinizing the LDP ideology in particular. The summary and comparison of my research results below should provide some basis for making prognostications with regard to the possible future development of the LDP. The issue of the prospects of the LDP's survival as a significant actor is to some degree congruent with the answer to the general question of what important a role should be ascribed to the LDP in post-Soviet Russian politics.

6.1. Summaries of the Research Results

Chapter 1: The Origins of the LDP

Chapter one dealt with two issues: some crucial features of Zhirinovskii's biography which can be conceived as determinants for his today behaviour, and Zhirinovskii's involvement into Moscow's 'informal' political scene at the end of the 1980s and in 1990-91. The chapter illustrated how Zhirinovskii's difficult childhood and youth effected his personality as an adult, and in which way his arduous experiences in fact resembled those of many of his fellow Soviet citizens. It showed in detail how unheroic and inconsistent his first attempts to enter politics were, and how miniscule and dubious an organization the LDPSU must have been in 1990-91. It also outlined how crucial a role the old Soviet, reactionary establishment sections played in promoting Zhirinovskii's and some of his

fellow marionettes' political careers until spring 1991. It showed that especially the CPSU Central Committee apparatus was deeply involved in a concerted attempt to insert Zhirinovskii and other leading Centrist Bloc members as a 'Trojanic Horse' into the new multi-party system, and to use these pseudo-liberals and pseudo-centrists for staging a larger, more comprehensive attack on genuine late Soviet centrism (e.g. Gorbachëv and his allies) and liberalism (the so called 'radical democrats'). The chapter concluded that the existence of the LDPSU, and most of Zhirinovskii's activities were at this time a function of the role he and his party had been assigned to by the *ancien régime* in its last anti-democratic rearing up which culminated in the August 1991 coup attempt.

Chapter 2: Zhirinovskii Enters Politics

This chapter argued that Zhirinovskii's crucial leap from Moscow's political scene to presidential candidacy in spring-summer 1991 would not have been possible without substantial financial and administrative backing from above. It particularly showed the circumstances, and uncovered some of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus members' back-stage manipulations connected with Zhirinovskii's party's registration, his nomination as a candidate in Russia's first presidential elections, and the financing of his presidential campaign mainly through the *RKP*-backed, dubious entrepreneur Andrei Zavidia.

Pursuing the financial issue in more breadth, the larger part of the chapter was devoted to various possible, proven and unproven solvent sponsors of Zhirinovskii. It suggested that apart from further money from the CPSU, and from some big corporations such as *Inkombank*, the LDP had been sponsored by middle- and small-size - including criminal - capital, and that the party itself had partly functioned as a trading company. Considerable amounts were apparently secured by using Zhirinovskii's media talents and the LDP's regional structure to sell State Duma seats to affluent entrepreneurs who were willing to pay for satisfying their political ambitions (which in some cases may have also been determined by other, non-political intentions such as furthering their businesses or gaining legal immunity as MPs).

The chapter reiterated and developed the thesis of a Russian specialist who had argued that the LDP played a specific role in lobbying interests of *middle-* and *small-size* companies of younger entrepreneurs who had been unsuccessful in securing state assets, licences and access to corrupt

officials during the initial privatization drive and token liberalization of the Russian economy in 1992-93. The chapter concluded that, although the rise of the LDP to national-level politics would not have been possible without support from the old establishment at some crucial points, the *ancien régime*'s stance on Zhirinovskii - and not on another political figure - as its major pseudo-democratic, non-conservative proxy in Russia's emerging multi-party system had been due to, among others, the LDP leader's well-developed political determination, instincts and talents. The relationship of the old elites and Zhirinovskii had been a symbiotic one: both needed each other. One could even speculate whether a more purposeful inclusion in the 1991 August Putsch preparation and execution of the then already well-known Zhirinovskii (for instance, through Luk'ianov) might have effected the course of recent Russian history.

Chapter 3: The Men Behind the Leader

The next chapter detailed some crucial characteristics of the LDP between 1990 and 1993, and also followed the subsequent development of some assistants, allies and partners of Zhirinovskii after December 1993. It showed, first, that, although the LDP leadership exaggerated membership figures at many points, Zhirinovskii apparently did manage to build up an organization of approximately 40,000 members (though most of them probably inactive) until December 1993. This made it already then the third or fourth largest political organization of Russia (after the Communists, Agrarians and the democratic movement if one sees this movement as a unified political force). The chapter, secondly, showed that, although larger splits or disintegration had been avoided since October 1990, the party suffered from considerable personnel fluctuation. The number of Zhirinovskii's consistently close assistants during the whole period was limited to two, three or maximally four men: Zhebrovskii and Minakov as well as, in some respect, Bogatyi and Khalitov who, however, had both lost their influence by autumn 1993. After the October 1990 split from a group of dissidents who rejected Zhirinovskii pro-CPSU line, the major transformation of the LDP leadership was the autumn 1992 departure of the neo-Nazis Zharikov and Arkhipov, and some of their friends. They were replaced by businessmen and technocrats (e.g. Kobelev and Vengerovskii) who substituted the enthusiasm and imaginative public relations work of the 'young radicals' with organizational and, above all, financial resources. This move secured a successful election campaign

and a less dubious image of the LDP in 1993.

The chapter also showed that Zhirinovskii's liaisons with other prominent personalities were much less numerous and more short-lived than the various alliances and collaborations created by virtually all other significant political forces during the period under consideration. These only temporary associations of the LDP with other relevant political forces and personalities might have been partly due to the fact that such links were determined by tactical rather than by strategic considerations. That means they were motivated by an interest in media-attention rather than lasting partnerships, for instance, with regard to Kashpirovskii and Limonov. In stark contrast to this stood Zhirinovskii's already before December 1993 well-developed foreign partnerships which not only distinguished him sharply from his colleagues on the right fringe. These ties also surpassed in terms of closeness and multifariousness the international ties of many democratic groupings. Especially, the intensive and much publicised ties with the Iraqi government and the rich, right-wing extremist German People's Union were noteworthy in the Russian context. The overall picture of the chapter is somewhat contradictory in that the impressive LDP record with regard to membership numbers and foreign ties seems to be incongruent with the considerable internal strain and an apparently only narrow circle of core activists involved in keeping the party alive. Although large in size, the party had by December 1993 become little more than an election campaigning machine, a very effective one though.

Chapter 4: Two Faces of Vladimir Zhirinovskii

Chapter four interpreted the two most distinct features of Zhirinovskii's ideology within the context of contemporary Russian politics and history. In its first section, it underlined the importance of the pseudo-centrist dimension of Zhirinovskii's rhetoric to an understanding of his position in the Russian party-spectrum. This dimension had entailed a consistent and multifarious attempt to convince the Russian electorate that the LDP represents a force *between* the revolutionary (genuinely) liberal democrats and the reactionary communists. Significantly, the chapter mentioned an important U.S.-American survey proving that this endeavour of Zhirinovskii was successful to a considerable degree, i.e. that, in 1996, the label 'centrist' was the relatively most frequent characterization assigned to the LDP by Russian respondents. It mentioned in connection with this that a peculiarly '(pseudo-)

centrist' dimension had also been evoked to characterize historic inter-war fascism by authors such as Seymour Martin Lipset, and that a number of West European parties had explicitly used pseudo-centrist and pseudo-liberal labels for presenting themselves to the public as allegedly moderate forces long before Zhirinovskii (e.g. the Dutch right-radical *Centrumdemokraten*, or the right-wing populist Austrian Freedom Party).

The larger part of the chapter was devoted to the various permutations of Zhirinovskii's supremacist imperialism until December 1993. It showed that Zhirinovskii's imperialism had had until then three dimensions: (a) internal reactionary administrative unitarianism with regard to the non-Russian autonomous regions of the Russian Federation, (b) external restorationism and irredentism with regard to most of the former Soviet republics, and (c) new external expansionism reaching far beyond the borders of the former Tsarist and Soviet empires. The chapter established that these three schemes can be interpreted as being in so far consistent with each other as they all seem to indicate a similar, relatively clearly identifiable uniform world-view in which the Russians are seen as a part of a larger Northern, Christian race or civilization with a civilizatory mission concerning 'Southern', Muslim nations, and 'non-civilized' ethnic groups and tribes. Thus Zhirinovskii employed in all three arguments a pseudo-multicultural rhetoric in so far as he promised a certain national autonomy within his new Russia. Yet, he in all three instances contradicted himself by the announcement of explicitly centralist, colonialist and repressive measures including large-scale employment of military force.

In its last sub-sections, the chapter argued at length that many of Zhirinovskii's seemingly weird statements with regard to the 'last dash' can be interpreted as relatively consistent utterances once they are interpreted as being determined by Zhirinovskii's attempt to prove the utility and feasibility of an implementation of his major plan of 'going down to the Indian Ocean'. The chapter concluded by outlining the rootedness of Zhirinovskii's plan in Russian 19th-century thought as well as in pre- and post-revolutionary foreign policies, and by indicating the topicality of Zhirinovskii's peculiar interpretation of what the prognosticated 'clash of civilizations' would entail for the world as a whole, and for Russia's future foreign policy in particular.

Chapter 5: Fascist Tendencies in Zhirinovskii's Writings in the Newspaper *Liberal*

Chapter five differed from the previous four analyses in that it attempted to introduce

systematically a generic concept into the interpretation of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'. It started with an extensive discussion of the development of a comparatively derived, ideal-typical concept of generic fascism. After shortly reviewing some major contributions to fascist studies, the chapter argued that a definition by Roger Griffin - 'palingenetic ultra-nationalism' - seems to be the most succinct formula, and useful construct for empirical fascist research proposed so far. The chapter went on to discuss in detail the importance and meaning of 'fascism' in post-Soviet Russia. It suggested that in view of the salience of the label in Russian public and academic discourse the concept of 'fascism' seems to be the most appropriate paradigm for the interpretation and typologization of a major brand of post-Soviet Russian right-wing extremism.

The major part of the chapter was devoted to a case-by-case, detailed qualitative content analysis of Zhirinovskii's contributions to the issues of the 1990-93 major LDP organ *Liberal*, and a subsequent classification of the articles and issues as either fascist or non-fascist. Partly, the ideas introduced here resembled those already quoted in Chapter 4 which had, however, in distinction to Chapter 5, concentrated on Zhirinovskii's major book *The Last Dash to the South* (1993a) and put Zhirinovskii's statement in another framework of analysis. Chapter 5 identified at least two distinctly fascist agendas in *Liberal*: (a) a re-interpretation of euro-fascist ideas in which Russia is seen as playing a crucial, saviour-role for the whole of continental Europe by way of initiating an all-European cultural and racial rebirth and cleansing; and (b) a preliminary outline of the rationale and content of the scheme of a 'going down to the Indian Ocean' which included an explicit demand for the abolition of the Afghan, Persian and Turkish states - i.e. of the same plan to be later outlined in more detail in Zhirinovskii's first book *The Last Dash to the South*. The chapter showed a clear tendency of radicalization of the rhetoric and content of Zhirinovskii's articles in *Liberal* from 1990 to 1993 (although the last *Liberal* issue did not go beyond the aggressiveness of the most outspoken, penultimate number 2 [12] of 1993).

6.3. A Comparison of the Research Results

A number of trends in Zhirinovskii's behaviour (Part I), the formation of the LDP agenda in general (Part II), and Zhirinovskii's contributions to *Liberal* (Part III) correlate with each other. Certain further developments, however, seemed to be incongruent or contradict each other. This

section aims to show the correlating, congruent development, to scrutinize how the divergence of certain other trends played out, and tries to provide some suggestions concerning possible interpretations of the most manifest incongruencies. The latter endeavour of disentangling the many contradictions and 'crazy' aspects of the Zhirinovskii Phenomenon will be again an issue in the concluding Chapter 8 of this study.

The most important general, large tendency in the LDP's evolution over the time period covered here is one of a relative radicalization, growth in rhetorical aggressiveness, and of the emergence of a relatively distinct, LDP-specific, foreign-policy centered agenda most vividly illustrated in the changes in *Liberal* in 1990-93, and in the publication of *The Last Dash to the South* in 1993.

As has been shown in Part I, the emergence of the LDP as a national-level political organization in 1990-91 was largely determined by the role it was assigned to by the reactionary establishment sections of the *ancien régime*. The curious name of Zhirinovskii's umbrella organization at this time stands as a symbol for this period: Centrist Bloc of Moderate-Radical Political Parties and Movements. During this period, Zhirinovskii's political career personally took a great leap because of the support of his high-standing god-parents. Yet, for the same reason, the positioning of the LDP in Russia's new political spectrum was stalled, and characterized by swift shifts from nominally pro-Western - i.e. pro-capitalist and liberal - positions to close cooperation with the old establishment and the imperialist ultra-conservatives of *Soiuz*. At various points in 1990-91, the LDP confirmed the odd name the 'Moderate-Radical Centrist Bloc' in it was indeed in some respect centrist, radical and/or moderate at the same time.

Zhirinovskii's party was created and supported by the Central Committee apparatus in order not to become a new, independent political force with a distinct profile, but (a) to undermine the new democratic multi-party system, (b) to function as the establishment's proxy in the centrist section of the new political spectrum, and (c) to discredit genuinely centrist policies. In other words, the LDP and Zhirinovskii were not independent actors but had to rely on support and guidance of their actions and statements by the *ancien régime*, and to function within these confines. All three Parts - the outline of the Centrist Bloc activities in Part I, the early programmatic evolution in Part II, and the content of the one analyzed 1990 issue of *Liberal* - confirm the pattern of vacillation of the

Zhirinovskii group at this period, and the contradictions between the party's anti-communist statements, and its pro-*ancien régime* announcements.

Parts I and II as well as the enclosed Appendix I on Zhirinovskii's biography are also in agreement with each other in that they all in one way or another indicate certain reasons and evidence for nascent radically right-wing inclinations of Zhirinovskii *before* his rise as a 'liberal-democratic' leader in 1990-91. Part I and Appendix I shortly deal with Zhirinovskii's peculiar childhood experiences, with his encounters of other Soviet nationalities in Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, and Moscow, and with his reported perception of these encounters. Significantly, Part II shortly introduces Zhirinovskii 1988 project for a, what he then called, Social-Democratic Party. This programme had already explicitly envisaged the abolition of the Union Republics and Autonomous Republics, and called for their replacement by Gouvernements. Thus this 1988 programme already contained a provision which later would become the backbone of Zhirinovskii's colonial-unitarian vision of a newly centralized *de jure* Russian state. In one of the following sub-section of these conclusions - in 6.4. -, some additional anecdotal evidence supporting the general impression that ultra-nationalist inclinations had become manifest in Zhirinovskii statements and behaviour before 1990 will be mentioned.

Disparities between the findings of the chapters can be seen as emerging (a) with regard to Zhirinovskii's support of the *GKChP* in August 1991, and (b) with regard to his association with Zharikov and Arkhipov in 1991-92, and with Limonov in 1992. That means, the major programmatic documents of the LDP introduced in Part II, and speeches and articles by Zhirinovskii analyzed in Parts II and III do not reflect the radically anti-democratic stance of Zhirinovskii expressed in his open, manifest support of the reactionary August 1991 coup attempt, and his association with outspokenly fascist figures such as Iakushev, Arkhipov, Zharikov and Limonov. Although Zhirinovskii has been involved in backstage cooperation with the old establishment since about autumn 1990 (first through Oleinik), and was between summer 1990 and spring 1991 associated to a prolific former Russian establishment-fascist, Valerii Skurlatov, all these activities happened under the banner of centrism and moderation. Yet, as mentioned, this tactic was, at least, to some extent determined by Zhirinovskii's dependence on the establishment. In fact, what was tactical and strategic in Zhirinovskii's behaviour is in general difficult to establish.

A first line of interpretation emerging from the various chapters' contradictions with each other would be that Zhirinovskii went through a gradual 'coming out'. This would entail the assumption that Zhirinovskii had already been in the possession of well-defined political ideas and aims at the beginning of his political career, and that he simply kept these ideas in secrecy until 1993. He started in 1988-90 with a clear, yet hidden strategy. All his subsequent steps were determined by tactical considerations and a mere preparation of the culmination in autumn-winter 1993 - i.e. of the publication of *The Last Dash to the South* in September 1993, and the electoral triumph in December 1993.

There is considerable support for this thesis in all three parts. The presence of an explicit unitarianism in Zhirinovskii's 1988 Social-Democratic Programme has been mentioned in Part II. Part I outlined how Zhirinovskii first founded a political organization with elusive aims, and then purged the party from ideological foes in October 1990 while, at the same time, beginning to associate himself with neo-Nazis such as Iakushev, Zharikov and Arkhipov. His overtures to liberal-conservative political forces in Western Europe shortly mentioned in Parts I and II and in Appendix I would, from such a perspective, appear as cynical attempts to gain political weight and financial assistance from these partners. In contrast, Zhirinovskii's successful relationships with Saddam Hussein and Gerhard Frey are indicative of Zhirinovskii's 'true' agenda. The juxtaposition of liberal-democratic ideas in the LDP's published re-registration documents of December 1992 with the vitriolic, ultra-nationalist tonus of Zhirinovskii's articles in the *Liberal* issue 1 (13), 1993 analyzed in Part III would also seem to illustrate that Zhirinovskii was, during the period under scrutiny here, merely a cool-headed political utilitarian who used political slogans in largely instrumental terms in order to hide his originally fascist agenda.

However, if Zhirinovskii had already in the late 1980s been a full-blown ultra-nationalist and, according to Part III's argument, a peculiarly Russian fascist, it is not entirely conceivable why he waited for such a long time with his coming out in this capacity. It is also not clear why Zhirinovskii, as outlined in Part I, abandoned his clearly fascist and highly efficient activists Iakushev, Zharikov, Arkhipov and Limonov in 1992. One, certainly at least partly, valid answer would be that Zhirinovskii did this for tactical reasons - i.e. in order not to be associated with such rabidly xenophobic, anti-Western, openly pro-Nazi and dubious figures. Yet, if he was that much concerned about his image,

why was it that Zhirinovskii's own, comparatively original fascist political agenda came out in *Liberal* and in *The Last Dash to the South* after the neo-Nazi's departure from the LDPR in 1993? At that point, moreover, the prospect of new parliamentary (and perhaps even presidential) elections was clearly looming following El'tsin's successful referendum of April 1993. Zhirinovskii's clear understanding of political tactics was exemplified by his active participation in El'tsin's June 1993 Constitutional Assembly and his demonstrative neutrality during the 1993 September-October showdown in Moscow. Yet, why did he then publish *The Last Dash* at all? And if Zhirinovskii is such a wise tactician: Why did he also demonstratively support the abortive August 1991 putsch on the very first day of its occurrence, and as one of the first and few right-wingers who dared to do so at all? Why did he take such a risk?

Therefore, a second, fundamentally different line of interpretation would be that Zhirinovskii never really had a clear ideology and strategy. During the whole period analyzed here, he was merely a tactician who sought to combine extensive media attention - e.g. Arkhipov's canards, and his own political clownerie -, on the one side, with an image of a serious statesman - e.g. abandonment of the 'young radicals' in 1992 and extensive foreign relations -, on the other side. In contrast to the above outlined interpretation of a gradual 'coming out' of the 'true' fascist Zhirinovskii, this second line of reasoning would argue that there was simply nothing to 'come out' from Zhirinovskii - apart from pure striving for power. The 1993 issues of *Liberal* (Part III) and *The Last Dash to the South* (Part II) and the scheme of a 'going down to the Indian Ocean' would, according to this line of reasoning, also appear as mere canards - just one more attempt to gain media attention through scandalous publications. The phrase 'Centrist Bloc of Moderate-Radical Parties and Movements' and the ideological muddle it expresses would appear as a metaphor for the whole 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'. The validity of the metaphor can be seen as exemplified by the Russian electorate's overwhelming, yet obviously invalid classification of Zhirinovskii as a 'centrist'. In fact, this second way of interpretation would entail that about half of the dissertation - namely the extensive outline of *The Last Dash* in Section 4.2. and the detailed conceptualization of Zhirinovskii's unitarian-expansionist ideas in Chapter 5 - were an essentially futile endeavour. Zhirinovskii is just an unscrupulous populist and demagogue, and does not hold any well-defined political ideas. Probably, this view of him and his party is the mainstream Western perception of the 'Zhirinovskii

phenomenon'.

The following two sections of my conclusions will be devoted to attacking this second line of reasoning. I will first argue that the surface contradictions between Zhirinovskii's centrist and fascist rhetoric should not be seen as forestalling in principle a possible fascist categorization of Zhirinovskii and his party. Second, I will outline extensively why a dismissing of Zhirinovskii's scheme of a 'last dash to the South' as a mere propaganda trick would be misleading, why the plan should *not* be seen as just one more of his many outrageous announcements, and why it represents an important and possibly the most important part of the LDP agenda - at least, as long as Zhirinovskii remains the party's leader. However, finally resolving the conundrum of the two above contradictory interpretations of Zhirinovskii (either a fascist, or cynical political entrepreneur) will be postponed until Chapter 8.

6.3. Fascism and Centrism

There are several reasons to regard the LDPR as an essentially fascist party (e.g. Sestanovich 1994; Talbott 1995), and there are other grounds not to do so (e.g. Fairbanks 1994; Richter 1996). As indicated in the Introduction to the dissertation, and in the introductory section of Part III, Chapter 5, on fascist tendencies in *Liberal*, it is not the task of this study to give a final answer to the question whether the generic concept of fascism should be applied to the LDP, or not.

Notwithstanding, a short commentary concerning the usage of the concept of fascism in connection with Zhirinovskii's apparently centrist statements shall be made. In view of the numerous quasi- and pseudo-centrist aspects of Zhirinovskii Phenomenon outlined in detail in Part II, Section 4.1., one could draw the conclusion that the LDPR is not a clear-cut extremist party and that - if fascism is seen as a variety of right-wing extremism - relevant fascist tendencies in this party are precluded. In other words, one may infer that, if it is true that Zhirinovskii used heavily pseudo-centrist rhetoric in 1990-93 and that this self-positioning of the LDP was widely accepted by the electorate as exemplified by the results of the quoted poll by US-American scholars, any approach to the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' as a whole informed by a comparison with European fascism would be misleading. This understanding of Zhirinovskii and his centrist vocabulary would, for instance, entail

that the presence of 'genuin' fascists in Zhirinovskii's surrounding (Iakushev, Zharikov, Arkhipov, Limonov, Batogov) was incidental or merely instrumental for Zhirinovskii. In view of the Russian electorate's manifest preference of the label 'centrist' to characterize Zhirinovskii, the findings of Part III of this study on fascist tendencies in *Liberal* could be seen as being not essential for an evaluation of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' as a whole.

Yet it should be remarked that some prominent social scientists have actually conceptualized fascism as not an extremist variant of the Right, but as a manifestation of the political Centre, or as being not 'really' right-wing. Seymour M. Lipset, for instance, described the classic (i.e. inter-war) fascist movements as middle-class extremism:

The centre position among the democratic tendencies is usually called liberalism. [...] Fascist ideology, though antiliberal in its glorification of the state, has been similar to liberalism in its opposition to big business, trade unions, and the socialist state. It has also resembled liberalism in its distaste for religion and other forms of traditionalism. And [...] the social characteristics of Nazi voters in pre-Hitler Germany and Austria resembled those of the liberals much more than they did those of the conservatives. (1969, 133)²⁷²

For a Western observer it might be in this context also revealing to recall that, for instance, the major contemporary Dutch crypto-fascist political organizations have chosen to call themselves *Centrum Partij* (later *Centrum Partij '86*) or *Centrumdemocraten* (Griffin 1993, 167; Husbands 1992, 111-125), or that the members of the equally crypto-fascist German *Deutsche Volksunion*, led by Zhirinovskii's political friend Dr. Gerhard Frey, address each other as '*Freiheitliche*' - 'liberals'. The extraordinarily successful Austrian right-wing populist party chaired by the notorious SS-sympathizer Jörg Haider has chosen to call itself *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, i.e. 'Freedom (or:

²⁷² One should remark, however, that Lipset's classification and various other attempts to set fascism apart from the spectrum of radical right-wing politics (e.g. Sternhell 1986; Andreski 1980) have remained isolated. Instead, mainstream fascist theorizing seems to agree that, if 'Right', 'Centre', and 'Left' are to bear any meaning in political analysis, fascist ideology should be classified as being essentially a sub-type of right-wing extremism, rather than of centrism (e.g. Confrancesco 1991; Backes 1989, 186, 259-260, 266; Blinkhorn 1990; Griffin 1993a, 1995a; Copsey 1994, 102; Eatwell 1995b, 11).

Liberal) Party of Austria'.

This means that the misuse of these kinds of labels is not an invention of Zhirinovskii. As has been the case with the Dutch, German and Austrian 'centrists' and 'liberals', Zhirinovskii's 'liberal democracy' or 'centrism' has not prevented him from making statements such as 'Hitler was a successful politician' (FAZ, 16 December 1993, 7), and from outlining at length what, in principle, a good idea the merging of nationalism and socialism into the concept of 'national-socialism' was in Germany, and, indeed, would be for Russia (1993c; I, 11 September 1993).

Regardless, the latter considerations are not meant to provide final conclusions about the appropriateness of the use of the fascist label for the case as a whole. What I meant to suggest was that the emphasis on the existence of quasi- or pseudo-centrist tendencies in Zhirinovskii's speech or actions does not by itself preclude conceptualizations of the more radical traits in the LDPR's pronouncements or behaviour within the terms of the broad paradigm of generic right-wing extremism.

The second major issue inhibiting a clear classification of Zhirinovskii and his party is how to evaluate his weird scheme of a 'going down to the Indian Ocean'.

6.4. *The Last Dash to the South a Mere Propaganda Trick?*

The Last Dash as One Among Several LDP Agendas

In Part III of this study, two or, according to prevailing preferences of distinction, three varieties of fascist ideology have been identified in Zhirinovskii's contributions to *Liberal*: the scheme of an 'advance to the South' which I have chosen to conceptualize as 'revolutionary imperialism', a Russian anti-democratic 'national revolution', and, subsequently, 'White Europe's' rebirth via racial cleansing and unification. The simultaneous presence of *various* concepts of a national palingenesis may, from a certain point of view, look as if weakening the argument put forward there. Yet, ideological eclecticism and syncretism has been observed in many fascist movements before. Actually, these traits have been singled out as an important corollary of the concept of generic fascism (Griffin 1995a, 8).

In view of Zhirinovskii's language in these writings and of the distinctiveness of his vision of

a national new birth as occurring by way of radical territorial expansion, the proof of fascist tendencies in his blueprint of a Southern advance was less simple than in the previously analyzed reprint from *Nation und Europa* in *Liberal* number 1 (11). In the latter article, Zhirinovskii's formulations had come close to synonyms of the terminology Griffin uses in his definition of generic fascism. In fact, it largely resembled well-known Western permutations of neo-fascism. Thus it was, especially in the treatment of the Southern plan and concepts related to this (such as Southern 'nationalism' and the 'civil war' in Russia), that a relatively long-winded procedure of serious discussion and interpretation of these 'irrational' visions had to be employed. In addition, the impression of 'shadow boxing' may have arisen when Zhirinovskii's assurances about the temporality of his authoritarianism, or about the peacefulness of Russia's 'advance to the South' were, first, taken as his word, and then, in the course of extensive arguments, shown as being im- or only partly plausible.

Though somewhat more cryptic, Zhirinovskii's plan of a 'going down to South' represents, nevertheless, in the context of Russian right-wing politics the more original component (Kurashvili 1994, 137), and, as I shall argue, also the more relevant palingenetic vision in his ultra-nationalist thought. When Zhirinovskii mentioned in his talk with Strauß the 'fortress "White Europe"' or the Russian 'national revolution', I got the impression that a part of this rhetoric may have been prompted by Andrei Arkhipov and Sergei Zharikov (Zhirinovskii's then close neo-Nazi assistants with connections to the Western neo-fascist scene), rather than dreamt up by himself. His curious schemes of West European payments for a subjugation of the 'South' (L, no. 2 [12], 1993, 4-5), or for Europe's 'liberation' from 'American and Zionist influence' by Russia (L, no. 8-9, 1992, 7) seem also to indicate that he is not fully aware of some basics of contemporary EU and international affairs. Whether this can be also said concerning Zhirinovskii's plan of an advance to the 'South', has been an issue of contention.

The Last Dash as a Non-Issue

All three major biographers of Zhirinovskii suggested in one way or another that one can dismiss Zhirinovskii's more extremist statements and especially his plan of an 'advance to the Indian Ocean'. Peter Conradi, a journalist, writes in his excellent introduction to the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' that

one should not take too seriously Zhirinovskii's wild statements on foreign policy. Much of what he writes in his *The Last Dash to the South* is pure fantasy which should be rather seen as a rhetoric appeal to loyal party followers than as a catalogue of concrete political aims. (1995, 258)

Vladimir Kartsev, a former colleague of Zhirinovskii at *Mir* Publishers, refers to, among others, *The Last Dash* when he writes

[a]ll this, of course, is utter nonsense, a tweaking of the civilized world's nose intended to arouse controversy and make everyone talk about him. (1995, 5-6)

Although the publicists Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova use - with some reservation - the label 'fascism' to conceptualize the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon', they nevertheless come to the conclusion that Zhirinovskii is 'an entertainer and comedian' (1995, 166) whose 'ideological cynicism' helps him to be

more inventive and resourceful than the true adepts of the nationalist philosophy. He also surpasses them in rhetoric and extremism, not investing his whole heart and soul in either, but only his political ambitions. For [Nikolai] Lysenko [NRPR], [Aleksandr] Sterligov [RNS], [Aleksandr] Barkashëv [RNE], or Dmitrii Vasil'ev, the founder of *Pamiat'* [all four parties are clearly fascist], extremism is an abnormal, pathological, but sincere passion. For Zhirinovskii, however, political convictions are only devices to help him get elected. (1995, 111; name-transliterations adapted).

Alan J. Koman combined an excellent content analysis of several of Zhirinovskii's writings with an insightful historical and political contextualization of the ideas of the LDPR. Although explicitly critical of the dismissive attitude towards Zhirinovskii in the West (1996, 323), Koman comes also to the conclusion that

Zhirinovskii has no firm convictions of his own. He badly wants to be president of Russia, and he thinks that a set of rabidly anti-Islamic foreign policy positions will help him attain power. (1996, 310)

Pointing into a similar direction, Russian-Jewish journalist Evgeniia Al'bats dismissed the 'North-South' idea as having not been developed by Zhirinovskii himself, but adopted from Saddam Hussein during Zhirinovskii's visits in Iraq (1995, 59).²⁷³ Finally, former LDP activist Zharikov and his neo-Nazi fellows (sec. 3.5.) claimed in an issue of *Ataka* (no. 777, N.d., 5) that the tirades about 'washing' something (hands or boots) 'in the Indian Ocean' (in fact simply this phrase) had been in writing firstly pronounced not by Zhirinovskii, but by one of their right-radical colleagues, a certain Iurii Bekhchanov, in February 1990 (Bekhchanov 1990).

Although Zharikov's specification may be correct, the overall picture emerging from the above statements by Conradi, Kartsev, Solovyov and Klepikova, Koman, and Al'bats is misleading. Not only seems the LDP's ideological development outlined in section 4.2. to indicate that the idea of an 'advance to the South' occupied, at least during the time period covered here, an increasingly important role in the overall LDP agenda. A number of revealing details of Zhirinovskii's political biography would also question the assertion that his undisguised obsession with the 'South' is too recent a development to be taken seriously, or is only one among many political preoccupations of Zhirinovskii, or is a mere propagandistic device.

The following argument will be divided into two parts. First, I shall show that foreign matters, international affairs or 'geopolitics' are, in spite of post-Soviet Russia's current weakness, an - if not *the* - central issue in Zhirinovskii's political thinking (and thus in the agenda of his highly synchronized party). Second, I recall and bring up some so far not mentioned evidence on his biography and writings concerning his plan of a 'going down to the Indian Ocean'. Although partly of an anecdotal nature, these particulars suggest that Zhirinovskii's fixation on what he calls the 'South' emerged already before the start of his political career, and seems to have dominated his

²⁷³ Many other authors have, in one way or another, dismissed the substance of Zhirinovskii's agenda as of little, or, at best, only secondary importance (e.g. Yoffe 1994; Kibalnik 1996).

political thinking, at least, until December 1993.

The Salience of International Affairs

Issues of international politics and Soviet-Russian foreign policy were during the period covered here among the - if not *the* - most important, constantly recurring themes in Zhirinovskii's utterances. To start with, Zhirinovskii himself has repeatedly pointed out that 'geopolitics' has been his vocation for a long time (e.g. Zhirinovskii 1996a, 228), and even since he was young (Schirinowskij 1994, 151). Conradi found out that geography was one of Zhirinovskii's favourite subjects in school (1995, 38). When the future LDP-leader studied at the Moscow Oriental Institute in the late 1960s he told his fellow students: 'One day I will be the Chairman of the Council of Ministers or the Minister of Foreign Affairs.' (as quoted in L. Ivanov 1996, 239). A long-term LDP-insider details that when Zhirinovskii communicated to his assistants that he wanted to be alone he used to tell them: 'Do not let anybody in [and] torment me. I have [to deal with] geopolitics.' (as quoted in Orlov 1996, 218) In accordance with this, several observers mentioned Zhirinovskii's visible passion for geographical maps (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 97; Conradi 1995, 152). Zhirinovskii actually described himself as a 'map man' (as quoted in Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 51).

In an August 1990 public round-table discussion on Soviet foreign policy between representatives of several recently established political parties, the eleven participants made 43 more or less long statements. Among the most explicit pronouncements made were those by Zhirinovskii who took the floor eleven times which means that he was more visible a discussant than any other party representative (Pyadyshev 1991, 93-110) He announced, among other things,:

In the event of our party taking part in government, we're going to insist that the office of Foreign Minister be entrusted to a member of the LDP. (as quoted in Pyadyshev 1991, 94)

During this roundtable - i.e. four months after the March 1990 foundation of his party - Zhirinovskii also provided a rationale for this specific claim of his party.

As soon as the Liberal-Democratic Party was founded, we wrote into the foreign policy section of its programme what we are going to seek in the foreign policy sphere in the event of the electorate giving us a mandate to participate in government. (as quoted in Pyadyshev 1991, 100)

In autumn 1990, the notorious Centrist Bloc offered to form a new government in which then popular USSR Deputy and Professor of Law Anatolii Sobchak from Leningrad was, without his knowledge, proposed for the post of Prime-Minister. It should not surprise that no other than Zhirinovskii would, according to the Centrist Bloc, replace Eduard Shevardnadze as the Soviet Union's new Minister of Foreign Affairs (Sobchak 1995, 161).

The first *longer* programme of Zhirinovskii's party of 1991 was, as detailed above (sec. 2.1.), written by an LDP-outsider, the social scientist Andrei Zagorodnikov (I, 14 April 1994). Characteristically, however, this circumstance did, according to Zagorodnikov, not apply to the document's sub-section on 'Priorities of the Foreign Policy of the USSR' which was written by Zhirinovskii himself (*Liberal 'no-demokraticheskaia...* 1991, 48).

One of Zhirinovskii's leaflets on the eve of the presidential elections in June 1991 contains the sober remark that '[w]hat is needed [for the improvement of Russia's socio-economic condition] are long years of constant initiatory work.' Yet, it then goes on:

I at once propose an unusual variant to start the overcoming of the crisis: a drastic change in the direction of USSR foreign policy which will guarantee the import of necessary resources into the country [...]. (PZh, no. 4, 1993, 1; Verkhovskii 1994, 41)²⁷⁴

In 1992, Zhirinovskii's June 1991 presidential elections running mate and notorious impostor Andrei F. Zavidii announced the creation of an 'International Government of Mutual Accord'. Zhirinovskii was identified by Zavidii as the future Foreign Minister in this 'government' (Verkhovskii 1994, 29).

²⁷⁴ Equally, in 1993, the new major LDPR organ *Zhirinovskii's Truth* speaks of the necessity of 'a radical change in Russia's foreign policy' (PZh, no. 7, 1993, 4).

When President Boris El'tsin announced at the Ninth Congress of Peoples Deputies on 26-29 March 1993 that he is ready to include in the government representatives of parties and movements, the LDPR was the first to react on this proposal. The party's Press Service declared at the end of March 1993 that, in connection with El'tsin's suggestion, it proposes Zhirinovskii as candidate for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs (*Partinform*, no. 13 [34], 25-31 March 1993, 5).

After the election of the Fifth State Duma in December 1993, Zhirinovskii struggled for some time hard to become the chairman of the Committee of International Relations (Morrison 1994, 4). Already before this, he had offered himself to Prime-Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as the new Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (*Kommersant*'', no. 12, 22-28 March 1993, 3). When neither of these proposals worked out, a special Committee on Geopolitics (duplicating the already established Committee on International Affairs chaired by the former Russian ambassador at Washington, *IaBLoko*'s Vladimir Lukin) was created on the insistence of Zhirinovskii. Since the creation of the Geopolitics Committee in early 1994, it has been chaired without interruption by LDPR deputies.

A 1994 statement of a leading Russian international affairs expert, Alexei Arbatov, suggests that Zhirinovskii's preoccupation was not without effect.

Foreign policy again captured the [Russian] public eye only after the tragic events in October 1993 [the Ruskoi-Khasbulatov insurrection], and in quite an odd way: through the parliamentary election campaign of radical nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskii. (Arbatov 1994, 58)

Finally, in its concluding section, the principal 1995 LDP manifesto describes the 'liberal democrats' as not seeking confrontation with other parties dealing with economics or agriculture. In distinction to parties specialized on such issues, the LDPR instead represents a political force the specialty of which is 'Russia's geopolitics' - a matter by which the LDP 'strives to organize [the other parties] through a great idea'. The LDP is thus 'the party of the geopolitical orientation and of the organisation of all movements into a single Russian stream.' (*Manifest...* 1995, 6).

The 'South' as a Recurring Issue

It is true that 'the last dash to the South' is only one of several foreign policy themes in Zhirinovskii's nationalist-imperialist speeches and writings. He also voiced territorial claims with regard to, for example, Poland, Finland or Alaska. I do agree with others that much of such expansionist talk can be dismissed as being a peculiar public-relations strategy, or a form of populism. Yet, to subsume the 'last dash' too under such headings as 'Zhirinovskii's demagoguery' or 'Zhirinovskii's canards' could mean throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

The geographic area that Zhirinovskii associates with the term 'the South' is, it should be borne in mind, his professional specialty. A review of some 'Who is Who in Russian Politics' (*Kto est' kto...* 1993; *Vlast'*... 1994 [1995]) reveals that - being a graduate of the prestigious Moscow Institute for Asian and African Countries - Zhirinovskii is, beside Minister of Foreign Affairs Evgenii Primakov, one of the very few Oriental experts in the post-Soviet Russian political establishment. It might be also recalled that Zhirinovskii grew up in Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan. As he himself has rightly pointed out, he had additional opportunities to complement his theoretical expertise with valuable practical experience when he passed an eight-month interpreter-traineeship in Turkey at the end of the sixties, and a two-year military service as an intelligence officer in Georgia in the early seventies (Zhirinovskii 1993a, 45).

Zhirinovskii himself described his book *The Last Dash to the South* as the 'essence of his brain' (1993a, 5). At another point he pointed out that he had started to develop the concept of an 'advance to the South' during his college years (Zhirinovskii 1996a, 236). Zhirinovskii's former colleagues at the law office *Injurkollegiia* (where he worked and was known as an eager discussant of politics in 1975-83) reported that Zhirinovskii's most cherished topic of conversation had been the threat from the 'South'. The Muslims surrounding Russia, would according to the lawyer, soon get the upper hand in the Soviet Union, and drive away the Russians (Conradi 1995, 53). Turkey seems to have been a specific target of Zhirinovskii's denunciations at this time already (Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 76). Although Kartsev, his former colleague at the *Mir* Publishing House (where Zhirinovskii worked between 1983-90), dismissed, as quoted above, Zhirinovskii foreign threats as 'utter nonsense', he reported in the same book that, in *Mir* Publishers, the future LDP-leader stood out for frequently discussing in public and private Soviet nationality policy - especially with regard

to the Central Asian republics (1995, 22).²⁷⁵ Similarly, Conradi who was quoted above as disqualifying the 'last dash' as 'pure fantasy' states, paradoxically, a few lines later that Zhirinovskii's

fixed ideas revolve [...] around the Muslim world and the necessity to 'neutralize' the threat he sees emerging from the South. (1995, 258)

Finally, Koman, who argues that Zhirinovskii's anti-Islamism is a tool to attract voters, also emphasizes the salience of the blueprint of a 'last "dash"':

Most important is that these plans to drastically expand the boundaries of Russia are the *core* of Zhirinovskii's foreign policy. They are not simply more off-the-cuff remarks uttered during interviews in an attempt to grab headlines. The reoccupation of all the CIS republics and the surge to the water's edge in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean would be the twin pillars of Russia's grand strategy should Zhirinovskii become president. In all his writings, no other ideas about foreign relations are given comparable emphasis. (1996, 292; emphasis in original; name-transliteration adapted)

After the December 1993 parliamentary elections, Zhirinovskii's agenda seems to have diversified. Other political and social themes - above all a far more explicit anti-Westernism and especially anti-Americanism - have come to occupy relatively more prominent positions in the overall LDPR agenda.²⁷⁶ As suggested above, the general focus on foreign policy, however, remained, and,

²⁷⁵ In contrast to this, Kartsev observed no signs of anti-Semitism in Zhirinovskii's behaviour during the six years he worked with him. For this reason, the former *Mir* director regards Zhirinovskii's anti-Semitism as merely one variety of the LDPR-leader's populism (Kartsev 1995, 80). For observations and suggestions pointing in the same direction, see Shultz 1993, 35; Solovyov and Klepikova 1995, 111; Conradi 1995, 257; and Kibalnik 1996, 2. In an interview with the journal *Playboy* in March 1995, Zhirinovskii explicitly approved of the idea that Israel and Russia should cooperate in combatting Islamic fundamentalism. Otherwise, '[the Muslims] will destroy Israel and smash Russia to pieces [...]' (as quoted in Koman 1996, 311)

²⁷⁶ Yet, as indicated above, at least between 1990 and 1993, Zhirinovskii's territorial claims to the West had apparently another meaning, than his schemes with regard to the South; and he has sometimes explicitly reassured the West (Lancelle and Frazer 1994, 39; Hirscher and Lange 1994, 14; Conradi 1995, 258; Zupko 1995, 82; Appendix II). In other words, whereas, in the early 1990s, Zhirinovskii's occasional threats to, among others,

in some instances, penetrated even more the LDPR's documents and behaviour (*Manifest...* 1995). In his report to the Sixth LDPR Congress in late summer 1995, Zhirinovskii stated once again: 'The biggest threat to Russia comes [*taitsia*] from the South.' (LDPR, no. 6, 1995, 2) His only longer writing published in English so far, a book called *My Struggle*, is characteristically an extensive outline of the 'last ``dash''' (Zhirinovskii 1996).²⁷⁷

In a major 1996 collection of his most pivotal political articles, indicatively called *Political Classics*, finally, Zhirinovskii summarizes again what kind of role the 'last ``dash''' plays for Russia and the world: it salvages the Russian nation; it protects Russia from partition; it is necessary for the solution of its internal problems; it represents an eternal settlement, it would be the end of separatism, revolutions and perestroikas; it means Russians are safeguarding the world from World War III; it is the world's liberation from wars from the South; it is the warding-off of the Muslim threat; it represents the only alternative to Russia's death and the means for the survival of the whole nation; it is the prevention of war in the future; it is necessary for the Northern regions which have otherwise no ecological and economic future; it means well-deserved warm climate for Russians and safety for small nationalities; it is Russia's destiny and deed which has to be done because Russia has no other choice; it is the logical completion of the formation of the Russian empire; and it is the historically predetermined future of Russia, its prospect for the 21st century (Zhirinovskii 1996a, 236-238, 240-245).

The Rationale and Purpose of the Dissertation's Final Argumentations

The next but one large argument of this study, Chapter 8., will develop some further tentative hypotheses concerning the essence and relevance of the Zhirinovskii Phenomenon. In doing so, it will be devoted to the question of how far one can combine and reformulate in a coherent way both of the above mentioned opposite interpretations of Zhirinovskii's thinking. Namely: Was Zhirinovskii

Finland or Alaska seemed to represent rather rhetorical flourish, his frequent and far more elaborate references to the 'South' indicate that this geographical area represented the major issue in his 'geopolitical' thought.

²⁷⁷ *My Struggle* (Zhirinovskii 1996) is essentially a translation of the *The Last Dash to the South*. It was, however, carefully edited in a way to make it somewhat less explicitly expansionist and aggressive than the original blueprints Zhirinovskii had developed in *Liberal* (nos. 4-5, 1992 through 3 [13], 1993), and the first edition of *Poslednii brodok na iug* (1993a).

a cool-headed fascist tactician with a clear ideology and strategy in his mind from the beginning of his political career? Or: Was and is he merely a right-wing populist whose behaviour indicates that no well-defined political idea informed his actions?

The latter interpretation has been already partly rejected in the above argument about the profoundness of Zhirinovskii's 'last dash to the South' to this political outlook. Yet, it is still unclear how this argument can be reconciled with Zhirinovskii's media clownerie, scandalous behaviour, mafia ties, and ideological cynicism. Thus Chapter 8 will argue that both of the above, seemingly incompatible interpretations are to some degree true, and that a merger of their valid assumptions can be conducive to putting the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' in a comparative framework. Chapter 8 will argue that the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' and Zhirinovskii himself went through a process of ideological evolution between 1990 and 1993. The Zhirinovskii and the LDP of 1993 were different from the Zhirinovskii and the LDP of 1990. On the other hand, though, they were and are also path-dependent. That means Zhirinovskii and the LDP have changed themselves. Yet, at the same time, they are burdened, and their post-1993 behavior will continue to be conditioned by, the image and behavioural patterns they had developed *before* the December 1993 State Duma elections.

The argument of Chapter 8 will imply that the application of the concept of fascism is a heuristically useful endeavour - not only with regard to some selected writings by Zhirinovskii, but also with regard to the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' as a whole. That means that further holistic, multi-variate comparisons of the LDP with non-Russian inter-war and post-war fascism should - because both are driven by permutations of a common genus of ideology - be to some extent revealing and informative. The question arises of how *politically* - as distinct from scholarly - relevant such comparisons would be.

The question of the political relevance of this study has already been shortly dealt with in section 5.2. of Part III where I argued that an elaborate distinction between fascist and non-fascist right-wing extremist ideologies might not be a very informative operation with regard to a political evaluation of post-war *West* European right-wing extremist parties, but is of relevance in *East* European transitional politics, and especially under the post-Soviet Russian conditions. That is because the external constraints to a hypothetical implementation of agendas of ideologically driven, fanatical movements are lower in Eastern Europe, and much lower in Russia. Post-Soviet Russia is

to a lesser degree than the contemporary Western states technologically, economically, politically and culturally integrated with the outside world.

I argued that, even if Le Pen, Haider or Fini became the leaders of their nations, it might not terribly matter whether they are fascists or merely right-wing populists. Even if they manage to assume a post like president or prime-minister of their respective country, they would, apart from massive resistance in- and outside their countries, encounter a densely structured political and social environment and multifarious dependencies from other states, international organizations, and other foreign actors (such as multinational corporations, international civil society, etc.). This would leave them only limited room for manouver. To be sure, nationalism would be high on the agenda. Yet, even an attempt to implement a social and ethical revolution - i.e. a fascist agenda - would be out of question in any way.

I argued that this cannot be said of Russia. In Russia, it may, as in the case of inter-war Europe, indeed matter whether a possible future Russian right-wing president would be a populist, ultra-conservative, or fascist. A disturbingly topical illustration of this issue is that it would have mattered a lot whether Serbia's future President would have been either a nationalist, authoritarian proxy of Rump Yugoslavia's President Slobodan Milosevic, or the leader of the clearly fascist Radical Serbian Party, Vojislav Seselj. Recently, Seselj's rise to the post of President of Serbia was merely halted in the last minute because voter-turnout in the final round of the elections was 1% or 2% below the minimum. In simple words, there are different degrees of evil, and in some cases one might want to know which sort exactly one gets.

A principal question logically preceding the issue of what exactly the prevalent ideology of an anti-democratic take-over would be, is the issue whether a substantial democratic decline or even breakdown can be excluded, seen as possible, or regarded as probable. Thus the above considerations concerning the relevance of the outlooks of some West European right-wing politicians are in so far by themselves irrelevant as, except for the case of Haider, the success of these politicians seems to be relatively improbable. In the case of Russia or Serbia, the questions of ideology and democratic breakdown are, in contrast, both relevant, and closely connected in that the specific kind and conditions of a certain breakdown could favour some anti-democratic movements more than others.

Thus I shall, before making some final suggestions on how to interpret the 'Zhirinovskii

phenomenon' as a whole, outline the rationale for doing so. Namely, I will compare some selected aspects of the institutional setting of post-Soviet Russia with 'Weimar Germany'. Among the inter-war democratic breakdowns which led to ultra-right take-overs involving a substantial fascist section, the German case seems to be for two reasons the most suitable one for comparison. First, Germany was the relatively most developed - i.e. culturally most modern, and most urbanized, secularized and industrialized - country to get a new anti-democratic government with fascist participation after World War I. Second, Germany remained the only country where the fascist section of the ultra-right coalition was largely successful in its intra-governmental power-struggle against its other right-wing extremist allies and against established elites and institutions. Also, in Germany, the fascist section of the ultra-right coalition assumed wide control without the intervention of a foreign fascist power as has been the case with Nazi Germany's installment of the Hungarian Arrow Cross, Croatian Ustashi and North Italian Salo Socialist Republic regimes.

The only other case to be of interest in that regard would be Italy. Yet, first, when Mussolini was appointed Prime-Minister in 1922, Italy was in many regards still a traditional country with a, paradoxically, still poorly defined national identity. Second, during his 20-year rule, Mussolini never managed to assume the amount of power Hitler had already secured by the mid-1930s. The Italian monarchy as well as the Vatican were among several politically relevant forces which largely preserved their influential position in Italian society despite Mussolini's talk about a '*stato totalitario*' - an idea he came, as indicated, only close to realizing under German tutelage in the short-lived Socialist Salo Republic of 1943.

Thus the below extensive comparison between post-Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany in Chapter 7 has been put before my concluding hypotheses on Zhirinovskii in Chapter 8. The comparison of post-Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany is meant to suggest the relevance and usefulness of this study in general. Above all, it is meant to imply the purposefulness of an engaging in the development of elaborate explanatory hypotheses for the peculiarity of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' in the concluding Chapter 8. The rationale of this argument is that, before trying to make sense of the idiosyncrasies of contemporary Russian right-wing extremism, it seems, in view of the plain craziness of many of its ideas, necessary to establish shortly why exactly such a scrutiny would be justified. Therefore, in the following chapter, I will assume that my concluding hypotheses

that Zhirinovskii has become a fascist leader and that the LDPR has become a fascist party by 1993 are true. Proceeding from this assumption, this chapter will argue that scrutinizing the LDPR's agenda and relevance seems, in view of some similarities between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia, an altogether worthwhile endeavour.

7. 'Weimar Russia': Misleading Catch-Phrase or Pertinent Metaphor?

7.1. Introduction

The Purpose of the Chapter

The aim of this chapter is to make some suggestions on how far the socio-economic conditions and international, and non-social environment (geography, technology) of post-World War I Germany's and post-Soviet Russia's societies resemble each other. Depending on the degree of similarity of some crucial indicators, the question shall be answered whether the metaphor 'Weimar Russia' is appropriate and informative, or irrelevant and misleading. The suggestions should not only be based on some formal qualitative comparisons between the particular conditions of Germany between 1918 and 1933, and Russia since 1991. It should also be tried to consider in some detail the different social-institutional and international configurations in which both societies are embedded.²⁷⁸ On the basis of such a contextualization of the data it should be shown how (a) similar factors had or have different effects in different contexts, and (b) how different factors had or have similar effects in different contexts.

In this section, I focus only on *some* social, economic, cultural, political and institutional

²⁷⁸ For the sake of simplifying the language of the outline, I frequently treat Weimar Germany here as if it were a present state and social system, i.e. by using the present tense. The temporal distance between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia is, of course, one of the major problems of this comparison. It will be dealt with shortly at some points below.

Another simplification is that I do not distinguish here between the first Russian republic from August 1991 til October 93, and the second Russian republic from December 1993 til today. This would further complicate the already rather complex comparisons.

patterns of Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia. Other important factors not touched upon here are the state of civil society, ideological traditions, the military, psychological and psychopathological issues (for instance, with regard to the 'generation of the trenches') or the middle class. These aspects and some other traits will not be dealt with here, above all, for reasons of space. Especially with regard to the impact of war on societies and of combat experience on the human psyche, one could argue that the below comparison is actually fundamentally incomplete. Yet, as far as I do not feel qualified to engage here in a comprehensive psycho-analytical argument involving a comparison of the impact of the World War I experience on German society with the impact of the Afghanistan, Tadzhikistan and Chechnia experience on Russian society, I shall refrain from developing hypotheses in this regard. Such a comparison though would have to be added to make my below conclusions more comprehensive.

The Chapter's Focus and Omissions

Whereas psycho-pathological factors are excluded mainly for reasons of saving space and lacking competence, I deliberately exclude here for methodological reasons a comparison of the German and Russian histories of modern right-wing extremist ideas and their sources and precursors. That might be in so far seen as counter-productive as one worth-mentioning similarity between Germany and Russia are the multifariousness of the fundamentalist anti-liberalism, and presence of a peculiarly disguised anti-egalitarianism and anti-democratism in their intellectual traditions. In other words, one argument in favor of the 'Weimar Russia' metaphor would be that there is a Russian equivalent to the much-quoted *Sonderweg* characteristic in German thought and politics. Whereas modern German nationalism was peculiar for its *völkisch* traits, biological racism, and eliminationist anti-semitism, Russian nationalism was and is characterized by an extraordinary messianism and chiliasm. This characteristic can be conceived as setting Russian nationalism in an equal way apart from other nationalisms as the mentioned peculiar *völkisch*, racist and anti-semitic traits did in the case of Germany.

However, in the following argument, I shall for two reasons avoid this highly complex issue and instead concentrate on situational and socio-economic resemblances between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia. Such a limitation seems to be useful not only because of limitations of space.

First, I shall avoid this issue in order to avoid an ethically problematic speculation. We have only known for sure that the German *Sonderweg* was a really distinct 'special path' since Auschwitz. Stalinism's victims were even more numerous. Yet, there is no proper Russian equivalent for the *Endlösung* and the *Vernichtungslager* although, during Stalin's last years, there were indications that something similar might have been in the waiting. Yet, as far as a similarly systematic, ideologically thoroughly rationalized, industrialized and technologically and administratively sophisticated human extermination program never materialized in Russia, the question of whether Russian nationalism is really in a similarly way peculiar would seem to remain ultimately open. The whole issue is, moreover, complicated by the fact that Hitler, fortunately, did not have at his disposal weapons of mass destruction whereas a Russian fascist president would presumably have such weapons under his (much less probable: her) control.

The second reason why an extensive comparative inquiry into Russian and German thought is not necessary here is that I am inquiring here the possibility of fascism in power *in general*, and not the probability of whether a Russian fascist regime would be equivalent to Nazism or not. That means what is of interest here is simply whether a breakdown of democracy is possible, whether the conditions of this breakdown can be seen as similarly grave as in pre-fascist Germany, and whether this indicates a general fascist threat or not. Thus, in this chapter I am assuming that Zhirinovskii and his party should be classified as fascist, and I am interested in the question whether, in view of this assumption, a fascist takeover is possible. Actually, if one excluded the possibility of a return of the communists to power and assumed that Zhirinovskii would be the politician who would benefit most from an enduring decline of Russian democracy, I would not even be interested in a fascist takeover specifically. The issue would merely be the possibility of a durable and not only transitional breakdown of democracy in a relatively modern state. That a fascist grouping would benefit from such a breakdown is implied in the assumption already. What exactly would come after such breakdown and what a possible rise of Russian fascism to crucial power positions could mean, would indeed suggest a comparison between Nazi and Russian fascist thought. Yet, this is another question. I am not interested here in possible scenarios for a non-democratic re-equilibration in Russia, but in process and possible course of breakdown *preceding* such a re-equilibration.

In view of the above methodologically argued deliberate narrowing of the focus of Chapter

7, I have chosen to rely here on only one specific kind of interpretation of Weimar Germany. This is the excellent book by the late Detlev Peukert called *The Weimar Republic* (1987). Peukert, however, nearly exclusively explains Weimar's breakdown in terms of socio-economic and situational-cultural characteristics, and does not pay much attention to the idiosyncracies of historic German thought and nationalism. Peukert - too easily probably - largely discounts in his book the *Sonderweg* argument. For the purpose of this particular inquiry this omission is, however, because of the above mentioned reasons, not as significant a hindrance as it would be in the context of other comparative inquiries using the case of German fascism as a point of departure.

The Limits of Comparing Economic Data

Further simplifications will be made because a formal, detailed comparison of some individual traits between the two cases does not tell very much. If one, for instance, saw some economic data, and the magnitude of Germany's economic depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s as crucial indicators that Weimar was bound to fall, than the conclusion would be that Russian democracy should have collapsed some time around 1995 or 1996 because Russia had by then experienced a similarly long and qualitatively comparable economic crisis as Weimar Germany. Given the fact that Russia's sharp social and economic downturn (yet not massive discharges of workers) started in early and mid-1992, it would be neither conceivable that, already in autumn 1993, Russian democracy was, for a short moment, on the verge of destruction, nor explainable why Russian electoral democracy still exists in autumn 1997. Thus comparing singular traits does not tell very much. Instead, the comparison has to be configurative and scrutinize the degree of similarity in the *combination* of various democracy-undermining factors.

In addition, I will be also reductionist in that I follow causal chains only in some cases back towards some sort of 'root'. Thus, I am, for instance, only considering some selected causes of Weimar Germany's economic crisis. It is not the economic depression per se but the specific effects it had on society which I am interested in. If, as it seems to be the case in Russia, economic dislocations are caused by some markedly different factors than in Weimar Germany, this would be only in so far of interest as the effects of the resulting economic decline on society would be different from the effects of an economic decline without such specifically different factors.

Thus comparing concrete statistical data, or listing individual traits of Weimar Germany and checking whether they are present in Russia is only useful to a limited extent. What seems to be the most promising approach is (a) to detect some broader patterns, deeper structural defects, and their causes, (b) to hypothesize what the mechanisms of the multiple conjunctural causation processes leading to the fall of Weimar Germany were, and (c) to try to make a holistic comparison with post-Soviet Russia in order to find out whether processes with similar effects (yet, perhaps different causal configurations) might be going on there.²⁷⁹

The Chapter's Structure

This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 7.2., I outline a fundamental similarity between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia - the relative likeness of their political party spectra. The establishment of this generic quality serves as the basis for further going comparisons. In section 7.3., I first propose a holistic interpretation of the roots of the crisis of Weimar Germany, and focus in doing so on the issue of simultaneity of problems, and on institutions and elites. Then I explicate how the more fundamental defects played out in some selected social spheres, and what other factors contributed to the deepening of the crisis. In doing so I deal in some detail with the rise of German nationalism, demographic developments, the disillusionment with radical modernism, the failure of the welfare state, the agricultural crisis, the characteristics of some political institutions, and with some general traits of the economic depression and its effects on society. In section 7.4., I first relate the holistic argument about simultaneity, institutional disequilibria, and the continuity of elites to the Russian case, and come to the conclusion that some basic similarities are indeed observable. In the second part of section 7.4., I then shortly go over the social spheres mentioned above and list some similarities and dissimilarities between the values the investigated variables took in both societies.

In the concluding section 7.5., finally, I summarize the argument, and then deal with the more fundamental question of whether comparing across such different time-periods is justified. I conclude that the values of a number of crucial environmental variables - above all a more pro-democratic world culture or *Zeitgeist* - which make fascism less probable today are indeed different

²⁷⁹ On holistic-multivariate, case-oriented comparison, see Ragin 1987.

than they were in the inter-war period. However, the character of today politics is radically different not only with regard to the salience of democracy. It is also disparate with regard to other issue dimensions such as ecology and other transnational issues, and the North-South divide which can be seen as potentially problematic for a democratic consolidation in Russia. Thus, I conclude, too many variables have changed too dramatically to allow for an easy dismissal of a right-wing extremist threat from the outset.

7.2. Controlling for Politics: Important Similarities in the Party Spectra, Intellectual Discourses, and Organizational Resources of Inter-War Germany and Post-Soviet Russia

The starting point of every comparison between two or more objects is the identification of some basic similarity or similarities between these objects. Apples and oranges can be compared on the basis that both are fruits. In contrast, to compare oranges with computer soft-ware is less easy because establishing the generic quality or condition characteristic of both, oranges and computer soft-ware, would be more difficult.

As I shall argue in detail in this section 7.1., the most important characteristic of the social and institutional structure common to both, Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia, is the presence of a large spectrum of well-organized political forces which either are only semi-loyal - some even merely pseudo-loyal - to democracy, on the one side, or are fundamentally anti-democratic and disloyal, on the other side (Linz 1978). In both the Russian and German case, moreover, these semi-loyal forces, on the one side, and disloyal forces, on the other side, have political leverage through more or less heavy presence in important political institutions, and through additional informal connections to power-holders in all branches of government. The Russian-German similarity goes further in that in both cases there is an important right-wing extremist segment that can be conceptualized as fascist, and there is a multifarious and institutionalized ultra-nationalist sub-culture. Finally, anti-democratic para-military groups - of different scope though - are present in both cases.

7.2.1. Political Parties

The major parties involved and cooperating in the bringing down the Weimar Republic were right-wing: the originally moderately conservative Catholic Centre Party, the clearly ultra-conservative, reactionary *Deutschnationale Volkspartei* DNVP (German National People's Party), and Hitler's *National-Sozialistische Arbeiter Partei* NSDAP (National-Socialist Workers Party). These parties were, in contrast to the German Communist Party, in so far *directly* implicated in the breakdown of the Weimar democracy in that they provided the crucial personell which initiated, carried out, and completed the gradual transmutation of Weimar's semi-presidential regime into a pseudo-presidential, de facto authoritarian regime, and finally pre-totalitarian regime in approximately 1930-1933.²⁸⁰ The initially moderate Centre Party put forward the conservative authoritarian Reichs-Chancellor Brüning (1930-1932), and the non-Nazi, yet still fascist Reichs-Chancellor von Papen (1932) who later even became Hitler's Vice-Chancellor (1933-34). Both of them more or less openly rejected the Weimar compromise. The ultra-conservative, even more explicitly anti-Weimar DNVP supported Reichs-President Hindenburg (1925-34) and sent, among others, its chairman Hugenberg into Hitler's first cabinet as Minister of Economics (1933) (Rees 1990, 289, 191; Peukert 1993). The NSDAP destroyed finally the already heavily eroded democratic institutions of the Weimar Republic in the first half of 1933. It was this collusion of German ultra-conservative, non-Nazi fascist, and Nazi right-wing extremist forces - as well as their allies - which, above all, purposefully undermined the Weimar constitution (although they were assisted in this by the qually anti-Weimar communists, and incompetent social-democrats and liberals).

There are no obvious semantic equivalents to these Weimar German parties in post-Soviet Russia with the partial exception of the Centre Party. However, considering the different historical backgrounds of Weimar and post-Soviet Russia, one can easily detect a partly similar configuration of anti-democratic political players. Somewhat revealing is, to begin with, that a major anti-democratic nationalist politician, former Russian Vice-President and today Governor of Kursk Oblast

²⁸⁰ For a useful typology distinguishing between presidentialism proper (i.e. democratic) and various forms of transmuted quasi- or pseudo-presidentialisms, see Riggs 1994.

Aleksandr Rutskoi, does also come from a coalition of political groupings which explicitly presented themselves as 'centrist': the Civic Union. Reminding von Papen's expulsion from the Centre Party because of his increasing closeness to Hitler in the early 1930s, Rutskoi's ostensibly social-democratic People's Party 'Free Russia' and other 'centrist' groups gradually distanced themselves from their major leader, Aleksandr Rutskoi, during his rapprochement with the ultra-nationalist National Salvation Front during 1993. Somewhat similar cases in point are the former Chair of the Russian Constitutional Court, Valerii Zorkin, and the former Speaker of the Congress of People's Deputies, Ruslan Khasbulatov. Both had, in 1990-92, been initially centrist or even pro-democratic political figures. Yet, they openly colluded with the extreme right during summer-autumn 1993 as exemplified by their contributions to the major ultra-nationalist weekly *Den* 'in summer 1993, and support of the 1993 October mutiny.

An equally comparable set of cases would seem to be the DNVP, on the one side, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, on the other. Both can be seen as representing, in their particular contexts, ultra-conservative parties with firm foundations in their countries' pre-democratic past, i.e. Wilhelmine Germany or Soviet Russia. Both have comprehensive ideologies which represent not only apologies for the largely discredited pre-democratic past, but also constitute arguments that their countries non-democratic and anti-Western experience provides guidance for the future.²⁸¹ In view of this, not only these parties' significance, function and location in the political spectrum, but also the public image, role, behaviour and outlooks of some of their leading representatives are in some respect similar. For instance, as outlined in Part I of the dissertation, Anatolii Lukianov (associated largely with the CPRF) had and has contacts with the LDPR and other ultra-nationalists. His status and importance for the extreme Right as a whole somewhat reminds the position of Hindenburg, and his representativeness of the old Wilhelmine regime and willingness to adopt Hitler in January 1933. During the 1996 presidential election campaign there were reports about contacts between Ziuganov and Zhirinovskii concerning a possible cooperation. In contrast to the DNVP-

²⁸¹ The novel orientation towards an alternative future is an aspect which is even more developed in Ziuganov's civilizational messianism and reformulation of the so called Russian Idea than in the DNVP's insistence on the particularity of the German authoritarian experience. See Ziuganov 1993 and 1995; as well as Vujacic 1996 and Scanlan 1996.

NSDAP collusion and DNVP-chairman Hugenberg's short-term joining of Hitler's cabinet in 1933, the CPRF-LDPR alliance has not materialized so far.

A further resemblance has been the attempts in both Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia to build up right-wing extremist umbrella organizations which would coordinate the activities of the ideologically diverse anti-democrats. The Russian, ultimately largely unsuccessful endeavours to create equivalents of Weimar's *Harzburger Front* include Aleksandr Sterligov's Russian National Assembly (introduced in section 0.2. of the Introduction), the *Nashi* (Ours) Movement of St. Petersburg (introduced in section 3.3.), the National Salvation Front, and most recently the National-Patriotic Union of Russia which supported Ziuganov in the 1996 elections campaigns.

As indicated above, in the framework of this section, I will regard the LDPR as a fascist - i.e. revolutionary ultra-nationalist - party, and thus as playing a role similar to that of the NSDAP in Weimar Germany. Although there are only little reminiscences of the *völkisch*, biologically racist, and eliminationist anti-semitic agenda of the NSDAP in the LDP ideology, Zhirinovskii's 'last dash to the South' is here seen as representing an adequate Russian equivalent to the Nazi program. As indicated above, Zhirinovskii's plan of a Russian advance to the Indian Ocean and his primary concern about 'Southerners' (rather than Jews) are seen as not just different and weird ideas. Reminding the origins of Nazi ideology in the German history of ideas, Zhirinovskii's ideas are firmly rooted in (a) 19th and 20th century Russian ultra-nationalist thought (e.g. Dostoevskii, Tiutchev, Eurasianism), in (b) the important imperialist-expansionist tendencies of Tsarist and Soviet Russian policies, and, moreover, in (c) some real security dilemmas which Russia will presumably face on its southern frontiers in the 21st century (above all Islamic fundamentalism, and, possibly, non-democratic Pan-Turkism).²⁸² Apart from this, Zhirinovskii can be put closer to Hitler by considering that there are number of neo-Nazis (Aleksandr Batogov, Iurii Kuznetsov, Valentin Prussakov) or apparent sympathizers of Nazism (General Filatov, Andrei Arkhipov) around him. Also, since 1992, he has close contacts with the German crypto-fascist micro-party *Deutsche Volksumion* (German People's Union). In addition, he has shown

²⁸² In so far as Hitler's fantasies about a world-wide Jewish-Masonic plot or his *Lebensraum* (living space) ideology lack the topicality and groundedness in some real dilemmas of Zhirinovskii's 'last dash to the South', one may (perhaps somewhat counterintuitively) regard Zhirinovskii as a more 'serious' politician than Hitler who was, in many regards, a mere psychopath (Waite 1993).

an obsession with the acquisition of new territories and with 'geopolitics' which is similar to Hitler's fantasies about a new *Lebensraum* (living space) for the Germans. Last but not least, some characteristics of the NSDAP and the LDPR structure and composition are notably similar: *Führer* principle, high centralization, over-representation of white-collar workers and middle class members, heavy over-representation of men, and a high percentage of young activists and members (Peukert 1993, 238-239).

Finally, in both cases, the anti-democratic parties have resourceful allies and sponsors in the economy, above all in the military-industrial complexes, but also in other sections (such as agriculture or banking) including big and small business.

7.2.2. Right-Wing Extremist Contaminations of the Democratic Regimes

One can distinguish between, on the one side, direct representation of right-wing extremist forces, and, on the other side, influence or potential allies of these forces in the two democratic regimes.

The most prominent similarity is the heavy presence of anti-democratic forces in both, the Reichstag and in the Congress of People's Deputies and, later, the State Duma. However, an interesting difference seems to be that, in Germany, the explicitly anti-democratic forces (NSDAP, DNVP, KPD) only started to dominate parliament when the gradual hollowing out of the Weimar institutions began with Brüning's chancellorship in 1930. In Russia, in contrast, the explicitly anti-democratic groupings (Communists, LDPR, various factions led by ultra-nationalist Sergei Baburin) and their allies (Agrarians, part of the industrialists) were (with the exception of the LDPR) already strong in the Congress of People's Deputies, and the 5th State Duma (1993-95), and became dominant in the Sixth State Duma elected in December 1995. In spite of continuous anti-democratic preponderance in the lower house of the Russian parliament, the nascent Russian democracy has survived so far. An important intervening variable might be that there has been no proper Russian equivalent for Chancellor Brüning or President Hindenburg. Russia's proto-democratic institutions had been, to be sure, actively undermined by non- or semi-loyal political forces under the leadership of Speaker Khasbulatov and Vice-President Rutskoi in 1992-93. Yet, in December 1993, there was

a considerable up-dating, reconfiguration and re-equilibration of democratic institutions which has proved to be successful so far.

Nevertheless, more or less clearly non-loyal political figures and potential allies of a hypothetical ultra-nationalist Russian president can also be found in the post-1995 executive branch of power on both, the federal and regional level. These figures include: former Minister of CIS Affairs and today Kemerovo Region Governor Tuleev, Minister of Justice Kovalev, Minister of Nuclear Energy Mikhailov, Minister of Interior Kulikov, President of Tatarstan Shaimiev (who officially supported the August 1991 putsch), and the Governors Mikhailov (LDPR, Pskov), Rutskoi (Great Power Movement, Kursk) or Starodubtsev (Agrarian Party, Tula). Semi-loyal actors in the executive branch include Minister of Foreign Affairs Primakov, many Governors and Presidents of autonomous Republics, and virtually all security and military agencies (some of which should be actually rather classified as in their majority disloyal). In addition, above mentioned disloyal former Head of the pre-1993 Constitutional Court Valerii Zorkin has remained a judge at the post-1993 Constitutional Court. It is not unlikely that most of these actors would cooperate with a non-democratic regime. Presumably a number of them would actually prefer such a regime - a condition seemingly roughly similar to that of Weimar Germany.

7.2.3. Ultra-Nationalist 'Social Capital'

A further important resemblance between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia are the significance of ultra-nationalist themes in intellectual discourse, the strength and diversity of an anti-democratic (non-) 'civil society', and the large amount of right-wing extremist media.

In Weimar Germany, among the most important intellectual currents undermining democracy where the so called 'conservative revolution', radical anti-Semitism, racism, National Bolshevism and social Darwinism. These currents, in turn, were partly based on, or congruent with, pre-Weimar anti-democratic intellectual movements such as reactionary monarchism, radically anti-equalitarian elitist ideas (Nietzsche), *völkisch* and vitalistic thought, or the imperialist ideas which inspired Wilhelmine Germany's foreign policy. Prominent intellectuals or cultural figures who made in one way or another a contribution to the fall of Weimar included notably Ernst Jünger and Stefan George, two of the

most important literary figures of 20th century Germany, the leading political and legal theorist Carl Schmitt ('What the *Führer* says is law.'), and the probably most important 20th century German philosopher Martin Heidegger, one-time rector of Heidelberg University. Institutional strongholds of anti-democratism included - apart from ultra-nationalist political parties and their newspaper editorial boards - the various irredentist Germanism associations, the 'conservative revolutionary' journal *Die Tat* (Action), the *Ostforschung* (East European studies) approach in social sciences, student fraternities, the *Berliner Herrenclub* (Berlin Gentlemen's Club), the Hugenberg press and film empire - to name but a few.

In post-Soviet Russia, a comparatively well-developed anti-democratic civil society seems to gain increasing influence in society and political potential. These forces have, as in the case of Weimar, a number of historic (i.e. Soviet and pre-1917) intellectual precursors on whom to draw such as Slavophilism, pan-Slavism, anti-Semitism, Eurasianism, National Bolshevism, Stalinism, the ultra-nationalist village prose, or Soviet 'Zionology' (Korey 1995; Reznik 1996). Among prominent intellectual figures who have explicitly supported extremely right-wing political forces since 1991 are the popular village prose writers, Valentin Rasputin and Vasilii Belov, or the renowned mathematician and publicist, Academician Igor Shafarevich. A further case is the late Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladoga, Ioann, the former number two in the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, who had been developing a (pseudo-) Christian-Orthodox fundamentalist ethno-centrist ideology until he died in 1994. The major right-wing extremist think-tanks include the 'conservative revolutionary' - i.e. fascist - Center for Special Metastrategic Studies (Aleksandr Dugin), the Association for the Complex Study of the Russian Nation (Nikolai Troitskii), the 'Spiritual Heritage' Foundation (Aleksei Podberezkin, a major advisor to Ziuganov), the Center for Experimental Studies (Sergei Kurgian), as well as several strongly nationalistic academic institutions such as the Moscow Institute for Slavic and Balkan Studies. Apart from the many federal level and regional communist and LDPR newspapers, major right-wing publication organs are the daily *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, the weekly right-wing extremist *Zavtra* (formerly: *Den*), the monthly ultra-nationalist 'thick journals' which were inherited from the Soviet Union, such as *Nash sovremennik*, *Molodaia gvardiia* and *Moskva*, and some new publications such as Dugin's irregular 'conservative revolutionary' *Elementy: Evraziiskoe obozrenie*, Eduard Limonov's and Aleksandr Dugin's *Limonka* (The Lemon) or Kurginian's *Rossiia*

XXI (Russia in the 21st Century).

A part of the ultra-nationalist civil society and publications are financed by large industrial and financial conglomerates such as the above mentioned (sec. 2.3.) Andrei Zavidia's combine *Galand* or the important *Inkombank* both of which have been accused of being creatures of the finance department of the former CPSU.

7.2.4. Para-Military Organizations

The final important characteristic of political life in Weimar Germany was the flourishing of para-military and war veteran organizations - some of them explicitly tied to political parties, and others not. The latter type included above all the so called *Freikorps* (Free Corps), ultra-nationalist militias which were formed after World War I and used by right-wing extremist politicians for their suppression of the Left. The major veteran organization was the *Stahlhelm* which was supported and financed by Mussolini in the 1920s. The most important para-military organizations of the late 1920s and early 1930s were those tied to parties: above all the NSDAP's *Sturmabteilung* or SA (Storm Troopers), but also the SPD's *Reichsbanner* (Imperial Flag), and the KPD's *Rotfront* (Red Front).

As in the case of the political parties, and the entrenchment of ultra-nationalism in state institutions and civil society, post-Soviet Russia has no *direct* semantic equivalents to Weimar Germany's para-military groups. Yet, there are some notable organizations which could easily assume similar roles as those of the *Freikorps*, *Stahlhelm* and *Sturmabteilungen*. Above all this concerns the clearly militaristic Cossak movement, a large part of which seems to be, at best, semiloyal to the democratic regime. Disturbingly, there are serious plans, such as those of Security Council Deputy Secretary Boris Berezovskii (oddly a Jew), to officially arm these troops. President El'tsin wants to integrate them into state structures, a process which has in some southern regions of Russia started already. This appears odd in view of, for instance, a recent announcement of the Terek Cossaks that they have chosen to officially support Aleksandr Barkashov's Russian National Unity, a clearly neo-Nazi party which openly uses Nazis symbols such as the swastika and the Hitler salute. Russian National Unity which mainly consists of young men, in turn, is by itself an important hybrid political party and para-military organization which trains its *soratniki* ('comrades') militarily, and has

branches all over Russia. Also there have been reports that other anti-democratic parties are building up para-military troops such as the communist *Krasnye druzhiny* (Red Troopers), the LDPR *Sokoly* (Falcons) or the *Natsional'ny legion* (National Legion) of the fascist National-Republican Party led by former State Duma deputy Nikolai Lysenko (sec. 0.3.). Finally, there are several Afghanistan war veteran organizations which have, however, not become politically active so far. Probably, Chechnya war veteran organizations will emerge as well.

7.2.5. Conclusions

The crucial inference to be drawn from this comparison is that Russia's fragile, unconsolidated democratic regime is operating under political conditions some which are in some regards indeed relatively similar or equivalent to those of Weimar Germany. The ideological-organizational features of the anti-democratic opposition are comparatively more reminiscent of inter-war Germany, than of other democracies which have broken down after periods of unsuccessful post-transitional democratic consolidation, or of long-term institutional decline (Latin America, Africa). The organizational characteristics and scope, as well as ideological orientations of right-wing extremist forces in Russia is markedly different from those of, for instance, the Ukraine, Belarus, Albania, the countries of Central Asia, or Serbia - i.e. other post-communist countries which have not managed to democratize, have stopped half-way through in their democratization, returned to an authoritarian equilibrium, or are threatened by unrest, instability and reversal of democratic achievements. Although anti-democratic post-communists and nationalists are also prominent in Ukrainian politics, none of these groupings (except for the neo-fascist, yet so far marginal *UNA-UNSO* [Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian People's Self Defense]) provide comprehensive ideological frameworks for embarking on an alternative civilizational path. Equally, the pseudo-presidentialist dictators of Belarus and Albania, Lukashenka and Berisha, have come to power through anti-establishment campaigns and without any sophisticated ideologized and organized mass movements behind them. The dictators of Central Asia (except for Kirgiztan) have simply transformed pseudo-communist patriarchal and semi-feudal clan-rule into nationalist-charismatic pseudo-presidentialist and pseudo-democratic clan-rule. The configuration of political forces in Serbia - above all the resemblances between the nationalist-turned

communists Milosevic and Ziuganov, and the fascists Vojslav Seselj and Vladimir Zhirinovskii - comes perhaps closest to that of Russia. However, a crucial difference seems to be that Serbia has so far experienced considerably less serious advances in democratization than Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia. Perhaps, in connection with this, Milosevic's Serbian Socialist Party has not gone through an ideological-organizational purgation, consolidation and revision process comparable to that of Ziuganov's CPRF. Instead, Milosevic may now reinvent himself as an economic reformer and partner for the West - a turn-about which would be very improbable in the context of the up-dated extremely anti-Western discourse introduced by Ziuganov and his advisors (*Zavtra's* Aleksandr Prokhanov, 'Spiritual Heritage' Foundation Chairman Aleksei Podberezkin) in the CPRF.

To be sure, in the case of a temporary or longer-lasting breakdown of democracy, Russia may still 'merely' go through a non-fascist authoritarian period. Such a dictatorship might, for instance, resemble in some respect the non-fascist regimes of Argentina's Peron, Chile's Pinochet, Spain's Franco or France's de Gaulle, perhaps involving a figure like Aleksandr Lebed, Aleksandr Rutskoi or Iurii Luzhkov - i.e. nationalists who, so far, have shown merely authoritarian ambitions, but not developed a fundamentalist anti-liberal ideology (although Rutskoi seems to have been gradually drifting in this direction since 1993). Yet, the particular configuration of political forces of Russia would not only allow for more radically anti-Western regimes. The strength and scope of these right-wing extremist parties and 'social capital' would also seem to facilitate more radical and durably anti-democratic solutions, rather than transitional reversions. In more general terms, the particularly high mobilization and polarization of Russian politics seems to resemble rather that of Weimar Germany than the political conditions of less modernized, densely organized, democratized and secularized societies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Peukert has pointed out that, already in 1918, the only real alternative to the Weimar Republic was not a different democracy, left-wing dictatorship or semi-authoritarian regime. Rather, World War I had already radicalized and polarized German society so far that the only other regime which could have emerged would have been some sort of non-Nazi harsh ultra-nationalist authoritarianism or even proto-totalitarianism, perhaps under such leaders as Ludendorff, Hindenburg, Tirpitz or Kapp (Peukert 1993, 67). Considering the political profile of the August 1991 and Oktober 1993 putschists, such a dire counterfactual speculation is not unfounded with regard to Russia as well.

In conclusion, from the viewpoint of some important characteristics of contemporary Russian party politics and civil society, the construction 'Weimar Russia' seems to be not unjustified. In particular, a breakdown of Russian democracy would open the possibility of a *Machtübernahme* or *Machtergreifung* by political forces which are in some respect markedly similar to those of Weimar Germany. Whether 'Weimar Russia' is, in consideration of other characteristics of Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia, an altogether rather informative or misleading metaphor shall be explored now.

7.3. Sketching the Paradigm: Some Basic Characteristics of the Political Culture, Economy, Society and International Environment of Weimar Germany

7.3.1. A Holistic-Institutional Interpretation

The German historian Detlev Peukert has conceptualized the crisis of the Weimar democracy as an instance of a multiple crisis of what he calls 'classical modernity'. By doing so he explicitly distanced himself from those who see Weimar as merely a stage in a peculiarly German *Sonderweg* - or special path - to modernity. The *Sonderweg* theorists assert that the Germans are a special sort of people whose 'national character' predisposed them to Nazism. In the case that this were true the metaphor 'Weimar Russia' would be a contradiction in terms (unless one does not identify a sufficient number of common traits in the 'national characters' of Germans and Russians).

Peukert instead sees the reason for the fall of Weimar and the victory of Nazism in the simultaneity of a number of well-known contradictions of modernizing and modern societies in general. Such potentially destabilizing contradictory pressures from society on the political system are characteristic of all societies which enter modernity (Huntington 1968). Yet, the belatedness, suddenness, and radicalness of Germany's modernization in the first half of this century - its 'jump' to modernity - meant that the peaks of many of these specific transitional pressures concided, and mutually reinforced each other. On the one side, some changes were initially so rapid and far-reaching that the newly erected relatively pluralistic, contractual and horizontal institutions of Germany's nascent polyarchic political system and civil society were not capable (or were, by large sections of

society, perceived as not being capable) to reduce adequately uncertainty and transaction costs in exchange operations inside the country and with the outer world (North 1990). On the other side, there was a considerable hangover-pattern in especially the civil service, academia, military and judiciary of Weimar meaning that many of the old elites were left in their positions although the function of these governmental or public posts had changed fundamentally. Thus there emerged a disequilibrium between the revived pre-democratic professional experiences and habituses of these old elites - i.e. of the informal institutional framework they remained entrenched in -, on the one side, and the new and radically different formal institutions installed after the 1918 November Revolution (or quasi-Revolution), on the other. In general, the legal set-up of the Weimar Republic was characterized by a blend of continuity and change, competing prescriptions, and pluralist compromises. Throughout the Weimar period there was constant pressure of a re-equilibration to adjust old informal and new formal rules and aims especially with regard to the large public sector.

However, Germany was at the end of the 1920s already too modern (industrialized, urbanized, bureaucratized, secularized) to return to its pre-democratic traditional authoritarianism and vertical patron-client institutions which had lost their appeal and ability to mobilize people. The Wilhelmine institutional framework was (rightly) perceived as being only able to cope with modernity's problems by postponing them. The result was thus not a return to some sort of *Sonderweg*. Instead, Germany went on a search for an alternative modernity which would neither reject the appealing aspects of modernization (such as scientific and technological progress) nor leave society in, what was (rightly or not) perceived, as an institutional vacuum. The competing new non-democratic ideals of various sections of society included an autocratic expert-state, a class dictatorship, a new *Volksgemeinschaft* (national community), and a racialist utopia (Peukert 1993, 243). Fascism merged all of these visions and seemed to many to provide an adequate replacement of the unfamiliar horizontal-contractual institutions with a set of new, quasi-modern institutions which, at the same time, had familiar features of vertical principal-agent relationships. Fascism also provided a pseudo-solution for many social problems by introducing a number of distinctly novel issues and priorities into public policy (such as racial purity or foreign aggression). By doing so it reconfigured previous incentive- and preference structures the contradictions of which had led to confusion, bitter conflict and frustration under poorly institutionalized pluralistic political conditions.

7.3.2. Some Further Variables and Intervening Factors

Whereas the outline so far represents an attempt to interpret the failure of Weimar in a holistic way, I shall now try to decipher some of the above mentioned 'contradictions' and 'pressures', and to explain, with reference to some selected areas, more concretely what 'simultaneity' of many characteristic problems of modern societies meant in the case of Weimar. In other words, I shall try to explicate how the above described institutional disequilibrium played out in practice, and which further determinants contributed to aggravating the disequilibrium.

The Rise of Nationalism

A first important aspect of the multiple crisis of inter-war German society emerged against the background of a rapidly urbanizing German society that had already largely thrown away its 19th century parochial-subject political culture, traditional-patriarchal world-views and strict religiosity. In the place of these attitudes, steady economic growth since the 1890s (when Germany passed the threshold to a full-scale socio-economic modernization) had generated a growing belief or even enthusiasm for technological, scientific and popular-scientific innovation. However, at the same time, German society's advanced secularization also meant that it embraced more and more an unreflexive nationalism as a substitution of strict religiosity and an alternative way of answering some existential questions of human life, i.e. of coping with the inability of death and of searching for practical and theoretical transcendence (Nolte 1963; Anderson 1991; Griffin 1993a). World War I and the nationalist frenzy it created represented further catalysts for this process. Yet, modernity's political breakthrough in the form of the Weimar Republic and the deepening of social modernization through continued rapid socio-cultural change had since 1918 not any longer been accompanied by distressing economic growth. Moreover, the Weimar experiment started against the background of a nationally humiliating Versailles treaty, the fear of prolonged reparation payments (then projected until 1988!), and the *Dolchstoßlegende* (the myth of a stab in the back) which asserted that the democrats had betrayed their fatherland by ending the war through capitulation. It were these psychological and psychopathological factors - e.g. the notion of 'debt-slavery' - rather than, for instance, the actually relatively modest financial stress of the yearly reparation payments, which put a heavy initial burden

on Weimar, and reinforced an already widespread and internalized nationalist sentiment (Peukert 1990, xii-3).

Apart from this, an aggressive, irredentist homeland-nationalistic civil society developed as a result of the transfer of previously German territories to some successor states (Poland and Czechoslovakia), and the emergence of additional German minorities abroad. Excluding Austria, there were approximately 10 to 12 million Germans living outside Germany in 1918. Many of them lived in actively nationalizing (i.e. homogenizing) states where political and civil rights of ethnic minorities were only poorly defined (Peukert 1993, 202; Brubaker 1996). One of the most pressing issues fueling aggressive revisionism was the Polish corridor separating mainland Germany and the sovereign Danzig (today: Gdansk) area. Characteristically, it was already in 1931 - i.e. more than one year before the *Machtergreifung* (the grab of power) by the Nazis - that the recreation of Greater Germany started when plans for the establishment of a German-Austrian customs union were announced.

New Demographic Developments

An even more distinctly modern aspect of Weimar's crisis were rapid demographic changes in German society since about 1900. This concerned above all a dramatic fall in birth rates, an absolute fall in the number of children beginning in 1910, and German society's gradual ageing which rised fears of a *Volkstod* (death of the nation). The general demographic decline and prospect of further burdens for the welfare system were among the sources of an advocacy of racist population policy along the line of a 'natural selection' through eugenics (Peukert 1993, 102).

Another problematic factor was that, before this fall, there had been a peak in birth rates between 1900 and 1910 which meant that between 1920 and 1930 a large amount of young people entered an already crowded labour market (Peukert 1993, 187-88). The result was particularly high and prolonged youth unemployment creating the notion of a 'superflous generation'. Notably, skilled workers and highly educated youth had more problems to find a job than unskilled workers. Although there were some legal welfare provisions for these young unemployed men and women, the Weimar Republic was not able deliver appropriate support. Thus, young people were in Weimar Germany, because of their high number, at the same time, especially prominent, and, because of their difficult

integration, especially marginalized. This was one of the breeding grounds for a new elitist discourse about those of 'lesser value' and those of 'higher value', and, probably, a major reason for the early and especially high support among students (up to 60%) for the then still small NSDAP of the 1920s (Peukert 1993, 94).

The Disillusionment with 'American-Style' Modernism

A third factor was that utilitarianism, new life styles, a pronounced optimism, popularization of scientific findings, social engineering, Taylorism, Fordism and other forms of rationalizing socio-economic life associated with the concept of 'progress' did not have the same immediate and positive effects on peoples socio-economic situation as in America - the example which inspired in several respect Weimar Germany's drive towards further modernization and opening.

At the same time, however, Weimar carried over into a formally pluralistic socio-political framework not only a largely unchanged pre-democratic civil service and military establishment. It also continued a number of other traditional features which were at odds and in conflict with the new self-definition and rational-legalistic legitimation mode of the Republic. One important unsolved conflict was, for instance, over the introduction of secular education between the SPD and liberals, on the one side, and the Catholic Centre and Right, on the other.

Thus the quick advance of reformist thought and policies, on the one side, and the tenacious persistence of old institutions, on the other, created tensions along several cleavage-lines: the Churches versus secularism, stagnant provinces against metropolitan Berlin, the parochial countryside versus the cosmopolitan city, traditionalism against modernism, the national versus the foreign, and, ultimately, the 'indigenous' against the 'alien' (i.e. the Jew).

The Failure of the Welfare State

A different factor which, in another way, appeared to prove the shabbiness of Weimar's progressive promise emerged when it turned out that the republican state and society had overloaded themselves with social responsibilities. Apart from the over-load problem, Weimar's 'socialism' was in another way haunted in that it continued some parochial-patriarchal features not in line with its supposedly egalitarian promise, such as policies to protect the barons of heavy industry, high

subsidies for a largely pre-modern agriculture, a concern rather with 'normality' than 'equality', and state-corporatist models of conflict solution. Three factors contributed to the peculiarly hybrid socialist-statist orientation of Weimar: the SPD's commitment to the social welfare state; the Bismarkian tradition of preventing political liberalization through making socio-economic concessions to the middle and lower classes; and the already present restrictions on especially medium and small entrepreneurship inherited from the *Burgfrieden* policy of World War I.

As a result, the Weimar Republic was inaugurated with an explicit promise of socialist intervention through extension of public administration (Peukert 1993, 39). The constitution linked the 'regulation of economic activity' to 'principles of justice', the goal of a 'dignified existence for all people' and a guaranteeing of the 'economic freedom of the individual [only] within these limits' (as quoted in Peukert 1993, 40-41). These provisions and the laws adopted accordingly introduced, on the one hand, a specifically performance-based legitimation modus into the political fundament of the Weimar Republic. On the other hand, these laws entailed unnecessarily strict and crude prescriptions for the solution of modern society's fundamental conflict between just distribution and economic efficiency when Weimar needed above all economic dynamism and hard budget constraints. The unavoidable, steady retreat from the original compromise of 1918 was thus accompanied by a steady decline of the legitimacy of the Republic and the social vision expoused in its constitution and declarations. Finally, when the Great Depression destroyed what was left of the state's capacity to distribute income, this resulted not just in further cuts. Instead of adjusting and reforming the welfare system, it led to a large scale dismantling of the welfare state, and a fundamental conceptual break in the assessment of the project of social justice itself (Peukert 1993, 145).

A further aspect has been introduced by Herbert Kitschelt who argued that the emergence of the German and Scandinavian welfare states had, in their exclusiveness, not only been informed by 'class politics but [also by] the common sense of national fate' (Kitschelt 1995, 263). In that sense, the 'socialism' of the Nazis can be interpreted as merely the final step in a continuous reformulation of the originally egalitarian Marxist-inspired vision into a comprehensive populist-patriarchial program of statist tutelage.

Also in this connection, a rather different interpretation of the above mentioned principle of 'rationality' found its application in the economy. For instance, it was used to justify the formation

of large industrial monopolies such as *IG Farben* (Industrial Association 'Colours') and *Vereinigte Stahlwerke* (United Steel Works) - i.e. the sort of Big Business which would later support Hitler's promotion to power. This opened the door for ever more state-intervention, price-agreements, rent-seeking, production quotas, subsidies, cartels, bureaucracy and protectionism, and, in Peukert's words, 'over- and ill-organized capitalism'. As a result of all these factors the level of government expenditure expressed as a proportion of GNP rose from 17.7% in 1913 to 30.6% in 1929 (Peukert 1993, 114).

The Unreformed Agriculture

Another important economic factor were the structural defects of, especially the East Elbian, agricultural enterprises.

The position of the large East Elbian landowners, in particular, had been weakened because they had lost the backing they had traditionally enjoyed from the Hohenzollern monarchy, because the legal prerogatives they had exercised over agricultural workers had been, at least on paper, nullified by the November revolution and because the war had deprived them of their traditional export markets. To sell their products on world markets, or compete with inexpensive imports, they needed to modernize; instead, lack of profitability drove them deeper into debt. (Peukert 1993, 121)

After a temporary relief in connection with inflation-induced advantages in 1918-23, falling wheat prices in the late 1920s resulted into 'nightmarish debts' of not only the Junkers, but most German farmers in general (Peukert 1993, 235). Compulsory auctions of debt-ridden farms were often the occasion for spontaneous outbursts of protest. The countryside as a whole became radicalized, and large parts went over to the NSDAP.

[Reich Chancellor] Brüning's clumsy attempt to break up heavily indebted [Junker] estates and divide them into peasant smallholdings [in 1930-32] was promptly denounced as 'agrarian

Bolshevism' and eventually provoked the big landowners into coming out against his presidential cabinet in early 1932 [the year when the more moderate Brüning was replaced with the Mussolini-admirer von Papen]. (Peukert 1993, 235)

The Political-Institutional Variable

A frequently quoted defect of Weimar was its peculiar configuration of political institutions: a semi-presidential federal republic with proportional representation in the parliament. Weimar's PR system (without a minimum-percentage threshold) has certainly been conducive to the fragmentation, fractionalization and polarization of the party system and the *Reichstag* (although to keep the KPD and NSDAP, the main adversaries, out would have probably demanded a pretty high percentage-threshold).

In contrast, it is not entirely clear whether semi-presidentialism, as has often been asserted, was really that crucial a problem of Weimar. In fact, the deterioration of Weimar's legitimacy began when the semi-character of the presidency was gradually revoked by Reich President Hindenburg from 1930 to 1933, and when the parliamentary governments were replaced by presidential cabinets - i.e. when a de facto purely presidentialist system was introduced. Hindenburg made extensive use of the infamous Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution:

This article not only allowed the *Reich* President to override *Länder* [i.e. the federal units] which failed to fulfil their constitutional obligations but also gave the President sovereign legislative and executive authority in a state of emergency. The validity of legislation enacted under Article 48 was not restricted to the state of emergency, although it could be rescinded by Parliament at any time. Despite this democratic safeguard, Article 48 was used in the years 1930-33 to legislate in defiance of the will of the Parliament, when the President countered each attempt to terminate his emergency powers by ordering dissolution. Indeed, in this situation Parliament's right to rescind led the presidential governments into a predicament from which there were only two ways to escape: either constant dissolution of the *Reichstag* followed by new elections, or an outright coup. In this sense Article 48 certainly did not offer adequate protection against abuses on the part of the President hostile to the constitution.

(Peukert 1993, 40)

Yet, in view of an over-emphasis on this particular defect in many analyses of Weimar Germany, Peukert aptly asks at the end of the above summary: 'On the other hand, what provisions would have been adequate?' (1993, 40)

If one assumes for a moment that all election results would have been similar and independent of the political-institutional configuration, a purely presidentialist system would have given the essentially disloyal President Hindenburg already in 1925 many of the powers he managed to gain only during 1930-32. Given the above mentioned generally radicalized character of German politics after World War I and the relative impotence of the ultra-conservatism of the DNVP, Hindenburg would have probably been forced to seek for the assistance of an ultra-nationalist mass movement in any way. A purely parliamentary system, in turn, would, perhaps, have meant a takeover by Hitler already in summer 1932 when the NSDAP support was at its apex.

In short, given the extra-ordinary social tensions and contradictions during the Weimar period, institutional reform may not have made much of a difference anyway. Instead, it has been argued, it was a miracle that the Weimar Republic survived as long as it did at all. In conclusion, the institutional counterfactual is not very powerful.

Economic Crises

The probably major reason why liberal politics failed in Weimar was that the young Republic had to manage two of the most severe economic crises in modern German history: the hyperinflation of 1922-23 and the, in Germany especially destructive, Great Depression of 1929-32. In the first place, a prolonged inflation caused by high war- and demobilization expenditures since 1914 stood already at the cradle of Weimar in 1918-1919. Subsequently, in 1922-1923, the, until then, relatively modest inflation transformed into hyperinflation - an especially 'rare and potentially devastating [experience] to a society' (Sachs 1993, 40). In January 1923, the prices were 2,783 times higher than in 1913; by December 1923, ten months later, they had become 1,261,000,000,000 higher than in 1913. This meant not only, among other things, hunger riots. It also left 'a profound imprint on the German psyche' (Peukert 1993, 64).

Peukert argues that Weimar survived this period and subsequently even managed to stabilize through a monetary reform only because there was no full-dressed political alternative at that point. The insurrectionist Left had not recovered from its defeats in 1919 and 1920, and the extreme Right was divided (1993, 76).

To be sure, the inflation was also related to, and responsible for, some more positive tendencies. For instance, the soft monetary policy after World War I kept unemployment low until 1923 (Peukert 1993, 65), and allowed to integrate soldiers back into society as well as to convert the military industrial complex relatively successfully. However, significantly, the primary losers of the enormous devaluation were above all those with long-term investment interests - i.e. the middle class (including public servants and intellectuals). Those who, on the other hand, in some respect benefited from the soft monetary policy included big business (which got cheap credits), farmers (whose mortgages were devalued), black marketeers (who speculated), demobilized soldiers (who got, in spite of fiscal constraints, relatively generous state-pensions) as well as workers (who kept, for the time being, their jobs) (Peukert 1993, 64-65).

In other words, that social group - the middle class - the political stances of which are often seen as the most important social foundations of democracy lost most. In contrast, those whose orientation towards democracy is seen as, at best, ambivalent during modernization periods were relative winners or lost less than the new and old middle classes.²⁸³ It was a panicking, fearful middle class which provided many of the NSDAP activists in the 1920s, and which, together with farmers (see below), was over-represented among the NSDAP members of 1930 (Peukert 1993, 237).

The correlated decline of German liberal-democratic parties traditionally representing the middle class has been described by Peukert as the most consequential political development on Weimar's political scenery (1993, 210). Whereas the national liberals had collected 18.5% of the vote

²⁸³ To be sure, as Ruschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1990) have rightly pointed out, it was often the pressure of underrepresented classes (i.e. the workers) rather than the active involvement of the middle class alone which constituted a crucial determinant for democratization. However, for instance, sections of the blue-collar class in Western Europe have since the 1970s become the main source of support for right-wing extremist parties (Kitschelt 1995). This has proven that workers will not by definition support left-wing parties and further democratization. On the whole, Aristotele's classic emphasis on the importance of a large and stable middle class (and today especially the new middle class) for political stability, moderation and social justice remains valid.

in the 1919 Reichstag elections and even over 20% in the 1920 elections, their share of votes fell to 13.6% in 1928 and under 5% of the turn-out in 1932 (Peukert 1993, 157).

The most fateful socio-economic development, in turn, was the especially devastating effects of the Great Depression on Germany caused (a) by the German economy's high dependence on the US economy (where the international crisis started), and (b) the accumulated unsolved structural problems and defects in Germany's economic and welfare system. Thus, in 1932, the level of production of capital goods fell to 46% of the level of 1913. Also in 1932, the registered unemployment reached its peak: 29.9% of the workforce with even higher rates among unionized workers and substantial additional hidden unemployment through short-time work and non-registration. Unemployment was especially high among young men at the age of 18 to 30, and, by 1933, many of them had been unemployed for several years (Peukert 1993, 252). Importantly, this was already the second collapse of the economy. Thus the crisis assumed a larger symbolic meaning for many Germans. It seemed to prove that Weimar was a blunder from the beginning in that it had radically devaluated the Old, but subsequently failed to create something viably New.

7.4. Comparing the Cases: Some Notable Similarities and Dissimilarities Between Post-Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany

7.4.1. The Simultaneity Problem and Hangover Effects in Germany and Russia: Functionally Equivalent or Qualitatively Different?

In this sub-section, the above argument concerning Weimar Germany will be followed closely, and, one may say, schematically. Some suggestions shall be made about how far those factors identified as being important determinants for the fall of Weimar and the rise of Nazism are discernable in contemporary Russia too. It should be noted at this point that it is, however, only in the subsequent, last section that an overall weighing of differences against similarities will be made, and a concluding assessment of the usefulness of the metaphor 'Weimar Russia' be tried.

The Simultaneity Problem

Obviously, today Russian democracy's challenges are significantly different from inter-war German democracy's (or they differ, at least, in their semantic conceptualization). As will become clear below, the concrete problems which both countries have been facing resemble each other only in certain respects. Nevertheless, it is striking how far the argument of the Weimar period historian Peukert about the decisive importance of the *simultaneous* presence of a number of specific contradictions of modern societies for the fragility of Weimar reminds of similar-sounding arguments concerning post-Soviet Russia. For instance, Claus Offe makes the explicit argument that the uniqueness of the post-communist transformations (and by implication the reason for the possibility of their failure) lies not only in the specific challenge of a transition from a socialist to a capitalist economy, but in the *simultaneity* of the economic and property reforms with other not less dramatic changes, above all the tasks of state formation, territorial division, liberalization and democratization (1991, 872-874). Moreover, one could not only add that, because of a longer communist history and thus a more thorough flattening of the pre-communist civil society (Fish 1996), these simultaneous transitions are especially problematic in Russia and the other Soviet republics (save the Baltics, the Western Ukraine and Moldova). The Russian case is also peculiar in that the new Russian state faces at least two other formidable challenges: the transition from a highly centralized unitarianism to an asymmetric federalism (with, moreover, partly consociational features); and a re- or new definition of the national identity of both, its ethnically Russian and its ethnically non-Russian citizens along several dimensions including, for instance, in the ethnic Russian case, such conflicting concepts as *sovetskii*, *evraziiskii*, *evropeiskii*, *ruskoiazychnyi*, *slavianskii*, *pravoslavnyi*, *rossianin*, *ruskii*, *velikoros*, *sibirskii*, *kazak*, etc. - i.e. Soviet, Eurasian, European, Russian-speaking, Slavic, Orthodox, civic Russian, ethnic Russian, Great Russian, Siberian, Cossack, etc.²⁸⁴

I would hypothesize that it is exactly this resemblance of the simultaneity of challenges and decision-awaiting problems (and less an alleged likeness of the German and Russian 'souls') which is a major determinant factor for the similarity of the above outlined political control-variable - i.e.

²⁸⁴ The issue of national identity is, in some regard, also, to be sure, of a certain - yet considerably lesser - relevance to the formation of the Ukrainian, Belarusian, Bosnian, reunited German, and Central Asian states.

for the presence in both countries of especially large, entrenched, resourceful and aggressive right-wing extremist party spectra. Although the nature of the individual problems and choices to be made differ greatly, the very fact of their high accumulation has produced strikingly similar patterns of stress, frustration and confusion in both Weimar German and post-Soviet Russian society. Compare the following appraisals of Peukert concerning Germany, and of Offe concerning Eastern Europe which even verbally - especially their emphasis on the difference between 'normality' and simultaneity - resemble each other. Peukert comes to the conclusion that Germany did not follow a special *Sonderweg*; instead,

[w]hat was 'special' about Germany between 1918 and 1932 was, on the one hand, the sudden and uncompromising manner in which modernization arrived and, on the other, the *simultaneous* presence of several different elements of crisis. It was a unique conjuncture, and yet one which at the same time demonstrates how easily the processes of modernization which we are accustomed to regarding as part of our *normal* experience can tip over into catastrophe. To use a metaphor of our own times, the *normal* operating state of a nuclear power station is certainly not the same as the 'worst case' of a melt-down, but the 'worst case' arises as a result of a simple succession of critical events that represents one possible outcome of the *normal* operating state. In a similar way, the crisis in Germany at the start of the 1930s made the 'German catastrophe' possible because it set off an escalation of the contradictory pressures that were inherent in classical modernity. (Peukert 1993, 281; emphases added)

In other words, as a result of the social effects of World War I, the crushing defeat at the Western front and the (attempted) November Revolution of 1918, modernity's advent was especially sudden and radical which produced quasi 'inevitably' a high accumulation and mutual reinforcement of social and institutional strains in Germany.

In the Russian case, having entered communism in 1917 at a partly pre-modern stage and having missed the opportunity of a more gradual transformation through incrementally implementing the relatively reformist ideas of, for instance, Malenkov, Khrushchëv, Kossygin, Andropov and,

finally, Gorbachëv, the rejection of the Soviet system was (in contrast to, for instance, Poland's or Hungary's transitions) an especially sudden and radical event which also produced quasi 'inevitably' a high accumulation and mutual reinforcement of social, institutional and, moreover, cultural strains. In the words of Offe:

The stages of a process, which in the case of the 'normal' Western European examples were mastered over a centuries-long sequence (from the nation-state to capitalism, and then to democracy), must thus be traversed nearly *simultaneously* in Eastern Europe (just as both components of a 'modern' political economy, namely, democracy and private property, had been simultaneously abolished by the October revolution). This occasions not only gigantic decision-making burdens, but also mutual effects of obstruction. It may well be that each of those problems will admit of being solved only when the situation makes it possible to assume that one of the other two problems has (or even both have) already been solved or is (are) presently not in need of a solution. [Because of] mutual blockage of solutions to problems [the protagonists may well find themselves in the tragic situation of having to refuse to taking] the proverbial advice to do 'one thing at a time' rather than 'everything at the same time' [...]. (1991, 875; emphases added)

To be sure, some accounts of the post-Soviet transformations have, on the other hand, correctly pointed to the partly *mutually reinforcing* - and not mutually destructing - effects which liberalization, democratization and economic reform might, in certain situations, have on each other. Joel Hellmann, for instance, outlined that a competitive political system prevents newly emerging short-term winners (and potential rent-seekers) in the first phases of reform from hindering further economic liberalization which would be disadvantageous to these short-term winners such as privatized monopolies (1996). Thus, according to him, the more democracy the more competitive and liberalized capitalism. Steven Fish (1997) argued that the results of founding elections - i.e. whether they were won by anti-communists or not, and whether the electoral victory of economic reformers was revoked or not - and thus the degree of turn-over of elites determine the seriousness of reform-efforts. One may add to Fish's statement that, in turn, the conditions under which these

founding elections took place - i.e. their fairness and the presence of resourceful enough anti-communist political groupings - greatly effected their outcome.²⁸⁵ Thus Fish also concludes - the more democracy and the stronger the liberal segments in civil society, the more consistent are the reform efforts.

Yet, the fact that *sometimes* 'good things go together' does not invalidate the salience of the more general feature that realizing multiple tasks concurrently often produces competing and contradictory logics, as well as unclear and shifting preference orders.

It seems that it is, perhaps, less the blunders of an overworked elite trapped in decision-gridlocks than broader society's persistent perception of uncertainty, confusion and indeterminacy about the final goals and purposes of the multi-layered reforms which explains the high and consistent electoral support for such extreme figures like Hindenburg, Hitler, Ziuhanov and Zhirinovskii. On the one hand, the chaotic impression and frequent mistakes which, in pursuing various competing and partly incompatible aims, the new democratic political elites are bound to make, decreases gradually the attractiveness of the liberal-democratic project as a whole, or, at least, raises doubts about its applicability to the country. Thus large sections of society become attracted not to *intra*-systemic democratic opposition groups but to disloyal *anti*-systemic ultra-conservative and revolutionary ultra-nationalist parties. These parties claim to provide relief by proposing that the country should enter an alternative civilizational paths. Yet, their attractiveness is also explained by the fact that they do not totally reject those aspects of the new social order which have already taken hold on the grass-roots level and been internalized by large sections of society. Above all these parties have largely embraced scientific-technological progress and, somewhat more ambivalently, the basics of a

²⁸⁵ A central problem of both of these quantitative and tightly argued papers is that the statistical significance of their arguments seems to be bolstered by deliberately including the Central Asian states, on the one hand, and excluding parts of Yugoslavia, on the other (Hellmann 1996, Fish 1997). In Fish's case, in addition, Azerbaijan is included. In view of the Central Asian states' and Azerbaijan's especially pertinent continuities in the socio-economic structure, their enduring pernicious patron-client relationships and elite composition, their underdeveloped civil societies, and their only limited democratization efforts so far, one may argue that these countries (except perhaps Kirgizstan) are closer to the Chinese or Vietnamese cases than to the Eastern European ones. Finally, it is unclear why Hellmann rates Macedonia as war-torn (and thus unsuited for his argument), and why both analysts do not consider Rump Yugoslavia - i.e. Serbia and Montenegro - at all (although they do consider Croatia which also followed irredentist nationalist policies and was involved in a war during the last years). Serbia's first presidential elections were actually relatively competitive.

capitalist economy.

The appeal of the radical politicians can also be explained in another way. The apparent irrationality and inconsistency in the behaviour of the legally-rationally legitimized democratizing elites and the prolonged character of the multiple transformation involving ever new changes and conflict-escalations in daily life, provides the a fertile breeding-ground for weird conspiracy theories, escapist promises of radical improvement through foreign adventures, and cheap populism and demagoguery. The democratic elites have difficulties to explain and justify their apparently contradictory behaviour in a consistent, comprehensible and rational manner. Thus explicitly inconsistent, incomprehensible and irrational promises, such as those by fascist and reactionary forces, become relatively more plausible.

The Persistence of Old Elites

A further marked resemblance of the general institutional framework of the Weimar Republic, and the first (1991-93) and second (1993-today) Russian republics is the high degree of hangover of old elites in supposedly novel or renovated institutions. This produced a remarkable persistence of old, pre-democratic patterns of behaviour, and thus a state of constant disequilibria between the new official, horizontal, formal institutional framework, and the still salient, unofficial, informal, vertical patron-client and principal-agent relationships inherited from the ancien regime.

The probably most obvious explanation for this state of affairs is that, in both cases, the new regimes were rapidly installed in societies where (a) the traditions and entrenchment of old ruling elites had been especially firm, (b) the legitimacy of the old regime had not been fundamentally questioned before the transition-inducing crisis, and (c) the loyalty of the old elites was ensured through an especially deeply internalized, anti-democratic ideology. In the German case, a continuous Prussian-German state and elite tradition went back as far as to the Liberation Wars of 1812 (i.e. over one-hundred years), and in the Russian case to the October Revolution of 1917 (i.e. over seventy years). Moreover, in both case the myths supplying the old regime where build on wars for indpendence, and impressive imperial expansion.

In Germany, the self-legimitation of the old regime and elites was, among others, built on the memory of the liberation from French occupation between 1806 and 1812, the successful wars against

Denmark, Austria and France in the 1860s-1870s, and, finally, the proclamation of the second Reich and coronation of an all-German Kaiser (in Versaille!) in 1871. In Russia, the Bolsheviks and Red Army (and thus, by implication, the whole elite associated with the Soviet regime) could claim to have at least twice saved the country from foreign occupation - in the civil war against 'counter-revolutionaries' and 'foreign interventionists' in 1918-22, and against Nazi Germany in 1941-45. Resembling the significance of the German re-unification of 1871, the representatives of the Soviet old regime could claim to have hold together the country, and managed a new 'gathering of lands' during the unrest from 1917 til 1922. After 1945, the Soviet Union became of super-power, and Russian troops, military advisors, civil personnell and financial-technical assistance were sent to propagate the Russian model of economic modernization, and developmental regime to Europe, Latin Amerika, Africa and Asia.

To be sure, there was, on the other hand, in both cases also a far-going discreditation - i.e. the failures which had caused the transition to a proto-democratic regime: the defeat in World War I in the case of Germany, and the economic, military and ideological 'defeat' in the Cold War in the case of Russia. However, those top groups of the old elites which were most closely associated with these systemic declines, e.g. the Hohenzollern family and the August 1991 putschists, and the formal normative-institutional framework in which they had been embedded, i.e. the monarchy, and the Politbureau and USSR government, were removed by popular upheavals. Instead of replacing the old elites with new ones, the second and third layers of the old elites simply pushed forward because they were still able to legitimate themselves with recourse to their (or their predecessors') real or alleged past achievements.

In view of this and of the relative longevity and adaptability which the old regimes had been showing through nearly three generations in the case of the USSR, or more than four generations in the case of Germany, the middle and lower echelons of the old elites were not only able to saddle the responsibility for the breakdown on (a) external factors, (b) the newly emerging elites ('November-traitors' in Germany; 'uprooted intelligentsia' and 'agents of the West' in Russia), or (c) the small upper-most section of the old elite such as the German nobility, or the CPSU central apparatus. The middle and lower echelons of the old elites were also in a position to claim openly and successfully the right to preserve old, or to assume new, powerful positions in the new state machine, and to reject

tacitly the need for substantial change in the style and in the normative-institutional setting of their professional and political activity. Such rising second-tier *ancien regime* representatives included von Seeckt, Hindenburg and Hugenberg in Germany, and former Minister Khizha, former Central Bank Chief Gerashchenko and today Prime-Minister Chernomyrdin in Russia. The positive aspects and length of the historical record of the *ancien regimes* from which they came, allowed the old elites to justify such a behaviour with some plausibility to themselves, and to broader society.

The New Elites' Implication with the Ancien Regime

A final determinant for the old elites' relatively successful bid for power under the new conditions was that the larger part of the new democratic elites had, before their rise to the top, ideologically and professionally partly cooperated with the old regime. That means that, in distinction to today Eastern Europe, there was no consolidated dissident movement to assume significant posts in the new democratic institutions, and media.

In the German case, the SPD - the most important political force in the establishment of Weimar - had not only occupied an important (although not decisive) position in the old regime's institutional framework, i.e. in the *Reichstag* of Wilhelm's monarchy. Its social visions were also to some degree reflected in the unique, bureaucratic social welfare system which had gradually been introduced since Bismark's first attempts to mollify the working class movement with welfarist concessions.

In Russia, leading reformers, such as El'tsin himself, the ideologist of *perestroika* Aleksandr Nikolaevich Iakovlev, and even to some degree Russia's major ideologist of economic and political reform, former Prime-Minister Egor Timurovich Gaidar, are also former members of old elite institutions. El'tsin was a regional functionary; Iakovlev was a Central Committee functionary under Brezhnev in the later 1960s and early 1970s and then again under Gorbachëv; and Gaidar was an editor for *Pravda*, and the Central Committee monthly *Kommunist* during perestroika when this journal, in spite of its name, became a major mouthpiece for radically reformist ideas.²⁸⁶ The whole

²⁸⁶ There was, to be sure, in Russia also human-rights dissident groups as well as the peculiar layer of persons called the *shestidesiatniki* - the men of the 1960s, i.e. the social and cultural activists of Khrushchëv's 'Thaw' of 1961-64. Yet, in distinction to the Polish Solidarity trade union, the East German New Forum proto-party and

picture reveals that it was above all the old Soviet academic elite which supplied most of the new democratic political elite. These academics - especially those from Moscow's influential think-tanks with access to the Central Committee - had enjoyed considerable material privileges under the old regime (yet, of course, also suffered considerably from rigid professional limitations). Apart from this, there was - paralleling to some degree the SPD's relationship to the German imperial welfare state - also some affinity between the internationalist, cosmopolitan and equalitarian ('leftish') outlook of reformers like Yakovlev and Gaidar, and some similarly conceived aspects of the officially proclaimed ideological dogma and policies of the Soviet regime.²⁸⁷ Gorbachëv defined until the very end his reforms as some sort of return to 'Leninist principles' or to the New Economic Policy of the 1920s - although, on should mention, his definition of 'Leninism' apparently diverged considerably from the denotation this term has assumed in the West.

This meant that in both, Weimar and post-Soviet Russia, an important section of the new elite had been partly accommodated within, or grown out from, the old regime, and was thus also implicated (or could also be seen as being implicated) in the old regime's failure. In both cases, certain aspects of the visions exposed by these new elites, such as Wilhelmine welfarism and Soviet internationalism, were already present in the legitimization modi of the *ancien regimes* - although the functions, interpretation and role of these ideas changed radically under the new conditions. Nevertheless, these surface similarities meant that the new elites had difficulties to distance themselves sufficiently from the old elites in order to make their claim for replacing them plausible.

The fuzziness of the distinction between the new elites and the *ancien regime*, and the historically grounded *esprit de corps* of the old elites, in a first step, opened the door for, and legitimized, the old elites' re-entrance into the corridors of power. In a second step, these same factors were conducive to the old civil servants' professional and political inertia in their new positions. Old habits and modi of behaviour were carried over into the new legal framework. They

the Czech Charta 77 movement, the Russian circles had not managed to institutionalize themselves properly. They thus remained largely on the fringes of post-Soviet Russian politics.

²⁸⁷ In more general terms, liberalism shares some traits with classic (as distinct from Leninist-Stalinist) Marxism, above all ethical universalism, and also libertarianism and egalitarianism although the Marxist and liberal conceptions of these notions differ somewhat.

undermined the normative content and adequate functioning of the supposedly new institutions. Finally, both first presidents Friedrich Ebert and Boris El'tsin²⁸⁸ resemble each other as individuals in that they showed unfortunately an especially strong inclination to preserve the continuity of their administrations with the past, and to coopt old elites without much hesitation (Peukert 1993, 29).

7.4.2. Socio-Economic Conditions and Institutional Defects in Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia

The above outline identified some resemblances between the broad patterns of socio-economic and institutional development, and configurations of political actors in Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia. In the below analysis, some of the issues which were - apart from the simultaneity problem and disequilibrium - present in post-Soviet Russia too, should be shortly dealt with. I shall in more detail compare Russian nationalism (and the environment into which it has grown) to the German case. The other social-institutional issues mentioned in connection with Weimar Germany, in contrast, will, with regard to Russia, be only briefly summarized and related to in a second sub-section.

The Salience of Russian Nationalism, and Russia's International Environment

Although the trajectory of the emergence and spread of German inter-war and Russian post-Soviet nationalism have been different, both countries were at that points of their development somewhat similar in so far as, in public debates and mass media reports, many social and political problems are defined in terms of national interest and group rights, and with reference to national

²⁸⁸ El'tsin, one may of course argue, has been prone to cooperate with the old guys simply because he is a former Central Committee colleague of people like Chernomyrdin or Gerashchenko. However, it seems useful to distinguish between El'tsin, on the one side, and, for instance, the first Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, another former First Secretary, who also came to abandon communism and to seek cooperation with the West, on the other. In contrast to Kravchuk, El'tsin had between 1986 and 1991 several times risked his career, and in August 1991 probably his life to push forward liberalization and democratization of Russia. Kravchuk left the CPSU after it had become clear that the August 1991 putsch (during which he remained conspicuously silent) had failed.

distinctiveness and history. Both nationalisms differ from contemporary Western nationalisms in that the definition of political and social issues in nationalist language has become internalized in many sections of society, including major parts of the political elite. Whereas, in inter-war Germany, nationalist arguments were not questioned because they then seemed to be 'natural' all over the world, in contemporary Russia, a somewhat similar lack of reflection is caused by the sparseness and superficiality of serious research on nationalism, its nature, causes and varieties. Civic rights groups dealing with ethno-centrism are small, underfinanced and mainly concentrated in Moscow. Moreover, there seems, as already indicated above, to be a tendency in Russian public debate to portray the Russian ethnos as being somehow by definition non-nationalistic. Presumably, Russians have always shown an especially tolerant attitude towards non-Russian Soviet nationalities, been formed by the allegedly distinctly pan-human character of the Orthodox religion, drawn uniquely benign lessons from their suffering in World War II, and so on. The conclusion is that talk about Russian nationalism or chauvinism is exaggerated. Consequently, chauvinist labelings of the *chernye* ('Blacks', i.e. Caucasians), *natsmeny* (abbreviation for national minorities with a derogative connotation), *yuzhane* ('Southerners') or *zhidy* ('kikes') are widespread, and go unchallenged.

In any case, this was not to suggest a total congruence of German inter-war and Russian post-Soviet nationalisms. In the overall public debate, the degree to which social problems are defined in nationalist terms in Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia may still diverge significantly. In contrast, the degree to which the specific sub-varieties of homeland nationalisms and their configurations in both post-authoritarian countries resemble each other is striking indeed. About 11-12 million '*Volksdeutsche*', on the one hand, and 25 million '*etnicheskie rossiiane*' (ethnic citizens of the Russian state) as they are confusingly called in Russia, on the other; the Danzig area separated from Germany by a Polish corridor, on the one side, and the Kaliningrad Oblast separated from Russia by a Latvian-Lithuanian-Belorussian corridor, on the other; plans for a re-unification with Austria in the German case, and with Belarus in the Russian case; the 'new abroad' as the label to describe the lost German territories, and the 'near abroad' as the term referring to the former Soviet Union Republics. In addition, the cases are similar in that the territorially reduced homelands had used to dominate the nationalizing host states before democratization, and in that the German and Russian minorities experienced a radical transfer from the status of a dominant to a dominated (and, in some

instance, repressed) group (Brubaker 1996, 135-147).

These similarities as well as a certain parallelity between the defeats in World War I and the Cold War and between the German humiliation of the Versailles treaty and the Russian dismay about NATO expansion may suggest that we have a resemblance of configurations of factors which makes the rise of an aggressive Russian irredentist ultra-nationalism very likely. Yet, the contextual setting of these conflict-breeding factors is in some respect different.

First of all, the Russian elites' elementary knowledge about the German inter-war experience itself is an inhibiting factor. That means that the Russian experience today has to be partly historicized.

Second, the today Russian homeland and the non-Russian host states of the '*etnicheskie rossiane*' are all, apart from other international affiliations, integrated in an international institution - the OSCE - which is explicitly committed to the protection of minority rights. This reflects the general tendency that the principle of territorial sovereignty is today much less robust than it was in inter-war Europe, that nation-states are in some respect significantly weaker today than during the first half of this century, that concern about minority rights is more legitimate today than then, that borders are less sacral today, and that cross-border jurisdiction is much more extensive today than it used to be.

Third, Russia's preponderance vis-a-vis the Newly Independent States is much greater than Germany's vis-a-vis Poland and Czechoslovakia which were temporarily stronger than Germany (Brubaker 1996, 139). This might be the reason why the Russian political and public discourse is much less uniformly revisionist than the German was in the 1920s and 1930s (although Russian relative preponderance may, depending on the political context, also become a destabilizing factor). Yet, on the whole, the larger part of the currently politically dominating Russian elite seems to be striving rather for hegemony through diplomatic and economic pressure than for territorial incorporation. The acceptance of the territorial status quo was in Weimar Germany, in contrast, much weaker (Brubaker 1996, 141).

On the other hand, however, there are also some differences between Weimar Germany's and post-Soviet Russia's geopolitical configurations which may rather speak in favour of *more* potential of instability in the case of Russia. Brubaker quotes the German historian Andreas Hillgruber who, among others, argued that German geopolitics had in some important respect actually improved after

World War I. That concerned above all the East Central European states which, given lacking protection from the Western powers and considering the Soviet threat, were 'structurally inclined to align themselves with Germany.' (Brubaker 1996, 139) There had been no comparable improvement for Russia. Instead, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states have to different degrees already shown inclinations to consider more close alignments with potentially or actually fundamentalist Islamic states and organizations. In addition, the Baltics' explicit (as well as Moldova's and the Ukraine's so far only hesitant) orientation towards the West has been perceived as threatening and anti-Russian in Russia. What is perhaps the most disturbing factor is, however, the unclear future of China. It seems only certain that China will continue to grow rather quickly, and thus become the biggest economy of the world in the next ten to fifteen years. It is not inconceivable that this may mean some sort of 'trouble' for Russia, Mongolia and Central Asia. If anti-Western ultra-nationalists still dominate the Russian parliament at that point, the outcome of all this would be very difficult to predict.

In conclusion, it is, on the one hand, true that technological progress, supra-national institutional development, and historical learning all represent factors which have altered radically the overall social and international environment in which ultra-nationalist parties operate. On the other hand, the fact that a strong, multi-farious and Weimar-like ultra-nationalist spectrum was able to develop in Russia, nevertheless, indicates that the strength of the effect of these changes should not be over-estimated. If one considers in addition that, in distinction to Germany which was not threatened by outside powers in the 1920s-1930s, Russia will (apart from the pseudo-threat from NATO) face some real national security challenges in the 21st century (Islamism, China), the above factors appear as less reassuring. Too many variables with the potential to influence the salience and strength of post-Soviet Russian nationalism in either way are different from those which furthered German nationalism. To make a definite assessment, whether more optimistic or pessimistic, is difficult.

Further Destabilizing Social and Institutional Factors

Whereas, in the preceding sub-section, Weimar-German and post-Soviet Russian nationalism and the context in which they developed, have been compared in detail, this sub-section will only

shortly summarize in which way some further socio-economic and political features of the Weimar Republic's society are reproduced in Russia.

Demography. Falling birth-rates and inter-generational conflict (for instance, on the labour-market) and the impression they made on German intellectual and public discourse have been interpreted as important determinants for Weimar's loss of legitimacy. Whereas the inter-generational conflict and unemployment of (especially educated) youth might be less salient in post-Soviet Russia than in Weimar Germany, the trends in demographic development are even more drastic, and potentially divisive for political debates. According to a recent forecast by the UN, the population of Russia will fall from currently 148 million to approximately 130 million in 2010 (*Panorama*, no. 842, 28 May - 3 June 1997). Ziuganov and Zhirinovskii are already exploiting the issue, and are introducing discourses resembling those about *Volkstod* (death of the nation) in Germany.

Disillusionment with Westernization. In post-World War I Germany, democracy and a legal-rational mode of legitimation was as much an import as it was in Russia in the early 1990s. In both cases, embracing the Western political system was connected to, and accompanied by, a radical break in the normative and discursive framework under the old regime and a wide-spread enthusiasm for Western ideas and consumer products, and especially for some aspects of American mass culture and life-style. As in the German case, the subsequent gradual disillusionment, alienation and backlash towards a search for the own past and traditions has it made possible for ultra-nationalist politicians to exploit the growing disaffection with Western mass culture for political means.

Break-Down of the Welfare System. Whereas the Weimar welfare system's principal defect was that the socialist-inspired constitution and laws made provisions which later could not be implemented, post-Soviet Russia's problem is that it has inherited from the Soviet Union an over-extensive and inconsistent system of state responsibilities for paying benefits to a wide range of people. Attempts to change this system are politically costly and readily exploited by the ultra-nationalist opposition. Yet to keep it without a softening of monetary policy (i.e. without fueling inflation) is fiscally impossible. In 1997, there were, according Vice-Premier Oleg Sysuev, still about 200 categories of Russian citizens who were entitled to state benefits (*Panorama*, no. 842, 28 May - 3 June 1997, p. 5) which meant that nearly two-thirds of Russia's population is supposed to receive some sort of social support. Among the most costly and inefficient welfare provisions are the

enormous subsidies for housing.

The principal problem for the East European reformers in general has been summarized by Kornai:

It is one thing to decide whether a state should give its citizens a right they have not enjoyed before and another to decide to withdraw from them a right they have gained and become accustomed to. A curious *institutional ratchet effect* can be seen here. The cogwheel of historical development turns one way, but it cannot turn back the opposite direction. (Kornai 1995, 133; emphasis in original)

Russia's difficulties to deal with social welfare-issues might be even more tenacious than those of the Weimar Republic. Although the erection of the Weimar Republic meant also some changes in economic life, Germany had by 1918 already a fully functioning modern capitalist economy. The post-communist governments in contrast are in the transition-period to capitalism caught in a number of traps. They have to cut subsidies and expenditures in order to achieve macro-economic stabilization; yet these cuts will ultimately lead to bankruptcies demanding state support for unemployed people. They have to privatize on a massive scale; yet quick privatization means social disruption and the emergence of private companies which are more difficult to tax. They have to be careful not to clamp down on semi-legal economic activities too abruptly; yet they also have to ensure adequate tax-collection (Kornai 1995, 107-140). In addition, the Russian pension system suffers from its inability to collect contributions from the large shadow economy. In view of rapidly falling birth-rates, the pension system will, even more quickly than in Western states with shrinking birth-rates, become less and less viable.

Agriculture. Agriculture is a sphere in which the difficulties of the post-Soviet Russian government might be even more intractable than in Weimar Germany. Whereas, in Germany, the East Elbian Junkers with their highly ineffective and indebted farms represented an especially reactionary section, practically the whole of the unreformed Russian agriculture is in a deep structural crisis the solution of which is hindered by a fundamental obstacle: the unwillingness of parliament to adopt a Law on Land Reform. The interest group of the old 'agro-industrial complex', the Agrarian Party of

Russia and its faction in the parliament, represent a major obstacle to reform, and a close (though sometimes unreliable) ally of Ziuganov's ultra-nationalist CPRF.

Political Institutions. The Russian political system resembles the Weimar German one remarkably: a federal semi-presidential republic. Also, half of the lower house of parliament, the State Duma, are elected through proportional representation.

However, although in many ways similar on the surface, a number of significant dissimilarities create an altogether different picture. The post-Soviet Russian proportional representation electoral system has a 5%-threshold. This electoral provision is a superficial copy from the post-war German system which had been explicitly introduced with reference to the Weimar experience. 225 of the 450 State Duma deputies are elected in proportional part of the vote. The other half of the State Duma is elected by single mandate district plurality vote. Also the upper house, the Federation Council, consists of regional representatives, and has considerable (especially veto) power. In general, federalism in Russia is a much stronger factor than in pre-1933 Germany. During the last years, the Russian Governors have become more and more independent from the centre. Moreover, the presidents of the national republics and mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg have enjoyed a high degree of independence ever since the first regional executives elections in 1991-92.

In any case, as has been argued above, it is not entirely clear whether *semi*-presidentialism was actually the problem of Weimar. Hindenburg was able to undermine the *de jure* semi-presidential system through usage of article 48; and he created a *de facto* presidentialist system with creeping dictatorial features. If that means, that Weimar was actually too presidentialist, than the Russian semi-presidential system would seem to be even more prone to abuse by an anti-democratic president as far as the legal regular power of the Russian president is much greater - especially his decree power. If one follows this logic through, than presidentialism *per se* would be the problem rather than semi-presidentialism. However, in that case, semi-presidentialism is better than pure presidentialism. Yet, if, on the other side, the lesson from Weimar Germany is that any sort of presidentialism should be avoided, than one could refer to, for instance, Mussolini's rise to power in a constitutional parliamentary monarchy.

Finally, the introduction of the 5%-barrier turned out to be in Russia more problematic than in Germany. It led not only to the exclusion of small parties, but to the waste of votes of nearly 50%

of the voters who participated in the PR part of the Duma elections in 1995.

In conclusion, it is difficult to make unequivocal conclusions about what exactly the political consequences of certain institutional designs are. The contexts vary enormously and institutional designs play out differently in different socio-economic settings. This is especially true of Russia with its condition of simultaneous transitions, or of de facto revolutionary transformation, and the extremely powerful governors, presidents and mayors in the 'federal subjects'. What is, perhaps, needed is less general discussion about presidentialism versus parliamentarism, or proportional representation versus single-member-districts, but instead institutional fine-tuning so as to enhance democratic representativeness, efficiency and governability - whether by means of devolution of power or assignment of responsibility.

Economic crisis. It was, as mentioned above, not economic crisis per se which caused the fall of Weimar, but rather two associated factors. First, the perception that the Weimar system was not able to solve Germany's problem played a crucial role. It is important to note that this perception was related to the fact that the 1929-33 crisis was already the second profound crisis in less than ten years. Second, an exceptionally high rate and longevity of unemployment was another related, important determinant. Here it is important to note that:

[d]aily life for the unemployed was not merely a matter of material deprivation and anxiety for the well-being of their families. They also bore the psychological burdens, difficult to overstate, of knowing that they were excluded from the production process - of having to spend the day without being able to perform any useful tasks. The rhythms of work, the time-discipline of the working day, had given shape to their lives and had made leisure all the more precious. All contemporary studies of daily life of the unemployed were agreed that even their leisure activities gradually withered away, that a general loss of a sense of time set in and that the long-term unemployed, in particular, increasingly lost all initiative and hope for a better future. (Peukert 1993, 254)

It is this particular state which made many unemployed not only to vote for extremist parties (above all the KPD), but also to join neighbourhood and political party militias such as the *Rotfront*,

Reichsbanner and the SA, to engage in constant street fights, and thus to contribute to Weimar's socio-political instability especially in the early 1930s in several ways.

The Russian economic crisis is in so far different in that (a) the crisis has been a continuous rather than a repeated one, (b) there was, strictly speaking, no hyper-inflation (although inflation was extremely high in 1992-93), and (c) that the Russian structural economic crisis is related to, or happens concurrently with, a transition effort. In other countries largely similar transition efforts have been successful. This fact makes the Russian case appear prospectively less bleak and hopeless than the Weimar one. In view of the above quotation from Peukert, the 1992-93 soft monetary policy of the old Soviet State Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko might have also had some beneficial effect in that it postponed mass-unemployment for some time (although it, at the same time, had many destructive effects). However, high discharges of workers will eventually come, or are already in the making. The fact that many Russian cities are company towns (the condition of which depends on the viability of usually one large enterprise) introduces a peculiarly aggravating factor which was not present in this form in Germany. It remains to be seen how the dismissals will play out in Russia - i.e. in how prolonged and high unemployment this will result and whether, how well the Russian state will be able to deal with this challenge, and how far Russian society will come to display characteristics of an atomized mass society (Kornhauser 1959).

7.5. Conclusions

A comparison between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia is in view of the relative similarity between the political party spectra of both societies justified. Two broader patterns of instability, and several narrower spheres of particularly severe social conflict appear as to some degree similarly salient in both societies. Moreover, the combination of these patterns and issues define the distinctiveness of both, Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia to a considerable degree in a largely similar way.

First, both societies have been confronted with the task of simultaneously coping with a number of conflicting, principal issues of creating viable modern states. In Weimar, the rapid change

from a largely traditional to a largely modern social and political order aggravated many of the problems inherent in modern life at the same time. In Russia, in contrast, by 1991, large parts of society had already passed the threshold to modernity, e.g. abandoned parochial-subject orientations in their political culture, and embraced the notion of a reflexive technological-scientific progress. However, simultaneity has in this case also been the crucial feature in so far as it referred to simultaneous changes in a number of principal institutions - economic, political, cultural and administrative. Although the decisions to be made and issues to be dealt with are thus substantially different in inter-war Germany and post-Soviet Russia, the gridlocks, conflicts and contradictions involved in the process of multiple, simultaneous reform, problem-solving and transformation are to some degree similar in terms of their frustrating effects on society and de-legitimizing repercussions for the new political regimes.

Second, in both new regimes, the new elites were neither able to prevent old elites from keeping or recapturing important positions in decision-making institutions, nor strong enough to induce the necessary fundamental changes in the attitudes and behavioral patterns of the old elites. Disequilibria between the old elites' internalized informal patterns of behaviour and thinking inherited from the past, and the new, distinctly different formal institutional framework in which these elites have been supposed to function have been undermining the transaction-cost reducing capacity of these institutions (North 1990). What follows is a socially inert, semi-anarchical state in which exchange operations, economic development and social cohesion are inhibited by a lack of interpersonal trust (Putnam 1992). Whether democracy will survive depends to a great deal on whether the gradual replacement or adaption of the old elites will make the new institutions functioning before the aggravation of the pathological features of a modern society, the continued lack of an adequate, trust-generating institutional framework, and the spread of negative social capital (such as the 'mafia' or unofficial militias) lead finally to collapse.

Third, rising nationalism, demographic dislocations, a crisis of the social welfare system, economic depression, disillusionment with Western ideas (or with how they are presented and perceived), crucial political-institutional patterns and an inert, unreformed agriculture were characteristic of Weimar Germany, and are also in one way or another present in post-Soviet Russia. However, these problems play out differently in Russia, and are dealt with by politicians in a different

domestic and international contexts.

Above all, Russian unemployment has neither in its scale, nor in its longevity reached the level of unemployment of the last years of the Weimar Republic. The fact that, at least, urban Russia is today slowly but steadily becoming a post-industrial society introduces a new intervening variable which is difficult to account for. It is, for instance, unknown how many additional discharged work-force the growing service sector is able to absorb.

In general, the world at the turn of the century looks different from inter-Europe. O'Donnell and Schmitter observe:

During the interwar period, authoritarian rulers could aspire to legitimate their government through some combination of the mobilizing imagery of Fascism and references to more traditional forms of corporatism. Such regimes could (and did) promote themselves as long-term solutions to the problems of political order and as the best possible modes of governance for their societies, especially when compared to impotent and divided parliamentary democracies elsewhere in Europe and to the prepotent and monolithic regime in the Soviet Union. Authoritarian rulers emerging after 1945 have not been able to count on such a possibility. This is their Achilles' heel and it explains their ideological schizophrenia. (1986, 15)

In addition one could mention that the spread of transnational media (e.g. CNN), telecommunication (e.g. Internet) and civil society (e.g. Amnesty International), and the growing strength of international organizations (UN, EU, NATO, Council of Europe, OSCE, OECD, IMF, World Bank) insert a whole new set of quasi-political actors into the domestic politics of modern (or post-modern) nation states. These actors were not present in the inter-war European states. By virtue of the institutional constraints these external actors set, and by virtue of their, in general, democracy-promoting activity, they seem to be limiting the freedom of action for, and reduce the political potential of, anti-democratic domestic forces.

However, unchecked optimism would be premature. It appears that neither O'Donnell's and Schmitter's comparison of the pre- with the post-1945 era, nor their assertion that post-World War

If anti-democratic models would necessarily suffer from 'ideological schizophrenia' capture fully the distinctiveness of the inter-war period from the contemporary world. It is, to be sure, beyond dispute that the ideal of democracy has today become relatively more widespread and attractive, and has, moreover, gained considerable credibility through the economic successes and social benefits which those countries which embraced democracy have been able to deliver over the last fifty years. However, not only did and do fascist movements also claim to be in their particular way 'democratic' (in that the people rule through the nation's Leader); and not only are economically successful non-democratic models still available (China, Persian Gulf states, Singapore). What seems to be unaccounted for in the statement of O'Donnell and Schmitter is that the issue dimension of world politics at the end of this century differs not only in terms of democracy's popularity, but has changed so fundamentally from the issue dimension of domestic and international politics of the first half of the century that simple extrapolations are only to a limited degree informative.

It is true that, in inter-war Europe democratic governance, minority rights and human rights were much less salient issues than today; yet neither were ecological disaster, international migration, over-population or the North-South divide. In view of the Western democracies' disproportionate contribution to ecological decline and their swallowing up of most of the world's natural resources, the attractiveness of their socio-political model cannot any longer be taken for granted.

Further, it is not entirely clear what the relatively much more vigorous intrusion of foreign political actors into the domestic sphere today means for the chances of overtly particularist political movements which are explicitly concerned with the preservation of national purity and distinctiveness, and with national re- or newbirth. It would seem not inconceivable that the manifest presence of international media, civil society and organizations make a projection of the responsibility for a domestic crisis on some external actor actually easier for ultra-nationalist politicians. Thus foreign influence and international interdependence may, at least in some instances, actually promote rather than counter-act an ascriptive view of human nature, and parochial and exclusive political claims. The recent rise of religious fundamentalism in many parts of the world can be seen as supporting such an argument. It is also unclear how much the factor of international cooperation and institutional interlocking counts in an age of weapons of mass destruction when every country which has these weapons becomes, in some sense, radically *independent* in that it has the potential to deter, if

necessary, foreign actors with an exceptionally deadly threat. Thus the statement that 'the world has changed since 1945' has a somewhat ambiguous meaning. Or, in other words, too many variables have changed to radically in order to make the claim 'the world has become a better place now' reassuring enough.

As far as, in spite of these multiple changes, the political spectra of Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia do show some remarkable resemblances, one may instead stick to focussing on the important differences in the actual domestic situations of both countries. These are (a) the absence, so far, of large scale unemployment in Russia, and (b) the fact that before German Nazism there had been no fascism and Holocaust whereas before the recent rise of Russian fascism and ultra-conservatism, in contrast, there had already been a violent pre-revolutionary Russian right-wing extremism (Rogger 1968), Stalinism and European fascism. Thus cross-national diffusion processes and historical learning introduce a new variable which is difficult to account for.²⁸⁹

In conclusion, 'Weimar Russia' seems to be a not altogether inappropriate metaphor and conveys some insight into the condition of post-Soviet Russia. One should keep in mind, however, that the Weimar Germany of the 1920s was much less 'Weimarized' than the Weimar Germany of the early 1930s. Whether the intensity of political conflict in Russia will some day in some way resemble that of Weimar Germany of the early 1930s will thus depend mostly on two factors. First, it will depend on whether the Russian democrats and Western states are able to create new political focal points through promoting the spread of information about Russian and generic, historic and contemporary right-wing extremism (including fascism, ultra-conservatism, Stalinism). Second, Russia's further 'Weimarization' will depend on whether it manages to deal with its current unemployment, to slow down the further rise of unemployment, and to manage a growing force of unemployed. It appears that only under the conditions of rapidly growing unemployment and the elite's continued unawareness about possible consequences of a fascist takeover, 'Weimar Russia'

²⁸⁹ The problem with the latter factor though is that the information and analyses on historic right-wing extremism and Stalinism available in Russia today are limited in their quantity and quality. As mentioned in Chapter 5, paradoxically, the most popular and frequently quoted post-Soviet Russian book on Hitler and the 'Third Reich' has been written and published by an important Russian neo-Nazi ideologist, Valentin Prussakov, who is now a major contributor to *Iuridicheskaja gazeta* (Juridical Newspaper), an LDPR organ (Prussakov 1992).

might end in a similar way Weimar Germany did.

8. What Is It All about?: Some Concluding Hypotheses on the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' in Comparative-Contextual Perspective

8.1. Fanatic or Opportunist?

The Conundrum of Fascist Clownerie

The last section of Chapter 6 (on the relevance of the 'last dash'), and the whole of Chapter 7 ('Weimar Russia') can be seen as supporting the argument of Part III on fascist tendencies, and may indicate the appropriateness of a fascist conceptualization of the whole ideology of the LDP between 1990 and 1993. Nevertheless, my tentative - i.e., so far, unverified - conclusion would be rather that, during this time period, the LDP's major propagandistic efforts and its dominating public image were altogether mostly of a right-wing populist, rather than fascist kind (Gestwa and Gestwa 1992). Yet, at the same time, in its programmatic and theoretical documents, the LDP was, on the other side, indeed becoming increasingly hybrid. That means that the LDP between 1990 and 1993 gradually merged its fluid pseudo-liberal and crypto-authoritarian agenda with more and more explicit fascist notions such as those about a Russian 'national revolution', a 'White Europe' and a 'last dash to the South'. This happened inspite of the fact that, in fascist theorizing, the relationship of liberal and fascist ideologies would be regarded as anti-thetical.²⁹⁰ This particular ideological conundrum represents one more corollary to the general contradiction detected in the two diverging interpretations of Zhirinovskii introduced in section 6.2. - i.e. that Zhirinovskii was either a fascist with a keen sense for political tactics and propaganda, or, on the other side, merely a power-hungry demagogue whose utterance of fascist ideas represented - apart from frequent political clownerie -

²⁹⁰ For a case study which outlines in depth the concept of hybrids in comparative ideology, see Roger Griffin's article on the 'democratic fascism' of the Italian right-wing party National Alliance (1996). For a philosophical explanation, as well as on the consequences for political conceptualizations of the hybridization of ideologies, see Freedman 1994.

merely one among many populist stratagems to gain media and voter attention.

On a first glance, there seems to be no solution how to reconcile these equally valid interpretations, and to explain how liberal propaganda slogans could have been uttered by a politician who would later come out as a fascist, and how a political clown could be a nationalist fanatic. Yet, if one sees Zhirinovskii and his party not as an isolated and static, but *contextually conditioned* and *evolutionary* phenomenon, a provisional explanation might be possible.

From Right-Wing Populism to Right-Wing Extremism

Zhirinovskii's development during the time period - and to an even larger degree after December 1993 - seems to resemble a dynamic which has been identified in the evolution of various German right-wing radical politicians and organizations before. Astrid Lange makes an explicit distinction between an ideologically informed right-wing extremism and a more cynical, ideologically flexible and opportunist right-wing populism. She comes with reference to the relationship of these two phenomena in post-war Western Germany to the conclusion that

[i]t is characteristical for *right-wing populists* that they stir up fears and insecurities in the population for the purpose of their own advantage (power, offices, carreer, popularity, money). On tactical grounds, they overemphasize certain aspects, kindle the mood with arm-chair catch phrases, and demand radical solutions for problems they artificially created by themselves. Whether that is 'only' vote-catching [i.e. populism] or a [genuinly] right-wing extremist inclination remains to be checked case by case. Usually, however, there are links to right-wing [extremism]. (Lange 1993, 23; emphasis in original)

Importantly, Lange adds that

Sometimes [electoral] success initiates a 'right-wing socialization' meaning that originally

tactical considerations transform into [authentic] belief content. (Lange 1993, 23)²⁹¹

Although this dynamic of 'right-wing socialization' does not entirely capture the progression of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomeon' until 1993, Lange's observation and her mentioning of the *evolutionary* character of non-conservative, modern right-wing politics can be taken as a starting for a more comprehensive explanation of the genesis of the LDP in the time period under scrutiny here.

8.2. A Grounded Preliminary Explanation

I would interpret the contradictory and, at a first glance, confusing character and development of the LDP between 1990 and 1993 as being determined by, at least, four specific circumstances of post-Soviet Russia or traits of the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon'. First, following Lange, Zhirinovskii's and his followers should be seen as having gone through an idiosyncratic socialization process which was characterized by the LDP's protracted positioning in the political spectrum. Second, this socialization process was above all determined by the late Soviet and early post-Soviet civil and political society's underdevelopment and separatedness from relatively closed country-level politics in the legislative and executive branches of power in 1987-93. Third, Zhirinovskii's protracted self-positioning in Russia's political spectrum was also determined by the occupation of the *palingenetic* dimension in late Soviet and early post-Soviet Russian political discourse by liberal democrats and moderate nationalists such as President Boris El'tsin, a populist liberal, former Prime-Minister Egor Gaidar, a liberal free-marketeteer, the 1996 presidential candidate Grigorii Iavlinskii, a liberal social democrat, former Minister of Finance and today State Duma Deputy Boris Fëdorov, a nationalist liberal, or the eye-physician and 1996 presidential candidate Sviatoslav Fëdorov, a politically liberal, yet economically socialist moderate nationalist. And fourth, Zhirinovskii's seemingly inconsistent behaviour and eccentric public relations strategies should be approached under the viewpoint of the peculiar mixture of pre- and post-modern traits in Russian

²⁹¹ On the possibility of a transformation of Zhirinovskii from a populist to a fascist, see also RV, 30 December 1993; Reshetnikov and Vasilyev 1994; and Morrison 1994, 30.

politics and society since ca. 1987. These four arguments should be now outlined one-by-one.

The Evolutionary Character of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' in 1990-93

One major explanation for the seeming incoherence and contradictions in Zhirinovskii's and his party's behaviour during the time period covered here is that the LDP not only *emerged* and *grew* in terms of organizational breadth and membership. Between 1990 and 1993, it also evolved in terms of defining its ideology, finding its distinct profile, and positioning itself in the political spectrum. One reason for the protracted maturation of the LDP was the occupation of the palingenetic dimension in Russian politics by genuine liberal democrats and moderate nationalists in 1990-93. This argument will ^{be} dealt with in more detail in a below sub-section.

Astrid Lange (1993, 23) has pointed to the evolutionary character of politics on the right fringe in general. Her argument seems to imply that potentially right-wing extremist (including fascist) political entrepreneurs may choose to enter politics mainly on a prominently populist, and less clearly ultra-nationalist ticket for tactical reasons. Another implication of this hypothesis could be that, once such political entrepreneurs have entered politics, they either gradually discover their own 'true' political preferences, or are pushed further to the extreme right by their political environment and the logics of a re-divisioning of scarce political space.²⁹² As was indicated in section 6.4. on the salience of the Southern issue in Zhirinovskii's thought since his student years, the argument that a right-wing extremist may choose to hide partly his political views for tactical reasons certainly to some degree applies to Zhirinovskii's only gradual elaboration of the scheme of a 'last dash'. As all political newcomers, Zhirinovskii had constantly to engage in trade-offs between tactical, strategic and doctrinaire considerations.

However, there seems to be also another reason for the developmental trait in the LDP pronouncements of 1990-93. Zhirinovskii and his party only 'came out' as an essentially fascist political force in 1993 because, until *glasnost*, the right-wing extremist discursive tradition in Russian thought had been either suppressed, or had been mixed with, and reformulated within, communist dogmas by the Soviet regime. Thus, although right-wing extremist attitudes may have

²⁹² See further on the problem of political space in fascism's rise, Linz 1980.

already been heavily present in Zhirinovskii's thinking before 1990, the formulation of a sophisticated programme which would merge the concrete political implications of such attitudes was, in view lacking examples, a difficult endeavour for him for some time. In the first place, Zhirinovskii had to get into contact with Moscow's neo-Nazi youth scene (Iakushev, Arkhipov, Zharikov; secs. 3.3. and 3.5.). He had to have the opportunity to discover his sympathy for the ideas of the important Russian right-wing theoretician Ivan Il'in (sec. 4.1.), to travel around the world and to meet with other right-wing politicians (sec. 3.4. and Appendix I) in the early 1990s. Only having made these important experiences and discoveries, did he acquire enough knowledge and erudition, and an adequate terminological and ideational apparatus in order to bring his ideas together, and to develop a more consistent world-view and concrete political programme.

This particularly developmental trait would also seem to offer some explanation why Zhirinovskii, on the one side, cooperated with Nazis in 1991-92 and with the equally manifestly fascist writer Limonov in summer 1992, and, on the other side, consistently radicalized his own rhetoric only in 1993. In 1992, he cooperated with the Nazis and Limonov because of tactical reasons in that he used their expertise, experience, enthusiasm and peculiar political style to attract media and voter attention. At the same time, he learned from these people and refined his own peculiar right-wing extremist attitudes. He then distanced himself from the fascists for tactical reasons, but also because he had changed himself. By 1993, he had developed his own fairly well-defined fascist scheme which built on his specific expertise in Oriental and especially Turkish affairs, and had a distinctly topical dimension in that it addressed the newly emerging global issue of a North-South divide and civilizational clash. His idiosyncratic vision of a 'going down to the Indian Ocean' did not coincide with Zharikov's and Arkhipov's esoteric neo-Nazism, and Limonov's newly interpreted National Bolshevism. That they separated was thus not illogical in ideational terms and was not merely tactically determined.

This would, in addition, explain why Zhirinovskii did not explicitly voice his plan for a 'going down to the Indian Ocean' in his, nevertheless, extremely aggressive and already clearly fascist interview to the German fascist ideologist Wolfgang Strauß of summer 1992 reprinted in the first *Liberal* issue of 1993. In mid-1992, he simply did not have yet such a well-formulated plan at his disposal, although his apprehensions against 'Southerners' and palingenetic visions (national

revolutions', a unified 'White Europe') were already clearly discernible (sub-sec. 5.4.2.).

Thus, if the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' is seen in evolutionary terms some aspects of the above puzzle of two equally valid, yet fundamentally contradictory interpretations of the phenomenon can be disentangled. The first interpretation said that Zhirinovskii is a cool-headed fascist tactician, and the second that he is a populist for whom voicing clearly fascist ideas was and is merely one among several stratagems to attract various types of voters. In some regards, Zhirinovskii was and is both. He started as a right-wing populist who cooperated with numerous fascists ranging from Nietzsche-admirer Skurlatov in 1990 to Hitler-admirer Batogov in 1994. He did and does this indeed rather for tactical reasons in that he, above all, exploited and exploits these men's political, organizational and journalistic expertise for his party-building and propaganda efforts. This was recently also exemplified by the rapprochement between Zhirinovskii and the prolific fascist publicist Valentin Prussakov.

On the other side, the emergence of the elaborate scheme of a 'last dash to the South' by 1993 - a distinctly original idea in the Russian context - marks that Zhirinovskii is himself a fascist with his own ultra-nationalist, palingenetic agenda. As mentioned previously, the fact that one can establish a wide-ranging eclecticism in the fascist ideas voiced by LDP representatives or allies does not contradict fascist theorizing which has established eclecticism and syncretism as one important corollary of the phenomenon of fascism (Griffin 1993a, 1995a). In other words, that the fascist visions of Zhirinovskii himself ('last dash'), the Zharikov-Arkhipov group (esoteric Nazism), Limonov (National Bolshevism), Iu. Kuznetsov's and M. Ivanov's St. Petersburg group ('Inner Predictor' against the Jews) and of Batogov and Prussakov (admiration for Hitler) differ from each other does not invalidate the argument that the LDP developed into a more or less properly and coherently fascist party.

Three further explanations for the seemingly incoherent, contradictory character of the Zhirinovskii phenomenon and its development until December 1993 should be put forward now. Whereas the above argument concerned some generalizable characteristics of right-wing extremist and fascist politics everywhere, the following interpretations are above all concerned with the specific socio-economic, political-institutional and normative-cultural as well as technological environment in which Zhirinovskii's party emerged, rose and now exists.

The Separatedness of the State from Civil and Political Society

The heavy post-totalitarian legacy of the neo-Stalinist Soviet system entailed, among other things, a relatively underdeveloped civil and political society. This meant, among other things, that nonetheless existing components of post-Stalinist Russian civil and political society - above all the dissident movement - either were independent, yet comparatively sharply separated from access to decision-making bodies, or had links to public institutions and access to decision-making processes; yet they were then also in one way or another dependent on these institutions. These seemingly civic and political organizations thus would have to be classified as not actually belonging to civil society proper, or as not actually forming a distinct political society separated from the state itself. In many other modern societies, political entrepreneurs, such as Zhirinovskii, would have had the choice between a wide variety of organizations, groupings, networks and structures which they could have joined, exploited or taken over, on which resources they could have relied, or in which they could have made a career. For Zhirinovskii, in contrast, there were only limited opportunities in this regard.

To be sure, in the late Soviet period, certain opportunities for political engagement such as voter-associations in the main cities did emerge. Yet, these opportunities were limited in number, scope, and resource equipment. Their openness to newcomers was also constrained. Thus the few existing right-wing extremist civil and political society institutions ready to engage in relatively independent social activity can be divided into three types which were, for different reasons, equally closed to, or unsuitable for, Zhirinovskii.

The first type constituted a few indeed relatively novel, but, at the same time, dubious and publicly stigmatized groupings such as the notorious *Pamiat* 'groups which were, moreover, rabidly anti-semitic and thus beyond Zhirinovskii's reach. The second type included Soviet semi-official structures with an, in contrast to *Pamiat* ', well-developed public image and relatively good political standing such as the circles around the ultra-nationalist 'thick journals' *Molodaia gvardiia* and *Nash Sovremennik* (Brudny 1991). However, these institutions and the composition of the organizations they gave birth to had highly entrenched and rigid structures, were implicated in cooperation with the *ancien regime*, and, in any way, with their inherited structure and attitude, incapable of effective political action - as the disastrous performance of the candidates of the so-called Council of Popular-Patriotic Forces co-led by Ziuganov in the 1990 Russian federal and regional elections illustrated.

The third type were simply children of the *ancien regime* with different organizational and political capabilities. Some of these structures, such as the KPRF (communists) and APR (agrarians), have, it is true, in distinction to some others - such as *Soiuz* and the Civic Union - survived as viable political forces. Yet, their staff, attitudes and structures were largely determined by their origins or heritage. There was no place for new political figures such as Zhirinovskii in organizations such as the ultra-nationalist umbrella organizations orchestrated by the KPRF. To be sure, Zhirinovskii would have probably succeeded in 1990 in joining the Communist Party itself - something he had tried at least twice (during university studies in the late 1960s and at *Iniurkollegiia* in the early 1980s). Yet, having no proven record of party or state apparatus work, it seems probable that leadership positions would have remained closed to him.

What this argument tries to suggest is that the leap from civil to political society, from political obscurity to presidential and parliamentary candidacy, from a 'divan-party' to a well-structured nation-wide organization, and from an announcement of political aspirations to actual member- or leadership in decision-making bodies was - in some regards - not an easy task for an outsider in Russia in the early 1990s. To be sure, a lot of novel political positions and new political space demanding new personnell were available in 1990. Consequently, many former dissidents, academics and low-level functionaries made astonishingly quick political careers in those days. Yet, most of these activists, organizers and professors had already before their involvement in the new politics of late or post-Soviet Russia acquired some sort of profile, resources, or status in society, or, in Bourdieu's terms, some sort of political, economic or cultural 'capital'. Zhirinovskii had, apart from possible ties to the KGB, no such 'capital' to his disposal.

Therefore, during the first years for Zhirinovskii's political activities since approximately 1988, tactical considerations heavily outweighed strategic and doctrinaire motives. In other words, Zhirinovskii had first to climb up the social and political ladder and to acquire some sort of political, cultural and economic 'capital' before he could behave as his ideological motives suggested. On the other side, in some regards, 'bad things went together'. That means Zhirinovskii could enhance his political capital exactly by voicing openly his resentment, xenophobia and racist, authoritarian, palingenetic and ultra-nationalist ideas. This was in certain situations and for certain voters an adequate behaviour. In some instances, however, he had to refrain from doing so in order to avoid

deterrence of potential political partners and sponsors, to prevent persecution by the judiciary, not to alienate sympathizers in the successor agencies of the communist party and Soviet state, and to preclude an untimely stigmatization as a fascist by the mass media.

The effect of the fractionalization, underdevelopment and isolation of post-Soviet Russian civil and political society on Zhirinovskii's rise was two-fold. First, in order to acquire some political position in 1990-93, Zhirinovskii and his party had to substitute organizational strength and social capital with extensive coverage in the mass media. This meant that political scandals replaced the 'normal', multifarious political activity of a political party in domestic political and social, as well as in foreign affairs. Because of the fractionalized political system until December 1993, Zhirinovskii had no political weight whatsoever. Thus he had to attract the attention of the media by providing information which would be valuable to journalists, newspapers, radio-stations, and TV networks not so much because of their political significance, but because of their entertainment potential. Zhirinovskii became famous not so much as a politician than as an entertainer. This aspect of the Zhirinovskii Phenomenon will be dealt with again in the below sub-section on the peculiarly mixed pre- and post-modern context of Zhirinovskii's rise.

Second, Zhirinovskii had in 1990-91 to follow the scripts which the old establishment had written for him. This designation said that he had to become a new democrat, liberal and centrist. The *ancien regime* did then not need an ultra-nationalist as its proxy in the new multi-party system. In fact, by then, the old establishment had already tried to promote prominent ultra-nationalists from outside the communist party and state apparatuses in the 1989 and 1990 all-Union, Russian federal and regional parliamentary elections. As mentioned above, the results of this tactic proved then, however, to be disastrous. Almost all candidates of Ziuganov's Council of National-Patriotic Forces failed to win seats in 1990. Indeed, some of the new Russian Congress of People's Deputies most vocal ultra-nationalists, such as Nikolai Pavlov and Sergei Baburin, who consistently and closely cooperated with the communist faction in the 1990-93 Russian parliament, were elected on tickets of the then main, genuinely liberal-democratic umbrella organization, Democratic Russia, which supported El'tsin. The protracted ultra-nationalist coming out of such Democratic Russia candidates as Pavlov and Baburin must have been a bitter experience for the leading activists of Democratic Russia. On the other side, it must have been a very welcome - though unexpected - opportunity for

the *ancien regime* representatives to widen their basis of social support.

As was outlined in detail in Part I, the 'Zhirinovskii phenomenon' of this period of 1990-91 largely falls within this context of *ancien regime* maneuvering. Nevertheless, the importance of this initial period for Zhirinovskii's political profile goes beyond 1991. As far as Zhirinovskii's pseudo-liberal and pseudo-centrist hurly-burly in 1990-91 marked the emergence of the LDP and lasted approximately one whole year, he and his party became to some degree path-dependent. That means although, until summer 1991, Zhirinovskii had had to play a role ascribed to him by others, he could after the implosion of the Soviet system not suddenly and radically change the outlook of his party. Above all, he was left with the name 'Liberal-Democratic Party' and with a bunch of published party documents containing a lot of explicitly liberal and, at least by implication, strongly pro-Western slogans. Zhirinovskii's peculiar profile of this period was that of a hybrid, in-between politician who was neither a *demokrat* in the sense of a pro-Western, genuinely liberal orientation, nor a Soviet reactionary such as some *Soiuz* representatives or the putschists of August 1991, nor a traditional, romanticist ultra-nationalist such as the contributors to the 'thick journals' *Moskva* or *Nash sovremennik*.

This peculiar, partly imposed and partly deliberately taken hybrid position of Zhirinovskii was, to be sure, also an advantage. Until the LDP's 1993 radicalization, it was especially useful in rebutting the accusation of political extremism and restorationism, and in claiming, for instance in front of Western reporters, to represent a pro-Western political force (see Appendix II). And as indicated above, the *ancien regime*'s 1990-91 staging of Zhirinovskii as a non-reactionary, media-effective visible political figure proved to be a successful strategy with regard to the 1991-93 period. Yet, once political society started gaining strength in Russia in the aftermath of the crucial 1993 parliamentary elections, this indeterminate profile turned out to be more of a liability than an advantage for Zhirinovskii and his party. Zhirinovskii's mixture of ultra-nationalism, liberalism and clownerie had certainly the useful side-effect of making Western and Russian journalists and political observers to dismiss him as not to be taken seriously. Yet, it had a similar effect on many of his potential right-wing extremist allies, and especially on crucial ideologists for whom 'liberalism' and, to a lesser degree though, 'democracy' are no-terms. Zhirinovskii appeared to them for a long time as a mere political provocateur. This damaged Zhirinovskii's image among his potential supporters, and his

opportunities to engage in beneficial alliances considerably.

As a result, one significant distinction between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia is that, so far, no proper equivalent to the *Harzburger Front* has emerged in Russia. There is a certain parallel between Hindenburg's and Hugenberg's disapproval of Hitler's tinkering with 'socialism', and the Russian mainstream Right's disapproval of Zhirinovskii's talk about 'liberalism' or 'centrism' and his scandalism. Yet, eventually, Hugenberg included the NSDAP in the *Harzburger Front* for tactical reasons - i.e. in order, as he saw it, to capture the non-socialist component of the NSDAP for his purposes, and to strengthen the united right-wing extremist front. Zhirinovskii and his party, in contrast to Hitler and the NSDAP, emerged first as a political marionette of the *ancien regime* and then had to survive in a still peculiarly fractionalized civil and political society with little access to decision-making bodies. This led to a protracted positioning of Zhirinovskii on the right-wing fringe of the political spectrum. It made Zhirinovskii to a greater degree an outsider in the political scene than Hitler who had also to balance the populist and electorally efficient effects with the deleterious repercussions of his pseudo-socialist propaganda.

However, although Zhirinovskii still suffers from the ambivalent image he acquired during the first years of his political activity, since his electoral success in 1993, he has become increasingly accepted by both, the mainstream post-communist and the mainstream conventional Right. Interviews with him appeared in major right-wing publications such as *Zavtra* and *Sovetskaia Rossiia*. The former editor-in-chief of the influential *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Military-Historical Journal), General Filatov, has become the head of the LDPR's propaganda department. The editorial board of the respected right-wing weekly *Iuridicheskaiia gazeta* (Juridical Newspaper) switched from cooperation with, to full membership in, the LDPR. By October 1997, Zhirinovskii's acceptance in the mainstream Right has went so far that the leader of the Agrarian Party, Mikhail Lapshin, complained in an interview that the LDPR had not participated in a joint conference of the 'popular-patriotic opposition' although Zhirinovskii had been explicitly invited (*ITAR-TASS*, 28 October 1997).

In conclusion, it remains to be seen how far the rapprochement between the LDPR and Ziuganov's National-Patriotic Union, the major new umbrella organization, will go. It is unclear whether Zhirinovskii will ever be able to get rid of his image as a clown, marionette and ideological

opportunist. As will emerge from the below argument concerning a possible successor of Zhirinovskii as an LDPR leader, a closer collaboration between the LDPR and the mainstream Right could, in the long run, be not only possible. It would, should there be a smooth leader change in the LDPR, seem probable. In other words, a Russian equivalent to the *Harzburger Front* might be in the waiting.

The Unavailability of the Palingenetic Dimension

A third major explanation of the inconsistency and lacking seriousness in the early development of the LDPR is that the palingenetic dimension in politics was occupied by the democrats and the El'tsin regime, and probably to some degree still is so. Juan Linz has noted the importance of the division and scarcity of political space for modern politics. He interpreted the idiosyncrasies of fascist movements, contradictions in their ideology, and the anti-rationalism of their stance as a result of, among others, their entering of modern politics when the political space had already been divided between the Left and Right (Linz 1980).

This argument should be seen in connection with Roger Griffin's explanation for the absence of even a moderately significant fascist movement in the United States of America in the inter-war period and especially after the World Economic Crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The Crisis hit the U.S. economy and society in many respect as badly as some major European economies and societies. In view of North America's cultural proximity to Europe, the diffusion potential of the Italian and German examples was clearly large enough to reach not only Britain, the Iberic peninsula and Scandinavia, but also beyond the Atlantic Ocean. However, although, in the 1920s, the Ku-Klux-Clan had between 4-5 million members, no noteworthy national-level fascist party emerged in the U.S.. Griffin explains that this was not only a result of a lacking feudal past, an inbuilt universalism in the American constitution and national ethos, a more thoroughly democratic political culture, a differently structured party system, an absence of a narrowly ethnic particularism, and a strong prevalence of various religions and active churches diverting some of the energy which also seems to feed nationalism.

Instead, Griffin explains fascism's absence in America by its being not only a distinctly modern, but also as a specifically modernist and in a peculiar sense even 'progressive' movement in that it purports to create an *alternative* modernity. Therefore, he explained that fascism did not gain

a footing in the United States because the political space for a movement promising a national ascent, and the idea of a distinctly nation-specific future was already occupied, and thus not available for fascism. The 'American nation' lived already in the 'New World'; it was already the 'first new nation'. The Germans', Russians' and other nations' post-World War I obsession with American technology, way of life, Taylorism, Fordism and other ideas and fashions showed to Europe, to America itself and to the rest of the world already then: The future belongs to America. As far as the American nation was already a 'new' nation, the idea of a 'newborn nation' - the central notion in fascist thought - did not have much of an appeal in the United States (Griffin 1993a).

America's relative position to the 'Old World' combined with elements of palingenetic liberalism in its constitution and outlook meant that ultra-nationalist rebirth-rhetoric encountered overwhelming competition in the contest for occupancy of the palingenetic dimension in political space. Since then, the United States have become even more of a leading 'nation' in the international context. Consequently, *fascist* right-wing radicalism has remained marginal in spite of the continuous prevalence of the racism issue in politics, and the rise of a new radical traditionalism and religious fundamentalism which is sometimes summarized under the label the 'New Right'. Thus, there is a certain radical right-wing potential in the United States (although it is probably not as large as in contemporary Western Europe). But because of, among other things, the unavailability of the palingenetic dimension in politics, it does not play out as a fascist movement in the USA.

An argument which reminds and reconfigures some ideas in Griffin's interpretation can be made for the peculiar post-Soviet Russian political space. It should take us another step towards explaining the peculiarity of the Zhirinovskii phenomenon. If Zhirinovskii is seen as a fascist, then he encountered in the late 1980s and early 1990s a distinctly difficult situation on Russia's political market-place. At this period especially and to a certain degree still now, there was not only a heavy occupation, but even a certain deflation of the palingenetic dimension in Russian politics. First, palingenetic rhetoric with different connotations had been the at the core of communist ideology and a major legitimization mode for the Soviet regime. In some instances, the Soviets saw themselves as building the civilization of the future per se. In others, they purportedly showed not the 'right', but merely an alternative political and socio-economic path (which would eventually turn out to be the 'right' one). In still other instances, the Soviet-Russian model figured specifically as the most

appropriate model of quick modernization for developing countries. Thus, paradoxically, in the ultra-conservative spectrum of Russian politics (represented above all by the Communist Party), one can find nominally revolutionary phrases although they are used in a distinctly reactionary vain.

The second competitor for the palingenetic dimension in late Soviet Russian politics was Gorbachëv's programme of *perestroika* (rebuilding, reconstruction) and 'New Thinking' which had strong underpinnings of a re- or newbirth in that it aimed at a substantially amended socialism. Moreover, there are good reasons to take Stalin's claim that he executed a second revolution from above seriously. In that case, Gorbachëv's de-Stalinization agenda would even seem to imply not only an in-depth reform, but a de facto revolutionary change (or, for that matter, a counter-revolution) in Soviet society - although it did not imply a departure from the alternative, socialist path of development.

Third, there were and are in the Russian public discourse also strongly prevalent rebirth ideas with romantic and traditionalist denotations implying in one way or another the return to the pre-revolutionary path of development, and sometimes to monarchy (and in a few cases even to autocracy). As indicated in an introductory section to Part III on *Liberal*, the idea of a return to pre-communist patterns is interpreted in two basic ways. In some instances, the revival of the pre-1917 tradition could mean a return to the European way of development which would, usually, amount to a moderately nationalist, essentially liberal, though, perhaps, somewhat atavistic agenda. In other instances, it has more explicitly anti-democratic, exclusivist and anti-modern implications amounting to an essentially ultra-nationalist, reactionary agenda. Although both of these agendas make an emphasis on a *re-* and not *new-*birth of the nation and are thus not palingenetic in Griffin's sense, the institutions they propose and symbols they use are new for today Russians who have no memory of the pre-1917 period. To some degree, these agendas thus compete with properly palingenetic agendas for scarce political space.

Fourth, the most important competitor of post-Soviet Russian fascism in the occupation of the palingenetic dimension was and still is radically reformist Western-oriented liberalism. El'tsin, and even more so young reformers like Egor Gaidar, Anatolii Chubais and Boris Nemtsov have occupied to a considerable degree such notions as 'creating a new Russia', 'leading Russia into the 21st century' and 'making Russia a modern, civilized country'. Contrary to fascist promises, Russia is,

according to the rhetoric of liberal politicians, already in the process of being born anew. After a period which was perceived as decadent by both, liberals and ultra-nationalists, it were the former and not the latter who managed to capitalize most on Russian society's readiness for innovation.

As long as, at least, the image of radical change and modernization through the El'tsin regime and especially its young or youthful reformers survives, I would argue, Russian fascism will have difficulties to sell its programme effectively. It simply does not make much sense to propagate an alternative to liberal-democratic modernity as long as there is a perception that this novel liberal-democratic modernity has not actually arrived yet, or that it is still in the process of making. At first, there would have to be a perception that the transition to an ostensibly universalist, equalitarian, individualist society has succeeded. Only when the Russian reform drive, and the dominant public and intellectual discourse about them have reached this stage and when El'tsin and his reform team can not any longer claim that vital changes are still to be made, assertions that the liberal-democratic type of modernity has failed or that it is not suited for Russia may have the chance to gain credibility.

Of course, at the latter stage, the credibility of this assertion will greatly depend on the Russian economy's and polity's performance, Russia's relative standing in the world, and a wide variety of international factors including relations with the West, developments in Chinese domestic and foreign affairs, and the future of radical politicized Islamism. Depending of how well the new ostensibly liberal-democratic socio-political order will be suited to tackle these problems, and how far nominally democratic structures will be open to societal input and filled with civic activity, Russian fascism's promise to create a new Russia-specific, alternative, post-liberal socio-political order will be either more, or less attractive. However, as long as several concepts of a 'new Russia' are competing with each other on the Russian political marketplace, fascism will remain marginal.

This interpretation gives an additional explanation of why Zhirinovskii's outcome as a fascist has been protracted, and why, since early 1993, he has used the conflicting tactics of opportunist populism and deliberate scandalism in the mass media, on the one hand, and of aggressive ultra-nationalism and doctrinaire revolutionary imperialism in party publications such as *Liberal* and *The Last Dash to the South*, on the other. It also partly explains why Zhirinovskii's long-standing plan of a 'transition to North-South relations' would only appear in an elaborate form in *Liberal* and *The Last Dash* in 1993, and why he had explicated some of the underlying ideas most explicitly first in

1992 interviews to the American daily *Los Angeles Times* or the German neo-fascist journal *Nation und Europa*. It would also clarify somewhat why he, on the one hand, cooperated with people like Zharikov and Limonov closely when his own politics were more moderate in 1992, and, on the other hand, distanced himself from these politicians in 1993 when his own politics became more radical.

As long as the palingenetic dimension in Russian politics was firmly occupied by more or less radical liberals, Russian fascism - in contrast to Russian ultra-conservatism - was doomed to be marginal. There were during the initial transition period many grievances to be exploited by right-wing politicians whether of a reactionary (Ziuganov), moderately conservative (Civic Union), liberal-authoritarian (Lebed) or populist (Zhirinovskii) kind. Yet, these grievances did not lend themselves to be mobilized for a new 'national revolution', and the search for yet another fundamental innovation in Russian domestic and foreign policies. Thus Zhirinovskii made only gradually public his revolutionary imperialist ideas. He even voiced some of them first in Western and not Russian print media. It was only when the first, 1992 large reform drive of the Russian executive seemed to come to a standstill during the summer 1993 deadlock with the Russian legislative that Zhirinovskii published two of his most explicitly fascist statements and made sure that they were heard all over the country. This was first the article 'The Collapse of the Fourth International' which explicitly defended Hitler's idea of merging nationalism and socialism to 'national-socialism' published in one of Russia's largest dailies *Izvestiia* in August 1993 (1993c); and, secondly, the first edition of his major book *The Last Dash to the South* of which some 30,000 copies appeared in late September 1993 (1993a). By that time, public discourse in Russia was partly captured by the extreme Right as exemplified by the rapprochement between the National Salvation Front and the chairmen of the Russian parliament, Ruslan Khazbulatov, and Russian Constitutional Court, Valerii Zorkin, who, noteworthy, both gave interviews to the clearly ultra-nationalist, partly fascist major weekly *Den'* (later recalled *Zavtra*) in summer 1993. Privatization, demonopolization and political reform were at that point seen to have failed. Consequently, the political space for agendas of alternative modernity seemed to emerge, and had to be captured decisively. The preconditions for the coming out of a new palingenetic movement had arrived. Their presence was then perhaps most manifestly confirmed by the active and undisguised participation of Aleksandr Barkashov's openly neo-Nazi Russian National Unity fighters in the October 3-4 ultra-nationalist uprising.

Zhirinovskii, probably to his advantage, was during the crucial days of the September-October 1993 crisis visiting his friend's, Gerhard Frey's, German People's Union *DVU*, and gave an address at the *DVU*'s early October 1993 rally in the Passau *Nibelungenhalle*. When Zhirinovskii came back to Russia on October 3rd, he sensed quickly the political implications of this crisis, and proposed his mediation between the conflicting sides. During the subsequent pre-election period of October-November 1993, he largely refrained from re-stating his fascist ideas of August-September 1993 and retracted to his populist tactics of 1992.

This change of behaviour is in agreement with the interpretative framework of this subsection. When in summer 1992, El'tsin and the democrats seemed to loose the political initiative, and public political discourse was turning against radical economic and political reform, new palingenetic political space seemed to become available. Thus Zhirinovskii went forward to publish his pro-Nazism *Izvestiia* article and *The Last Dash* in order to respond to the new situation. The political configuration, however, changed again radically with El'tsin's September 1993 re-appointment of the leading Westernizer Egor Gaidar as First Deputy Prime-Minister, and, above all, his September 21st Decree ordering the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies and of the Constitutional Court, new parliamentary elections and a referendum on a new constitution. Suddenly, the radically liberal transformation of Russian society gained new live, and projects for an alternative modernity were once again condemned to marginality. Consequently, Zhirinovskii retracted to his populist tactics.

These populist tactics of propaganda aimed at the mass audience, however, have to be distinguished from Zhirinovskii's efforts to build an effective party-machine. In the framework of this venture, Zhirinovskii was ready to use the services of such able functionaries as the neo-Nazis Zharikov and Arkhipov who, in the beginning, were useful in attracting Moscow's youth by their publishing of the openly fascist youth-oriented irregular *Liberal* supplement *Sokol Zhirinovskogo*. However, when, in summer-autumn 1992, Zharikov's and Arkhipov's drive to gradually transform the LDP in a fully fascist party gained strength with the publication of the numbers 3 and 4 of *Sokol Zhirinovskogo*, this effort coincided with the eclipse of Russia's first radical reform drive and El'tsin's announcement of a mass privatization programme. As far as Russia's peaceful, liberal revolution was then in full speed and the palingenetic dimension in political language firmly occupied by El'tsin, Chubais, Gaidar and others, Zharikov and Arkhipov's insistence on the LDP's further radicalization

was untimely, and their usage of palingenetic slogans tactically inappropriate. Consequently, Zhirinovskii tacitly distanced himself from Arkhipov and Zharikov and intervened in their publication efforts. As a result, two competing issues of number 4 of *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* were published in autumn 1992: one fascist by Zharikov and Arkhipov, and one more moderate, populist by Zhirinovskii's Tatar General Secretary Akhmet Khalitov.

However, by early 1993, the political context had changed again significantly. Above all, the radical reformer Egor Gaidar had been replaced by the moderate conservative Viktor Chernomyrdin in December 1992, and El'tsin's power was curtailed significantly during the first months of 1993. Whereas Russian reforms had seemed to get new momentum with the announcement of the privatization programme in autumn 1992, by early 1993, the fate of Russian reforms had become highly unclear. Consequently, Zhirinovskii switched to a more radical stance, at least in his publications in *Liberal*, and introduced palingenetic ideas. This mood seemed to change again on April 25, 1993 when El'tsin re-gained the initiative through a successful referendum supporting his position vis-a-vis the increasingly reactionary Congress of People's Deputies. Zhirinovskii, as a result, took actively part in El'tsin's Constitutional Assembly in early June 1993. Yet, during the following two months, El'tsin failed to cash in the new political weight he seemed to have gained in the April 1993 referendum. Instead, the right-wing extremist spectrum consolidated and reached out to the leadership of the Russian parliament and Constitutional Court. The Congress of People's Deputies managed to adopt a law de facto curtailing Chubais' privatization programme. By August-September 1993, the congress was actively preparing the adoption of a law de facto abolishing the presidential system in the Russian executive.

Consequently, at the same time, Zhirinovskii came out publicly - and not only in the LDP party press - with an alternative to both, the ostensibly established liberal-democratic modernity and a retrogression to the politically pre-modern past. As mentioned above, he published his piece on the merger of nationalism and socialism in *Izvestiia* and *The Last Dash*. He then switched again back to opportunist populism once the reformers had regained the political initiative in October 1993. During the 1993 election campaign, he avoided strictly political issues but presented himself as a moderate and 'man from the street', and promised, among other things, that he would provide men to lonely living women.

In most of 1994-95, the influence of the reformers around El'tsin waned again. Instead, the machinations of the conservative hangover personell in the El'tsin administration, and of such dubious figures such as the Chief of Presidential Security Staff Aleksandr Korzhakov became dominant. Together these clans formed the 'Party of War' which initiated the Chechnia adventure. As thus the pace of Russian reform seemed to slow again, Zhirinovskii became again more radical and added an especially vitriolic anti-Americanism to his anti-Asian racism. In December 1994, the LDPR faction in the State Duma was the only major political force which voted openly in support of a continuation of the Chechen war.

In conclusion, both Linz's pointing out of the importance of an already largely divided, scarce political space for the emergence and peculiarity of fascism (1980), and Griffin's argument about the existence of a palingenetic dimension in transitional politics for which various political forces compete (1993a) seem to be useful. If seen in this context, Zhirinovskii's apparently inconsistent behaviour had not only a tactical but also strategic dimension. Not only had Zhirinovskii to secure his party from legal persecution during times of a reformist hegemony in the executive. With the continuing changes on Russia's political landscape, and leading reformers and conservatives frequently changing their relative positions in the state hierarchy and public discourse, Zhirinovskii had also constantly to refashion his own public image in order to secure for himself a political niche. At some times, he would become more of a 'centrist', or a more pragmatic and grounded 'liberal democrat', make populist promises, and merely question the professionalism and statesmanship of the dominant reformers who were slowly carrying out an economic, ethical, social and political revolution during the last seven years. At other times, in contrast, he would seize the political space left open by departing or fired reform ministers such as Egor Gaidar, Anatolii Chubais and Boris Fëdorov, and propose instead his own social, political and ethical revolution - a fascist one though. In other words, as long as liberal-democratic palingenetic rhetoric dominated public discourse and the legitimization of state policies, Zhirinovskii could do little more than criticize the course of this form of national newbirth. As soon as El'tsin switched to a more cautious and perhaps even conservative agenda, Zhirinovskii would instead propose his own variety of national newbirth through radical domestic re-centralization and an unprecedented imperial expansion. As should have emerged in Part I on Zhirinovskii's build-up of his party, the LDP leader is a cunning, politically clever, cool-blooded, and

thoroughly calculating politician as well as able organizer. The introduction of Griffin's argument about the importance of the availability of the palingenetic dimension in transitional politics allows for an interpretation of Zhirinovskii's behaviour in agreement with the empirical findings of Part I. In conclusion, at least some apparent manifest contradictions in Zhirinovskii's actions appear thus as not inconsistent with largely rational considerations of appropriate political tactics and strategies in changing political contexts and opportunity structures.

The Mixture of Pre- and Post-Modern Politics in Russia

A final argument to be made here in order to resolve the above mentioned conundrums of fascist clownerie, opportunist ideologism and corrupt fanaticism is that Russia is now, perhaps, in a unique stage of social development. It combines an absence of a properly developed civil and political society, intermediate institutions and *Rechtsstaat* as well as a partly still traditional political culture (especially in remote provinces and regions) with a nominally open political system and increasingly far-reaching and technologically advanced telecommunication systems and electronic media. The Russians are now entering in many regards the post-industrial age of cross-border communication, entertainment, cultural and normative pluralism, moral relativism, and ubiquitous advertising - a new stage of socio-cultural development which has been by some labelled 'post-modernity'.

Yet, at the same time, Russian society has not gone through some crucial stages of the restructuring and reconsolidation of the social fabric during, after and as a result of the passing of traditional society and its communitarian, particularist, familist, hierarchical and manichean ontological-normative outlooks, standards, norms and mores, and the vertical partron-client and principal-agent relationships which traditional value-systems support. Neither had Russian society the time to develop the full set of modern social capital - i.e. a network of non-state institutions which structure society, channel, aggregate or diffuse social inputs into the political system, provide alternative sources of identity, nurture political society, and protect individuals' private life and socio-cultural groups from intervention from outside and, above all, by the state. Nor had Russian public discourse so far the time to reflect sufficiently upon the multifarious ambiguities and risks involved with the advent of modern industrial production and its novel demands upon the natural environment, or with the massive application of qualitatively new technologies such as nuclear power and genetic

engineering. In a number of ways, Russian society is currently becoming post-modern without having ever become fully culturally, socio-structurally and politically modernized.²⁹³ Since 1987, Russia has been going through an unprecedented socio-cultural collapse, and a unique *Sturzmodernisierung* into an *unreflexive* post-modernity, and high-tech mass-society of socially atomized individuals exposed to ever more sophisticated infotainment (Kornhauser 1958).

To be sure, in Russia as all over the world, the large-scale use of new information technologies and electronic media also promotes the spread of universalist, individualistic and equalitarian norms, society's cross-regional social cohesion, and the nations integration into various cross-national or even global normative and institutional networks. Yet, in distinction to most Western post-industrial states, the civic institutions to restrain, counteract, neutralize or balance the pathologies and mis-use of these new communication technologies are absent or underdeveloped in Russia. The probably most manifest and for Russian society so far most stressful explication of this peculiar phenomenon was the unrestraint rise and subsequent catastrophic crumbling of the huge, notorious financial pyramide schemes such as *MMM*, *Russkii dom 'Selenga'* or *Khopër-Invest* which made large-scale use of televsion, modern advertisement techniques, and computer technology in order to deceive millions of Russian investors.

This peculiar state of current Russian society implies that Western evaluative frameworks for political ideas, institutions and styles are only partly applicable to Russian conditions, or have to be refashioned substantially in order to incorporate these idiosyncrasies. Thus, in the absence of a proper party-system, it is only of limited interest how far the LDPR represents a proper party as long as it functions as an effective election machine. In the absence of a sufficiently well-defined framework of pluralist ethics, political norms and conventions, it is only of limited interest how bizarre Zhirinovskii's scandalous behaviour is as long as this behaviour is successful in putting him in the headlines. In the absence of public reflection on how the advent of weapons of mass destruction effects the conduct of international politics, it is only of limited interest to point out the inappropriateness of Zhirinovskii's threat to use nuclear weapons as long as he succeeds in making

²⁹³ Of course, Russia has, since Stalin's industrialization drive in the 1930s, become technologically and administratively modern, and been profoundly secularized. Perhaps, post-Stalin Soviet-Russian society can be labelled 'half-modern'.

this threat to appear as promoting Russian national interest. In the absence of proper information about, and familiarity with, foreign countries, it is only of limited interest how fantastic Zhirinovskii's conspiracy theories with regard to the 'South' or the United States are as long as such theories are effectively spread accross the country, and provide a conceptual framework for explaining a number of poorly or misunderstood current foreign and domestic political developments. In the absence of any - apart from the Communist Party - well-defined and -organized interest, pressure or political groups, it is only of limited interest how much the LDPR is restrained by its dependence on the popularity of its leader as long as it has such a leader, as long as Russian politics as a whole remains personalistic and voters tend to identify political movements rather with their leaders than with their ideologies, and as long as other political groupings similarly depend on the relative popularity of their leadership figures.

In conclusion, from the Western view of point, it might be obvious that Zhirinovskii and his party represent an extra-ordinary eccentric, and scandalously amoral, cynical and irresponsible political force which would be at best ephemeral in any Western country. However, Zhirinovskii's rise is not only a result of the socio-economic crisis Russia is experiencing now. It is also an indication of how profoundly the ethical, cultural and political norms which would normally prevent the rise of a figure as erratic as Zhirinovskii are shattered in Russia.

The socio-cultural crisis of Russia is deeper than in other comparable countries. On the one side, the post-Soviet Russian socio-cultural and -political system does not any longer purport open or crypto-traditional value orientations. Such has remained the case in the still significantly traditional societies of Central Asia. On the other side, Russia does so far also not resemble such largely socio-culturally modernized countries as the new democracies of East-Central Europe where the mixture of traditional and quasi-socialist values under communist regimes has quickly been replaced with well-defined concepts of national identity and future development, and with a set of modern political-cultural norms which have been either inherited from the pre-1945 period or imported from today Western Europe or North America. Thus Russian public opinion might only at some future stage of its cultural and institutional development come to fully appreciate how destructive Zhirinovskii's influence for Russian politics and society has been, how easily the pathological traits in Zhirinovskii's psyche revealed themselves already during his first public political activities and utterances, and how

far and often Zhirinovskii broke the rules of 'normal', principled and orderly political conflict and competition. However, in the absence of a new, adequate normative post-traditional framework such a reflection remains impossible. Consequently, it seems, Zhirinovskii will, for the time being, continue to be able to exploit new communication technologies, the backwardness of civil society, and some pathologies of capitalist development for furthering his political aims.

A Final Remark About the Future of the LDPR

In conclusion, two principal issues in the future survival and development of Zhirinovskii's party can be identified. First, the future position and strength of the LDPR will depend on how well it will manage to resolve conflicts between several contradictory or competing tactical and strategic challenges it faces. The LDPR's tasks emerging from these challenges will be specified below. Second, the LDP's fate will depend on how well it will manage to adapt to (and, perhaps, even to undermine) the currently ongoing maturation processes in Russian politics, society and political culture. The handling of these two principal issues can be broken down into the following four sub-issues.

First, Zhirinovskii will have to balance more careful than before his scandalism and political clownerie and the positive effect this has on the LDPR's publicity with the task of developing a more serious public image of the party and of himself. As Russian politics and mass media become more sophisticated and Russian public opinion more enlightened and experienced, the solution of this problem will play a big role in the LDPR's progress towards a firm entrenchment in Russia's post-transitional political society.

Second, Zhirinovskii will have to make some crucial decisions concerning the placement of himself and his party in the constantly transforming Russian political spectrum. Such popular figures like Moscow's Mayor Luzhkov and the retired Generals Lebed' and Rokhlin have recently grown to national-level prominence and wholeheartedly embraced 'patriotic' rhetoric. By doing so, they have substantially narrowed down the non-communist nationalist-populist space occupied by Zhirinovskii. In view of these new competitors for non-revolutionary ultra-nationalism, the right-wing populist tactics Zhirinovskii frequently applied before might become less effective or inappropriate. More manifestly palingenetic rhetoric could under these conditions appear as the most effective way to

preserve a distinct, identifiable political profile.

However, at the same time, the recent rise of the youthful, former Nizhnii Novgorod Governor Boris Nemtsov seems to have also again narrowed down the palingenetic dimension in Russian politics. Nemtsov's self-styled image is that of a novel reformer of the Russian oligarchical and rubber-baron capitalism and corrupt state machine, and creator of a new *properly* capitalist Russian market economy and *truly* democratic state. Thus Nemtsov represents another 'new' Russia, and has managed once again to postpone Russia's arrival at modernity proper. This might once more inhibit the extreme Right in its 'selling' of various agendas for an 'alternative modernity'. How Zhirinovskii will deal with this double problem of new competition in both of his previously preferred positions in the political spectrum is uncertain.

Third, the LDPR will have to be careful in dealing with the question of how far and with whom to associate itself. This concerns both sponsors and political allies. It is torn between between a number of conflicting, yet potentially equally promising options of its behaviour relative to other political actors. It will (a), on the one hand, have to preserve its distinct political profile which includes a, somewhat paradoxical, anti-communist anti-conservatism; yet, it will, on the other hand, also have to engage in tactically useful alliances including the Communist Party, the most powerful potential ally. It will (b), on the one hand, be interested in further enlarging its already substantial financial base; yet, on the other hand, it will have to be careful not to get too closely associated with mafia structures. It will (c), on the one hand, try to maintain its potentially useful ties to such figures as France's Jean-Marie Le Pen, Serbia's Vojislav Seselj, Germany's Gerhard Frey and Iraq's Saddam Hussein; yet, on the other hand, it will to have to be careful not to become too much identified with a possible negative public stigmatization in Russia, or political downfall of these figures.

However, the, obviously, most important, fourth question will be how far the LDPR will become an, in Samuel Huntington's terms, viable - i.e. entrenched, complex and adaptive - political institution instead of a mere electoral campaigning machine. Since 1993, signs of a transformation of the LDPR into a real party have been discernible. Regional branches with their own newspapers, organizations, and distinct, local public profiles have proliferated on impressive speed. Durable links to sponsors seem to have been established. A second tier of Zhirinovskii-assistants in the LDPR leadership seems to have formed a permanent core of functionaries which has made its peace with its

eccentric, authoritarian commander and developed a vested interest in sustaining the LDPR as an influential political force. This second tier of more or less experienced organizers, politicians and publicists includes Deputy Party Chairman Stanislav Zhebrovskii who has been an LDPR member since 1990, and *Iuridicheskaja gazeta* editor-in-chief Oleg Fin'ko who had once been a member of the Political Council of the National Salvation Front. These two well-educated and efficient men edit or oversee most of the numerous periodical LDPR publications (cf. 'Further Reading: Primary Sources'). The core functionaries further include Aleksandr Mitrofanov who is acquiring an own political standing as Chairman of the State Duma's Geopolitics Committee, and Gen.(ret.) Filatov, Head of the LDPR's Press Service who was until 1991 the editor of the respected academic journal *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Military-Historical Journal).

Most importantly, since 1993, the LDPR has been actively seeking to diversify its political influence by participating in regional and local elections, and was in some instances successful. Recently, the party, for instance, managed to get under its control a large section of the Novosibirsk City Council. The most important new development in this regard, however, has been the rise of Evgenii Mikhailov (34). Mikhailov is a native of Pskov *oblast'*, graduate of Moscow State University's History Department, former Moscow City Council Deputy and later State Duma Deputy, and he was leading 1993-96 North-West Russian LDPR functionary and editor of a trans-regional LDPR newspaper. In 1996, Mikhailov was elected with a considerable margin the new Governor of the *Pskovskaia oblast'*, and became simultaneously the first and so far only LDPR representative in the Federation Council, the upper chamber of Russia's new parliament. Already before his election, Mikhailov has stood out as being one of the few LDPR functionaries who had worked towards the acquisition of his own distinct political profile by publishing an ideologically sophisticated book-size, ultra-nationalist treatise on Russia's future called *Bremia imperskoi natsii* (The Imperial Nation's Burden, 1995).

The age, biography and professional and political background of Mikhailov all indicate that he could make a legitimate claim to become Zhirinovskii's successor. He has been and still is accumulating significant political capital which could one day give him a serious chance to succeed in preserving the LDPR during a leadership change. To be sure, the LDPR's future would after a departure of Zhirinovskii from Russia's political scene through, for instance, arrest, health problems,

or death (for instance, by assassination) look highly uncertain. Yet, Mikhailov's rise and growing political base at Pskov, and the above indicated signs of a gradual institutionalization of the LDPR suggest that the party may have a credible chance to survive Zhirinovskii.

Appendix I

Zhirinovskii's *Curriculum Vitae* from 1946 to 1993

Note: The following chronology may contain distorted or incorrect information as I have tried to include *all* - i.e. also unconfirmed - data mentioned in the secondary sources, newspapers, and LDP publications listed in the sections 'Abbreviations', 'Bibliography' and 'Further Reading'. If quoting this chronology, please, refer to it as uncertain facts. Some sources are indicated: (B)=Belkin, (C)=Conradi, (K)=Karstev, (Li)=Limonov, (Lu)=Luchterhandt, (Or)=Orlov, (P)=Plekhanov, (Pr)=Pribylovskii, (SK)=Solovyov and Klepikova, (Su)=Suetnov, (T)=Timtschenko, (V)=Verkhovskii.

- 1945 13 Nov Aleksandra Pavlovna Zhirinovskaia (née Makarova; b. 1912), mother of five children from late Andrei Vasil'evich Zhirinovskii (who died in August 1944 from tuberculosis), marries Vol'f Isaakovich Eidelstein (b. 1907), planner at a cooperative producing clothing and footwear in Alma-Ata, capital of the Kazakh SSR.
- 1946 25 Apr Zhirinovskii born Vladimir Vol'fovich Eidelstein.
- 1946 Nov Vol'f Isaakovich Eidelstein dies in car-accident.
- 1949 - 1953 Attends 24-hour six-day-per-week kindergarten (SK); Aleksandra Pavlovna works at cafeteria of Alma-Ata Zooveterinary Institute.
- 1950 - 1962 Aleksandra Pavlovna lives together with fifteen years younger men with an alcohol problem.
- 1953 - 1964 Registered as Zhirinovskii at best, KGB-sponsored Alma-Ata middle and then boys' school no. 39 at Dzerzhinskii Street with many pupils from privileged families (among them Kuliash Tashalitova, daughter of Kazakh Minister of Transportation); temporary chairman of his class's Young Pioneer group; among favorite subjects: geography, history; intended careers: military officer, investigating judge, diplomat.
- 1954 Zhirinovskii's school becomes coeducational.
- 1958 25 Apr Family celebrates Vladimir's birthday firstly.
- 1960 - 1964 Two-day-per-week training as car-mechanic at Alma-Ata Car Repair-Shop No. 2 (within his school's education programme).
- 1961 Becomes member of *Komsomol* (no. 39,261,633), and, for some time, a *Komsomol* functionary; after a conflict with his English teacher and class leader, Esterna Blinder, reduced to ranks; takes part in people's court civic trial at his school at which he gives

- 1962 17 Aug Receives first passport on which his name is stated to be Eidelshstein.
- 1963 Summ Goes with his class for vacation to Black Sea holiday resort Sochi; abortive heterosexual encounter.
- 1964 9 June Applies successfully at Alma-Ata Rayon *Ispolkom* for change of his name from Eidelshstein to Zhirinovskii on passport and birth-certificate.
- 1964 26 Jun Receives advanced school-leaving diploma (with his new surname on it); grades: mostly fours (Bs), some fives (As) and threes (Cs).
- 1964 3 July Leaves Alma-Ata and arrives at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport (or on 3 June 1964 [Zhirinovskii 1993e, 5]).
- 1964 Jul-Aug Lives with his elder half-brother near Moscow; unable to register as applicant for university studies because of lacking letter of recommendation from Alma-Ata *Komsomol* Rayon Committee; mother finagles a recommendation from the Alma-Ata District *Komsomol* Committee (K); registers for entrance examination at Institute of Oriental Languages; moves into a dormitory; takes English classes (costs: Rbls100); passes successfully entrance examinations (essay: C, Russian: B, history: A, written English: C, oral English: C).
- 1964 Sep Six-year full-time undergraduate Turkish area and language studies at Philology Department of 600-student Institute of Oriental Languages (since 1972: Asia/Africa Institute), Moscow State University; in his six-man Turkish language study group are, among others, sons of a general, deputy foreign minister, CPSU Central Committee *apparatchik*, and State Committee for Foreign Economic Links director; French and English language courses; initial scholarship of Rbls35 (+ Rbls30 from mother) per month; extra-curricular work as trade-union functionary; shares for one year Moscow House of Students room with a Mongolian student; winter holidays at Moscow State University House of Recreation at Krasnovidovo near Moscow.
- 1964 - 1965 Conductor of a Club of Interesting Meetings at Oriental Institute.
- 1965 Starts receiving increased achievement scholarship of Rbls47.50 per month.
- 1965 - 1968 Group Senior of his study collective's *Komsomol* cell at Oriental Institute.
- 1965 - 1967 Takes part-time evening courses at Department of International Relations at Moscow University of Marxism-Leninism; receives excellent grades.
- 1966 Summ Goes, as only member of his Institute, with first Moscow State University student building brigade to Hungary; one-and-a-half-month stay at Budapest, and subsequent round-trip through Hungary, including Lake Balaton; romantic affair with Hungarian girl Aniko.

- 1966 Presents to Dean of the Oriental Institute a proposal to reform Soviet Oriental studies.
- 1966 - 1967 *Komsomol* functionary for agitation at Oriental Institute.
- 1967 15 Apr Sends letter to CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev; proposes reforms in agriculture, education, industry, and city life.
- 1967 Summ Holidays at Dzheimit student youth camp near Anapa (Pitsunda) on Black Sea; makes acquaintance with Galina Aleksandrovna Lebedeva, his later wife.
- 1967 Dec Participates together with Vladimir Kozlovskii, another Oriental Institute *Komsomol* activist and later Jewish human rights activist (K), in experimental TV discussion 'Democracy: Theirs and Ours' (referring to Western and 'Soviet democracy') sponsored by Moscow City *Komsomol* Committee; gives outspoken presentation which makes negative impression on his Institute's authorities (according to Kartsev, Moscow City CPSU Committee issues a warning).
- 1967 20 Dec Moscow State University *Komsomol* Committee considers request from Zhirinovskii concerning a recommendation for his candidacy for membership in the CPSU; decision postponed.
- 1968 Elected secretary of *Komsomol* bureau of his year's Institute class.
- 1968 - 1969 Eight-month internship at Moscow editorial board for Turkish transmissions of Soviet Radio Committee.
- 1968 Jan Denied, according to his own information, Oriental Institute's support for his application to participate as an interpreter in a Russian sports delegation one-month visit to Turkey because of his contribution to the December 1967 TV debate.
- 1968 25 Apr Oriental Institute CPSU Bureau confirms letter of evaluation for an application for a one-year internship as an interpreter in Turkey.
- 1968 14 May Moscow State University CPSU Committee approves of 200 letters of evaluation for foreign trips; among the five rejected letters is the Oriental Institute CPSU Bureau's recommendation for Zhirinovskii.
- 1968 19 Jun Oriental Institute CPSU Bureau refrains from authorizing a letter of evaluation for a one-month trip with a Moscow State University building brigade to France.
- 1968 23 Sep Oriental Institute CPSU Bureau confirms a second letter of evaluation for a one-year stay in Turkey (and a similar letter for another student going to Turkey).
- 1968 8 Oct Moscow State University CPSU Committee approves of letter of evaluation for duty

- 1962 17 Aug Receives first passport on which his name is stated to be Eidelshstein.
- 1963 Summ Goes with his class for vacation to Black Sea holiday resort Sochi; abortive heterosexual encounter.
- 1964 9 June Applies successfully at Alma-Ata Rayon *Ispolkom* for change of his name from Eidelshstein to Zhirinovskii on passport and birth-certificate.
- 1964 26 Jun Receives advanced school-leaving diploma (with his new surname on it); grades: mostly fours (Bs), some fives (As) and threes (Cs).
- 1964 3 July Leaves Alma-Ata and arrives at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport (or on 3 June 1964 [Zhirinovskii 1993e, 5]).
- 1964 Jul-Aug Lives with his elder half-brother near Moscow; unable to register as applicant for university studies because of lacking letter of recommendation from Alma-Ata *Komsomol* Rayon Committee; mother finagles a recommendation from the Alma-Ata District *Komsomol* Committee (K); registers for entrance examination at Institute of Oriental Languages; moves into a dormitory; takes English classes (costs: Rbls100); passes successfully entrance examinations (essay: C, Russian: B, history: A, written English: C, oral English: C).
- 1964 Sep Six-year full-time undergraduate Turkish area and language studies at Philology Department of 600-student Institute of Oriental Languages (since 1972: Asia/Africa Institute), Moscow State University; in his six-man Turkish language study group are, among others, sons of a general, deputy foreign minister, CPSU Central Committee *apparatchik*, and State Committee for Foreign Economic Links director; French and English language courses; initial scholarship of Rbls35 (+ Rbls30 from mother) per month; extra-curricular work as trade-union functionary; shares for one year Moscow House of Students room with a Mongolian student; winter holidays at Moscow State University House of Recreation at Krasnovidovo near Moscow.
- 1964 - 1965 Conductor of a Club of Interesting Meetings at Oriental Institute.
- 1965 Starts receiving increased achievement scholarship of Rbls47.50 per month.
- 1965 - 1968 Group Senior of his study collective's *Komsomol* cell at Oriental Institute.
- 1965 - 1967 Takes part-time evening courses at Department of International Relations at Moscow University of Marxism-Leninism; receives excellent grades.
- 1966 Summ Goes, as only member of his Institute, with first Moscow State University student building brigade to Hungary; one-and-a-half-month stay at Budapest, and subsequent round-trip through Hungary, including Lake Balaton; romantic affair with Hungarian girl Aniko.

journey to Turkey.

- 1968 20 Nov Moscow State University *Komsomol* Bureau agrees to provide a letter of recommendation for CPSU application.
- 1969 Short-term internship at Moscow office of State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.
- 1969 Apr Starts planned twelve-month practical as an engineer and translator-interpreter for foreign trade combines *Tiazhpromeksport* (Heavy Industry Exports) and *Neftekhimpromeksport* (Oil Chemical Industry Exports) at Iskenderun Iron and Steel Joint Soviet-Turkish Works, Turkey, located close to an American military base.
- 1969 Nov Arrested for several days as *KGB* agent, and deported as *persona non grata* by Turkish authorities because of espionage; according to L. Aleinik and M. Pronin, Soviet Embassy in Ankara forced to pay bribe to prevent international scandal; rumors about foreign-currency speculations and homosexual acts (SK); no Moscow State University file on Zhirinovskii internship in Turkey and final Moscow State University report on Zhirinovskii non-traceable.
- 1970 4 Apr Moscow State University CPSU Committee recommends four 1970 Oriental Institute graduates for employment at the *KGB*; Zhirinovskii's name not mentioned in protocols.
- 1970 Graduates 'With Distinction' as an Orientalist, Philologist, and Translator-Interpreter; according to Zhirinovskii's own report, he is offered 'about five' post-graduate research scholarships in the fields of philology and philosophy (which would have exempted him from military service); buys small *Saporozhets* car with special rouble certificates (hard currency equivalents) earned during Turkey internship.
- 1970 - 1972 Serves, according to fellow student Kozlovskii as only Oriental Institute graduate, in Soviet Army; Second Lieutenant and staff-officer at an intelligence unit of Political Directorate of the Transcaucasian Military District, Tbilisi; gives lectures and writes leaflets and top secret reports based on Turkish radio and TV transmissions; lives in 26-sqm-room in communal flat; acquaintance with neighbour, military communications specialist, Vasilii Malik from Ukraine; travels in Georgia and Armenia; General Barkov among his superior officer.
- 1971 Writes unpublished monograph 'The Political Parties of Turkey'.
- 1971 Marries Galina Aleksandrovna Lebedeva, a general's daughter and biologist working at Academy of Medical Sciences' Institut of Virology, perhaps, for sake of Moscow residence permit (SK); Galina Aleksandrovna remains in Moscow in order to complete her Candidate of Science dissertation.

- 1972 Son Igor' (whom Zhirinovskii calls in public 'Lebedev') born; studies later law and works in LDP apparatus.
- 1972 - 1975 Researcher at Western Europe Department of International Liaison Sector of Soviet Peace Committee; meets delegations from, among others, France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland; takes German language courses; contacts with World Federalists who advocate common European home; acquaintance with Swiss attorney and former candidate for the office of the President of the Swiss Confederation Dr. Max Habbitt (?) who several times visits Moscow and invites him to Switzerland; not allowed to travel to a Western country; rumours about embezzlement of trade union money (Pr); has to free position for niece of B.N. Ponomarev, CPSU Central Committee International Department Head.
- 1973 April Zhirinovskii's family moves from Galina Aleksandrovna's parents' flat to separate cooperative, three-room, first-floor apartment in the *Tëplyi Stan* district on outskirts of Moscow; makes first payment himself; furniture, bedroom and kitchen set provided by Galina's parents; becomes chairman of building cooperative.
- 1973 Jul-Aug Participates in Tenth World Festival of Youth and Students at East Berlin (over 500,000 participants, among them 25,000 foreign delegates from 140 countries).
- 1973 Oct Participates in organization of Moscow Congress of Supporters of Peace.
- 1974 Autum Moves through an apartment exchange, from the *Tëplyi Stan* district to an eight-floor flat in the *Sokol'niki* district, closer to the city centre (SK).
- 1974 - 1977 Part-time student of international law at evening-studies section of Department of Jurisprudence of Moscow State University; 70% of the students are police men, 30% 'girls working in courts' (B); graduates ahead of schedule as a lawyer; concurrent foreign language studies.
- 1975 Jan-May Work-period at Dean's Office of the Economics Faculty of Moscow Higher Trade Union School; responsible for foreign student affairs.
- 1975 - 1983 Legal consultant at 50-attorney *Inturkollegiia* (the Soviet Ministry of Justice Foreign Bar Association dealing with clients abroad); initial employment in Pension Department involving business trips to Belarus and the Ukraine; later work on inheritance cases connected with West Germany; becomes chairman of the firm's Works Council; applies unsuccessfully for visas to go to Switzerland and to take part in a cruise in the Pacific Ocean (P).
- 1977 Divorces his wife (B); lives later with his mother until her death in 1985, his wife and son living elsewhere on their own (K); pays one-quarter of his income as alimony for his son (K); rumours that he either married again, or lived together with another woman until late 1970s; according to Kozlovskii, he may have had a second wife

called Liudmila Nikolaevna (AiF, no. 21, 1995).

- 1977 Writes diploma thesis 'Human Rights in the Contemporary World'.
- 1977 Intends to join abortive political party led by Anatolii Anisimov.
- 1980 Attends foreign language courses at *MID*.
- 1981 Does not secure necessary support of his *Iniurkollegiia* bosses for CPSU applications; drafts, according to Evgenii Kulichev, several complaints to the CPSU Rayon Committee, and a letter to the Justice Ministry; sends five anonymous notes accusing *Iniurkollegiia* bosses of poor leadership.
- 1983 Forced to give notice of termination of employment at *Iniurkollegiia*; threatened by law-suit because of embezzlement and corruption accusations (received travel vouchers as a present from a client) in connection with a West German inheritance case (according to what he later told *Mir* Director Kartsev, Zhirinovskii was helped to purchase a vacation pass by an Armenian client as a sign of gratitude for assistance in an inheritance case); *Iniurkollegiia*'s Chairman, CPSU Secretary and Head of Personnel nevertheless explicitly recommend Zhirinovskii to Kartsev, Director of Zhirinovskii's subsequent employer *Mir* Publishers, and to General Barkov, *Mir*'s Head of Personnel.
- 1983 Applies and receives a visa for emigration to Israel; possibly, as former *KGB* employee, denied emigration (SK, and German Jewish leader I. Bubis).
- 1983 Becomes Senior Legal Consultant for copyright issues as one of three members of *Mir*'s (*Goskomizdat*-subordinated, scientific Moscow publisher then extending cooperation with Western partners) new Legal Services Department headed by Georgii A. Kvelidze (a Georgian, former employee of USSR Department of Public Prosecution, and CPSU member burdened with a party reprimand of March 1984, and involved in long-lasting conflict with *Mir*'s administration); initial income: Rbls140 or 150 per month; *KGB* opposes Zhirinovskii's employment at *Mir* (K); friendly relations with Kvelidze; specializes on doing legal support for employee benefits; secures several privileges for *Mir* employees (low-cost lunches, free rides on public transportation, bonuses, subsidies); acquaintance of S.M. Zhebrovskii, Deputy Chairman of *Mir*'s Editorial Board for Literature on Physics and Astronomy; regular participation at CPSU meetings as a guest; abortive romantic affair with female graphic artist at *Mir* (K); starts, according to *Mir* employee Menzheritskii, during perestroika, to shout frequently anti-communist slogans and provokes a fist fight.
- 1985 28 Feb Attends, as guest, open meeting of *Mir*'s CPSU organization attended by 87 CPSU members, chaired by Zhebrovskii, and devoted to the CPSU Central Committee Directive on Cadre Policy; gives outspoken political speech; complains that leadership positions are occupied by too old people and filled up not according to capabilities, but

on the principle of party-membership, nationality, and social background (P); women are overburdened; and 'local [i.e. non-Russian] comrades [in the national republics]' are lazy and uneducated; sharp rebuke by *Mir's* CPSU Bureau Secretary Gen.(ret.) N.K. Barkov.

- 1985 March Has a critical talk with Kvelidze concerning February 28 speech; proposed by Kvelidze for 50% increase of his annual premium; agrees to write letter to the Party Bureau condemning his speech.
- 1985 19 Mar *Mir's* CPSU Bureau discusses and condemns Zhirinovskii's speech; Kvelidze mentions Zhirinovskii's current 'psycho-emotional overstrain on the basis of family affairs', and excludes a repetition; plans becoming member of Union of Journalists.
- 1985 29 May Aleksandra Pavlovan dies.
- 1985 27 June Kvelidze reports to *Mir's* CPSU Bureau about 'educational work' with Zhirinovskii; Zhirinovskii criticized for working as a plaintiff's council for a certain Tsaturian from Sukhumi (Abkhazii) involved in an inheritance lawsuit with Zhirinovskii's former employer *Iniurkollegiia*; Kvelidze announces that, after a talk with him, Zhirinovskii has dropped *Iniurkollegiia* case; *Mir's* then Editor-in-Chief, G.B. Kurganov, mentions to Kvelidze possibility of Zhirinovskii's transfer to an 'ideological institution in connection with his ideological unpreparedness'.
- 1985 July Zhebrovskii elected Head of *Mir* Trade Union Committee.
- 1985 31 July Meeting of *Mir's* CPSU organization; Bureau Secretary, N.K. Barkov, describes Zhirinovskii as 'demanding special attention'.
- 1985 August Writes letter to *Mir* Party Bureau condemning his February 28, 1985 speech.
- 1985 29 Aug Meeting of *Mir's* CPSU organization; Deputy Head Book-Keeper, A.I. Starshinin, asks Kvelidze (who is requesting a cancellation of his March 1984 party reprimand) why Zhirinovskii wrote a letter condemning his February 28 speech only in August 1985; Kvelidze rebuts Zhirinovskii had regretted before orally several times.
- 1985 2 Oct Secretary N.K. Barkov, indicates in a report to *Mir's* CPSU Bureau that Zhirinovskii may possibly leave the Publishing House, and Kvelidze is leaving *Mir* for new job as Deputy Head of Legal Services Department of *Vneshtorgizdat* (Foreign Trade Publishing House).
- 1985 Liquidation of *Mir's* Legal Services Department; becomes Publishers' only legal consultant with income of Rbls180-200 per month.
- 1985 Oct Zhebrovskii elected member of *Mir's* CPSU Bureau.

- 1987 9 Jan *Mir's* CPSU Bureau approves unanimously an obligatory letter of evaluation for Zhirinovskii's application for a 15-day holiday trip to East Germany in February 1987; subsequently several applications for travel to Czechoslovakia and East Germany approved by Kartsev are turned down by *KGB*.
- 1987 16 Apr S.N. Belousov, *Mir's* Chairman of the Group of People's Control and Scientific Editor for Spanish Language Literature, describes, at a session of *Mir's* CPSU Bureau, Zhirinovskii as 'product' of Kvelidze (who is, at this time, not any longer at *Mir*).
- 1987 April First *Mir* employees meeting (attended by ca. 50 staff members out of ca. 640) for nomination of a candidate for 'election' of a deputy representing the 'work collective of the enterprise', and to be elected in 192nd Electoral District of Moscow's Dzerzhinskii Rayon to the Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies; A.P. Iastrebov, *Mir* CPSU Bureau member and Head of *Mir's* Editorial Board of English Language Literature on Physics and Mathematics, presented as official candidate nominated by the authorities; Zhirinovskii obstructs meeting by pointing on unlawfulness of a nomination with less than half of *Mir's* staff assembled, and by threatening to turn to the media and courts in case of a nomination; proposes his own candidacy (according to Kartsev, this meeting took place already on 21 February 1987, followed by another abortive attempt to assemble a convention of *Mir* employees with a quorum).
- 1987 15 May Second four-hour *Mir* employees meeting for nomination of one out of four proposed candidates for the election to Rayon Soviet (according to Kartsev: fourteen proposals for nomination); after withdrawal of Iastrebov and another candidate, Zhirinovskii and A.S. Popov, Deputy Head of the Editorial Board on Mathematics and Mechanics (non-CPSU, but supported by Iastrebov), remain only candidates for nomination; an *Iniurkollegiia* Top Secret letter addressed to *Mir's* CPSU Secretary and accusing Zhirinovskii of bribery arrives, but is not read aloud; Zhirinovskii promises to fight against privileges and for salary increases; a large majority (182 *Mir* staff members, among them CPSU members) of those present votes openly for Zhirinovskii as only nominated candidate in 192nd District.
- 1987 16 May Moscow City CPSU Committee organ *Moskovskaia pravda* (Moscow Truth) publishes an article on the 15 May meeting headlined 'Why Did the Party Bureau Secretary Remain Silent?' (K); Kartsev summoned to Dzerzhinskii Rayon CPSU Committee for a session with Rayon Secretary for Ideology, and ordered to restrain Zhirinovskii.
- 1987 19 May At a session of *Mir's* CPSU Bureau, Secretary N.K. Barkov complains that Zhirinovskii won nomination because of 'his demagoguery [and] all kinds of promises'; discussants mention that only little more than half of *Mir's* staff were present, and that Party Bureau was poorly prepared and had no appropriate orator able to rebut Zhirinovskii's demagoguery.

- 1987 23 May Strongly affirmative article on Zhirinovskii's nomination as candidate for Dzerzhinskii Rayon Legislature in the popular Moscow daily *Vecherniaia Moskva* (which later, probably in June 1987, though publishes anonymous notice claiming that *Mir*'s collective has *voluntarily* withdrawn Zhirinovskii's nomination as candidate).
- 1987 28 May Session of Dzerzhinskii Rayon CPSU Committee at which 'Zhirinovskii case' might have been discussed (Protocoll #11 of this session remains classified).
- 1987 28 May Electoral Commission of 192nd Electoral District of Dzerzhinskii Rayon chaired by S.N. Belousov, a *Mir* CPSU Bureau member, rejects registration of Zhirinovskii as candidate 'in connection with mistrust [caused] by documents from [Zhirinovskii's] previous place of work [*Iniurkollegiia*]'.
- 1987 29 May Belousov reports decision of 192nd Electoral District Commission to *Mir*'s CPSU Bureau; Bureau resolves to inform *Mir*'s employees in case of confirmation of decision by Dzerzhinskii Rayon Electoral Commission.
- 1987 June Decision of Electoral Commission made public on *Mir*'s notice-board together with an *Iniurkollegiia* letter indicating circumstances of the termination of Zhirinovskii's employment there; Zhirinovskii puts up a corrective answer claiming that one of his clients thanked him for having two weeks lived in his Moscow flat by presenting his mother a tea-service (Pr); Zhirinovskii asked to come to the Dzerzhinskii Rayon CPSU Committee and threatened with sanctions; according to Viktor Dashevskii, Zhirinovskii also ordered to Dzerzhinskii Rayon KGB office; daily (?) *Mir* staff meetings in defense of Zhirinovskii with frequent media presence, and several (?) TV program *Good Evening, Moscow* interviews with Zhirinovskii (?); Zhirinovskii's supporters plan sending a petition to Moscow City CPSU First Secretary B.N. El'tsin; Soviet Supreme Court ignores Zhirinovskii's written protest concerning the Electoral Commission's cancellation of his nomination.
- 1987 8 June N.K. Barkov replaced as *Mir*'s CPSU Bureau Secretary by A.P. Iastrebov; Bureau approves of Iastrebov's report to *Mir*'s CPSU organization concerning Zhirinovskii's nomination.
- 1987 8 June Meeting of *Mir*'s CPSU organization; in his report 'The Current Situation and the Tasks of the Party Organization', Secretary Iastrebov criticizes at length Zhirinovskii's speech at *Mir*'s nomination meeting on February 15, 1987 (especially promises to meet immediately toilers' demands; critique of Soviet Afghanistan policies and Soviet electoral law; chauvinism; talk about an alleged attack from southern republics and danger which southerners represent for European USSR population); Iastrebov condemns Zhirinovskii's populism, questioning of 'party character of the society and state', double dealing with *Mir* employees and demonstrative rejection to contribute to Chernobyl Foundation; Iastrebov complains that an article by CPSU member Kogan criticizing Zhirinovskii has not been put on *Mir*'s notice-board.

- 1987 9 June At a session of *Mir*'s CPSU Bureau, Secretary Iastrebov strikes positive balance of CPSU organization meeting on previous day, and requests from Bureau members to contribute to a 'stabilization of the workers collective' at a *Mir* staff members meeting following this session.
- 1987 9 June Third meeting of *Mir*'s employees concerning Zhirinovskii's nomination; Dzerzhinskii Rayon CPSU Committee sends representative of Moscow City Soviet Legal Department who announces that Zhirinovskii's nomination will in no case be approved; Zhirinovskii, asked about his 'nationality', specifies that he assumes his father, allegedly a jurist and graduate of L'vov (today: Lviv) University, was Russian; according to Pribylovskii, in spite of employees' sympathy for Zhirinovskii, no new voting on his nomination; right to nominate a candidate for elections in Moscows 192nd Electoral District transferred from *Mir* to a local factory.
- 1987 8 July Session of *Mir*'s CPSU Bureau; adoption of self-critical document concerning permission of Zhirinovskii's nomination by *Mir*'s staff.
- 1987 21 Oct At a session of *Mir*'s CPSU Bureau, Zhebrovskii mentions active agitation for forthcoming elections to *Mir*'s Works Council by Zhirinovskii and a 'group of colleagues of the journal editorial boards' which, 'in certain cases, assumes the character of an agitation for a Workers Collective Soviet without communists.'
- 1987 26 Oct Attacks the former 192nd Dzerzhinskii Rayon Electoral District Commission member, G.R. Vinogradov, at an open meeting of *Mir*'s CPSU organization; D.G. Zaidin, Editor-in-Chief of a journal of *Mir*, and Kartsev regret Zhirinovskii's nomination at two employee conventions as candidate for *Mir*'s Works Council (according to Kartsev's book, however, 'Zhirinovskii didn't even make the list of candidates').
- 1987 Lat Dec Tells *Mir* Director Kartsev that he intends to create a liberal-democratic party.
- 1987 - 1989 Takes part (sometimes as a speaker) in rallies of wide variety of Muscovite 'informal' groupings; arrested several times, beaten up by the police, and fined a 20% reduction from his salary for several months (K); Kartsev resists pressure from KGB to fire Zhirinovskii.
- 1988 Spring Participates at so called Peace and Human Rights Seminars at Soviet Peace Committee.
- 1988 7-9 May Participates at Founding Congress of Democratic Union *DS* in V. Bogachëv's flat; 116 participants (among them probably many *agents provocateurs*); elected and subsequently (for pro-communist pronouncements) excluded from Union's Coordination Council; declares, at a press-conference, that he is a former KGB-officer, and author of *DS* programme (Lu).
- 1988 May Starts circulating programme for 'Social-Democratic Party of Russia' at gatherings

of Muscovite 'informals', among them Free Inter-Professional Association of Toilers, and 'Democratic Perestroika' Club.

- 1988 Aug *Moskovskaia pravda* publishes, according to Zhirinovskii, article against him and DS-leader V. Novodvorskaia (Za, no. 6 [11], 1994, 1).
- 1988 Lat Oct Co-founder and -director of officially sponsored Moscow Society for Jewish Culture at Jewish Theatre *Shalom*; attends only two meetings; according to his own information, he is later caught at a *Pamiat* 'meeting and thus not any longer invited to *Shalom*.
- 1988 Dec Distributes among *Mir* employees his 'social-democratic' party programme in connection with the forthcoming elections to USSR Congress of People's Deputies.
- 1988 15 Dec Foundation of V. Skurlatov's *RNF*, a later collective member of the Centrist Bloc.
- 1989 Circulates modified programme of 'Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia' at various meetings.
- 1989 - 1990 Participates in numerous *neformal*y meetings and rallies in Moscow.
- 1989 13 Jan L. Ubozhko and V. Bogachëv announce foundation of Democratic Party.
- 1989 March Offers his nomination by *Mir*'s staff as candidate for elections to USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and introduces his party programme at *Mir* staff meeting; after the speech, Zhirinovskii withdraws application, and speaks out in favour of nomination of *Ogonëk*'s popular editor-in-chief Vitalii Korotich, a leading democratic public figure at this time, as a candidate in electoral district of Dzerzhinskii Rayon; Korotich either represented by an emissary (Pr) or himself present (K).
- 1989 May-Jun V. Bogachëv leaves miniscule Democratic Party and creates initiative group for the foundation of a liberal-democratic party (Pr).
- 1989 3 Sep Gives address at rally of I. Sychev's anti-semitic *Pamiat* 'group at Luzhniki Park, Moscow.
- 1989 Autum Joins V. Bogachëv's LDP initiative group; maintains contacts with S. Plekhanov's and A. Arkhipov's Organizational Committee for a March of Solidarity with the Baltic Russian Population.
- 1989 No-Dec Campaigns unsuccessfully for nomination by *Mir*'s staff as candidate for RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies elections; meeting designed to nominate Zhirinovskii attended by only 50 employees.
- 1989 13 Dec Organizational meeting for foundation of Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet

Union; Zhirinovskii chairman; V. Bogachëv 'coordinator'.

- 1990 Feb Candidate for elected post of Director of *Mir* Publishers (occupied by Kartsev 1982-89); other candidates: G. Kurganov (*Mir*'s editor-in-chief), Brianov (member of *Mir*'s Works Council), a former director of a closed secret enterprise (name unknown), and famous liberal economist Boris Pinsker; promises, according to *Mir* employee Menzheritsky, among others, 'two-month paid vacation and thousand-rouble salaries'; receives only 30 votes (approx. 5% of *Mir*'s staff).
- 1990 Febr V. Skurlatov's RNF and A. Ogorodnikov's miniscule Christian-Democratic Union found Russian Democratic Forum.
- 1990 3 Feb V. Voronin and V. Uglov create Council of Founders of the A.D. Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces.
- 1990 14 Feb Foundation of USSR Congress of People's Deputies group *Soiuz* by, among others, V. Alksnis, V. Iarin (member of Gorbachëv's Presidential Council) and E. Ligachëv (former CPSU Central Committee Secretary of Ideology).
- 1990 March Performs, according to A. Mal'gin, as proxy for Moscow KGB Rayon Officer Sopelkin in elections to Moscow City Soviet in 39th electoral district; later LDPR Governor of Pskov *oblast'*, E. Mikhailov, elected Moscow City Soviet Deputy.
- 1990 13 Mar Article 6 of USSR Constitution (on CPSU's leading role) abolished; CPSU Politbureau meeting on multi-party-system resolves, according to A. Sobchak, to create alternative liberal-democratic party.
- 1990 31 Mar Founding Congress of LDPSU at Rusakov House of Culture (*Sokol'niki* district of Moscow) protected by police men; everyone present offered to become LDPSU member and congress delegate; several *Mir* employees take part; 215 'delegates' from over 40 cities and nine Union republics; a minute of silence in memory of A. Sakharov; claims to hold passport of a Swiss organization certifying that he is a 'world citizen'; wrong announcement that Iu. Afanas'ev, G. Iakunin and V. Lin'kov represent LDPSU in RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies; adoption of Zhirinovskii's short programme for a Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia; Bogachëv elected Coordinator (161 votes for, no vote against), Zhirinovskii Chairman (174 votes for, no vote against) and A. Khalitov Chairman of Auditing Commission; 12-man Central Committee elected (S. Zhebrovskii, S. Kostromin, E. Smirnov, V. Tikhomirov, K. Krivonosov, L. Narimandidze, L. Alimov); room for first press conference at Communist Party guest house *Oktiabr'skaia* Hotel provided by CPSU Central Committee member Boris Oleinik (SK); LDPSU's first address at Zhirinovskii's *Mir* office; LDPSU joins, according to Zhirinovskii, soon afterwards Liberal International.
- 1990 31 Mar All-Union Re-Foundation Congress of Iu. Bokan's Blue Movement (founded 1981).

- 1990 April Demands USSR All-Union Pioneer Organization building (vis-a-vis main Dzerzhinskii Square KGB building) as Moscow LDPSU headquarters.
- 1990 1 Apr LDPSU's foundation heavily publicized by central Soviet mass media.
- 1990 8 Apr Split of Council of Founders of Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces into a V. Voronin group and V. Uglov group.
- 1990 9 Apr According to Zhirionvskii, LDPSU initiates 'round-table' of eight un-named parties.
- 1990 27 Apr S. Nikologorskii's Peace Party founded.
- 1990 28 Apr V. Potëmkin's League of Independent Scholars founded.
- 1990 30 Apr Participates, together with L. Ubozhko, as observer at V. Voronin's Foundation Congress of Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces at Moscow House of Scholars.
- 1990 May Visits Italy on invitation by Italian Liberal Party; gives interview to ILP journal *L'Opinione*.
- 1990 May V. Bogachëv and V. Zhirinovskii invited to a congress of the Liberal International in Geneva.
- 1990 1 May According to Zhirinovskii, LDPSU forms separate column of march at traditional May demonstration.
- 1990 6 May Third Congress of V. Skurlatov's Russian Democratic Forum.
- 1990 9 May According to Zhirinovskii, LDPSU participates in 'round-table' discussion.
- 1990 19 May According to Zhirinovskii, LDPSU participates in 'round-table' discussion.
- 1990 8 June Founds, together with 9 other groupings, moderate-radical Centrist Bloc of Parties and Movements under patronage of CPSU Central Committee member B. Oleinik at Soviet Peace Committee; Zhirinovskii, Voronin, and Skurlatov co-chairmen; among later temporary or permanent collective members are 20-40 micro-parties, e.g. *RNF*, Sakharov Union, Peace Party, Russian Democratic Forum, League of Independent Scholars (Pr).
- 1990 20 Jun First issue of major LDPSU irregular newspaper *Liberal* published.
- 1990 27 June Centrist Bloc adopts resolution warning against party dictatorship and proposing All-Union Forum of Democratic Forces.
- 1990 19 July I. Iuzvishin's Informational-Popular Party (*Mosgorspravka* Party) founded; enters

later Centrist Bloc.

- 1990 31 July Official date given for alleged adoption of V. Skurlatov's Action Programme-90 by 'Russian Democratic Forum Council of Representatives'.
- 1990 Aug Guest at *FDP* unification congress at Hannover; LDBP leader V. Koshev also present.
- 1990 Aug V. Voronin elected Centrist Bloc Chairman; weekly *Glasnost* publishes embarrassing articles on criminal past of V. Voronin.
- 1990 Aug Participates, together with V. Skurlatov and A. Khalitov, in multi-party round-table-discussion on foreign policy at editorial board of Moscow journal *International Affairs*.
- 1990 30 Aug S. Volkov's microscopic Popular-Constitutional Party (autumn 1990-February 1991 Centrist Bloc member) founded.
- 1990 Sept According to Zhirinovskii, LDPSU Moscow regional conference excludes V. Bogachëv because of 'financial misuse'; according to Zhebrovskii, Bogachëv embezzled Rbls6,000 from a supporter from Kharkov.
- 1990 19 Sep Announces, during press-conference at CPSU Central Committee Press-Centre, Bloc's readiness to cooperate with every other political party, including CPSU, in developing an economic programme, and preparation of list of names for a 'coalition government of national trust'; A. Sobchak proposed USSR Council of Ministers Chairman.
- 1990 Lat Sep Participates, together with other Centrist Bloc leaders, at consultations at USSR Supreme Soviet *dacha* at Petrovo-Dal'nii.
- 1990 Autum *Vatan* (Fatherland) All-Union Society of Meskhetian Turks enters Centrist Bloc.
- 1990 Oct Centrist Bloc elects V. Voronin Chairman of Organizational Committee for (abortive) Forum of All Democratic Forces of the USSR 'For Unity'; L. Ubozhko's Conservative Party enters and A. Brumel' leaves Centrist Bloc.
- 1990 Ear Oct Participates, together with LDPB leader V. Koshev, as guest at 43rd Congress of Liberal International in Helsinki, Finland.
- 1990 6 Oct Second Extra-Ordinary LDPSU Congress in Zhirinovskii's absence; 40 (or 46) delegates from 20 regions; observers of *PKD*, Social-Democratic, Russian Christian-Democratic, Free Democratic, and Democratic (later Conservative) Parties present; radical critique of previous party line, and Zhirinovskii, and shift towards anti-communism; exclusion of Zhirinovskii (20 for, 10 against, 5 abstain); election of new

Central Committee: K. Krivonosov (Chairman), E. Smirnov (Political Affairs Deputy), L. Narimanidze (Organizational Matters Deputy and Moscow Section Secretary), V. Bogachëv (Chief Coordinator), E. Asanova (LDP organ *Rech'* Editor-in-Chief), V. Tikhomirov (Youth Section Chairman), L. Gezenput (Auditing Commission), N. Gromov (Obninsk), E. Salpykov (Alma-Ata), V. Arischin (Char'kov), A. Shvets (Marganets).

- 1990 11 Oct Participates in meeting of Boris Oleinik, USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities Deputy Speaker, with sixteen small political parties, including Centrist Bloc members.
- 1990 18 Oct *Soiuz* announces entry into Centrist Bloc (yet resolves in December to assume only 'observer' status).
- 1990 20 Oct All-Union LDPSU Conference with the Power of a Congress organized by Zhirinovskii-group at Rusakov House of Culture; 151 'delegates' from 60 regions of nine Union republics; numerous Blue Movement members made LDPSU 'delegates' to secure quorum of Conference; exclusion of V. Bogachëv and four further Central Committee members; election of new five-man Highest Council, 26-member Central Committee and A. Khalitov as *Liberal's* editor-in-chief; L. Alimov, V. Zhirinovskii and A. Khalitov nominated candidates for USSR Supreme Soviet; Bogachëv delegation distributes anti-Zhirinovskii leaflets.
- 1990 29 Oct Meets, together with V. Voronin, V. Alksnis, Ju. Bokan' and V. Korchagin, USSR Prime-Minister N. Ryzhkov for talks on 'formation of a coalition government for national unity'.
- 1990 Nov Leaves *Mir*; LDPSU's headquarters transferred from Zhirinovskii's *Mir* office (no. 7) to Zhebrovskii's *Mir* office (no. 41) by permission of *Mir's* new Director, Gennadii Kurganov, a former fellow student of Zhebrovskii.
- 1990 Nov Issue no. 2-3 of *Liberal* edited by A. Khalitov published.
- 1990 Nov Agitates, together with Voronin, in Abkhazia and Baltics for the creation of Republican National Salvation Committees (Lu).
- 1990 Nov According to Zagorodnikov, a Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs gives order to transfer to Zhirinovskii a certain sum of US-dollars for a trip to Yugoslavia; participates at foundation congress of Liberal-Democratic Party of Slovenia.
- 1990 Nov 'Round-table discussion' on how to retain USSR's territorial integrity including *Soiuz*, Inter-movements, LDPSU and *RNF*.
- 1990 1 Nov Centrist Bloc leaders meet A. Luk'ianov; Zhirinovskii not present.

- 1990 7 Nov Participates, together with other Centrist Bloc leaders, in grand meeting dedicated to October Revolution; makes acquaintance of A. Zavidiiia.
- 1990 9 Nov V. Iakushev's neo-Nazi National-Social Union founded.
- 1990 13 Nov Major LDPSU organ *Liberal* registered.
- 1990 15 Nov Centrist Bloc forms USSR National Salvation Committee (Lu); Voronin chairman.
- 1990 20 Nov V. Bogachëv sends telegraph to *FDP* reporting Zhirinovskii's exclusion from LDP.
- 1990 Dec L. Ubozhko's Conservative Party leaves Centrist Bloc accusing Voronin and Zhirinovskii of cooperation with communists.
- 1990 1-2 Dec Transformation of USSR Congress of People's Deputies group *Soiuz* into *Soiuz* All-Union Voluntary Association of Deputies of All Levels.
- 1990 15 Dec V. Potëmkin's Progressive Party founded on basis of League of Independent Scholars at former Higher *Komsomol* School.
- 1991 - 1992 Visits, among others, Krasnoiarsk, Ekaterinburg, St. Petersburg, Murom, Nizhni Tagil, Archangel, Vologda, Novosibirsk, Kaluga, Belgorod, Obninsk, Saransk, Krasnodar, Malakhovka, Minsk and the Crimea.
- 1991 Jan Visits, together with V. Voronin, Latvia and Lithuania; meets representatives of local National Salvation Committees.
- 1991 Jan Lays, according to Arkhipov, information concerning alleged libel against newspapers *Rech'* and *Moskovskaia pravda*, and News Agency PostFactum; demands Rbls100,000 as compensation payment.
- 1991 Jan Centrist Bloc Committee for National Salvation announces readiness to take over power.
- 1991 2 Jan LDPSU submits, according to Zhirinovskii, documents for registration at USSR Ministry of Justice.
- 1991 23 Jan Centrist Bloc co-chairman V. Voronin asserts his all-union National Salvation Committee has no ties with Baltic National Salvation Committees.
- 1991 28 Jan LDPSU first Soviet all-Union political party to apply for official registration (C).
- 1991 29 Jan Blames, together with other Centrist Bloc leaders, Lithuanian and Latvian parliaments' and Soviet media's support of Baltic independence for armed clashes in Baltics.

- 1991 30 Jan Centrist Bloc leaders received by *KGB* Chairman V. Kriuchkov.
- 1991 30 Jan E. Limonov supports idea of replacement of M. Gorbachëv by National Salvation Committee.
- 1991 Febr V. Alksnis proposes creation of USSR Congress of People's Deputies National Salvation Committee including A. Sobchak and N. Nazarbaev.
- 1991 4 Feb Submits LDPSU member lists for registration at USSR Ministry of Justice.
- 1991 6 Feb Rejects that armed confrontation in the Baltics were inspired by Moscow; V. Voronin announces support for integrity of USSR and direct presidential rule in Baltics.
- 1991 6 Feb *RKP* provides Firm 'Zavidliia' with a non-interest-bearing loan of Rbls3,000,000 until December 31, 1991.
- 1991 12 Feb Submits further lists for registration at USSR Justice Ministry.
- 1991 16 Feb Speaks, as Centrist Bloc conference at Moscow House of Tourists, out in favour of 'direct presidential rule', and dissolution of Russian Federation and Baltic parliaments, and all political parties.
- 1991 18 Feb Proposes to transform Centrist Bloc into USSR National Salvation Committee; B. Oleinik approves in public of Centrist Bloc course (O).
- 1991 27 Feb LDPSU takes part in *RKP*-sponsored anti-reformist conference 'For a Great and United Russia!'
- 1991 March V. Skurlatov's *RNF* leaves Centrist Bloc.
- 1991 1 Mar Submits further lists for registration with USSR Ministry of Justice.
- 1991 14 Mar Invited to the Justice Ministry and told that most of his lists are invalid.
- 1991 22 Mar First long LDPSU programme (written by A. Zagorodnikov) submitted at Red Proletarian Printer.
- 1991 28 Mar 50,000 copies of first long LDPSU printed at Red Proletarian Printer.
- 1991 April First issue of V. Voronin's irregular newspaper *Tsentr* (Centre) published.
- 199 3 Apr All documents submitted to USSR Ministry of Justice returned to Zhirinovskii.
- 1991 8 Apr Re-submits invalid lists to the USSR Justice Ministry; talks to Department Head M. Vyshinskii, and Minister S. Lushchikov who demands changes in LDPSU statutes for

registration; according to a Justice Ministry insider, telephone call by A. Lukianov demanding LDPSU's registration.

- 1991 12 Apr LDPSU registered as second all-Union party by USSR Ministry of Justice.
- 1991 13 Apr Sends letter to Justice Minister Lushchikov assuring that rules will be obeyed, complaining about difficulties with collecting membership lists because of political instability in Abkhazia and the Baltics, and promising to file subsequently more extensive data as soon as situation becomes quieter.
- 1991 13 Apr Second LDPSU congress consisting of 44 delegates; Supreme Soviet and Justice Ministry representatives present as observers; departure from Centrist Bloc; Zhirinovskii on A. Khalitov's proposal approved as candidate in forthcoming RSFSR presidential elections.
- 1991 16 Apr Predicts in interview to *Komsomol'skaia pravda* victory in presidential elections.
- 1991 17 Apr Centrist Bloc nominates V. Voronin as third candidate for upcoming RSFSR presidential elections (after El'tsin and Zhirinovskii); insists, according to Voronin, at Centrist Bloc session that LDPSU was not present at V. Voronin's nomination (T).
- 1991 18 Apr Visits, together with V. Voronin, USSR Justice Ministry to register Centrist Bloc; withdraws at last moment LDPSU documents preventing Centrist Bloc application for registration; Centrist Bloc excludes LDPSU.
- 1991 20 Apr Second *Soiuz* Congress; transformation of All-Union Voluntary Association of Deputies of All Levels into All-Union Movement; *RNF* participant.
- 1991 22 Apr A commentary on *Radio Rossii*, claims Centrist Bloc ceased to exist at the end of March; nine of its eleven groups left because of the Bloc's 'reactionary nature'.
- 1991 27 Apr Condemns six Union Republics which did not sign Novo Ogarëvo Agreement on 23 April, and demands outlawing of organizations whose aim is to split USSR.
- 1991 27 Apr V. Bogachëv founds *ELDP*; K. Krivonosov's *RLDP* renames itself into *RLP*.
- 1991 May Reanimates his marriage with Galina Lebedeva, according to V. Ivanov, for image reasons, yet continues to live separately from wife (Khopak 1995, 49).
- 1991 May-No V. Voronin's Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces organizes exhibition on occasion of Sakharov's 70th birthday.
- 1991 May Announces, for the first time, that Finland will return to Russia as soon as he attains power.

- 1991 May Recruits former boxers M. Dianov, D. Mikhailovskii and V. Dolbetikov as bodyguards.
- 1991 May Gives speech at Moscow Institut of Sociology; listeners propose to re-name his party 'national-socialist' (B).
- 1991 1 May Soviet army newspaper *Krasnaia Zvezda* prints Zhirinovskii statement.
- 1991 10 May LDPSU Congress with 25 participants at A. Khalitov's Lenin Collective Farm near Moscow; foundation of LDPSU Russian Federation Section; Zhirinovskii elected chairman of coordination council, and nominated as presidential candidate; A. Zavidii running mate.
- 1991 16 May Submits, as first applicant, documents for registration at Central Electoral Commission for presidential elections.
- 1991 20 May TASS reports Zhirinovskii and L. Ubozhko only two of six officially registered Russian presidential candidates who have not submitted prescribed 100,000 signatures in their support.
- 1991 22 May Gives scandalous speech at Fourth Russian Congress of People's Deputies; 477 delegates vote to include Zhirinovskii on ballots for Russia's first presidential elections; tells LG that he would recommend books by Dale Carnegie (*How to Win Friends and Influence People*) as reading for his cabinet members; SR reprints Zhirinovskii's speech nearly completely.
- 1991 23 May- Appears, according to Belkin, three times alone
11 June and one time together with other candidates on TV screen;
- 1991 25 May Gives one-and-half-an-hour interview to Moscow Radio Station *Maiak*.
- 1991 28 May Official start of electoral campaign period; A. Nevzorov supports candidacy of V. Zhirinovskii and A. Makashov; LDPSU election headquarters at *Moskva* Hotel, room no. 748.
- 1991 28 May Participates at a Moscow TV programme 'Good evening Moscow'; makes a stir by appearing in black suit and bow-tie.
- 1991 31 May Gives one-hour interview to I. Fesunenکو in Ostankino TV programme *Kto est' kto* (Who Is Who); makes anti-Czech statements.
- 1991 Summ Participates, according to S. Plekhanov, in K. Proshutinskaia's TV programme *Press-klub*.
- 1991 Ear Jun Visits three Ural cities, among them Sverdlovsk, and Moscow State University where

E. Mikhailov (later LDPR Governor of Pskov *oblast*) is among his listeners; E. Mikhailov makes acquaintance with S. Zhebrovskii.

- 1991 1 June *RNF* Congress; Skurlatov proposes creation of federal-democratic party.
- 1991 3 June Gives speech at meeting in Perm; promises alteration of foreign policy, and preservation of privileges for military-industrial complex.
- 1991 4-5 Jun Visits Cheliabinsk; Delivers addresses at local TV, Regional Soviet, the huge *ChTZ* (Cheliabinsk Tractor Factory) and Thermal-Technological Institute.
- 1991 6 June Participates as interviewee in one-hour Ostankino TV programme 'Without Retouch'.
- 1991 7 June Leaves, together with S. Plekhanov, Moscow for electoral campaigning; holds rally at Rostov stadium.
- 1991 8 June Holds several rallies in Krasnodar.
- 1991 9 June Received by Iu. Shutov (sponsor of A. Nevzorov's St. Petersburg TV programme *600 sekund*) in Leningrad Pulkovo Airport; meeting with A. Nevzorov; special *600 sekund* telecast on Zhirinovskii shot; lunch with a Leningrad Military-Industrial Complex representative (and former Leningrad *oblast* 'CPSU committee secretary); visits Riazan' via Moscow (P).
- 1991 10 June Participates in two-hour TV roundtable discussion of presidential candidates (without El'tsin); focuses on 'national question'.
- 1991 11 June Popular Moscow daily MK publishes article sharply attacking Zhirinovskii.
- 1991 12 June Receives 7.81% of the turnout vote in Russian Federation presidential elections; wins in some areas up to 20%; Russian TV reports *KGB* support for Zhirinovskii; soon after the elections, for some time hospitalized in Soviet elite hospital on Michurin Avenue (B).
- 1991 13 June Tells Russian TV that he would have won, if RSFSR president had been elected not 20 days but in three months; according daily *Rabochaia tribuna*, Zhirinovskii has filed a protest seeking the annulment of votes received by El'tsin because the latter used his official position as speaker of parliament to his advantage.
- 1991 14 June Gives press-conference partly in French.
- 1991 20 June Announces candidacy for elections of USSR President allegedly scheduled for March 1995.
- 1991 July Received by USSR Vice-President Gennadii Ianaev who promises help in finding

premises for LDPSU (P).

- 1991 July USSR Jurists Union founds weekly *Iuridicheskaiia gazeta* which becomes major LDPSU platform until reappearance of *Liberal* in early 1992.
- 1991 7 July Gives interview to major nationalist weekly *Literaturnaia Rossiia*.
- 1991 8 July Proposes *Soiuz* speaker V. Alksnis as Governor-General of a Baltic Gouvernement.
- 1991 10 July Predicts foundation of new 'third force', non-communist, anti-Gorbachëv alliance of LDPSU, *Soiuz* and others in early August.
- 1991 16 July Moscow daily MK reports an attempt on LDPSU co-founder V. Bogachëv; Bogachëv given an injection and heavily wounded; according to Bogachëv, he received on day of attempt a telegramme from Zhirinovskii urging him to stop political activities.
- 1991 25 July Holds press-conference at editorial-board of monthly 'thick journal' *Molodaia gvardiia*; condemns Novo-Ogarëvo Agreement.
- 1991 28 July Given triumphal reception at mass rally in Tiraspol, capital of the 'Dniest SSSR'.
- 1991 30 July Supports, in SR, 'Message to the People' (SR, 23 July 1991) written by A. Prokhanov and G. Ziuganov, and signed by altogether twelve leading ultra-conservatives; compares Message to Stalin's 1941 call for mobilization.
- 1991 Aug Firm 'Zavidiia' registered at Moscow October Rayon *Ispolkom*; 'Zavidiia' official sponsor of principal ultra-conservative daily *Sovetskaia Rossiia* until June 1992, and co-constitutor of principal ultra-nationalist weekly *Den* until September 1993.
- 1991 7-9 Aug Visits, on invitation of pro-Russian Estonian Intermovement and Republican Council of Strike Committees, Estonia; addresses Intermovement audience in Tallin; several meetings at Russian-dominated factories.
- 1991 12 Aug Visits self-proclaimed Dniestr and Gagauz SSR in Moldova; gives interview to TASS's chief correspondent in Moldova.
- 1991 13 Aug V. Manilov, Chief of Information Services of USSR Ministry of Defense, distances himself from Zhirinovskii's questioning of Finland's independence.
- 1991 14 Aug Responsible Secretary of Vilnius *GK* (*glavkom* or *gorkom*?) of Lithuanian SSR, Iu. Gal'tsev, writes letters to Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Head of Management, N.A. Griбанov, and to Vilnius *OMON* Commander, Police Major B. Makutynovich, asking for assistance (maintenance, protection) in Zhirinovskii's planned (but later cancelled) visit to Vilnius, Klaipeda and Snehcius on August 20-23, 1991.

- 1991 19 Aug Sends, together with S. Zhebrovskii, in the name of the LDPSU Highest Council, telegramme of support to coup leader G. Ianaev; gives pro-*GKChP*-speech at Moscow *Manezh* Square; advocates 'transfer of all power in USSR to GKChP' (Pr); E. Mikhailov and A. Nevzorov among few *GKChP* supporters.
- 1991 20 Aug Proposes, at an evening meeting at a building on the Kalinin Prospekt 27, in presence of some USSR People's Deputies, to 'shoot Boris El'tsin' (*Vecherniaia Moskva*, 24 August 1991; St. no. 5, 1992, 9).
- 1991 22 Aug Moscow's Mayor G. Popov bans CPSU and LDPSU Moscow headquarters, and orders cutting of electricity and telephone lines; *Mossoviet* investigation commission established; LDPSU temporary headquarters removed from hotel *Moskva* to hotel *Tsentral'naia* (Central).
- 1991 22 Aug Sends, together with S. Zhebrovskii, 'clarification' concerning LDPSU behaviour during coup attempt to *TASS* and Justice Ministry; meets USSR Minister of Justice Lushchikov who warns LDPSU and demands statement by Highest Council on who was responsible for LDPSU support of *GKChP*.
- 1991 22 Aug Gives interview intended for publication in *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Military-Historical Journal); after editor-in-chief Major General V.I. Filatov (later LDPR Press Secretary) is removed, the interview is published in *IuG* (no. 9, 1991).
- 1991 23 Aug LDPSU Highest Council sends letter to USSR Ministry of Justice asserting that it has 'reprimanded' Zhirinovskii for 'hasty' support of *GKChP*; some time later, Moscow Procuracy clears LDP of allegation of unlawful activity, and lifts ban.
- 1991 Lat Aug Hides together with bodyguards for several days in Sofrin, a town outside Moscow; Zhirinovskii's former aide V. Savitskii excluded from LDPSU for voicing disagreement with Zhirinovskii's support of *GKChP*.
- 1991 23 Aug LDPSU Highest Council issues statement expressing regret about party's support of the coup, and distances itself from Zhirinovskii's announcement.
- 1991 28 Aug *KGB* produces official document (signed by Deputy Director V. Lebedev) stating that Zhirinovskii never worked for it.
- 1991 Sept Visits Turkey (P).
- 1991 Sept National-Social Union leader V. Iakushev becomes leader of the LDPSU Youth Section and Deputy Chairman of the LDPSU Moscow organization (Pr); according to other sources this alliance either occurred only in October 1991, autumn 1992, or lasted from early 1991 to early 1992.
- 1991 9 Sep Sends letter Moscow Mayor G. Popov asking for lifting of ban of LDPSU because

it did not participate in *GKChP* putsch; copies to Moscow Prosecutor, Committee for Constitutional Review, RSFSR and USSR Chief State Prosecutors; later Deputy Moscow Prosecutor A. Antoshin informs Zhirinovskii that G. Popov has been proposed to lift ban.

- 1991 24 Sep Gives widely quoted, scandalous anti-Baltic interview to Lithuanian newspaper *Respublika*.
- 1991 28 Sep LDPSU Moscow Regional Organization Conference at Moscow *oblast'* Lenin *Sovkhoz* House of Culture; rent for hall: Rbls600).
- 1991 Autum Participates in presentation of Martti Hosa's (?) Finish book *A Report from Moscow*, published by Gummerus (?) Publishers, at Helsinki; the books chapter on Zhirinovskii is called 'The *KGB*'s Disciple'; announces to sue author and publisher for slander and to demand US\$50,000; rejects re-incorporation of Finland into Russia.
- 1991 Autum Has a quarrel and terminates alliance with A. Zavidiiia (V).
- 1991 Ear Oct Centrist Bloc delegation with 'peace mission' to Nagorny Karabakh.
- 1991 Ear Oct Enters journalists lounge and makes xenophobic and authoritarian statements at Moscow Meeting of Conference on the Human Dimension of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (10 September - 4 October); gives interview to RFE correspondent F. Salkazanova.
- 1991 Oct Visits, together with S. Plekhanov, St. Petersburg and Kronstadt; holds meetings at V. Marychev's St. Petersburg Steel-Rolling Factory Club.
- 1991 9-11Oct Visits, on invitation of Young National-Patriotic Organization of Volgograd, Volgograd and the city of Elan' (where he won 80% of the votes in the June 1991 presidential elections); meetings at, among others, the Volgograd Socio-Political Institute, Pioneer's Palace, Central Market, Carriage Depot, and Central Station.
- 1991 24 Oct Third abortive session of legal proceedings instituted by Zhirinovskii against newspapers *Rech'* and *Moskovskaia pravda*, and News Agency PostFactum (because of alleged libel) at Moscow Sverdlovsk Rayon People's Court; representatives of defendants *Moskovskaia pravda* and PostFactum not present; postponement of proceedings on next day; court orders General Director of PostFactum Agency to appear at proceedings.
- 1991 25 Oct PostFactum General Director does not appear at Moscow Sverdlovsk Rayon People's Court.
- 1991 26-7Oct Rebirth Party founded on basis of, among others, *Soiuz*, *RNF*, and *Vatan*; V. Skurlatov and two other *RNF* activists elected to Executive Committee.

- 1991 31 Oct *Krasnodarskaia gazeta* publishes article by Zhirinovskii.
- 1991 Winter A. Arkhipov manages to find premises for LDPSU Moscow headquarters at Rybnikov pereulok.
- 1991 Nov New, temporary LDPR Youth Section leader V. Iakushev, leader of the National-Social Union, participates in abortive attempt to create neo-Nazi umbrella organization Popular-Social Movement.
- 1991 2-3 Nov All-Union LDPSU Conference at House of Culture of A. Khalitov's Lenin-State Farm near Moscow; 356 (or, according to Arkhipov, 346) delegates from 60 regions and nine (or twelve) Soviet Republics; according to Arkhipov, international guests from Finland, Switzerland, and Madagascar; resolution to M. Gorbachëv and B. El'tsin adopted demanding the release of the Russian army officers S. Parfënov and A. Kuz'min arrested by Latvian police; Professor of Economics A. Zviagin leads section 'The Economics of Transition'; alternative draft for a new Russian constitutional presented.
- 1991 5 Nov Holds meeting at Moscow *Strela* (Arrow) cinema.
- 1991 6 Nov Holds meeting at Moscow *Chaika* (Gull) House of Culture.
- 1991 18 Nov Holds press-conference at Moscow *Strela* (Arrow) cinema.
- 1991 25 Nov Foundation of Iu. Bokan's Republican-Humanitarian Party (later collective member of Movement for Democratic Reforms) announced.
- 1991 30 Nov Foundation of People's Liberation Movement *Nashi* (Ours) V. Marychev's St. Petersburg Steel-Rolling Factory Club; A. Nevzorov and A. Alksnis elected to Council; Zhirinovskii (apparently), M. Ivanov and V. Marychev among members although not elected to movement's Council.
- 1991 Dec Announces, at a meeting at Moscow State University, with reference to the Russian-Japanese dispute over the Kurile Islands that Russia will demand the annexation of Hokkaido.
- 1991 Dec Starts public appearances in front of Moscow Metro Station *Sokol'niki* at 2 p.m. on every last Saturday of a month.
- 1991 Dec V. Iakushev leaves post of LDPSU Youth Section Chairman (Pr).
- 1991 1 Dec Skurlatov's *RNF* and LDPSU hold joint rally in front of the building of Latvian Permanent Representative at Moscow in defense of former Deputy Commander of the Riga *OMON* unit, S. Parfënov.

- 1991 6 Dec Pickets in front of Moscow prison *Matrosskaia tishina* (Sailor's Peace) in support of jailed *GKChP* leaders.
- 1991 9 Dec Issues resolution to army service men; promises restoration of military might and privileges.
- 1991 15 Dec LDPSU-organized anti-Baltic rally in front of Latvian Embassy at Moscow; main speaker V. Alksnis.
- 1991 15 Dec Advocates at Russian Communist Workers Party meeting communist-LPSU alliance (Su).
- 1991 19 Dec Gives press-conference to Russian and foreign journalists; demands new presidential elections, advocates privileges for military men, and condemns Belovezh Agreement.
- 1991 21 Dec Pickets in front of *Matrosskaia tishina* in support of jailed *GKChP* leaders; condemns Belovezh agreement.
- 1991 22 Dec Participates as speaker, together with V. Alksnis, in 'march of hungry queues' to the Ostankino TV Center at Moscow; flies, after the meeting, into a tantrum at Moscow LDPSU headquarters (Or).
- 1991 22 Dec Travels to Minsk; gives interview to Belorussian TV programme *Krok* (Step).
- 1991 23-4Dec Tries to hold rally at Minsk Palace of Sports; Minsk Executive Committee puts ban on rally; spontaneous rally at Palace of Sports entrance; according to Arkhipov, 10,000 participants (?); clashes with nationalist Belarus People's Front; tries to enter office of Belarus Supreme Soviet Speaker S. Shushkevich; gives interview to Belorussian TV in which he proposes to transform Belarus into a Russian Gouvernement; swears at Belorussian MPs (Su); Belorussian Chief State Prosecutor N. Ignatovich announces legal action; Minsk Department of Internal Affairs sends request to *MUR* asking for assistance in Zhirinovskii's appearance at Minsk to explain his conduct; *MUR* Police Colonel Iu. Fedoseev rejects Minsk's request.
- 1991 25 Dec Press-conference of Russian Supreme Soviet Commission for investigating the circumstances of August 1991 Coup at Moscow House of Soviets; far-reaching allegations about Zhirinovskii's support of the coup, unlawfulness of LDPR registration of April 1991 and its support by CPSU Central Committee, *KGB* and *OMON* during Zhirinovskii's presidential election campaign.
- 1991 27 Dec Returns, according to Arkhipov, from vacation and holds press-conference concerning Russian Supreme Soviet Commission's allegations.
- 1991 27 Dec Session of the Organizational Committee of *Assotsiatsiia zakomosti i poriadka AZIP*

(Association for Lawfulness and Order) established by the LDPSU and IuG; adoption of resolution condemning 'campaign' against LDPSU and Zhirinovskii; *AZIP* Chairman E. Belilovskii (a Jew) criticizes LDPSU for using slogans of 'patriots'.

- 1991 29 Dec Announces in Leningrad TV show *Adamovo iabloko* (Adam's Apple) 'not to refrain from using nuclear weapons outside the borders of the USSR'.
- 1992 Advertises expansion of LDPSU staff in Manpower Office (Or).
- 1992 Winter Meets during inofficial visit of Istanbul, Turkey, LDP-leader M. Yilmaz (Sloane).
- 1992 Jan Founding Conference of Moscow Club of Young Liberals designed to be a model for LDPSU youth organization (SZh).
- 1992 Jan All-Union LDPSU Conference; announcement of foundation of joint LDPSU-Communist *AZIP* designed to formulate an alternative draft for, and initiate a referendum on, a new constitution; address at LDPSU Moscow headquarters; Chairman E. Belilovskii; Secretary G. Gubina; among six further members of *AZIP* presidium: A. Khalitov, A. Zavidiiia, S. Skvortsov (CPSU-2), S. Martem'ianov (Moscow Committee for Communist Unity), Iu. Galkin (Russian All-People Union *ROS*).
- 1992 18 Jan Sponsors Founding Conference of abortive Movement for the USSR; among collective members: LDPSU, United Workers Front, and Federal Democratic Party; S. Beliaev elected chairman.
- 1992 19 Jan LDPSU participates in joint opposition picket in support of would-be 'Dniestr Republic' in front of Moldova's embassy.
- 1992 Lat Jan Participates, together with Russian National Front (?), at picket in front of Supreme Soviet building and Lithuanian embassy (*Kuranty*, no. 17, 28 January 1992).
- 1992 22 Jan Meets, according to an LDPSU press report, two representatives of the British Embassy in Moscow (Second Secretary G. Spindler and Political Department Head David Manning [?]) for a 70-minute talk.
- 1992 26 Jan LDPSU participates in a joint opposition picket in support of the would-be 'Dniestr Republic' in front of Moldova's embassy.
- 1992 29 Jan LDP receives forty boxes of humanitarian aid through the Moscow City government; boxes are distributed among Zhirinovskii's family and the LDP leadership (Or).
- 1992 31 Jan Nightly assault in flat of Zhirinovskii's nephew Pavel A. Zhirinovskii (b. 1970), a student at the Ul'ianovsk Polytechnic, who is robbed and beaten up; as a result, Zhirinovskii's sister moves to Moscow and starts working at LDP headquarters.

- 1992 Febr Moscow Metro leases some of its garages to the *INO* cooperative related to the LDPSU.
- 1992 Febr LDPR leadership addresses service men and employees of law protection organs; demands introduction of state of increased combat-readiness, distribution of small-arms to serving officers, and permission to use it.
- 1992 Feb/Mar After one and a half years, newspaper *Liberal* re-appears with Number 4-5, and represents until spring 1993 most important LDP mouthpiece.
- 1992 1-2 Feb Extended session of LDPSU Highest Council; 75 regional representative from former USSR; condemnation of formation of the CIS; special attention to military crisis.
- 1992 2 Feb LDPSU participates in joint opposition picket in support of would-be 'Dniestr Republic' in front of Moldova's and Romania's embassies.
- 1992 5 Feb Gives, according to SZh, nine interviews at Moscow headquarters to AP, *Time*, youth journal *Davai, davai* (Come on), weeklies *Domostroi* (Patriarchal Family Life) and ME, Second Public TV channels of Germany and Italy, German newspaper *Südkurier* (Southern Messenger), and radio *Imost'* (Youth).
- 1992 6 Feb E. Limonov flies from Paris to Moscow.
- 1992 9 Feb Popular Russian comedian G. Khazanov parodies Zhirinovskii at a meeting; Zhirinovskii later lays information against Khazanov.
- 1992 9 Feb Holds meeting in Moscow (Or).
- 1992 10 Feb Gives interview to Bratislava journalist.
- 1992 12 Feb Appears at the Moscow Sverdlovsk Rayon Court for first session of legal proceedings he has instituted against V. Aksiutchits, L. Alimov, the weekly *Stolitsa* (The Capital) and A. Mal'gin, *Stolitsa's* editor-in-chief, because of alleged defamation (comparison with Hitler, and KGB-connections); predicts to receive Rbls100,000 to 1 million from *Stolitsa*; proceedings postponed because of Aksiutchits's and Alimov's default; Mal'gin speculates about Zhirinovskii's involvement in a burglary of Mal'gin's office in order to obtain documents.
- 1992 13 Feb According to SZh, US-journal *Jerusalem Report* publishes article on Zhirinovskii by A. Lesser with false photograph (of former Ukrainian CPSU Politbureau member V. Shcherbitskii instead of Zhirinovskii); Zhirinovskii announces to lay information against *Jerusalem Report*.
- 1992 16 Feb Visits Murom and Vladimir in company of Western journalists from, among others, AP; holds rally at Murom's largest cinema.

- 1992 18 Feb Meets E. Limonov firstly at Moscow LDPSU headquarters in Moscow; receives also three unidentified Japanese visitors (Li).
- 1992 21 Feb Holds meeting at Moscow State Historical-Archival Institute *MGIAI* (today: Russian State University of the Humanities *RGGU*) in downtown Moscow; E. Limonov, and then *MGIAI* student and later *Novyi vzgliad* newspaper journalist Ia. Mogutin among listeners; group of students proposes Zhirinovskii as replacement of Institute's Rector Iu. Afanas'ev.
- 1992 23 Feb Soviet Army Day; LDPSU participates in demonstration (yet not in violent clashes) on Moscow *Tverskaja* Street; A. Zhemlo organizes sale of LDPSU newspapers (Or); planned meeting between LDP leadership and Limonov cancelled.
- 1992 24 Feb Visits, together with A. Arkhipov, S. Zharikov and S. Plekhanov, E. Limonov at his temporary home in Moscow Herzen Street.
- 1992 25 Feb E. Limonov flies to Krasnoiarsk.
- 1992 25 Feb Does not appear at a Moscow court for proceedings concerning one of this informations against mass media (Or).
- 1992 27 Feb Gives order to remove his telephone number from published LDPSU documents (Or).
- 1992 28 Feb Meets, according to SZh, two representatives of Political Department of Moscow US embassy: embassy's Second Secretary Mr. Bikadam (?) and employee Mr. Lukin; 'Proposals for a Military Reform for a Transition Period by the Liberal-Democratic Party' published.
- 1992 March Failed legal proceedings instituted by Zhirinovskii against the Agency PostFactum because of alleged libel; Moscow Krasnopresnensk Rayon People's Court follows Zhirinovskii's accusation that *Moskovskii komsomolets*'s description of his behaviour as contradicting law, and calling him a 'fascist' is wrong, yet rejects his demand of a compensation of Rbls500,000; on next day, Court declines Zhirinovskii's action against the Moscow daily *Kuranty* which quoted an LDPSU congress delegate as admitting that the LDPSU is financed by the *KGB* and Zhirinovskii is a drug addict.
- 1992 March V. Skurlatov founds Committee for the Support of the Moldovan-Dniestr Republic; Zhirinovskii among members.
- 1992 1 Mar Visits by invitation public literary evening with, and devoted to, E. Limonov in Moscow Central House of Literary Men; among further guests: SR Editor-in-Chief V. Chikin, *Den*' Deputy Editor-in-Chief V. Bondarenko, *KPRF* leader G. Ziuganov present, and Chairman and some members of the Party of Sexual Minorities.

- 1992 5 Mar Stalin's anniversary; V. Skurlatov's Party of Rebirth gathers on Moscow's Pushkin square and burns an effigy of B. E'ltin; rally ringleaders arrested by police.
- 1992 8 Mar International Women's Day; gives sexist interview to Ostankino TV (SK).
- 1992 17 Mar Denied opportunity to deliver an address at 200,000-people joined ultra-nationalist opposition rally on Moscow's Manege Square; holds separate meeting nearby.
- 1992 20 Mar Printing of first number of fascist newspaper *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* (50,000 copies; as unnumbered supplement to *Liberal*) under editorship of A. Arkhipov and S. Zharikov; three further similarly fascist issues published in May (officially announced number of copies: 100,000), October (50,000), and November (837,500 [?]) 1992.
- 1992 22 Mar Starts, together with S. Plekhanov, short visit to Siberia and the Urals; holds several meetings in Krasnoiarsk at among others the local university and Combine Building Factory Club; gives interview to Krasnoiarsk Radio; meets ultra-nationalist Director of Chemical Corporation 'Enisei' Pëtr Romanov; favourably received by officials at Sverdlovsk and Nizhnii Tagil.
- 1992 April Publication of first edition of 96-page pro-LDPSU pamphlet *The Zhirinovskii-Phenomenon* (50,000 copies) by I. Kulikova (b. 1918), Professor of Aesthetics at the Moscow Institut of Philosophy and Zhirinovskii's PR-assistant, with S. Plekhanov, Zhirinovskii's official biographer, in Moscow.
- 1992 April Gives a secret order to form LDP self-defense units consisting of youth and former servicemen (Or).
- 1992 April Meets for one-and-a-half-hour with a Moscow State University students delegation led by E. Mikhailov at LDP Moscow headquarters; agrees to cooperate with E. Mikhailov who becomes his unofficial representative at Moscow City Soviet.
- 1992 4 Apr Fourth LDPSU Moscow Organization Conference; approximately 200 participants (Or); decision to show 75-minute documentary film 'Mr. Zhirinovskii - Presidential Candidate' in Moscow cinemas *Gorizont* and *Strela*.
- 1992 8-10Apr Completion of postponed legal proceedings from 12 February 1992 concerning alleged libel on Zhirinovskii at the Moscow Sverdlovsk Rayon People's Court; no defamatory content in the *Stolitsa* articles by V. Aksiutchits, L. Alimov and A. Mal'gin found; Zhirinovskii demands also Rbls100,000 from *Stolitsa* for publishing on cover of its 1991 issue 36 (42) a photomontage combining half of Zhirinovskii's with half of Hitler's faces; Court obliges *Stolitsa* to compensate Zhirinovskii with Rbls5,000 and to publish an apologizing statement; S. Beliak, Zhirinovskii's lawyer, reads aloud telegram by Black Sea Fleet Admiral Kasatonov in support of Zhirinovskii.

- 1992 10 Apr LDPR document 'The Theoretical Platform of the Party - A Concept for the Social Security of Russia in the Global Historic Process' edited by Iu.P. Kuznetsov completed.
- 1992 13 Apr Sends telegramme to Sixth Congress of People's Deputies condemning policies of 'anti-Russian, anti-state' government.
- 1992 Mid-Apr Finnish Minister of Defense E. Ren (?) calls for strengthening defense capabilities apparently in response to Zhirinovskii's territorial claims.
- 1992 18-9Apr Third LDP Congress at Moscow (or, according to Zhirinovskii, at Krasnoiarsk); 628 (or 637) 'delegates' from 43 regions and former Soviet Republics; G. Frey, Jr., son of DVU chairman Dr. G. Frey, gives address; USA amabassador present (?; Or); adoption of LDP's 'Theoretical Plattform' edited by Iu. Kuznetsov; renaming of LDPSU in LDPR; resolution condemning unlawfulness of CIS's creation adopted; St. Petersburg delegate Iu. Savin announces creation of a St. Petersburg self-defense unit; presentation of project for new party programme; by-elections of Central Committee members; A. Khalitov elected Deputy Party Chairman for Organizational Issues; Zhirinovskii flies into a tantrum (Or).
- 1992 22 Apr E. Limonov and V. Alksnis participate in Paris Sorbonne forum of prominent politicians and publicists 'Where is the East going?'.
- 1992 25 Apr Zhirinovskii receives as birthday-presents a *Moskvich* car, copying technology, and cheques for several hundred thousand roubles.
- 1992 May E. Limonov (in Paris) offered per telephone post of Minister of Culture in LDPR Shadow Cabinet; Limonov demands and receives Internal Affairs portfolio.
- 1992 6 May Holds rally at St. Petersburg Palace Square; recants former demands to return Finland to Russia.
- 1992 8 May LDPR-DVU cooperation announced in Munich-based Frey-newspaper *Deutsche Nationalzeitung*.
- 1992 9 May Holds several rallies in Mosocw on occasion of Day of Victory over Fascism.
- 1992 14 May Holds 2000-people rally at Belgorod; predicts 60 million votes for him in elections; supports presidentialism; criticizes economic reform program.
- 1992 21 May V. Voronin's Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces holds rally at Mosocw Luzhniki Park on occasion of A. Sakharov's 71nd birthday; defamations against Sakharov's widow E. Bonner.
- 1992 25 May Meets, according to LDPR press, Turkish businessmen in the official delegation of

Turkish Prime-Minister (?) Demirel at Moscow International Trade Centre.

- 1992 28 May Holds, according to LDPR press, 7,000-participant rally at Vologda.
- 1992 Summ Meets US-American anti-Semite James Warner (?), Chairman of League for the Protection of Christians (?) and author 'The Country of ZOP [Zionist Occupational Power]' (?), from Louisiana at LDPR Moscow headquarters; Warner's baggage, according to LDPR press, lost at Moscow *Sheremet'ev*-2 Airport.
- 1992 Summ Rescues, according to his own report, during vacation near Sudak (Crimea) a small boy from drowning in Black Sea; holds rally in Sudak.
- 1992 Summ Invites major ultra-nationalist and neo-communist leaders to banquet at A. Vengerovskii's restaurant *Krutoi ar* (?); G. Ziuganov, A. Prokhanov, A. Sterligov and others do not accept; V. Alksnis and V. Anpilov (shortly) appear (Li).
- 1992 June Visits, against the will of the Ukrainian government, Simferopol on Crimea; demands Ukraines unification with Russia (Sp, no. 26, 1992).
- 1992 June LDPR nominates A. Khalitov as candidate in by-elections to Congress of People's Deputies in the 63rd Territorial District (city of Dimitrov, Moscow *oblast*).
- 1992 2 June Gives interview to Wolfgang Strauß, editor of German leading neo-fascist theoretical organ *Nation und Europa* (Nation and Europe), at Moscow LDPR headquarters.
- 1992 5 June Finishes visit to Mordovian capital Saransk; holds, according to SZh, rally in presence of local political leadership.
- 1992 5 June Moscow Theoretical Conference 'Russia as Seen by the Opposition' (according to *Partinform*: Scientific-practical conference 'Economic Reforms in Russia and Their Influence on the Geopolitical Situation') initiated by LDPR's St. Petersburg organization; 47 participants from St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tiumen' and Ekaterinburg; 22 speeches by, among others, Zhirinovskii, and A. Arkhipov.
- 1992 9 June Participates at Moscow multi-party 'round-table' discussion 'Parties and Social Movements on National Conflicts in the CIS and Russian Federation' published in *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* (Sociological Research).
- 1992 12-3Jun LDPR guest delegation participates at First Congress of Russian National Assembly *RNS*; A. Nevzorov, V. Filatov and A. Batogov among leading body members.
- 1992 14 June Speaks at meeting next to the Moscow Central Park of Culture; condemns E. Shevardnadzes Ossetian policies; calls for support of South Ossetia.
- 1992 17 June First session of LDPR Shadow Cabinet (A. Arkhipov, E. Limonov, A. Mitrofanov,

S. Zharikov, Iu. Buzov, A. Kurskii), at the Moscow office of sympathizing businessman Senderev (where later a second Shadow Cabinet meeting is held), and at Buzov's flat; Cossack Boldyrev as guest; Zhirinovskii not present (Li).

- 1992 19 June E. Limonov participates in picket at Moscow Gorbachëv Foundation.
- 1992 22 June Presentation of LDPR National Government Shadow Cabinet consisting of 20 Ministers at Moscow House of Journalists: A. Arkhipov (Information); Iu. Buzov (Foreign Trade); I. Demidov; M. Ivanov (Deputy Prime-Minister); V. Ivanov (Health Care); A. Khalitov (Foodstuffs and Agriculture); V. Kobelev (Labour); A. Kurskii (Mineral and Natural Resources); A. Krivonosov (Education); E. Limonov (Head of All-Russian Investigation Bureau); A. Losev; A. Mitrofanov (Foreign Affairs); M. Musatov (Defense); A. Vengerovskii (Scientific Affairs); S. Zharikov (Youth and Sports); S. Zhebrovskii (Economics); A. Zhemlo (Head of Chief Directorate of Reformatory Institutions); V. Zhirinovskii (Prime-Minister).
- 1992 23 June Holds, according to SZh, during one-day visit to Kaluga meeting at Kaluga Socio-Political Centre.
- 1992 24 June Updated membership composition of miniscule Centrist Bloc announced: Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces, Blue Movement, *Vatan* Meskhetian Turks Society, Democratic Union of Intelligentsiia of Azerbaidzan, 'Rebirth of Russia' Social Foundation, People's Forum of Abkhaziia, Society of Internationalists of Abkhaziia, Federation of Peace and Accord, League of Independent Scholars, International Fond of Popular and Parliamentary Initiatives, 'Industrial *Donbass*' Firm, Nizhnii Novgorod Association of Victims of Communist Terror, Innovative Sociological Centre, and Inter-Republican Social Association 'Popular Action'.
- 1992 Lat Jun LDPR Shadow Cabinet (A. Arkhipov, Iu. Buzov, E. Limonov, A. Mitrofanov, S. Zharikov) meets without Zhirinovskii at Mitrofanov's and A. Filatov's *dacha* on Moscow Nikolina Hill; E. Limonov meets, through A. Arkhipov, Zhirinovskii's German friend Nadja Hoffmann (according to Limonov, a Jew) at restaurant of Central House of Literary Men.
- 1992 Lat Jun Visits, together with E. Limonov, A. Arkhipov and M. Musatov, Krasnodar Krai; gives press conference at editorial board of *Komsomolets Krasnodara*; gives anti-Armenian speeches at Stanitsa Severskaia House of Culture and in front of Krasnodar Krai Soviet; meets Armenian Prosecutor Garik Sarkisovich (who proposes commercial cooperation between Armenian diaspora and LDPR), a Krasnodar Krai administrator of oilchemical products, and local Cossack leaders; allegedly planned meeting with Chief Ataman Gromov cancelled; E. Limonov visits editorial board of 'thick journal' *Kuban*; A. Arkhipov later publicizes canard that Zhirinovskii saved a boy from drowning in river Kuban'.
- 1992 28 June LDPR press office announces that many Zhirinovskii supporters are fighting among

Dniestr Republic secessionists, and that a further group of 25 volunteers from Krasnoïarsk is about to join them; Krasnoïarsk functionary V. Ivanov complains later per telephone to Limonov that neither the Dniestr Government nor LDPR provide funds to send volunteers to Moldova.

- 1992 3 July According to SZh, meeting of LDPR Shadow Cabinet; E. Limonov initiates adoption of an anti-Moldovan and pro-Anpilov resolution.
- 1992 6 July Gives, according to SZh, life interview to Novosibirsk TV.
- 1992 8 July Continuation of Moscow June 5th, 1992 LDPR Theoretical Conference at St. Petersburg; addresses by M. Ivanov and E. Kuznetsova (Tiumen').
- 1992 10 July Publication of Plattform of the Liberal-Democratic Party; among others, demands for a purely territorial division of country, redirection of foreign policy, and creation of professional army.
- 1992 12 July E. Limonov returns to Moscow from several-day visit to Dniestr Republic.
- 1992 13 July Publishes resolution demanding referendum on re-creation of Russian state in 1977 USSR borders, mixed economy, and new constitution.
- 1992 14 July Holds big Russian-speaker-rally at Estonian city of Ivangorod; chides Estonia - a 'criminal state' - for having established borders unilaterally; suggests retribution flights over Narva by Russian Su-29 bombers.
- 1992 16 Jul Presents LDPR Shadow Cabinet (without Limonov) at St. Petersburg; criticism by St. Petersburg LDPR activists; E. Limonov flies to Paris.
- 1992 26 July - A. Batogov, editor of neo-Nazi irregular *Russkoe*
 3 Sep *voskresenie* (and later LDPR central apparatus employee and State Duma candidate), committed for trial at Butyrskaja Criminal Prison because of racist hate-speech (Art. 74 of the RSFSR Criminal Code) and eulogy of Hitler.
- 1992 28 July Iu. Buzov, LDPR Shadow Cabinet Foreign Trade Minister, announces at Foros that Shadow Cabinet will rent Gorbachëv's former Black Sea *dacha*.
- 1992 29 July LDPR signs declaration of All-National Committee 'Russia for the Dniestr Region' (of which it is a member) calling for recognition of Dniestr and Gagauz Republics and support for their drive for independence.
- 1992 29 July Session of Centrist Bloc of Political Parties and Movements consisting of 14 CIS-organizations; presentation of new action programme; announcement of readiness to present its own projects for a new constitution and programme for economic recovery, and of creation of a New Russia Roundtable.

- 1992 30 July LDPR Shadow Cabinet protests officially against arrest of *Russkoe voskresenie* editor A. Batogov.
- 1992 31 July V. Voronin presents Declaration at press-conference at Centrist Bloc Moscow headquarters; calls for new elections, permanent New Russia Roundtable and 'all-national forum'; condemns IMF inspired reforms.
- 1992 Aug Announces intention to become candidate in Moscow mayoral elections; denies information that comedian M. Zadornov is an LDPR member.
- 1992 Aug LDPR Shadow cabinet adopts resolution 'dissipation of people's property' concerning, among others, the transfer of Russian foreign assets to the Russian Information Agency.
- 1992 10 Aug Russian Ministry of Justice annuls LDPSU registration of April 1991 'in connection with the violation of rules of registration by the Union Ministry'.
- 1992 11 Aug Russian Deputy Minister of Justice G. Cheremnykh announces that Ministry is ready to consider LDP statute's re-registration after two months; chairman of the LDPR party-organizational department G. Kazantsev announces that LDP intends to appeal officially against Ministry's decision in the Constitutional Court.
- 1992 14 Aug Ministry of Justice transfers falsified LDPSU registration documents to Chief State Prosecutor's Office.
- 1992 16 Aug Speaks at *DVU* conference 'Germans and Russians - Enemies for Ever?' in Mühlhausen (Thuringia) during a several-day visit to Germany; praises Gen. A. Lebed as 'true patriot', and calls for territorial reduction of Moldova and Baltic Republics; N. Hoffmann looks after Zhirinovskii during the visit, and subsequently visits Moscow.
- 1992 18 Aug Session of Centrist Bloc; annulment of LDPSU registration rejected as unwarranted because it implies annulment of results of 1991 presidential elections; V. Voronin announces intention to lay information at Constitutional Court; demands new presidential elections in December 1992.
- 1992 19 Aug Holds press-conference; declares Zionism and United States enemies of Europe; calls for reassertion of Russian control over Baltic states; asserts that annulment of LDPSU registration led to emergence of new sponsors; LDP Highest Council issues pro-Abkhazian statement.
- 1992 28 Aug Frey's *Deutsche Nationalzeitung* publishes first of many interviews with Zhirinovskii.
- 1992 30 Aug Centrist Bloc calls for moratorium on all military actions in, and summit on, Abkhaziiia.

- 1992 Sept ZIP announces intention to publish either 40 or 20 million copies of a book called *Fantasy and Reality* containing, among others, AZIP's draft constitution, political declarations of a communist grouping and the LDPR, and a science-fiction novel by US-author Robert Haynlayn (?); Zelenograd firm *Platan* asked to assist in distribution, and explains that AZIP Chairman E.L. Belilovskii has made agreements for a Rbls1.5 billion credit for the publication; Belilovskii proposes in the (ultimately unpublished) book computerized planning of consumption, and shooting of criminals and political dissidents according to martial law.
- 1992 10 Sep Participates at meeting in front of Japanese Embassy at Moscow.
- 1992 11 Sep Endorses, together with V. Alksnis, El'tsin's decision to postpone planned trip to Japan.
- 1992 14 Sep LDPR Press Service issues document claiming that *Izvestiia* (11 September 1992) distorted statements by Zhirinovskii on 10 September 1992 meeting in front of Moscow Japanese Embassy.
- 1992 15 Sep Visits Theatre of History *Tetris* at the N.A. Ostrovskii State Museum and Humanitarian Centre *Preodolenie* (Overcoming) where a wax figure of him is exhibited next to Ivan the Terrible (according to Arkhipov, Zhirinovskii visits Museum of Wax Figures at the Moscow Tverskaia Street 19).
- 1992 Mid-Sep Visits the Moscow gallery *Sart* where a sculpture of his head by V. Shcherbakov is exhibited.
- 1992 17 Sep N. Hoffmann sends letter to E. Limonov concerning arrangements for Zhirinovskii's planned visit to France; names Parisian DuPont as Zhirinovskii's host.
- 1992 19 Sep Calls E. Limonov in Paris; asks to arrange meetings with J.-M. Le Pen, J. Chirac, and Russian embassy staff; announces meetings with Russian businessmen in Paris.
- 1992 22 Sep A. Arkhipov calls E. Limonov in Paris, and announces split in LDP; young LDP activists not included in delegation to France.
- 1992 23 Sep Arrives, together with 6-person delegation (including S. Zhebrovskii, V. Minakov), at Paris for four-day visit sponsored by Russian businessmen S. Gorshkov and A. Pinkin; asks Limonov to arrange meetings with Rothschild, vocalist Ch. Aznavour and Armenian commune leader; J. Chirac's mayoral office rejects proposal for meeting; visits without invitation several Paris party headquarters; allegedly meets leading representatives of Republican Party, Centre of Independent Democrats, Gaullists, Radical Party, Union of French Democracy and Russian emigre circles (Count Palen); gives press-conference and meets together with V. Minakov (through intermediaries E. Limonov and G. Penselleli) *Front National* leader J.-M. Le Pen for a two-hour talk on September 25; proposes Moscow as future centre of a right-wing

international; receives book 'Le Pen's Album' as present; lunches with right-wing extremist Prince Sixt-Henri De Bourbon Parm (?) and G. Penselleli on September 27; visits tombs of Unknown Soldier and Napoleon, homes of Richelieu and Baudelaire, and Sex-Shop (Li).

- 1992 Oct E. Limonov goes via Budapest to Belgrade, and participates on Bosnian Serb side in Yugoslav war near Sarajevo; meets, among others, S. Milosevic, R. Karadzic and R. Mladic.
- 1992 Oct Gives interview to Alexander Yanov published in *New Times International*; asserts 'lumpen'-majority of population will vote for him.
- 1992 8 Oct Joint meeting of Centrist Bloc, Society of Abkhazian Internationalists and Abkhazian People's Forum at entrance of Gorkii Central Park of Culture and Recreation; apart from V. Voronin, among participants: D. Vasil'ev (*Pamiat*), A. Lebedev (Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces), V. Skurlatov (Party of Rebirth) and L. Ubozhko (Conservative Party).
- 1992 10 Oct Gives address and, on V. Minakov's proposal, nominated candidate for office of Moscow's mayor at Fifth LDPR Moscow Organization Conference; M. Musatov reports of activities since April Congress; addresses by A. Khalitov, P. Kazakov, A. Zubkov, V. Romaniuk, S. Iakunov, L. Garsh'ian, V. Ochagov, S. Zhebrovskii.
- 1992 17 Oct Skurlatov's *RNF* threatens sanctions against Latvian Embassy at Moscow, if *OMON* Officer S. Parfënov is not released by Latvian government.
- 1992 23 Oct LDPR declaration calling for support of Abkhazian secessionist movement published.
- 1992 24-5 Oct Observs, together with A. Arkhipov, A. Mitrofanov and M. Musatov, 3,000-participant (?) Foundation Congress of National Salvation Front at Moscow Parliamentary Centre; leaves Congress during second session; V. Skurlatov, A. Nevzorov and V. Alksnis elected members of *FNS* Political Council; E. Limonov, contrary to a promise by G. Ziuganov, not included in *FNS* Political Council.
- 1992 27 Oct E. Limonov, S. Zharikov, A. Arkhipov, A. Mitrofanov, and A. Vengerovskii meet at restaurant *Krutoiar* (apparently co-owned by Vengerovskii), and agree to discontinue their cooperation with Zhirinovskii.
- 1992 31 Oct Joint anti-Gaidar LDPR and the Russian Party rally in front of Moscow House of Soviets attended by approx. 300 people.
- 1992 31 Oct Participates, together with A. Arkhipov, E. Kogan (*Soiuz*), and V. Skurlatov (*RNF*), in opening ceremony of night-rock-club 'Sexton', Moscow's third coffee-bar established by right-radical youth 'Ruined Childhood' Foundation.

- 1992 Winter Holds, together with M. Ivanov, rallies in assembly halls of Kolpino Rayon Administration and St. Petersburg Polytechnical College.
- 1992 Nov Begin of production of documentary 'Vladimir Zhirinovskii and His Party' by V. Balakhovskii, (Deputy?) Head of the LDPR Propaganda and Agitation Department.
- 1992 Nov Gives interview to *Long Island Newsday*, declares Baltics, Poland, Finland and Alaska should be included into Russia.
- 1992 1 Nov Joins 600-700-people protest meeting (organized by Trade Union of Russian Academy of Sciences Employees at entrance of Gorkii Central Park for Culture and Recreation) demanding more state support for sciences and scientists; LDP raises its party flag and distributes *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* issues; meeting's organizers protest unsuccessfully against presence political slogans and symbols; gives after the meeting Zhirinovskii an address.
- 1992 7 Nov 75th anniversary of Great October Revolution; joint opposition 25-30,000-participant rally on Moscow Manege Square; LDPR holds separate several-hundred-participant rally close to main meeting; LDPR phalanx is allowed to link up with column of communists and socialists in Red Square march (SK); demands restoration not of USSR, but Russian State; A. Arkhipov and S. Zharikov absent.
- 1992 10 Nov Moscow Frunze Rayon People's Court rejects in third hearing Zhirinovskii's accusation of libel of daily *Izvestiia* (I, no. 228, 1991 quoting RV, no. 18, 1991 quoting the Lithuanian newspaper *Respublika* 1991), and his demand of a Rbls200,000 compensation payment.
- 1992 12 Nov Gives press-conference at Moscow cinema *Strela*; predicts military coup for next year.
- 1992 13 Nov Irregular fascist LDPR St. Petersburg newspaper *Slovo Zhirinovskogo* edited by Iu.P. Kuznetsov registered at St. Petersburg Regional Inspection.
- 1992 14 Nov LDPR dissidents, including S. Zharikov, A. Arkhipov, A. Mitrofanov, Iu. Buzov and E. Limonov, agree to found National-Radical Party *NRP* at meeting at Mitrofanov's Nikolina Hill *dacha*; several subsequent meetings (including S. Plekhanov, A. Kurskii and A. Vengerovskii) to prepare *NRP* foundation.
- 1992 Mid-No Holds, together with V. Balakhovskii, rally at Malakhovka *Soiuz* cinema.
- 1992 16 Nov LDPR declaration 'To the Russian People' issued; calls for unitary, presidentialist Russian state in 1977 USSR borders, and for strongly state-regulated market economy.
- 1992 20 Nov First issue of *Slovo Zhirinovskogo* (5,000 copies) with non-LDPR supplement

Rossiianin at printer of St. Petersburg Publisher *Lenizdat* produced.

- 1992 21 Nov Talks four hours to Saddam Hussein and three-and-a-half-hour to Foreign Minister T. Aziz during one-week visit to Baghdad (via Amman); A. Khalitov member of LDPR delegation; meetings with 2,000 young people at Youth Affairs Central Committee, Ministry of Agriculture representatives and with MPs; receives as gifts Iraqi flag, Captain's uniform, and portrait of Saddam Hussein (reports later about Iraq visit at monthly rally at Moscow Metro station *Sokol'niki* with, according to LDPR-press, 2,000 listeners).
- 1992 22 Nov Foundation of National-Radical Party by 30 delegates from Moscow, Rostov-on-the-Don, Krasnoiarski, Kaliningrad and Saransk including A. Mitrofanov, E. Limonov, S. Zharikov, A. Kurskii and A. Arkhipov (joined by fascist Moscow *NORD* group) at Mitrofanov's Nikolina Hill *dacha*; election of 11-member Political Council (including Rock-musician V. Marochkin) and Arkhipov as Chairman; A. Vengerovskii (although not present) provides *NRP* headquarters (Li) at his Moscow Inter-Branch Scientific-Educational Center for Electronics and Informatics.
- 1992 24 Nov Accuses in an interview Germany of expansionism on Balkans.
- 1992 24 Nov Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, S. Iastrzhembskii characterizes Zhirinovskii's visit to Iraq as counter-productive, and irrelevant for Russian foreign policy.
- 1992 Lat Nov E. Limonov, according to V. Ivanov, in Krasnoiarsk.
- 1992 27 Nov Signs Pact for Civil Peace and Accord of several Russian democratic and nationalist parties initiated by New Russia bloc; promises thus to act within constitutional provisions, and to refrain from forming paramilitary units and inciting violence.
- 1992 30 Nov LDPR activists take part at pro-Russian 200-people rally in Simferopol, Crimea, and hold up a map of 'greater Russia' including Poland, Finland and Alaska.
- 1992 Dec LDPR documentary 'Zhirinovskii and His Party' shot, and shown for two months at Moscow cinema *Strela*.
- 1992 Dec A. Mitrofanov returns from National-Radical Party to LDPR.
- 1992 2 Dec SZh registered anew as LDPR Moscow City Organization newspaper.
- 1992 5 Dec Suggests dismemberment or direct Moscow control of Baltic republics in case of their unwillingness to cooperate with Russia.
- 1992 14 Dec Russian Ministry of Justice re-registers LDPR.
- 1992 17 Dec National-Radical Party registered by Moscow City Soviet Justice Department.

- 1992 Dec Four-man LDPR delegation including A. Mitrofanov and A. Arkhipov (?) to Iraq.
- 1992 26 Dec Announces candidacy in elections of Moscow Mayor in February 1993; hands out free tea and cakes at a rally in Moscow.
- 1992 27 Dec Joint pro-Abkhazian 60-80-people picket of LDPR, Union for the Protection of Soviet Citizens, Party of Rebirth, Toiling Russia, and Union of the Russian People in front of Georgian embassy; young Abkhazians distribute LDPR-leaflets.
- 1992 30 Dec Takes part in, and, according to S. Umalatova (formerly *Soiuz*), finances, of so-called Sixth Extraordinary Congress of the People's Deputies of the USSR including A. Luk'ianov and V. Alksnis
- 1993 2 Jan Leads ten-man picket against US policy towards Iraq at Moscow's *Sheremet'ev*-2 Airport during US-President George Bush's arrival.
- 1993 9 Jan LDPR activists demonstrate, together with representatives of Russian Liberation Movement, Russian Party, *Nashi* and Serbian students (altogether 40-50 people) in support of Serbia from St. Petersburg Metro station 'Insurrection Square' to Palace Square.
- 1993 10 Jan New LDPR Programmatic Theses published.
- 1993 11 Jan New LDPR biweekly organ *Pravda Zhirinovskogo* registered at Russian Ministry of Press and Information.
- 1993 15 Jan LDPR participates in a pro-Iraq and pro-Serbia rally in front of the Russian Foreign Ministry organized by V. Skurlatov's Party of Rebirth.
- 1993 14 Jan Paris-based weekly *Russkaia mysl'* (Russian Thought) publishes article by L. Aleinik publicizing Zhirinovskii's participation in foundation of Moscow *Shalom* Theatre Society for Jewish Culture.
- 1993 16 Jan Sixth LDPR Inter-Regional Conference; 276 delegates from 57 regions of Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia and other former USSR republics; Iraqi diplomats as guests; party anthem on melody of Tsarist national anthem played; introduction of song 'Zhirinovskii Is Always With You' (allegedly discovered by Viktor Balakhovskii in the countryside around Moscow) composed by Igor' Mateta (T); various diplomats including a representative of the Iraqi embassy among guests; adoption of a resolution; 52 LDPR members sign as volunteers for Iraq.
- 1993 18 Jan Iu.P. Kuznetsov gives anti-Western address at St. Petersburg conference on 75th anniversary of dissolution of Russian Constitutional Assembly by the Bolsheviks.

- 1993 22 Jan First registered candidate for announced re-elections for Moscow Mayor; other potential ultra-nationalist candidates include A. Zavidiiia, A. Sterligov, E. Kogan, S. Troitskii and V. Filatov.
- 1993 23 Jan Participates as speaker in large joint ultranationalist demonstration and rally on occasion of the Day of the Soviet Army in Moscow city centre.
- 1993 24 Jan Sends 9-man LDPR delegation led by A. Khalitov to Iraq; delegation allegedly included paramilitary volunteers, a Colonel with an Afghanistan background, and a physician; talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister T. Aziz, Minister of Defense and Parliamentary Speaker Sadi Mehdi Saleh; Khalitov offers assistance by Russian experts in Iraqi war against multi-national forces.
- 1993 26 Jan Russian Foreign Ministry calls for legal action against Zhirinovskii in connection with his sending supporters to Iraq.
- 1993 Feb S. Zharikov announces official leave from LDPR Shadow Cabinet.
- 1993 25 Feb At a press-conference, LDPR leadership announces support for referendum on trust towards the president and parliament, and for presidential elections in December 1993, and parliamentary elections in spring 1994.
- 1993 Spring Brings juridical action against newspaper *Moscow Guardian* because of Billy Rogers' labelling him a 'fascist' (no. 41, November 1992), and demands US\$1.5 million; *Moscow Guardian* convicted to pay Zhirinovskii Rbls10 million, and ceases publication.
- 1993 Spring National-Radical Party renames itself Right-Radical Party (acting chairman A. Arkhipov); E. Limonov leaves Right-Radical Party and enters alliance with A. Dugin and I. Lazarenko.
- 1993 March First issue of LDPR Moscow Organization newspaper *Na semi kholmakh* (On Seven Hills), edited by V. Bogaty, published.
- 1993 March According to V. Pchëlkin, paramilitary LDPR Youth Organization Self-Defense Unit *Sokol* (Falcon) with 70 members created.
- 1993 March Sends letters to Commander-in-Chief of Russian Naval Forces and Norther Navy Commander concerning recent collision of a US and a Russian submarines.
- 1993 March According to Iu. Ianushevich, A. Vedenkin visits as LDPR representative, together with a *Mozbiznesbank* representative, Chechnia; talks with D. Dudaev and Z. Gamzakhurdiiia.
- 1993 1 Mar Gives interview to BBC at LDPR headquarters in Moscow; announces creation of

authoritarian regime through elections.

- 1993 4 Mar Visits Nizhii Novgorod; according to LDPR press service, meeting hall overcrowded in spite of a Rbls100 entrance fee.
- 1993 11 Mar Gives, according to LDPR press service, life interview on US television.
- 1993 12 Mar Zhirinovskii's partner in Germany, N. Hoffmann, of the Bureau for Cultural Exchange between Russia and Germany invites, in Zhirinovskii's name, among others, fascist *National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands* (National-Democratic Party of Germany) to send representatives to Fourth LDPR Congress; F. Schönhuber, then chairman of the major German right-radical party *Die Republikaner* (The Republicans), later also reports about an unsuccessful approach by Zhirinovskii (*Der Republikaner*, no. 1, 1994, 4-5).
- 1993 13 Mar Demands new elections and replacement of 'weak' President El'tsin in front of reporters at Eighth Congress of People's Deputies at Moscow.
- 1993 13 Mar Leads a picket of about 40 nationalists concurrently with large pro-El'tsin demonstration on Soviet Square, in front of Moscow City Council; at attempt to address crowd, attacked and lightly injured; SZh reports baptism of fire for 20 members of 100-man Youth Defense Unit *Sokol*.
- 1993 14 Mar LDPR press service accuses *DemRossiia* of attack on Zhirinovskii; LDPR Head of Propaganda V. Balakhovskii charges *DemRossiia* activists with using stones, metallic chains, knives and truncheons; *DemRossiia* leader L. Ponomarev rejects accusations.
- 1993 15 Mar Gives interview on Russian liberalism to *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* (Sociological Research).
- 1993 17 Mar Gives address at large joint opposition rally at Moscow Soviet Square.
- 1993 21 Mar Visits, together with S. Zhebrovskii, Briansk and Kaluga; holds rally at Briansk Political Centre.
- 1993 22 Mar A. Arkhipov and S. Zharikov publish first and only issue of neo-Nazi journal *K toporu* (To the Axe), no. 5 (continuation of SZh numeration).
- 1993 28 Mar LDPR activists participate in joint opposition meeting on St. Petersburg's Palace Square in support of nationalist opposition in Congress of People's Deputies.
- 1993 April According to E. Mikhailov, first issue of fortnightly *Pravda Zhirinovskogo* (edited by A. Khalitov) published (50,000 copies); later issues are edited by V. Zhebrovskii.
- 1993 April Guest at a congress of the Baath Party in Bagdad; meeting with Saddam Hussein.

- 1993 April Circulation of LDPR Highest Council proposal for a new Russian constitution; opening of specialized Heavy Metal music shop *U Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskii's) at the LDPR headquarters in Moscow.
- 1993 April Meets a University of Wisconsin group of students and professors of Russian politics; warns against US-interference in Russian domestic affairs; presents to the student, 'in view of their difficult financial situation', Rbls30,000.
- 1993 14 Apr Begin of daily showing of documentary 'Mr. Zhirinovskii - Presidential Candidate' at Moscow cinema *Strela*.
- 1993 14 Apr Gives interview to Radio *Rossia*; LDPR Highest Council calls voters to vote in 25 April national referendum 'No' on the questions of 'confidence' towards El'tsin and the support for his economic policies, and 'Yes' on the questions of early parliamentary and presidential elections.
- 1993 19 Apr 'Some Propositions of the Programme for Leading the Economy Out of the Crisis' by S. Zhebrovskii published.
- 1993 24-5Apr Fourth LDPR Congress at Moscow Central House of Tourists; more than 370 delegates (according to LDPR press, 420 delegates from 44 regions of Russia; according to *Partinform* and *Obozrevatel'*, 650 delegates from 70 regions); 21 delegates from former Soviet republics; *DVU* chairman Dr. G. Frey and convicted German neo-Nazi terrorist Manfred Roeder among official foreign guests; further foreign guests from Iraq, Finland, Austria and several CIS countries; Highest Council (S. Abel'stev, A. Vengerovskii, S. Zhebrovskii, V. Kobelev) and Central Committee consisting of 35 regional functionaries (including V. Marychev, A. Khalitov, P. Rozhok, V. Ivanov, V. Minakov) elected; Zhirinovskii's aide Colonel G. Kazantsev deprived of mandate and fired because of insisting on LDPR Auditing Commission report; creation of institution of Personal Advisers to the Chairman; Zhirinovskii approved as presidential candidate.
- 1993 25 Apr Celebrates birthday at Moscow's *Praga* Restaurant; receives congratulatory telegramme from Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev.
- 1993 Lat Apr V. Gvozdev appointed LDPR Deputy Chairman for Economic Issues, and co-opted in Highest Council.
- 1993 May LDPR youth organization delegation participates at Baghdad General Conference of Youth and Students of Non-Aligned Countries which founds Youth and Student Organization of Non-Alignment with headquarters at Baghdad, and A. Zubkov, leader of the LDPR youth organization *Sokol* (Falcon), as vice-chairman (according to another information this organization is called Association of Student and Youth Organizations of Member Countries of the Non-Alignment Movement, and was founded in April 1993; *Partinform*, no. 37 [58], 8-14 September 1993, 14);

announcement that, from September 1993 onwards, an LDPR youth organization representative will be permanently present at Baghdad, and that the executive committee of the Organization will meet first on 29-30 September 1993; at a meeting of the delegation with Kuri Faisal Shakhr (?), a member of Iraqs Highest Revolutionary Command, Iraq expresses willingness to develop further mutual relations.

- 1993 May Participates in a picket of 'patriotic' organizations on Moscow's Slavic Square in support of Serbia; G. Ziuganov among further speakers.
- 1993 May LDPR Press Service announces that LDPR youth section will stage pro-KGB pickets at international conference 'The KGB: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow' on 28-30 May.
- 1993 May LDPR holds, according to Tsygankov, interregional conference with participants from the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.
- 1993 May E. Mikhailov becomes member of LDPR (according to Mikhailov's book, this occurred already in April 1993).
- 1993 1 May Gives speech on national question at LDPR meeting in front of *Bol'shoi* Theatre; proposes full replacement of current Russian leadership and new axis Berlin-Moscow-Beijing.
- 1993 6 May Zhirinovskii's lawyer, S. Beliak, wins a law-suit on alleged libel on Zhirinovskii against weekly *Rossia*; *Rossia* forced to publish a corrective statement and to pay Zhirinovskii Rbls50,000 (instead of Rbls1 million asked for by Beliak); according to LDPR Press Service, four *Rossia* journalists have become LDPR members during the last months.
- 1993 9 May Gives long pro-authoritarian and -unitarian speech at a meeting in Moscow.
- 1993 18 May Announces candidacy for 1996 presidential elections.
- 1993 21 May V. Voronin and Centrist Bloc press-secretary A. Lebedev give press-conference on occasion of 72nd birthday of A. Sakharov; defamations against Sakharov's widow E. Bonner.
- 1993 25 May NG announces that LDPR will participate in forthcoming Constitutional Assembly.
- 1993 June LDPR Highest Council adopts resolution calling for a solution of the Ukrainian social crisis through unification with Russia.
- 1993 June Gives interview to Japanese news agency condemning Chinese naval attacks on a Russian fishing-trawler.

- 1993 June Meets graduates of 16th school of the city of Khimki; present premiums of up to Rbls10,000 to some graduates.
- 1993 3 June Participates in All-Russian Constitutional Assembly organized by 'national-patriotic' opposition (2,100 participants from 36 regions); advocates unification of opposition and election of one leader.
- 1993 5 June Participates in El'tsin-sponsored Constitutional Assembly.
- 1993 14 June End of daily showing of documentary 'Mr. Zhirinovskii - Presidential Candidate' at Moscow cinema *Strela*.
- 1993 15 June Regular session of the LDPR Shadow Cabinet; confirmation of 'Ministers' of National Security, Communication and Transport; consideration of issues in the formation of a Department of Temporary Lost Territories and the Legal Foundations of Alaska's Selling to the USA (possibly this meeting took place on 15 July 1993; see *Partinform*, no. 29 [50], 14-20 July 1993, 2).
- 1993 18-20Ju 'Dniestr Republic' celebrates first anniversary of 'victory' over Moldova in Bendery; a Moscow Russia-Dniestr Solidarity Committee delegation delivers greeting from its co-leaders V. Anpilov and Zhirinovskii.
- 1993 26 June Participates in Plenary Session of 4th Section of El'tsin-sponsored Constitutional Assembly; advocates strong presidentialism and unitarianism.
- 1993 27 June Extraordinary Session of LDPR Highest Council condemns 'barbarian American bombardement of Baghdad on 26 June'; LDPR Press Service announces sending a new volunteers detachment to Iraq.
- 1993 28 June Pro-Iraq LDPR rally in front of Moscow US embassy and *MID*.
- 1993 28 June Gives press-conference at Moscow restaurant *Praga* (Prague); predicts 20% of votes in parliamentary elections, and second place in presidential elections; announces upcoming presentation of an LDPR Foundation.
- 1993 28 Jun - Visits with LDPR delegation Bulgaria on
2 July invitation of Bulgarian micro-party LDPB; proposes re-creation of Warsaw Pact as a Military Union of Slavic States, and Russian naval presence in Bulgaria in view of 'Turkish threat'.
- 1993 July Holds rallies at Samara, Krasnoiarsk and St. Petersburg.
- 1993 July Gives interview to Los Angeles Russian weekly *Panorama* (published on August 3).
- 1993 July Second issue of henceforth fortnightly *Pravda Zhirinovskogo* edited by S.M.

Zhebrovskii published (10,000 copies).

- 1993 July First issue of newspaper *Oppozitsiia* (Opposition) edited by V. Zhuravlëv (a later LDPR State Duma deputy) published by so called Democracy and Humanism Foundation.
- 1993 July Sends letter to Russian President B. El'tsin proposing LDPR activist Iu.N. Parshakov as new Governor of Ivanovo *oblast'*.
- 1993 July Sends letter to Serbian President S. Milosevic asking for release from prison of Serbian nationalist dissident Vuk Draskovic.
- 1993 3-4 July Third Scientific-Practical Conference of the LDPR called 'The Methodology of Russia's Overcoming of the Political, Economic and Spiritual Crisis' at the *Sokol'niki* House of Youth (on 3 July) and the LDPR headquarters (on 4 July); 200 participants reported in LDPR press (280 from 38 regions reported in ME); among guest-speakers: A. Zviagin (Economics Professor at Moscow University of Commerce), Professor G. Lukava (*KPRF* functionary), and Father Vsevolod representing, according to an LDPR source, Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Aleksii II.
- 1993 8 July Appears at a picket of woodcutters in front of House of Government of the Russian Federation in Moscow.
- 1993 9 July Participates at a nationalist rally against the partition of the Black Sea fleet between Russia and the Ukraine in front of the Russian parliament.
- 1993 16 July Sends a letter to Prime-Minister V. Chernomyrdin proposing to dispatch 70,000 Russian workers for summer work to Bulgaria.
- 1993 24 July Guest at Second Congress of the National Salvation Front at Moscow Parliamentary Center; not allowed to give a welcoming speech; after a split of the Party of Rebirth, V. Skurlatov founds Party of the Rebirth of the Great Power's Rebirth.
- 1993 25 July Visits St. Petersburg for celebration of Day of the Russian Naval Forces; protests in a telephone call to LDPR Press Service against Central Bank monetary reform.
- 1993 29 July Participates in protest action of several hundred Army officers in front of the Frunze Military Academy; advocates 'preventive attacks' on 'war-mongering groupings' in southern Central Asia.
- 1993 30 July Foundation of Ukrainian Party of Slavic Unity based at Donetsk, headed by Igor' Karpenko (b. 1952), and seemingly allied to LDPR (T).
- 1993 31 July Opens the first LDPR Summer Festival in Moscow *Sokol'niki* district; condemns Constitutional Assembly; disapproves of Russian troops deployment in Tadzhikistan;

advocates authoritarian regime.

- 1993 August Sub-section of Union of Journalists founded at editorial boards of *Liberal* and *Pravda Zhirinovskogo*; secretary K.N. Panfërov (b. 1963).
- 1993 August Visits, together with S. Zhebrovskii, Tver'.
- 1993 August Gives interview to A. Umland at LDPR Moscow headquarters.
- 1993 3-6 Aug 50th anniversary of Kursk Battle; Visits together V. Kobelev Tula, Orël, Kursk, Kurchatov, and Belgorod.
- 1993 10 Aug Visits Moscow art exhibitions 'The Money of the New People' and 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality'.
- 1993 11- 6Au Receives delegation of Bulgarian LDPB led by Veselin Koshev which visits Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Shchël'kovo; meeting with Iraqi ambassador; talks about creation of 'Orthodox-Slavic Union' including Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Russia.
- 1993 18 Aug V. Kobelev takes part in meeting of Russian parliamentary speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov with representatives of political parties.
- 1993 23 Aug Important nationalist provincial monthly *Nashi istoki* (Our Origins) (appearing in the Samara, Orenburg and Ulianovsk regions) becomes official LDPR mouthpiece.
- 1993 28 Aug Publishes radically nationalist article 'The Failure of the Fourth International' in daily *Izvestiia*.
- 1993 1 Sep Receives Ural Cossack delegation under Ataman and Cossak Forces Colonel B. Guliaev in LDPR Moscow headquarters.
- 1993 4 Sep S. Zhebrovskii meets LDPR functionaries of Moscow and Moscow region.
- 1993 5 Sep Moscow City Day; Zhirinovskii and V. Kobelev visit youth club *Meteor* which has been adopted by LDP's Moscow regional organization.
- 1993 5-7 Sep At invitation of Chechen President Gen. D. Dudaev, LDPR delegation under Zhirinovskii visits Groznyi where second anniversary of republic's independence is celebrated; friendly talks with Chechen leadership, Ingush President R. Aushev and late, Georgian ex-President Z. Gamzakhurdiia.
- 1993 16 Sep V. Voronin gives Centrist Bloc press-conference at the editorial board of his newspaper *Tsentri*; promises 'iron discipline' and creation of a new 'Euro-Asian Union of Russia' in case of election as Russian president.

- 1993 17 Sep Denied German visa to participate in *DVU* Congress in Germany to which he is invited by G. Frey.
- 1993 19 Sep Visits St. Petersburg City Council; LDPR picket at German consulate in St. Petersburg; subsequently German authorities issue a visa to Zhirinovskii.
- 1993 Sep A. Vedenkin starts, as Zhirinovskii's representative, six-week visit to Berlin firm *TVO* administering former *SED* funds.
- 1993 21 Sep Supports El'tsin's dissolution of parliament.
- 1993 24 Sep LDPR Highest Council announces party's participation in State Duma elections.
- 1993 24 Sep *Deutsche Nationalzeitung* publishes interview with Zhirinovskii's ally M. Bocharov.
- 1993 26 Sep Planned LDPR delegation Baghdad visit cancelled shortly before start (ME, no. 37, 1993).
- 1993 Lat Sep Publication of first edition of Zhirinovskii's principal, autobiographic-programmatic essay *The Last Dash to the South* (1150 copies).
- 1993 30 Sep Starts, at invitation of the *DVU*, visit to Germany.
- 1993 2 Oct Delivers address ('Russians and Germans - Forever Friends') at a *DVU* rally in Hall of Nibelungs at Passau, Bavaria.
- 1993 2 Oct LDPR Krasnoiarsk functionary V. Ivanov meets young Director of 'Alisa' Stock-Market G. Sterligov at Moscow.
- 1993 3 Oct Returns from Germany to Moscow
- 1993 3-4 Oct Armed clash between Russian executive and ultra-nationalist MPs; tries unsuccessfully to enter 'White House' (P); condemns use of violent means and violation of constitution by both sides; criticizes El'tsin for incompetence in accomplishing a coup; orders neutrality for LDPR members; offers mediation between legislature and executive side; supports new presidential and parliamentary elections; some members of V. Skurlatov's Great Power Rebirth Party die during armed clashes.
- 1993 5 Oct LDPR declares 'fifth Russian revolution' has been carried out, demands three days of mourning, and proclaims itself 'major opposition party'.
- 1993 6 Oct Visits together with V. Kobelev Podol'sk, Moscow region.
- 1993 10 Oct Special LDPR electoral campaigning staff created; Zhirinovskii chairman; Right-Radical Party assists in LDPR election campaign.

- 1993 12 Oct Predicts 66-67 seats in new State Duma; LDPR first party to hand in all-federal list of candidates.
- 1993 15 Oct V. Voronin chairs session of International Roundtable of Political Parties and Movements 'For an Informational-Network Building-Up of Society' at *Mosgorspravka*; representatives of *ELDP*, the Humanitarian Party, Informational-People's Party, and Union of Communists present; Voronin protests against banning of some parties and 'monopoly in mass media'.
- 1993 16 Oct Representatives of LDPR, *KPRF* and *Nashi* Movement meet at St. Petersburg Steal-Rolling Factory Club; decide to promote as State Duma candidates, among others, V. Marychev and A. Nevzorov.
- 1993 19 Oct Holds rally at *Rodina* cinema in Velikie Luki.
- 1993 25 Oct Visits Egor'evsk near Moscow where his rally is supported by local administration.
- 1993 27 Oct Asks in TV appearance for financial support (Or).
- 1993 30 Oct Holds traditional monthly rally at Moscow Metro station *Sokol'niki*; instead of usual 150-200 attendants, 500 participants.
- 1993 30 Oct V. Skurlatov's Great Power Rebirth Party renames itself Liberal-Patriotic Party 'Rebirth'.
- 1993 Nov Meets high-ranking Russian Navy officers.
- 1993 Nov E. Mikhailov becomes Deputy Editor of *Pravda Zhirinovskogo*, and founds LDPR Pskov election campaign headquarters.
- 1993 No-Dec Participates as only party chairman in special election campaign seminar organized by British campaign experts; performs best in final course test.
- 1993 1 Nov Presidential Chief of Staff, S. Filatov, sends request for information about LDPR to party headquarters.
- 1993 2 Nov LDPR replies to S. Filatov's request.
- 1993 3 Nov LDPR Highest Council puts forward updated party list for proportional part of forthcoming State Duma elections.
- 1993 3 Nov Fëdor Shelov-Kovediaev tells RFE/RL Research Institute that only Russia's Choice, *KPRF* and LDPR will do well in elections.
- 1993 5 Nov K. Parfënov and Iu. Kuznetsov represent LDPR in multi-party TV election debates

'The 1993 Elections and the Future Shape of Russia'.

- 1993 6 Nov LDPR presents approx. 173,000 signatures supporting its participation in State Duma elections to Central Electoral Commission; LDPR second party to present signature lists.
- 1993 7 Nov Reuters reports that LDPR is with 173,000 valid signatures entitled to participate in elections.
- 1993 10 Nov Central Electoral Commission announces LDPR's registration for State Duma elections.
- 1993 12 Nov Meets, according to LDPR press report, with British MPs at Moscow English Club.
- 1993 17 Nov Open TV debate of party leaders, including Zhirinovskii.
- 1993 19 Nov Delivers first 15-minute election campaign address on TV; focuses on national question and restoration of Russian empire.
- 1993 Lat Nov Gives, on invitation of local Cossacks, address at Mineral'nye vodyi House of Railway-Men (Su).
- 1993 24 Nov- Frequent live performances in national and local
10 Dec electronic media make him most visible politician during pre-election period; gives short speeches or interviews on, among others, TV channels *Rossia* (three times), *Ostankino* (five times), *Sankt-Peterburg* (once) and *Moskva* (once), and on radio *Maiak* (twice) and *Radio-1* (twice).
- 1993 26 Nov Court of Arbitration in Informational Matters warns DPR Chairman N. Travkin and Zhirinovskii who made offending statements against each other.
- 1993 26 Nov Participates in El'tsin's meeting with representatives of 13 electoral blocs (Su); announces support for El'tsin constitution; holds press-conference and outlines electoral programme of LDPR at Moscow Parliamentary Centre.
- 1993 30 Nov Issues statement explicitly supporting adoption of El'tsin's constitutional project.
- 1993 30 Nov E. Gaidar says at an election meeting at House of Cinematographers that 'whereas, three years ago, Zhirinovskii reminded me of the Hitler of Soviet movies, today he reminds me of the real Hitler of 1929'.
- 1993 2 Dec Gives interview to Radio Liberty.
- 1993 2 Dec Lays, because of slander, an information at Court of Arbitration in Informational Matters in connection with Gaidar's statement at House of Cinematographers;

Zhirinovskii's lawyer, S. Beliak, announces demand of Rbls100 million from Gaidar.

- 1993 6 Dec Sends faked *Progress* Bank money-orders to pay for LDPR advertisement to Moscow *Galaktika* Radio Company (Rbls26 million for 3 hours in *Novaia volna* [New Wave] programme), and to Radio Station *Maiak* (lighthouse) (Rbls10,719,737 for 69 minutes).
- 1993 6 Dec Beaten up by body-guards at an attempt to present a bunch of flowers to famous singer Sofia Rotaru at evening concert at Moscow Variety Theatre; lays information.
- 1993 7 Dec Holds press-conference at Moscow's Parliamentary Centre; calls LDPR 'center-right party'; lays out electoral programme; describes Women of Russia and Civic Union as possible partners in State Duma.
- 1993 7 Dec Viacheslav Khazov (LDPR Tver section and Confederation of Anarcho-Syndikalists) arrested because of hooliganism.
- 1993 8 Dec E. Gaidar predicts that, among others, LDPR will be well-represented in State Duma.
- 1993 9 Dec Holds press-conference; lays out LDPR foreign policy programme.
- 1993 10 Dec E. Gaidar's Russia's Choice issues statement saying Zhirinovskii has become real threat to Russia.
- 1993 10 Dec Holds last, 4,000-people election campaign rally in front of Moscow *Bol'shoi* Theatre.
- 1993 11 Dec Ostankino TV changes its programme, and shows, after movie 'Stalin's Legacy', one-hour critical documentary on Zhirinovskii called 'The Hawk' by Pavel Chukhrai.
- 1993 12 Dec Elections to the Federal Assembly; LDPR receives 12,318,562 (22.92%) votes in proportional part; E. Mikhailov elected, among others, directly in Pskov *oblast'* electoral district (31.3%); Zhirinovskii head of third largest faction and member of Council of Fifth State Duma.

Appendix II

Appendix II

'The West will pay us.'

A talk with Vladimir Zhirinovskii

(LDPR-Headquarters, Rybnikov pereulok, Moscow, August 1993)¹

Question: Though some parts of your economic programme might be consistent with the liberal doctrine, the question remains: Why have you called your party 'liberal-democratic'? It seems that you are emphasizing rather different values, such as the restoration of the Russian imperial state. You supported the Emergency Committee [the putschists] in August 1991. You are on good terms with Dr. Frey [leader of the ultra-right German People's Union DVU], who is not regarded exactly as a liberal democrat in Germany...

V.Zh.: A pure liberal democracy is not possible in our country. Look: the attempts of [Egor] Gaidar to introduce here a liberal economy led to a total breakdown. The country is on the brink of ruin, on the brink of a military coup. Therefore all this should have been done step-by-step. Then we would have moved quicker towards the liberal model. Time is needed for this, a lot of time. This [the liberal model] is, so to say, the direction of our development. That does not mean that this is the aim we will translate into reality tomorrow.

That means you have called your party so...

V.Zh.: ...as a perspective to organize the economy in a liberal way, to make our democracy liberal and free, and to come, concerning the state, to a liberal notion. But not today. Today this is impossible, when there is war in the south...

Notwithstanding, close relations with Iraq are in stark contradiction to the Western notion of liberalism...

V.Zh.: Agreed! However our attitude to Iraq is based on the fact that it is a strategic ally as concerns our foreign policy and not on the basis of its domestic regime. Iraq has the same enemies as us - Turkey and Iran. If Saddam Hussein was in New Zealand or Ethiopia, in Somalia or Chile, I would have no connections with him. [Our relations] are founded on military-strategic considerations, on geopolitical grounds, concerning the security of our [southern] borders.

Shortly after the creation of your party, you had some contacts with liberal democrats in Western Europe, with the Liberal International for example.

V.Zh.: Yes, exactly. But they do not want [contacts]. I wanted to have relations with them. It is their fault. I wanted us to be admitted to the Liberal International.

Is this the reason you established contacts with European right-wing movements?

V.Zh.: I established contacts with those who agreed to have contacts with us, in order to have in those countries people with whom one can cooperate.

The German People's Union is not a very influential party in Germany...

¹ This interview was made possible by a Foreign and Commonwealth Office Travel Bursary and the support of Mrs. Fiona Fenton of the British Council in Oxford. Jörgen Zuch and Nicholas K. Gvosdev helped to prepare the interview for publication. The talk appeared first in *The Woodstock Road Editorial: An Oxford Magazine of International Affairs*, Hilary 1994, Issue 16: 3-5. A German version was published before as well. Unfortunately, it has been edited in a way that it contains several misprints and distortions (Umland, 1994a).

V.Zh.: Still, we proceed from the assumption, that at least we have something, some contacts after all... A certain closeness exists already. He [Dr. Frey] has invited me. I have invited him. Yes, they are not very influential. Yet, what can one do? If the German liberals do not pay us the necessary attention... I cannot simply leave it at that. After all, I can exercise a certain influence in Germany through the German People's Union, through Munich, Bavaria... There are some assets. The same with France: I would like to have more contacts with the Union of French Democracy of Giscard d'Estaigne, with the Gaullists. Yet, they do not give in, and Le Pen agreed to meet [with me]. Therefore these steps [relations with European right-wing parties] are forced on me. Not because my or my party's standpoint corresponds with the philosophy [of these groups]. These are actions we are forced to take in order to establish contacts with these countries.

The reluctance of liberal democrats in the West to establish any contacts with you can be explained by, among other things, the fact that you are proposing the resurrection of the Russian Empire within its 1914 borders, including Poland and Finland.

V.Zh.: Because they do not know us well enough. It is necessary to meet more often, to talk with each other and to know our positions. Therefore, I am against any empires. Empires are unnecessary. However one can also not destroy Russia as such. Russia has its own geopolitical space. We do not need anything from outside. Finland should stay Finland, and Poland [should stay Poland] too.

You include the CIS countries in your definition of Russia. It might be useful for these countries to form a joint economic space. However, if you want to annex the former Soviet republics to Russia, they will probably struggle against it. How do you propose to reincorporate these states into Russia?

V.Zh.: The creation of the CIS was illegal!

Nevertheless, the former Soviet republics are independent states today. How would you bring about the creation of the Russian province 'Dushanbe' in place of the current state of Tadzhikistan?

V.Zh.: They already agree in Tadzhikistan that there will be a Dushanbe [the capital of this CIS member] province! This is all because of the war. In the south, all this will come to pass on account of war. In Central Asia and the Caucasus they will wage war a little bit. And then, they will want to be incorporated into Russia as provinces. The Baltic countries will return to Russia because of economic measures...

Which is doubtful...

V.Zh.: Who will supply energy to Estonia? Timber, metals - who will supply these things?

Russia - on the basis of mutual...

V.Zh.: But we will not give anything! We will supply nothing!

Still, these countries would hardly agree to become parts of Russia again.

V.Zh.: We shall see. They will have to decide. When they understand that they cannot manage without Russia, without its economy... The Russian population there comprises half a million, even more. And they will not accept the status of second-class citizens for long. This will be the situation, when they come back to Russia.

Your scenario would be: economic blockade and...

V.Zh.: ...the agreement to develop the economy in the framework of a single state. If not, we will trade with Finland and Turkey, with China and India, but not with Estonia. Let the Germans and Swedes supply Estonia!

One more question on foreign policy: at the last congress of the National Salvation Front [the then dominant umbrella organization of the so called 'irreconcilable' opposition] there was a proposal to leave the United Nations, on the grounds that it has allegedly become nothing more than an

extension of the US. What are your thoughts on international organizations like the UN, or the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank?

V.Zh.: If we have in these organisations a position Russia deserves...

What do you mean by 'a position Russia deserves'?

V.Zh.: That we are not counted at a lower quality than we [actually] are.

After all, Russia has already a defined position as a member of the Security Council.

V.Zh.: Yes. In principle the UN should follow a neutral line. If it carries out a pro-American policy, this will not be profitable to us.

Would you then also propose to leave the UN?

V.Zh.: In this case we would leave the UN. If it plays the role of an international mediator and if it is an objective and independent organization, we will support it. We are opposed to anyone's hegemony and we do not pretend to such a role ourselves.

And what is your opinion about the global financial organizations?

V.Zh.: The same. If these organizations act for the purpose of the recovery of the world economy, we will be in support. However, if one group of states enriches itself through the impoverishment of another group, we will not take part in this. Although, we will take part in this if we belong to the group of states which enriches itself at the expense of the other group. We are ready for this.

To get for instance a credit from the IMF...

V.Zh.: ...and not to pay them back!

...one has to fulfill certain conditions.

V.Zh.: We will not fulfill anything! We will set the conditions.

Then there will be no credit.

V.Zh.: We do not need it. We will manage without it. Conditions are negotiated with us on an equal basis - partnership relations. We will ourselves dictate conditions to other countries. They should not dictate conditions to us.

Still, one cannot do without compromises.

V.Zh.: Compromises - definitely, but compromises which take into account the interests of Russia. Let us take the division of spheres of influence. Let us divide the planet into such spheres.

And what sort of 'sphere of influence' would you demand for Russia?

V.Zh.: The very smallest! Only three countries: Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. For Western Europe - the whole Africa. Let them deal with that. For North America - all of South America. For Japan - all of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. This results in a very good division: from the North towards the South.

Turkey is a NATO-member.

V.Zh.: So what? It is a NATO-member. It will belong to Russia's sphere of influence.

Maybe Turkey might not agree to this.

V.Zh.: It does not have to be asked.

In Iran and Afghanistan there is the problem of Islamic fundamentalism...

V.Zh.: That's fine. We will neutralise it - this is in the interest of the West. And the West will pay us for this.

In cash?

V.Zh.: In cash.

And what amount...

V.Zh.: We will see. The sum we need at that moment. We will calculate what it will cost for us, and the West will compensate us that amount. If not, we will direct the Islamic factor against Western

Europe and secure our southern border - through Turkey and the Balkans into Western Europe. Today there are four million Turks in Germany. In France there are many Arabs.

Are you focusing on this area because you are an orientalist by profession?

V.Zh.: Yes, this is my area of expertise. This is exactly the region where one can play well for a very long time.

How would you yourself explain your success during the presidential elections in 1991? You appeared on the political scene only three weeks before the voting, received significant support [6.2 million votes, or 7.81%].

V.Zh.: I was the youngest candidate. I was never a communist. All the others were communists. I had a clear position on all the issues. And the Russian question [regarding the 25 million ethnic Russians living outside the Russian federation]. And I boldly stated the reasons for our crisis. All this caused definite attention and led to this result.

At this moment [August 1993], according to the opinion polls, your popularity seems to have fallen.

V.Zh.: No, quite the contrary! At this time, I am in third place, after [Boris] El'tsin and [Aleksandr] Rutskoi [the former vice-president]. Yet, El'tsin and Rutskoi are serving politicians and I am in the opposition. Therefore I am in first place among the politicians of the opposition. And this is their distorted and manipulated data. If you take the newspaper *Pravda*: it has published an interview with General Lebed' [commander of the Russian forces in the Dniestr region of Moldova] this week. He has finally admitted that the data from the Tula division [used to demonstrate support among the military for El'tsin] was forged in order to benefit El'tsin. Today, 28% of the votes are for me, 23% for El'tsin. That means if one carries out a real and objective poll, we are second or third place.

What is your answer to those journalists who describe you as a fascist?

V.Zh.: Well, when this happened, we brought a civil action against them and that was it. It happens.... That was 1991 and at the beginning of 1992. You can see fascists now. They are running around. The 'Black Shirts' are marching. We do not have this. We are opposed to any use of force. Only in the framework of democracy. Therefore: Liberal-Democratic Party. Elections, democracy, freedom and so on. We are against any exaggerations. Fascism, communism and anti-semitism are precluded.

That means you do not see your party as an extremist one?

V.Zh.: By no means. We are a moderate, right-centrist Party twenty degrees right of the centre, like the Gaullists, Giscard d'Estaing in France, the CDU/CSU in Germany, the Conservatives in Britain, the Republican Party in the US, the Conservatives in South Africa, the LDP in Japan and so on.

Let us say you become the president of Russia and that you will have to deal with a parliament in opposition. How would you behave? Would you tolerate such a parliament?

V.Zh.: Of course! It is necessary to try to come to terms with the parliament and to find compromise solutions. Early elections are, of course, a possibility... They take place in various countries. Still, one has to find a compromise formula, so that there is a stability of power and respect for the executive and the legislative [branches]. One always has to find ways which are in accordance with the law.

This would be consistent with the Western notion of liberal democracy. Your political history, however, contradicts this. One gets the impression that you are saying to everybody the things that they want to hear. Your actual point of view is difficult to discern.

V.Zh.: Such is the country, the country...

Bibliography

- Abramov, Ju.K. and Golovina, T.Iu., eds., 1996, *Politicheskie partii i dvizheniia Rossii 1996: Ezhegodnik*, Moskva: Press Ltd.
- Al'bats, E., 1995, *Evreiskii vopros*, Moskva: PIK.
- Albrecht, U., 1994, 'Ethnosoziale Kriege in Europa als Herausforderung an die sozialwissenschaftliche Theoriebildung', presented at the international colloquium 'Gewalt, Nationalismus, Rassismus, Ausländerfeindlichkeit 10.-12. Februar 1994', Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
- Allardyce, G., 1979, 'What Fascism is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept', *American History Review*, vol. 84, no. 2, April: 367-388.
- Anderson, B., 1991, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd edn, New York/London: Verso.
- Andreev, A., 1992, 'Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soiuz (ROS): god bor'by i ego uroki', *Moskva*, no. 11-12: 158-162.
- Andreev, V., 1996, 'Nationalism in Russia: Past, Present, and Prospects for the Future', *Jamestown Prism*, 5 April, http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public_html/russia/_nat.txt.
- Andreski, S., 1980, 'Fascists as Moderates', in: Larsen, Hagtvet, and Myklebust 1980: 53-55.
- Arbatov, A.G., 1994, 'Russian National Interests', in: Blackwill, R.D. and Karaganov, S.A., eds., *Damage Limitation or Crisis: Russia and the Outside World*, Washington, DC: Brassey's: 55-76.
- Assheuer, T. and Sarkowicz, H., 1992, *Rechtsradikale in Deutschland: Die alte und die neue Rechte*, 2nd edn, München: C.H. Beck.
- Aves, J., 1988, 'The Democratic Union - A Soviet Opposition Party?', *Slovo* (London: SSEES), vol. 1, no. 2: 92-98.
- Baburin, S.N., 1995, *Rossiiskii put': Stanovlenie rossiiskoi geopolitiki kamuna XXI veka*, Moskva: ANKO.
- Backes, U., 1989, *Politischer Extremismus in demokratischen Verfassungsstaaten: Elemente einer normativen Rahmentheorie*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Bajohr, S., 1995, 'Obshchestvo in der sozialpolitischen Theorie von Jurij F. Samarin und Ivan S. Aksakov', *Berliner Jahrbuch für osteuropäische Geschichte*, no. 2: 173-186.
- Baker, D., 1996, *Ideology of Obsession: A.K. Chesterton and British Fascism*, London/New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Bakshutov, V.K., 1994, *Russkii vopros: Filosofskie ocherki*, Ekaterinburg: Ernest.
- Barinova, E., 1994, '"Volki" v rossiiskom kariatnike: Kak Zhirinovskii kuet svoiu pobedu', *Megapolis-Express*, no. 25, 31 August: 10-11.
- Bates, R.H., 1997, 'Area Studies and The Disciplines: A Useful Controversy', *PS: Political Science & Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2, June: 166-169.
- Bekhchanov, Iu., 1992 [1990], 'Apologiya revoliutsionnogo imperializma', *Utro Rossii*, no. 1 (18), February: 1-2 (reprinted in: *Sokol Zhirinovskogo*, no. 3, 1992: 4-5, and in: *Ataka*, no. 777, N.d.: 4-5).
- Belin, L., 1995a, 'The Strange Career of Alexei Vedenkin', *Transition*, vol. 1, no. 10, 23 June: 13-15.
- Belin, L., 1995b, 'Ultranationalist Parties Follow Disparate Paths', *Transition*, vol. 1, no. 10, 23 June: 8-12.
- Belin, L., 1995c, 'Zhirinovskii's Uphill Battle', *Transition*, vol. 1, no. 22, 1 December: 20-24, 68.

- Belkin, A., 1994, *Epokha Zhirinovskogo*, Moskva: AO 'Print-Atel'e' - Diamant.
- Berezovskii, V.N., 1994, 'Vladimir Zhirinovskii kak fenomen rossiiskoi politiki', *Svobodnaia mysl'*, no. 4: 96-109.
- Berezovskii, V.N., Krotov, N.I. and Chervakov, V.V., eds., 1991, *Rossia: Partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Spravochnik*, Moskva: RAU-PRESS/Institut massovykh politicheskikh dvizhenii, 1st vol., 1st part: 1-149, 1st vol., 2nd part: 150-339.
- Berezovskii, V.N., Chervakov, V.V. and Solovej, V.D., 1992, 'Vladimir Zhirinovskii: Politik v rossiiskoi politike', unpublished manuscript, Moskva: Tsentr analiticheskoi informatsii o politicheskoi koniunkture.
- Berezovskii, V.N. and Chervakov, V.V., eds., 1993, *Sto partiinykh liderov Rossii: Kratkii biograficheskii spravochnik*, Moskva: RAU-PRESS/Institut massovykh politicheskikh dvizhenii.
- Berezovskii, V.N. and Chervakov V.V., 1994, 'Komp'iuternyi spravochnik 'Rossiia politicheskaii'', unpublished computer data base, Moskva: Tsentr analiticheskoi informatsii o politicheskoi koniunkture.
- Bessonov, B.N., 1995, *Fashizm: ideologiya, politika*, 2 vols., 2nd edn, Moskva: Luch (1st edn 1985).
- Blinkhorn, M., 1990, 'Introduction: Allies, Rivals or Antagonists? Fascists and Conservatives in Modern Europe', in: Blinkhorn, M., ed., *Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe*, London: Unwin Hyman: 1-13.
- Bocharov, M., 1994, *Diktatura: politicheskaiia fantaziia*, Moskva: N.p.
- Bolgarin, G.R. and Maslov, V.I., 1991, 'Sinee dvizhenie', *Sotsial'no-politicheskie nauki*, no. 6: 96-99.
- Bondarenko, V.G., 1992, *Eduard Limonov*, Moskva: Paleia.
- Braasch, S., 1996, 'Kein Grund zum Feiern: 25 Jahre "Deutsche Volksunion"', *blick nach rechts*, vol. 13, no. 2, 24 January: 3-5.
- Brown, A.H., 1974, *Soviet Politics and Political Science*, London/Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.
- Brown, J.F., 1994, 'Extremism in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union', *RFE/RL Research Report. The Politics of Intolerance: A Special Issue from the RFE/RL Research Institute*, vol. 3, no. 16, 22 April: 1-4.
- Brubaker, R., 1996, 'Homeland nationalism in Weimar Germany and 'Weimar Russia'', in: Brubaker, R., *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 107-147.
- Brudny, Y.M., 1991, 'The Heralds of Opposition to Perestroika', in: Hewett, E.A. and Winston, V.H., eds., *Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroika: Politics and People*, Washington, DC: Brookings: 153-189.
- Brumberg, A., 1995, 'Future without limits', *Times Literary Supplement*, no. 4835, 1 December.
- Budge, I., Robertson, D. and Hearl, D., eds., 1987, *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies*, Cambridge, UK/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bunich, I., 1992, *Zoloto partii: Istoricheskaiia khronika*, Sankt-Peterburg: Shans.
- Burleigh, M. and Wippermann, W., 1991, *The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Byzov, L., 1995, 'Rossiiskie natsional-patrioticheskie sily i ikh elektorat', in: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, ed., *Analiz elektorata politicheskikh sil v Rossii*, Moskva: Komtekhn: 46-61.

- Cali, M.-J., 1995, *Der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina: Ursachen, Konfliktstrukturen, Internationale Lösungsversuch*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Canovan, M., 1981, *Populism*, London: Junction Books.
- Carden, P., 1984, 'Edward Limonov's Coming Out', in: Matich, O. and Heim, M., eds., *The Third Wave: Russian Literature in Emigration*, Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis.
- Carter, S.K., 1995, 'The CIS and After: The Impact of Russian Nationalism', in: Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan 1995: 174-197.
- Cheles, L., Ferguson, R. and Vaughan, M., eds., 1995, *The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe*, 2nd edn, London/New York: Longman.
- Chernov, S., 1995, 'Rock star turns his talents to helping extremists', <http://www.spb.su/sppress/125/rockhole.html>.
- Chernov, S., 1996, 'Nationalist calls for ban on foreign merchandise', <http://www.spb.su/suppress/96/idiot.html>.
- Chetvëryi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR 21-25 maia 1991 goda: Stenograficheskii ocherk. Tom I. 1991, Moskva: Verkhovnyi soviet RSFSR.
- Clark, T.D., 1995, 'The Zhirinovskiy Electoral Victory: Antecedence and Aftermath', *Nationalities Papers*, vol. 23, no. 4: 767-778.
- Clem, R.S. and Craumer, P.R., 1995a, 'A Rayon-Level Analysis of the Russian Election and Constitutional Plebiscite of December 1993', *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 36, no. 8: 459-475.
- Clem, R.S. and Craumer, P.R., 1995b, 'The Geography of the Russian 1995 Parliamentary Election: Continuity, Change and Correlates', *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 36, no. 10: 587-616.
- Confrancesco, D., 1991, 'Faschismus: rechts oder links?', in: Bracher, K.D. and Valiani, L., eds., *Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus*, Berlin: Dunker & Humblot: 41-107.
- Conradi, P., 1995, *Schirinowski und der neue russische Nationalismus*, transl. by Peter Klumbach, Düsseldorf: ECON.
- Copsey, N., 1994, 'Fascism: The Ideology of the British National Party', *Politics*, vol. 14, no. 3: 101-108.
- Dadiani, L., 1994, 'Natsisty i "poputchiki"', *Novoe vremia*, no. 36: 16-19.
- Davidheiser, E., 1994, 'The Red-Brown Coalition: The Campaigns of the Protest Parties', unpublished paper prepared for the Russian Election Project workshop, Harvard University, April 8-9, 1991, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
- Deich, M. and Zhuravlev, L., 1991, 'Pamiat' kak ona est', Moskva: MP 'Tsunami' - 'What & Where in Moscow'.
- D'iakov, I., 1994, *Tretii reikh: vzgliad iz khazarii*, 2nd edn, Moskva: Russkoe slovo.
- D'iakov, I., 1995, *Russkim*, Ulan Ude: n.P.
- Divin, V., 1991, 'Kakaia "firma" pomogaet "tsentristam"', *Stolitsa*, no. 14: 17-18.
- Dmitriev, A.V. and Toshchenko, Zh.T., 1994, 'Sotsiologicheskii opros i politika', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no. 5: 42-51.
- Dogan, M. and Pelassy, D., 1984, *How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics*, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Dreizin, F., 1988, 'Russian Style in Emigration: Edward Limonov's Anglicisms', *Wiener Slawistischer Almanach*, vol. 22: 55-67.
- Duncan, P.J.S., 1990, 'Russian Messianism: A Historical and Political Analysis', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Glasgow: University of Glasgow.

- Duncan, P.J.S., 1992, 'The Rebirth of Politics in Russia', in: Hosking, G.A., Aves, J. and Duncan, P.J.S., *The Road to Post-Communism: Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union, 1985-1991*, London: Pinter: 67-120.
- Dunlop, J.B., 1976, *The New Russian Revolutionaries*, Belmont, MA: Nordland.
- Dunlop, J.B., 1983, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dunlop, J.B., 1985, *The New Russian Nationalism*, New York: Praeger.
- Dunlop, J.B., 1991, 'The Leadership of the Centrist Bloc', *Radio Liberty. Report on the USSR*, 8 February: 4-6.
- Dunlop, J.B., N.d., 'Russkii natsionalizm segodnia: organizatsii i programmy', in: Huttenbach, H.R. et al., eds., *Nationalities Papers - Zapiski po problemam natsional'nostei*, New York-Moskva: Association for the Study of Nationalities of the USSR and Eastern Europe: 7-27.
- Dunlop, J.B., 1993, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dunlop, J.B., 1994, 'Zhirinovskii's world', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 2, April: 27-32.
- Dunlop, J.B., 1995, 'The Growth of Fascist Tendencies in the Russian Orthodox Church', unpublished manuscript, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution.
- Eatwell, R., 1992, 'Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, vol. 4, no. 2: 162-194.
- Eatwell, R., 1993, 'Ideologies: Approaches and Trends', in: Eatwell and Wright 1993: 1-22.
- Eatwell, R. and Wright, A., eds., 1993, *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, London: Pinter.
- Eatwell, R., 1995a, 'How far to revise history (and influence people?), neo-Fascist style', in: Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan 1995: 309-326.
- Eatwell, R., 1995b, *Fascism: A History*, London: Chatto & Windus.
- Eichwede, W., ed., 1994, *Der Schirinowski-Effekt: Wohin treibt Rußland*, Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
- Elliott, V. and Stewart, J., 1994, 'Russian Extremist not so Extreme in San Francisco', *The San Francisco Free Press*, 8 November.
- Estraikh, G., 1994, 'Who is Vladimir Zhirinovskii?', *Forverts* (New York), in Hebrew, 7 January 1994: 10, 20.
- Evropeiskii institut sredstv massovoi informatsii, ed., 1994, 'Parlamentskie vybory v Rossii', *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, no. 2: 3-98.
- Fadeev, V.V., 1992, *Ocherk 88 goda (pokhozhdenie neformala)*, 2nd edn., Moskva: Russkoe slovo.
- Fairbanks Jr., C.H., 1994, 'The Politics of Resentment', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 2, April: 35-41.
- Fashizm: Uznaite svoego vruga!*, 1995, Moskva: gruppa 'Sotsialisticheskaiia solidarnost'.
- Fëdorov, B.F., 1991, 'Liberal'no-demokraticheskaiia partiia, LDP Sovetskogo Soiuza', *Sotsial'no-politicheskie nauki*, no. 1: 97-99.
- Fëdorov, B., 1995, *100 voprosov o dvizhenii 'Natsional'noe vozrozhdenie' i Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi fonde*, Moskva: N.p.
- Fish, S.M., 1995, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fish, S.M., 1996, 'Russia's Fourth Transition', in: Diamond, L. and Plattner, M.F., eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd edn, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press: 264-276.

- Fish, S.M., 1997, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Postcommunist World', unpublished paper, University of California at Berkeley.
- Fleron, Jr., F.J. and Hoffmann, E.P., 1993, 'Post-Communist Studies and Political Science: Peaceful Coexistence, Detente, and Entente', in: Fleron, Jr., F.J. and Hoffmann, E.P., eds., *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science: Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sovietology*, Boulder, CO/San Francisco/Oxford: Westview: 371-385.
- Frazer, G. and Lancelle, G., 1994, *Zhirinovskiy. The Little Black Book: Making Sense of the Senseless*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.
- Freedman, M., 1994, 'Political concepts and ideological morphology', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 2: 140-164.
- Gaidar, E.T., 1994, 'Stavka na negodiaev', *Izvestiia*, no. 91, 17 May: 1, 5.
- Galkin, A.A., 1971, *Sotsiologiya neofashizma*, Moskva: Nauka.
- Galkin, A.A., 1994, 'Rossiiskii fashizm?', *Sotsiologicheskii zhurnal*, no. 2: 17-27.
- Galkin, A.A., 1995a, 'Fashizm: korni, priznaki, formy proiavleniia', *Politicheskie issledovaniia*, no. 2 (26): 6-15.
- Galkin, A.A., 1995b, *Zapadnia: rasskaz o tom, chto prinës nemetskim rabochim natsional-sotsializm*, Moskva: Russko-amerikanskii fond profsoiuznykh issledovaniï i obucheniiia.
- Galkin, A. and Krassin, Yu., 1994, 'Russische Wahlen in den Ruinen sowjetischer Modernisierung: Informationen zum Nachdenken', *Das Argument*, vol. 36, no. 2 (204): 199-209.
- Galkin, A. and Krassin, Iu., 1995, 'O pravom radikalizme v rossiiskom obshchestve', *Obozrevatel*, no. 12: 52-58.
- Gamble, A., 1992, 'Foreword', in: Heywood 1992: xiii-xiv.
- Gärtner, R., 1995, 'Rechtsextremismus und Neue Rechte', *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, vol. 24, no. 3: 253-262.
- Gebhard, P., 1994, 'Eine Brücke zwischen Europa und Asien: Die Lehre der Eurasier in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion um die russische Identität', unpublished M.A. thesis, Frankfurt am Main: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität.
- Gellner, E., 1983, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Geopolitik: Ein altes Konzept wird neu befragt* (=WeltTrends. Internationale Politik und vergleichende Studien, 4th vol.), 1994, Berlin: Gesellschaft für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Publizistik.
- Gestwa, G. and Gestwa, K., 1992, 'Wladimir Shirinowskij: Das politische Porträt eines russischen Populisten', *Osteuropa*, vol. 42: A314-A322.
- Gestwa, K., 1993, 'Russischer Rechtspopulismus', *Die Neue Gesellschaft: Frankfurter Hefte*, vol. 40, no. 6: 503-506.
- Gintsberg, L.I., 1971, 'Fashizm i istoriia noveishago vremeni', *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, no. 4, July-August: 33-48.
- Goldstein, S., 1995, 'Extremist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy Making Indelible Mark on the New Russia', <http://www.nd.edu/~astrouni/zhiwriter/spool/11.html>.
- Gorodetskii, G., 1995, *Mif 'Ledokola': Nakamune voiny*, Moskva: Progress-Akademiiia.
- Gossweiler, K., 1975, 'Krizis burzhuaznoi istoriografii fashizma', *Ezhegodnik germanskoi istorii 1974*, Moskva: 316-337 (reprinted in German as: 'Die bürgerliche Faschismustheorie und Faschismusforschung in der Krise', in: Gossweiler, K., 1986, *Aufsätze zum Faschismus*, Berlin [Ost]: Akademie Verlag: 369-413).

- Grebing, H., 1971, *Linksradikalismus gleich Rechtsradikalismus: Eine falsche Gleichung*, Stuttgart: Klett.
- Gregor, A.J., 1969, *The Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale for Totalitarianism*, New York: Free Press.
- Gregor, A.J., 1974, *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gregor, A.J., 1979, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gregor, A.J., 1997 [1974], *Interpretations of Fascism*, New Brunswick, 2nd edn, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Griffin, R.D., 1993a, *The Nature of Fascism*, 2nd edn, London: Routledge (1st edn, 1991, London: Pinter).
- Griffin, R.D., 1993b, 'Europe for the Europeans: Fascist Myths of The European New Order 1922-1992', *Humanities Research Centre Occasional Papers*, no. 1, Oxford: Oxford Brookes University.
- Griffin, R.D., 1993c, 'Nationalism', in: Eatwell and Wright 1993: 147-168.
- Griffin, R.D., ed., 1995a, *Fascism* (=Oxford Reader), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Griffin, R.D., 1995b, 'Faschismus in Europa', *ZAG: Zeitschrift antirassistischer Gruppen*, vol. 5, no. 16: 43-45.
- Griffin, R.D., 1995c, 'Nazi Art: Romantic Twilight or (Post)modernist Dawn?', *The Oxford Art Journal*, vol. 18, no. 2: 103-107.
- Griffin, R.D., 1996, 'The "post-Fascism" of the Alleanza Nazionale: a case study in ideological morphology', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 1, no. 2: 123-145.
- Groth, A.J., 1971, 'Ideology: What Does It Tell Us About Politics?', in: Groth, A.J., *Major Ideologies: An Interpretative Survey of Democracy, Socialism, and Nationalism*, New York/London/Sydney/Toronto: John Wiley & Sons: 1-18.
- Guibernau, M., 1996, *Nationalisms: The Nation State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Gurvich, V.M., 1994, 'Russkii marsh k fashizmu', *Kentavr*, no. 2: 128-132.
- Gusev, V.A., 1992a, 'Problemy gosudarstvennogo ustroistva v trudakh I.A. Il'ina', *Sotsial'no-politicheskie nauki*, no. 2-3: 72-80.
- Gusev, V.A., 1992b, 'Konservativnaia politologiya Ivana Il'ina', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no. 4: 64-70.
- Gussejnow, G., 1994, '"Die Elemente der Freiheit zersetzen das Volk": Über die Sprache des russischen Nationalismus', in: Eichwede 1994: 81-99.
- Hafeneger, B., 1994, 'Rechtsextreme Europabilder', in: Kowalsky and Schroeder 1994a: 212-227.
- Hahn, G.M., 1994, 'Opposition Politics in Russia', *Europe-Asia Studies* (formerly: *Soviet Studies*), vol. 46, no. 2: 305-335.
- Haller, M. and Deiters, G.C., 1989, 'Alte Parolen, neue Parteien: Die Republikaner und die deutsche Volkunion-Liste D', in: Benz, W., ed., *Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik: Voraussetzungen, Zusammenhänge, Wirkungen*, 3rd edn, Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch: 248-272.
- Hampden-Turner, C., 1970, *Radical Man: The Process of Psycho-Social Development*, Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.

- Hannah, J.P., 1993, 'The Last Thrust Southwards': Zhirinovskiy and the Middle East', *Policywatch* (The Washington Institute), no. 108, 28 December.
- Harms, M., 1992, 'Von der Staatspartei zum Parteienstaat?', in: Harms, M. and Linke, P., eds., *Überall Klippen: Innen- und außenpolitische Gegebenheiten Rußlands*, Berlin: Volk und Welt: 104-115.
- Hellen, T., 1996, *Shaking Hands with the Past: Origins of the Political Right in Central Europe* (=Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium, 50th vol.), Helsinki: The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters and The Finnish Academy of Science and Letters.
- Hellmann, J.S., 1996, 'Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform', unpublished paper presented at the 1996 Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boston, MA.
- Hermant, J., 1992, *Old Dreams of a New Reich: Völkisch Utopias and National Socialism*, Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Herzinger, R. and Stein, H., 1995, *Endzeit-Propheten oder die Offensive der Antiwestler: Fundamentalismus, Antiamerikanismus und Neue Rechte*, Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
- Heywood, A., 1992, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.
- Hielscher, K., 1993, 'Der Eurasismus', *Die neue Gesellschaft: Frankfurter Hefte*, vol. 40, no. 5: 465-469.
- Hielscher, K., 1994, 'Die Front der Antiwestler: Ideologische Grundmuster des russischen Nationalismus', in: Eichwede 1994: 57-80.
- Hill, R.J., 1994, 'Parties and Party System', in: White, S., Pravda, A. and Gitelman, Z., eds., *Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics*, 3rd edn, Durham, NC: Duke University Press: 88-108.
- Hirscher, G., 1994, 'Schirinowskij und der deutsche Rechtsextremismus', in: Backes, U. and Jesse, E., eds., *Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie*, 6th vol., Bonn: Bouvier: 162-179.
- Hirscher, G. and Lange, K., 1994, *Schirinowskij und die LDPR - Gefahren für die deutsche und internationale Politik* (=Forschungsbericht der Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen), München: Hans-Seidel-Stiftung e.V.
- Hockenos, P., 1993, *Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, London-New York: Routledge.
- Hockstader, L., 1994, 'How Russia's Zhirinovskiy Rose', *The Washington Post*, 6 March: A1, A26-A27.
- Hofer, W., ed., 1957, *Der Nationalsozialismus: Dokumente 1933-1945*, Frankfurt am Main/Hamburg: Fischer Bücherei.
- Holm, K., 1996, 'Der alte Russe Heraklit: In Rußland breiten sich rassistische Gedanken ungehindert aus', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, no. 20, 24 January: 27.
- Holman, E., 1993, 'Is Zhirinovsky a Fascist?', on: World Wide Web, 14 December.
- Hoppe, G. and Genzer, A., comps., 1994, 'Nationale Tendenzen im heutigen Rußland', *Osteuropa*, vol. 44, no. 4: A233-A240.
- Hosking, G.A., Aves, J., and Duncan, P.J.S., 1992, 'Triumph and foreboding', in: Hosking, G.A., Aves, J. and Duncan P.J.S., *The Road to Post-Communism: Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union, 1985-1991*, London: Pinter: 202-212.

- Hough, J.F., 1994, 'The Russian Election of 1993: Public Attitudes toward Economic Reform and Democratization', *Post-Soviet Affairs* (formerly: *Soviet Economy*), vol. 10, January-March: 1-37.
- Hough, J.F., Davidheiser, E. and Lehmann, S.G., 1996, *The 1996 Russian Presidential Election*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Hundseder, F., 1994, 'Die Ersten von Morgen?: "Republikaner"', DVU, NPD, Deutsche Liga', in: Benz, W., ed., *Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland: Voraussetzungen, Zusammenhänge, Wirkungen*, 4th edn, Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch: 228-245.
- Huntington, S.P., 1968, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Husbands, C.T., 1992, 'The Netherlands: Irritants on the Body Politic', in: Hainsworth, P., ed., *The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA*, London: Pinter: 95-125.
- Iadov, V., 1994, 'Natsistkaia ideologija v rabotakh Zhirinovskogo', *Izvestia*, 23 April: 13 (reprinted in English in: *Radical Opposition Leaders*, no. 15, 7 December 1994: 10-11).
- Ignatow, A., 1994a, 'Das "geistige Universum" des Wladimir Shirinowskij', *Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien: Aktuelle Analysen*, no. 3, 25 January.
- Ignatow, A., 1994b, 'Shirinowskij's "Sprünge": Eine ideologische Zwischenbilanz', *Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien: Aktuelle Analysen*, no. 33, 29 June.
- Igritskii, Iu.I., 1990, 'Konceptsiia totalitarizma: uroki mnogoletnikh diskussii na Zapade', *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 6, November-December: 172-190.
- Il'in, I.A., 1991, *O Rossii*, Moskva: TRITE-Rossiiskii Arkhiv.
- Il'in, I.A., 1992, *Nashi zadachi: Istoricheskaia sud'ba i budushchee Rossii. Stat'u 1948-1954 godov*, 2 vols., Moskva: Rarog.
- Il'in, I.A., 1993, 'O pravoslavii i katolichestve', *Moskva*, no. 3: 3-8.
- Il'in, I.A., 1995, *Rodina i my*, ed. by Iu.T. Lisitsy, Smolensk: Posokh.
- Il'in, I.A., 1996, *Osnovy gosudarstvennogo ustroistva: Proekt Osnovnogo zakona Rossii*, Moskva: Rarog.
- Iliushenko, V., ed., 1996, *Nuzhen li Gitler Rossii?: Po Materialam mezhdunarodnogo foruma "Fashizm v totalitarnom i posttotalitarnom obshchestve"*, Moskva: PIK.
- Ivanov, I.I., 1992, *Aleksandr Nevzorov*, Moskva: Paleia.
- Ivanov, M., 1992, 'Novaia elita konceptual'noi vlasti', *Sokol Zhirinovskogo*, no. 3: 10-12.
- Ivanov, L.J., 1996, *Rußland nach Gorbatschow: Wurzeln, Hintergründe, Trends der sich formierenden Gruppierungen - Perspektiven für die Zukunft*, Passau: Wissenschaftsverlag Richard Rothe.
- Ivanov, V., 1996, *Naslazhdenie gibeli. Politika v Rossii: ot nauki do psikhopatii*, Moskva: Akim.
- Johnson, H.M., 1968, 'Ideology and the Social System', *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7: 76-85.
- Kaganskaya, M., 1986-87, 'The Book of Vles: The Saga of a Forgery', *Jews and Jewish Topics in Soviet and East European Publications*, Winter: 3-18.
- Kagarlitskii, B., 1992, *Raskolovshisia monolit: Rossiia na poroge novykh bitv*, Moskva: OVEN.
- Kagarlitsky, B., 1990, *Farewell Perestroika: A Soviet Chronicle*, transl. by R. Simon, London-New York: Verso.
- Kartsev, V. with Bludeau, T., 1995, *!Zhirinovskij!*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Khairuzov, V., 1996, *Sergei Baburin: Politicheskii portret*, Moskva: Novator.

- Khopak, D., comp., 1995, 'Neizvestnyi Zhirinovskii: Dokumenty (1967-68, 1985-87 gg.)', unpublished manuscript, Moskva: Panorama.
- Khronika putcha chas za chasom: Sobytiia 19-22 avgusta 1991 v svodokakh Rossiiskogo informatsionnogo agentstva*, 1991, Moskva: RIA.
- Kibalnik, S., 1996, 'Zhirinovskiy as a Nationalist "Kitsch Artist"', *Keman Institute Occasional Papers*, no. 264, July.
- Kipp, J.W., 1994a, *Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy and the Liberal-Democratic Party: Statism, Nationalism, and Imperialism*, January, E64, Camberley, Surrey: The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.
- Kipp, J.W., 1994b, 'The Zhirinovskiy Threat', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 3, May-June: 72-86.
- Kitschelt, H., 1995, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Kleines Fremdwörterbuch*, 1974, 3rd edn, Leipzig: VEB Bibliographisches Institut.
- Klepikova, E. and Solovyov, V., 1995, *Zhirinovskiy: The Paradoxes of Russian Fascism*, transl. by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Viking/Penguin Group.
- Kliamkin, I.M., 1993, 'Kakoi avtoritarnyi rezhim vozmozhen segodnia v Rossii?', *Politicheskoe issledovaniia*, no. 5: 50-54.
- Kliamkin, I.M., 1996, 'Elektorat osnovnykh izbiratel'nykh ob"edinenii na parlamentskikh vyborakh 1995 g. po materialam fonda "Obshchestvennoe mnenie"', in: *Parlamentskie vybory... 1996*: 59-66.
- Koenen, G. and Hielscher, K., eds. 1991, *Die schwarze Front: Der neue Antisemitismus in der Sowjetunion*, Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
- Koman, A.J., 1996, 'The Last Surge to the South: The New Enemies of Russia in the Rhetoric of Zhirinovskiy', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 19: 279-327.
- Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 1993, Moskva: Iuridicheskaya literatura.
- Korchagin, V., 1996, *Sud nad akademikom*, Moskva: Vitiav'.
- Korey, W., 1995, *Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism*, Chur, Switzerland: Harwood.
- Kornai, J., 1995, *Highways and Byways: Studies on Reform and Post-Communist Transition*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Kornhauser, W., 1959, *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe: Free Press.
- Koval', B.I., ed., 1993, *Rossia segodnia. Politicheskii portret b dokumentakh: Vypusk 2. 1991-1992. Stanovlenie gosudarstvennosti. Armiia i politika. Nove partii. Tserkov' i obshchestvo*, Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia.
- Kovler, A.I., 1994, 'Vybery 1993 goda: Osvoenie metodov politicheskogo marketinga', in: *Federal'noe sobranie Rossii: Opyt pervykh vyborov*, Moskva: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, Institut gosudarstva i prava: 109-119.
- Kowalsky, W. and Schroeder, W., eds., 1994a, *Rechtsextremismus: Einführung und Forschungsbilanz*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Kowalsky, W. and Schroeder, W., 1994b, 'Einleitung: Rechtsextremismus - Begriff, Methode, Analyse', in: Kowalsky and Schroeder 1994a: 7-20.
- Krasnov, V.N., 1995, *Sistema mnogopartiinosti v sovremennoi Rossii (ocherk istorii)*, Moskva: Obozrevatel'.
- Krotov, N., 1993, 'Zhirinovskii Vladimir Vol'fovich (politicheskii portret)', *Obozrevatel'*, no. 26.

- Kruchina, N., 1991, 'The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Its Hard Currency Means', *Current Politics and Economics of Russia*, vol. 2, no. 4: 301-306.
- Kto est' chto: kniga 1 - politicheskie organizatsii i bloki, obshchestvennye organizatsii*, 1994, Moskva: Ministerstvo ekonomiki Rossiiskoi federatsii, Institut mikroekonomiki, Tsentr sotsial'no-politicheskogo analiza.
- Kto est' kto v Rossii i v blizhnem zarubezh'e: Spravochnik*, 1993, Moskva: Izdatel'skii dom 'Novoe vremia'/Vsë dlia Vas'.
- Kulikova, I.S., 1992, 'Fenomen Zhirinovskogo', in: *Fenomen Zhirinovskogo* (=Seria 'Tainy vlasti v organizatsiakh', 3rd vol.), Moskva: Zhurnal 'Kontrolling': 5-81.
- Kulikova, I.S., 1995, *Surrealizm v iskusstve*, 2nd edn, Moskva: RAIT, 1995.
- Kurashvili, B., 1994, 'Vozmozhno li fashizm v Rossii?', in: Kurashvili, B., *Kuda idët Rossiia?*, Moskva: Prometei: 132-139.
- Kuznetsov, Iu.P., 1994, 'Kto boitsia nashei derzhavnosti?', *Pressa Rossii*, no. 5-6 (25-26): 4.
- Kuznetsov, Iu.P., 1995, 'Konstitutsionnyi printsip russkogo natsional'nogo dvizheniia: Iz knigi "Rossiia v global'nom istoricheskom protsesse"', *Slavianin*, no. 1: 37-41, no. 2: 46-49.
- Lakër [Laqueur], Uo. [W.], 1994, *Chërnaia sotnia: Istoki russkogo fashizma*, Washington, DC: Problems of Eastern Europe.
- Lange, A., 1993, *Was die Rechten lesen: Fünfzig rechtsextreme Zeitschriften: Ziele, Inhalte, Taktik*, München: Beck.
- Laqueur, W., 1993, *Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia*, New York: HarperCollins.
- Laqueur, W., 1994, *The Dream that Failed: Reflections on the Soviet Union*, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Larsen, S.U., Hagtvet, B. and Myklebust, J.P., eds., 1980, *Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism*, Bergen/Oslo/Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget.
- Laswell, H.D., 1977, *Psychopathology and Politics*, 3rd edn, Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press (1st edn 1930).
- Latsis, O., 1995, 'Sharlatantsvo kak instrument politiki', in: Latsis, O., *Chto s nami bylo, chto s nami budet*, Moskva: Evraziia: 109-114.
- Lemberg, E., 1974, *Ideologie und Gesellschaft: Eine Theorie der ideologischen Systeme, ihrer Struktur und Funktionen*, 2nd edn, Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln/Mainz: W. Kohlhammer.
- Lentini, P., ed., 1995, *Elections and Political Order in Russia: The Implications of the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly*, Budapest/London/New York: Central European University Press.
- Leonhard, W., 1994, *Die Reform entläßt ihre Väter: Der steinige Weg zum modernen Rußland*, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.
- Lester, J., 1994, 'Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party: A Profile', *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe: A Review of European Affairs*, no. 47: 17-30.
- Levicheva, V., 1994, 'Parties, parties, parties...', *Political Archives of Russia*, vol. 3, no. 4: 211-216.
- Levinson, A. and Shokarev, V., 1994, 'Novaia real'nost'', *Segodnia*, 26 February: 10.
- Lewinson, A. and Schokarew, W., 1994, 'Wer wählt rechts?: Eine Analyse', in: Eichwede 1994: 143-155.
- Levy... pravye?: Materialy seminara 'Izmenenie poniatii "levye" i "pravye" v massovom soznanii v gody perestroiki i perestrelki' 18 noiabria 1995 goda*, 1995, Moskva: Levyi informtsentr.

- Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuz: Dokumenty i materialy*, 1991, Moskva: Politizdat.
- Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia Rossii: Materialy V s'ezda Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii 2 apreliia 1994 goda*, 1994, Moskva: LDPR.
- Limonov, E., 1992a, *Podrostok Savenko: Povest'*, Krasnodar: Zhurnal 'Kuban'.
- Limonov, E., 1992b, *Ischeznoenie varvarov: Stat'i, esse* (=Glagol, 9th vol.), Moskva: Zhurnal 'Glagol'.
- Limonov, E., 1993a, 'Izvrashcheniia natsionalizma', *Novyi vzgliad*, no. 117: 8.
- Limonov, E., 1993b, *Ubiistvo chasovogo*, Moskva: Molodaia gvardiia.
- Limonov, E., 1994, *Limonov protiv Zhirinovskogo*, Moskva: Nezavisimyi al'manakh 'Konets veka'.
- Linz, J.J., 1975, 'Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes', in: Greenstein, F.I. and Polsby, N.W., eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, 3rd vol., *Macropolitical Theory*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley: 174-411.
- Linz, J.J., 1978, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibrium*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Linz, J.J., 1979, 'Some Notes toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective', in: Laqueur, W., ed., *Fascism: A Readers Guide*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin: 13-78.
- Linz, J.J., 1980, 'Political Space and Fascism as a Latecomer: Conditions Conducive to the Success or Failure of Fascism as a Mass Movement in Inter-War Europe', in: Larsen, Hagtvet and Myklebust 1980: 153-189.
- Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A., 1996, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, S.M., 1969, *Political Man*, London: Heinemann Educational Books.
- Litvinoff, E., 1980, 'The Slavophile Revival and Its Attitude to Jews', in: Kelman, J.M., ed., *Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union: Its Roots and Consequences*, 2nd vol., Jerusalem: The Centre for Research and Documentation of East-European Jewry, The Hebrew University: 65-73.
- Luchterhandt, G., 1991, 'Der "zentristische" Block', *Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien. Aktuelle Analysen*, no. 46.
- Luchterhandt, G., 1993, *Die politischen Parteien im neuen Rußland: Dokumente und Kommentare* (=Dokumentation zur Kultur und Gesellschaft im östlichen Europa, ed. by Wolfgang Eichwede and Marlene P. Hiller, 1st vol.), Bremen: Edition Temmen.
- Luchterhandt, G. and Luchterhandt, O., 1993, 'Die Genesis der politischen Vereinigungen, Bewegungen und Parteien in Rußland', in: Veen, H.-J. and Weilemann, P.R., eds., *Rußland auf dem Weg zur Demokratie?: Politik und Parteien in der Russischen Föderation*, Paderborn-Wien-Zürich: Schöningh: 125-213.
- Luchterhandt, G., 1994, 'Die Entfesselung einer Marionette: Wladimir Schirinowski und seine LDPR', in: Eichwede 1994: 117-142.
- Ludin, B., 1995, 'Fascism on the Rise?: The History, Origins and Contemporary Political Expressions of Right-Wing Extremist Politics in Russia', unpublished M.A. thesis, London: SSEES, University of London.
- Luk'ianov, A., 1991, 'Dialog s Anatoliem Luk'ianovym', in: Karaulov, A., ed., 1993, *Vokrug Kremliia*, 2nd vol., Moskva: Slovo: 310-322.

- Luk'ianov, A., 1992, *Pesnia protesta: vtoraiia kniga stikhov iz tiurny uznika 4-ogo izoliatora 'Matroskoi tishiny' predsedatel'ia Verkhovnogo soveta SSSR*, Moskva: Paleia.
- Luk'ianov, A., 1993, *Perevorot: mnimyi i nastoiashchii (otvety na voprosy, prishedshie b 'Matrosskuiu tishinu')*, Moskva: Manuskript.
- Luks, L., 1994, 'Rußland: Die faschistische Herausforderung', *DW Analyse: Hintergründe und Analysen*, no. 10.
- Lysenko, N., 1993a, 'Otkrovennyi razgovor o "druz'iakh", "vragakh" i korennykh interesakh natsii', *Nash sovremennik*, no. 7: 150-158.
- Lysenko, N., 1993b, 'Strategiia nashei bor'by', *Molodaia gvardiia*, no. 9: 175-203.
- Lyttelton, A., ed., 1973, *Italian Fascisms from Pareto to Gentile*, London: Jonathan Cape.
- Makarkin, A., 1994, 'Liberal'no-demokraticheskaiia partiia', *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 4: 64-71.
- Manifest Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii*, 1995, Moskva: LDPR.
- Markov, S., 1996, 'Izbratel'nye ob''edineniia na parlamentskikh vyborakh', in: *Parlamentskie vybory...* 1996: 67-103.
- Martelli, F., 1996, *La Russia di Zhirinovskii*, Bologna: il Mulino.
- Maximov, A., ed., 1996, *Maximov's Companion to the 1996 Russian Presidential Elections. Election Results: Facts and Figures*, London: Maximov Publications.
- Maximow, A. and Odesskij, M., 1994, "'Ich kann nicht warten': Aus der Welt des Wladimir Schirinowski - eine biographische Skizze", in: Eichwede 1994: 101-116.
- Mayring, Ph., 1995, *Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken*, 5th edn, Weinheim: Deutscher Studienverlag.
- McAuley, M., 1984, 'Nationalism and the Soviet Multi-Ethnic State', in: Harding, N., ed., *The State in Socialist Society*, Basingstoke, Hampshire/Oxford: The Macmillan Press/St. Antony's College: 179-210.
- McFaul, M., 1992, 'Russia's Emerging Political Parties', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 3, no. 1: 25-40.
- McFaul, M., 1993, 'Russian Centrism and Revolutionary Transition', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3: 196-222.
- McFaul, M., 1994, *Understanding Russia's 1993 Parliamentary Elections: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy* (=Essays on Public Policy, no. 46), Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University.
- McFaul, M. and Markov, S., eds., 1993, *The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs*, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
- McFaul, M. and Petrov, N., eds., 1995, *Politicheskii al'manakh Rossii 1995*, Moskva: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi.
- McFaul, M., 1997, 'Making Institutions Stick: Russia's Protracted Transition from Communist Rule', unpublished paper, Stanford University, CA.
- Medvedev, R. et al., 1993, *Spravochnik: Politicheskie partii, dvizheniia i bloki sovremennoi Rossii*, Nizhnii Novgorod: Leta.
- Medvedev, Zh.A., 1994, 'Das Phänomen Schirinowski', in: Forbes, M. and Fink, W., eds., *Schirinowskij: Politiker - Populist - Nationalist?: Berichte und Kommentare der deutschen und internationalen Publizistik*, München: Hans-Seidel-Stiftung: 17.

- Medvedkov, Yu.V., Medvedkov, O.L. and Hudson, G.E., 1996, 'The December 1993 Russian Elections: Geographical Patterns and Contextual Factors', *The Russian Review*, vol. 55, January: 80-98.
- Mikhailiuk, V.I., 1991, 'Partiia cheloveka', *Sotsial'no-politicheskie nauki*, no. 6: 100-103.
- Mikhailov, E., 1995, *Bremia imperskoi natsii*, Moskva: N.p..
- Mikhailov, R., Kulikova, I.S. and Kolkotin, E.A., 1994, *O russkom liberalizme* (=Bibliotekha LDPR), Moskva: LDPR.
- Miller, J., 1993, *Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of Soviet Power*, Basingstoke, Hampshire/London: Macmillan.
- Mitrokhin, S. and Urban, M.E., 1992, 'Social Groups, Party Elites and Russia's New Democrats', in: Lane, D., ed., *Russia in Flux: The Political and Social Consequences of Reform*, London: Edward Elgar: 62-81.
- Mordzhinskaia, E.D., ed., 1976, *Kritika ideologii neofashizma*, Moskva: Mysl'.
- Morrison, J., 1991, *Boris Yeltsin: From Bolshevik to Democrat*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.
- Morrison, J.W., 1994, *Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist* (=McNair Paper 30, April 1994), Washington, DC: Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
- Moses, J.C., 1991, 'The Challenge to Soviet Democracy from the Political Right', in: Hubert, R.T. and Kelley, D.R., eds., *Perestroika-Era Politics: The New Soviet Legislature and Gorbachev's Political Reforms*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe: 105-128.
- Mosina, M. and Solodukhin, Iu., comps., 1993, 'Partiia Zhirinovskogo: Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia, Informatsionnyi obzor', unpublished reprint of Russian press reports, Moskva: Informatsionnoe agentstvo POSTFACTUM.
- Mosse, G.L., 1979, 'Introduction: Towards a General Theory of Fascism', in: Mosse, G.L., ed., *International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches* (=SAGE Readers in 20th Century History, 3rd vol.), London/Beverly Hills: SAGE: 1-41.
- Motyl, A.J., 1992, 'The End of Sovietology: From Soviet Studies to Post-Soviet Studies', in: Motyl, A.J., ed., *The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR*, New York: Columbia University Press: 302-316.
- Motyl, A.J., 1994, 'Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: A Man of His Times', *The Harriman Review*, vol. 7, nos. 7-9: 11-18.
- Mudde, C., 1995, 'Right-wing extremism analyzed: A comparative analysis of the ideologies of three alleged right-wing extremist parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86)', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 27: 203-234.
- Neganov, S.V., 1995, 'LDPR na Urale', in: Vorob'eva, Z.E. et al., eds., *Sotsial'no-kul'turnye protsessy v otechestvennoi i zarubezhnykh tsivilizatsiiakh: Tezisy dokladov i soobshchenii XX iubileinoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii posviashchvvennoi 20-letiiu PGIK (sektzii obshchestvennykh nauk)*, Perm: Permskii gosudarstvennyi institut iskusstv i kul'tury: 48-52.
- Nevzorov, A., 1991, 'Dialog s Aleksandrom Nevzorovym', in: Karaulov, A., ed., 1993, *Vokrug Kremli*, 2nd. vol., Moskva: Slovo: 394-404.
- Nevzorov, A., 1995, *Pole chesti*, Sankt-Peterburg: Shans.
- N.N., 1994, 'Schirinowskij und die Deutschen: Zwischen Medienhetze und Massenjubel', in: Schirinowskij 1994: 41-122.

- Nolte, E., 1963, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche: Action française, Italienischer Faschismus, Nationalsozialismus*, München: R. Piper.
- Nolte, E., ed., 1967, *Theorien über den Faschismus*, Köln: Kiepenhauer & Witsch.
- Nolte, E., 1968, *Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die faschistischen Bewegungen*, München: R. Piper.
- Nolte, E., 1987, *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus*, Berlin: Propyläen.
- Nolte, E., 1993, *Streitpunkte: Heutige und künftige Kontroversen um den Nationalsozialismus*, Berlin: Propyläen.
- North, D.C., 1990, 'Institutions and a transaction-cost theory of exchange', in: Alt, J.E. and Shepsle, K.A., eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 182-194.
- Novikov, A.V., 1992, 'Problemy otechestvennogo avtoritarizma (vozvrashchaias' k teme)', *Vestnik moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 12: Sotsial'no-politicheskie issledovaniia*, no. 4: 19-26.
- 'O fashistskoi opasnosti (noiabr' 1991 g.)', 1991, in: Koval' 1993: 209.
- O preduprezhdenii proiavlenii fashistskoi opasnosti v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Materialy parlamentskikh slushanii. 14 fevralia 1995 goda*, 1995, Moskva: Redaktsionno-izdatel'skii otdel Apparata Gosudarstvennoi Dumi.
- Obrashchenie Vladimira Zhirinovskogo, predsedatelia Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii, k chlenam LDPR i sochuvstvuiushchim. Programma Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii. Ustav LDPR*, 1993, Moskva: LDPR.
- Obshchestvenno-politicheskie dvizheniia i partii Rossii: Spravochnik. Vypusk no. 2*, 1993, Moskva: Direktsiia dokumentatsii i spravocnogo servisa, Rossiiskoe informatsionnoe agentstvo 'Novosti'.
- O'Donnell, G., and Schmitter, Ph.C., 1986, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Offe, C., 1991, 'Capitalism by Democratic Design?: Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe', *Social Research*, vol. 58, Winter: 865-892.
- Oleshuk, Iu., 1994, 'Zhirinovskii - popytka poniat', *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 10: 77-86.
- Olson, M., 1965, *The Logic of Collective Action*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Orlov, I., 1996, *Stoi Rossii ot vozhdai*, Moskva: Pallada.
- Ortung, R.W., 1995a, 'A Politically Timed Fight Against Extremism', *Transition*, vol. 1, no. 10, 23 June: 2-6.
- Ortung, R.W., 1995b, 'Congress of Russian Communities Fights for a Stable Niche', *Transition*, vol. 1, no. 22, 1 December: 14-16.
- Ortung, R.W., 1996, 'Duma Elections Bolster Leftist Opposition', *Transition*, vol. 2, no. 4, 23 February: 6-11.
- Oschlies, W., 1995, *Wladimir Schirinowski: Der häßliche Russe und das post-kommunistische Osteuropa*, Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau.
- Otto, R., 1990, 'Contemporary Russian Nationalism', *Problems of Communism*, vol. 39, no. 6, November-December: 96-105.
- Parlamentskie vybory 1995 goda v Rossii* (=Nauchnye doklady/Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, 9th vol.), 1996, Moskva: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

- Parland, T., 1993, *The Rejection in Russia of Totalitarian Socialism and Liberal Democracy: A Study of the Russian New Right* (=Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium, 46th vol.), Helsinki: The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters.
- Partii i politicheskie bloki v Rossii: Vypusk pervyi, 1993, Moskva: Narodnaia neftianaia investitsionno-promyshlennaia evro-aziatskaia korporatsiia.
- Partiino-politicheskie elity i elektoral'nye protsessy v Rossii (=Analiticheskie obozreniia Tsentra kompleksnykh sotsial'nykh issledovanii i marketinga. Serii: Politologii, no. 3'96 [17]), 1996, Moskva: Tsentr kompleksnykh sotsial'nykh issledovanii i marketinga.
- Payne, S.G., 1980a, 'The Concept of Fascism', in: Larsen, Hagtvet and Myklebust 1980: 14-25.
- Payne, S.G., 1980b, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Payne, S.G., 1993, 'Historic Fascism and Neofascism', *European History Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 1: 69-75.
- Payne, S.G., 1995, *A History of Fascism, 1914-1945*, London: UCL Press (US-edn, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).
- Peukert, D.J.K., 1993, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity*, New York: Hill and Wang.
- Pfahl-Traugher, A., 1995, *Rechtsextremismus: Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme nach der Wiedervereinigung* (=Schriftenreihe Extremismus & Demokratie, ed. by Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse, 5th vol.), 2nd edn, Bonn: Bouvier.
- Plekhanov, S.N., 1992, "'Ia - odin iz vas'", in: *Fenomen Zhirinovskogo* (=Serii 'Tainy vlasti v organizatsiakh', 3rd vol.), Moskva: Zhurnal 'Kontrolling': 82-95.
- Plekhanov, S.N., *Zhirinovskii: Kto on?*, Moskva: Evraziia-Nord/BIMPA.
- Podvintsev, O.B., 1996, 'Angloiazychnye avtory o sisteme koordinat politicheskogo spektra i tipologii konservatizma', in: *Rakhshmir* 1996b: 151-157.
- Politicheskie partii sovremennoi Rossii: Informatsionnye i analiticheskie materialy ob obshcherossiiskikh partiakh i obshchestvennykh dvizheniakh (1990-1993). Vyp. 1, 1993, Moskva: Rossiiskaia politicheskaiia entsiklopediia.
- Politicheskie partii v Rossii: Spravochnoe izdanie, 1995, Moskva: Fond prava.
- Poltoratskii, N.P., 1989, *Ivan Aleksandrovich Il'in: Zhizn', trudy, mirovoztrenie. Sbornik statei*, Tenafly, NJ: Hermitage.
- Porojkow, I., Porojkow, S. and Burger, T., eds., 1995, *Russische Presse '95*, Moskau/Darmstadt: Agentur 'Sojuspetschat'/Hoppenstedt.
- Preißler, F., 1994, 'Zur Entwicklung des russischen Nationalismus, 1989-1993: Die "Patrioten" im Spannungsfeld von Russischer Föderation, Rußland/ "Rossija" und UdSSR', unpublished M.A. thesis, Frankfurt am Main: Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität.
- Pribylovskii, V., 1991a, 'Likurg, Chingis-Khan i Gitler', *Panorama*, no. 1 (28): 1/4.
- Pribylovskii, V., 1991b, 'Slovar' Oppozitsii: Novye politicheskie partii i organizatsii Rossii', *Sostoianie strany: Analiticheskie vestniki informatsionnogo agentstva PostFactum*, no. 4/5.
- Pribylovskii, V., ed., 1991c, *Natsional'no-patrioticheskie ob'edineniia. Chast' I: 'Pamiat'*, Moskva: Institut gumanitarno-politicheskikh issledovanii.
- Pribylovskii, V., 1992a, *Dictionary of Political Parties and Organizations in Russia* (=Significant Issues Series', vol. XIV, no. 7), Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

- Pribylovskii, V., 1992b, 'Slovar' novykh politicheskikh partii i organizatsii Rossii', 4th edn, unpublished manuscript, Moskva: Panorama.
- Pribylovskii, V., 1993, 'Sto politikov Rossii: Kratkii biograficheskii slovar'', 2nd edn, unpublished manuscript, Moskva: Panorama.
- Pribylovskii, V., 1994, 'Russkie natsional-patrioticheskie (etnokraticheskie) i pravo-radikal'nye organizatsii (Kratkii slovar'-sparvochnik)', unpublished manuscript, Moskva: Informatsionno-ekspertnaia gruppa 'Panorama'.
- Pribylovsky, V., 1994, 'A Survey of Radical Right-Wing Groups in Russia', *RFE/RL Research Report. The Politics of Intolerance: A Special Issue form the RFE/RL Research Insitute*, vol. 3, no. 16, 22 April: 28-37.
- Pribylovskii, V., ed., 1995a, 'Russkie natsionalisticheskie i pravo-radikal'nye organizatsii 1989-1995: Dokumenty i teksty', 1st vol., unpublished manuscript, Moskva: Panorama.
- Pribylovskii, V., 1995b, 'Vozhdi: Sborknik biografii rossiiskikh politicheskikh deiatelei natsionalisticheskoi i impersko-patrioticheskoi orientatsii', unpublished manuscript, Moskva: Panorama.
- Pribylovskii, V., 1995c, 'Na zare perestroiki', in: Khopak 1995: 38-43.
- Pribylovsky, V., 1995, 'What Awaits Russia: Fascism or Latin American-Style Dictatorship?', *Transition*, vol. 1, no. 10, 23 June: 6-7.
- Proekt. LDPR. Konstitutsiia Rossii, 1993, Moskva: LDPR.
- Programma i ustav Rossiiskogo obshchenarodnogo soiuza, 1995, Moskva: ROS-informbiuro.
- 'Programma Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soiuza [kratkii variant]', 1990, in: Berezovskii, V.N., Krotov, N.I., Chervakov, V.V. and Solovei, V.D., eds., 1992, *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Sbormik dokumentov i materialov v 10-ti knigakh*, Moskva: RAU-Press/Institut massovykh politicheskikh dvizhenii, 3rd vol.: 135.
- 'Programma Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii priniata I s''ezdom LDPR 18-19 apreliia 1992 g.', 1993, in: *Rossia: Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennye ob''edineniia (1991-1993 g.g.)*, 1st vol., Moskva: Ivan: 93-96.
- Programma Natsional-bol'shevistskoi partii, N.d., Moskva: Paleia.
- Prowe, D., 1994, 'Classic' Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe: Comparisons and Contrasts', *Contemporary European History*, vol. 3, no. 3: 289-313.
- Prudkov, O. and Bach, D., eds., 1992, *Wer sitzt morgen im Kreml?: Die neuen Parteien in Rußland und ihre Führer* (=Peter-Hammer-Taschenbuch, 75th vol.), Wuppertal: Peter Hammer.
- Prussakov, V., 1992, *Okkul'tnyi messii i ego reikh*, Moskva: Molodaia gvardiia-Shakur 2.
- Prussakov, V., 1993, 'Slava Rossii! (Kratkii obzor rossiiskogo fashiststkogo dvizheniia)', in: Prussakov, V. and Shiropaev, A., *Slava Rossii!*, Moskva: Front natsional'no-revoliutsionnogo deistviia: 5-34.
- Prussakov, V., 1994a, 'Ostorozhno: Edichka! (Professional'nyi negodiai v strane durakov)', *Iuridicheskaiia gazeta*, no. 28 (141): 5, 14.
- Prussakov, V., ed., 1994b, *Germaniskii natsional-sotsializm* (=Etnicheskaiia istoriia, 5th vol.), Moskva: Pallada.
- Prussakov, V., 1994c, 'Fashizm i evrei: tainy nedavnogo proshlogo', *Al'-Kods*, no. 24 (45), August: 10.
- Prussakov, V., 1994d, *Prakh Gitlera*, Moskva: LKhA 'Al'manakh'.

- Prussakov, V., ed., 1995, *Portrety na fone svastiki: biograficheskie ocherki* (=Etnicheskaya istoriya, 4th vol.), Moskva-New York: Pallada & Svet.
- Przeworski, A. and Teune, H., 1970, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*, New York: Wiley-Interscience.
- Putnam, R.A., 1992, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Pyadyshev, B.D., ed., 1991, *Russia and the World: New Views on Russian Foreign Policy*, New York: Birch Lane.
- Quinn-Judge, P., 1994, 'Zhirinovskiy vs. the Turks', *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 1, no. 2: 87-91.
- Rabochaia gruppа Vnutrennogo prediktora Rossii, 1993, 'Shpiral' istorii: kuda vedut "dorogi na Moskvu". Paragraf iz rukopisii, podgotovlennoi Vnutrennym prediktorom Rossii, "Razgermetizatsiia" (1990 g.), *Rossiianin: Spetsialnyi vypusk Sankt-Peterburgskogo otdeleniia Russkogo natsional'nogo sobora*, Sankt-Peterburg: ONTO 'Genez', 18 October.
- Ragin, C.C., 1987, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rakhshmir, P.Iu., 1971, 'Sovremennye tendentsii burzhuaiznoi istoriografii fashizma', *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya*, no. 6.
- Rakhshmir, P.Iu., 1995a, 'Tri konservativnye traditsii: obshchee i osobennoe', in: Rakhshmir 1995b: 4-17.
- Rakhshmir, P.Iu., ed., 1995b, *Konservatizm i liberalizm: sozvuchiia i dissonansy (K 125-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia P.B. Struve). Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii. Perm', 24-26 maiia 1995 goda* (=Issledovaniia po konservatizmu, 3rd vol.), Perm': Permskii gosudarstvennyi universitet.
- Rees, Ph., 1990, *Biographical Dictionary of the Extreme Right Since 1890*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Reshetnikov, M. and Vasilyev, V., 1994, 'Analytical Research: Democracy, National Populism, Extremism, Fascism? - Problems of Spiritual Leadership', *Foreign Broadcast Information: Central Eurasia Daily Report (FBIS-SOV)*, no. 001: 32-35 (translated reprint from *Rossiiskie vesti*, 30 December 1993: 4-5).
- Reznik, S., 1996, *The Nazification of Russia: Antisemitism in the Post-Soviet Era*, Washington, DC: Challenge Publications.
- Riabov, A.I., 1990, 'Neofashizm segodnia', *Nauchnyi kommunizm*, no. 3: 75-83.
- Riabov, A.V., 1994, 'Ob eklektichnoi ideologii (zametki na poliakh odnoi nashumevshei knigi), *Kentavr* (formerly: *Voprosy istorii KPSS*), no. 2: 133-139.
- Richter, E., 1996, 'Faschistische Parteien und Bewegungen in der Russischen Föderation am Beispiel der RNE (Russische Nationale Einheit)', unpublished M.A. thesis, Köln: Universität zu Köln.
- Riggs, F.W., 1994, 'Conceptual Homogenization of a Heterogeneous Field: Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective', in: Dogan, M. and Kazancigil, A., eds., *Comparing Nations: Concepts, Strategies, Substance*, Oxford/Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell: 72-152.
- Robinson, R., 1972, 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration', in: Owen, R. and Sutcliffe, B., eds., *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, London: Longman: 117-142.
- Rogger, H., 1968, 'Was there a Russian Fascism?: The Union of the Russian People', *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 36, no. 4: 398-415.

- Rossia: partii, vybory, vlast*, 1996, Moskva: Obozrevatel' - RAU-Korporatsiia.
- Rossia: politicheskie partii i obshchestvennye ob'edineniia (1991-1993 g.g.). Spravochnoe izdanie. Vypusk 1*, Moskva: TOO 'Ivan'.
- Rowley, D.G., 1994, 'Russian Nationalism and the Cold War', *The American Historical Review*, vol. 99, no. 1, February: 155-171.
- Rühl, P., comp., 1995, 'Wir sind doch nur kleine Leute...: Gleichgültigkeit und Nachsicht gegenüber Antisemitismus und Rechtsradikalismus in Rußland', *Osteuropa*, vol. 45, no. 7: A369-A375.
- Ruschemeyer, D., Stephens, E.H., and Stephens, J.D., 1990, *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ryan-Hayes, K., 'Limonov's "It's Me, Eddie" and the Autobiographical Mode', *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, University of Pittsburgh, no. 1004.
- Rybkin, I.P., 1994, *Gosudarstvennaia дума: Piataya popytka*, Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi humanitarnyi fond 'Znanie'.
- Sachs, J., 1993, *Poland's Jump to the Market Economy*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Sakwa, R., 1993, *Russian Politics and Society*, London: Routledge.
- Sakwa, R., 1994, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', *Democratization*, vol. 1, no. 2: 295-308.
- Sakwa, R., 1995, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', *Europe-Asia Studies* (formerly: *Soviet Studies*), vol. 47, no. 2: 195-227.
- Samoilov, E.V., 1993, *Fiurery: obshchaia teoriia fashizma*, 3 vols., Obrinsk: SELS.
- Sartori, G., 1969, 'Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 63, no. 2: 398-411.
- Sartori, G., 1970, 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 64, no. 4: 1033-1053.
- Sautmann, B., 1995, 'The Devil to Pay: The 1989 Debate and the Intellectual Origins of Yeltsin's "Soft Authoritarianism"', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 28, no. 1: 131-151.
- Schilling, W., 1995, 'Die russischen Intellektuellen und die Neugestaltung Rußlands', *Europäische Rundschau*, vol. 23, no. 1: 25-32.
- Schirinowskij, W., 1994, *Was ich wirklich will*, München: FZ-Verlag.
- Schmidt-Häuer, C., 1993, 'Ein Irrwisch mit tausend Zungen', *Die Zeit*, no. 51: 3.
- Schneider, E., 1991, 'Die Konservativen im Volkskongress der UdSSR: Die Deputiertengruppe "Union"', *Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien: Aktuelle Analysen*, no. 15.
- Schneider, E., 1994, 'Schirinowskij und seine Partei', *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, no. 35.
- Schneider, E., 1995a, 'Die nationalistische und die kommunistischen Fraktionen der rußländischen Staatsduma', *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, no. 28.
- Schneider, E., 1995b, 'Rechtsextremismus in Rußland', *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, no. 53.
- Schüddekopf, O.E., 1973, *Fascism*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Scruton, R., 1982, *A Dictionary of Political Thought*, London: Pan Books.
- Seliger, M., 1976, *Ideology and Politics*, London: Allen & Unwin.
- Sestanovich, S., 1994, 'A Communist Setback', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 2: 23-27.

- Shils, E., 1968, 'The Concept and Function of Ideology', *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7: 66-76.
- Shmidt, Iu.M., ed., 1993, *Problema otvetstvennosti za razzhiganie mezhnatsional'noi rozni*, Moskva: NIPTs 'Memorial'.
- Shukman, A., 1983, 'Taboos, Splits and Signifiers: Limonov's *Eto ya - Edichka*', *Essays in Poetics*, no. 2.
- Shultz, K.M., 1993, 'The Political Potential of Right-Wing Russian Nationalism', unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Virginia.
- Siegler, B. and Maegerle, A., 1993, 'Schirinowskis Kampf für ein "weißes Europa": Rußlands Wahlsieger redet in rechtsextremen Blättern vom völkischen Schulterschluß', *die tageszeitung*, Berlin, 18 December: 4.
- Skillen, D., 1995, 'Media Coverage in the Elections', in: Lentini 1995: 97-123.
- Skocpol, Th., 1979, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skurlatov, V., 1980, *Molodëzh i progress: Filosofskie razmyshleniia o drame Svobody, Liubvi i Izmeny v istorii*, Moskva: Molodaia gvardiia.
- Skurlatov, V., N.d., 'Fashist li ia?', *Oppozitsiia*, no. 12: 3.
- Slater, W., 1994, 'Russia', *RFE/RL Research Report. The Politics of Intolerance: A Special Issue from the RFE/RL Research Institute*, vol. 3, no. 16, 22 April: 23-27.
- Slider, D., Gempel'son, V. and Chugrov, S., 1994, 'Political Tendencies in Russia's Regions: Evidence from the 1993 Parliamentary Elections', *Slavic Review*, vol. 53, no. 3: 711-732.
- Sloane, W., 1992, 'Who's Afraid of Vladimir Wolf?', *Moscow-Magazine*, April-May: 40-47.
- Sobchak, A., 1995, *Zhila-byla kommunisticheskaia partiia*, Sankt-Peterburg: Lenizdat.
- Soeffner, H.-G., 1982, 'Statt einer Einleitung: Prämissen einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Hermeneutik', in: Soeffner, H.-G., ed., *Beiträge zu einer empirischen Sprachsoziologie* (=Tübinger Beiträge zur Linguistik, ed. by Gunter Narr, vol. 189), Tübingen: Narr: 9-48.
- Sokolov, P., Ivanov, M. and Kuznetsov, Iu.P., eds., 1992, *Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia: Teoreticheskaia platforma partii - kontseptsiiia obshchestvennoi bezopastnosti Rossii v global'nom istoricheskom protsesse. Odobrena na 3-em s'ezde partii 18-19 apreliia 1992 g.*, Sankt-Peterburg: LDPR, 10 April.
- Solovei, V.D., 1992, 'Sovremennyi russkii natsionalizm: ideino-politicheskaia klassifikatsiia', *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost'*, no. 2: 119-129.
- Solovei, V.D., 1993a, 'Russkoe natsional'noe dvizhenie 60-80-kh godov XX veka v osveshchenii zarubezhnoi istoriografii', *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, no. 2: 107-112.
- Solovei, V.D., 1993b, 'Evoliutsiia sovremennogo russkogo natsionalizma (1985-1993 gg.)', in: Kukushkin, Iu.S. et al., eds., *Russkii narod: istoricheskaia sud'ba v XX veke*, Moskva: ANKO: 283-305: 46-73.
- Solovei, V.D., 1994a, 'LDPR: istochniki finansirovaniia i sotsial'naia opora', unpublished paper, Moskva: Gorbachëv-Fond.
- Solovei, V.D., 1994b, 'Russkii natsionalizm i vlast' v epokhu Gorbachëva', in: Goble, P. and Bordiugov, G., eds., *Mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniia v Rossii i SNG: Seminar Moskovskogo Tsentra Karnegi. Vypusk 1: doklady 1993-1994 gg.*, Moskva: ITs 'AIRO-XX'.
- Solovei, V.D., 1995, 'Rossiia ne obrechena na fashizm, no uzhe i ne zastrakhovana ot nego', *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, no. 55 (1982), 29 March: 1-2.

- Sovremennyi fashizm, natsionalizm, ksenofobiia i antisemitizm v pechati Rossii: Informatsionno-analiticheskie materialy*, 1995, Moskva: Fond 'Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo'.
- Spechler, D.R., 1983, *Russian Nationalism and Political Stability in the USSR*, Cambridge, MA: Center of International Studies, MIT/ Center of International Affairs, Harvard University.
- Spier, H., 1994, 'A Cri-de-Coeur Against Reform: The Zhirinovskiy Threat', *Institute of Jewish Affairs. Analysis*, no. 1, February.
- Stepankov, V.G. and Lisov, E.K., 1992, *Kreml'evskii zagovor*, Moskva: Ogon'ek, OGIZ.
- Stern, F., 1961, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of Germanic Ideology*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Sternhell, Z., 1986, *Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France*, transl. by D. Maisel, Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Stöss, R., 1994, 'Forschungs- und Erklärungsansätze - ein Überblick', in: Kowalsky and Schroeder 1994a: 23-66.
- Suetnov, A., 1993, *Novaia oppositsiia: Katalog neokommunisticheskikh i natsional-patrioticheskikh izdaniy i organizatsiy*, 2nd edn, Moskva: Arkhiv netraditsionnoi pechati.
- Suetnov, A., 1995, *Zhirinovskii: Ocherk politicheskogo povedeniia*, Moskva: Arkhiv netraditsionnoi pechati.
- Suny, R.G., 1993, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Szporluk, R., 1989, 'Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism', *Problems of Communism*, vol. 38, no. 4, July-August: 15-35.
- Talbott, S.P., 1995, 'Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and the December 1993 Elections: Current Prospects for Fascism in Russia', *Slovo* (London: SSEES), vol. 8, no. 5, November: 71-86.
- Tannenbaum, E.R., 1973, *Fascism in Italy: Society and Culture 1922-1945*, London: Allen Lane/Penguin.
- Teague, E., 1990, 'An Open Society?', *Radio Liberty. Report on the USSR*, 7 December: 7-8.
- Teague, E., 1991, 'The "Soyuz" Group', *Radio Liberty. Report on the USSR*, 17 May: 16-21.
- Thamer, H.-U. and Wippermann, W., 1977, *Faschistische und neofaschistische Bewegungen: Probleme empirischer Faschismusforschung*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Timtschenko, V., 1994, *Ich erwecke Rußland mit Bhut - Vladimir Wolfowitsch Shirinowski*, Berlin: Aufbau.
- Tobarkov, I., 1992, 'The "Statists" and the Ideology of Russian Imperial Nationalism', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 49, 11 December: 10-16.
- Tolstych, V., Galkin, A., Loginov, V. and Buzgalin, A., 1995, 'Der russische Faschismus im Widerstreit', *Utopie Kreativ: Diskussion sozialistischer Alternativen*, no. 52, February: 65-72.
- Tolz, V., 1994, 'Russia's Parliamentary Elections: What Happened and Why', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 2, 14 January: 1-8.
- Tolz, V. and Teague, E., 1992 'Is Russia Likely to Turn to Authoritarian Rule?', *Radio Liberty. Report on the USSR*, 24 January: 1-8.
- Tsygankov, A.P., 1994, 'Zhirinovskiy's Strategy to Succeed Yeltsin, and How to Thwart It', *Demokratizatsiya*, vol. 2, no. 4: 537-547.
- Trevor-Roper, H.R., 1981, 'The Phenomenon of Fascism', in: Woolf, S.J., ed., *Fascism in Europe*, 2nd edn, London-New York: Methuen: 19-38 (1st edn 1968, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).

- Troitsky, A., 1989, *Rock in Rußland: Rock und Subkultur in der UdSSR*, transl. by M. Sax, Wien: Hannibal-Verlag.
- Tsymburskii, V.L., 1995, "'Novye pravye'" v Rossii: natsional'nye predposylki zaimstvovannoi ideologii', in: Zaslavskaiia, T.I., ed., *Kuda idët Rossiia?: Al'ternativy obshchestvennogo razvitiia. Mezhdunarodnyi simpozium 15-18 dekabria 1994 g.*, 2nd vol., Moskva: Aspekt Press: 472-482.
- Tucker, R.C., 1990, *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941*, New York/London: W.W. Norton.
- Ulam, A.B., 1977, *In the Name of the People: Prophets and Conspirators in Prerevolutionary Russia*, New York: Viking.
- Umland, A., 1994a, 'Ein Gespräch mit Wladimir Schirinowski', *Die Neue Gesellschaft: Frankfurter Hefte*, vol. 41, no. 2: 114-117.
- Umland, A., 1994b, 'Wladimir Shirinowskij in der russischen Politik: Einige Hintergründe des Aufstiegs der Liberal-Demokratischen Partei Rußlands', *Osteuropa*, vol. 44, no. 12: 1117-1131.
- Umland, A., 1995a, 'Review of McFaul and Markov 1993', *Osteuropa*, vol. 45, no. 9: 668-669.
- Umland, A., 1995b, 'Die intellektuellen Sprachrohre des russischen Revanchismus', *Die Neue Gesellschaft: Frankfurter Hefte*, vol. 42, no. 10: 916-921.
- Umland, A., 1995c, 'Shirinowskij's Parteipresse', *Rußland liest*, no. 2: 32-33.
- Umland, A., 1997, 'The Post-Soviet Russian Extreme Right', *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 44, no. 4, July/August: 53-61.
- Urban, M.E., 1991, 'Party Formation and Deformation on Russia's Political Left', in: Hubert, R.T. and Kelley, D.R., eds., *Perestroika-Era Politics: The New Soviet Legislature and Gorbachev's Political Reforms*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe: 129-150.
- Urban, M., 1994, 'December 1993 as a Replication of Late-Soviet Electoral Practices', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 10, April-June: 127-158.
- Vandenko, A. and Dodolev, E., eds., 1992, *Ikh Kreml'*, Moskva: Novyi vzgliad - Moskovskaia pravda.
- Vengerovskii, A., 1994, 'Komu nuzhna slabaia Rossiia', *MaKhaON: Mir muzhchiny*, no. 1 (3): 30-31.
- Vengerovskii, A., 1995, *Khochu i mogu*, Moskva: AO NII 'Tsentrprogrammsistem'.
- Verkhovskii, A., ed., 1994, 'Vladimir Zhirinovskii i Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia: Informatsionnyi paket', unpublished manuscript, Moskva: Panorama.
- Verkhovskii, A., 1996, 'Sobach'ia starost'', *Novoe vremia*, no. 6 (2636): 10-12.
- Verkhovskii, A., Papp, A. and Pribylovskii, V., eds., 1996, 'Politicheskii ekstremizm v Rossii', unpublished manuscript, Moskva: Panorama.
- Verkhovskii, A. and Pribylovskii, V., 1996, *Natsional-patrioticheskie organizatsii v Rossii: Istoriia, ideologiya, ekstremistskie tendentsii*, Moskva: Izdatel'stvo 'Institut eksperimental'noi sotsiologii.
- Vivarelli, R., 1991, 'Interpretations of the Origins of Fascism', *Journal of Modern History*, vol. LXII, March: 29-43.
- Vlast'*. *Deputaty Gosudarstvennoi dumy: Kratkii biograficheskii spravochnik*, 1994 [1995], 4 vols., Moskva: Institut sovremennoi politiki.
- Vnutrennyi Prediktor Rossii, 1994, 'Kratkii kurs...', *Biznes i uchët v Rossii: Spetsial'nyi vypusk*, no. 5-6: 3-65 (reprinted in: *Slovo Zhirinovskogo: Spetsial'nyi vypusk*, December 1994).

- Vnutrennyi Prediktor SSSR, 1992 [1991], *Mertvaia voda*, 3 vols., Sankt-Peterburg: Kitezh - Derzhavnyi grad Rossii.
- Vujacic, V., 1994, 'The Russian Right: 1989-1993', in: Timko, C.A., ed., *Russia After the Elections: A Workshop Report, February 25, 1994*, Berkeley, CA: The Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, The University of California: 41-54.
- Vujacic, V., 1996, 'Gennadiy Zyuganov and the "Third Road"', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 2: 118-154.
- Vybory v Gosudarstvennuiu dumu, 7 oktiabr' - 14 dekabria 1993: *Informatsionno-analiticheskii biulleten'*, 1993, nos. 1-9, Moskva: Informatsionnoe agentstvo PostFactum.
- Wagner, B., ed., 1994, *Handbuch Rechtsextremismus: Netzwerke, Parteien, Organisationen, Ideologiezentren, Medien*, Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
- Waite, R.G.L., 1993, *The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler*, New York: Da Capo (1st edn, 1977, New York: Basic Books).
- Wehler, H.-U., 1994, 'Die Kontinuität der Unbelehrbarkeit: Ernst Noltes Nationalsozialismus - nur Reaktion auf den Bolschewismus?', in: Lohmann, H.-M., ed., *Extremismus der Mitte: Vom rechten Verständnis deutscher Nation*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch: 135-144.
- Weigle, M.A., 1994, 'Political Participation and Party Formation in Russia, 1985-1992: Institutionalizing Democracy?', *The Russian Review*, vol. 53, April: 240-270.
- White, S., McAllister, I. and Kryshchanovskaya, O., 1994, 'El'tsin and his Voters: Popular Support in the 1991 Russian Presidential Elections and After', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 46, no. 2: 285-303.
- White, S., Rose, R. and McAllister, I., 1997, *How Russia Votes*, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Whitefield, S. and Evans, G., 1994, 'The Russian Elections of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 10, no. 1: 38-60.
- Whitefield, S. and Evans, G., 1996, 'Support for Democracy and Political Opposition in Russia, 1993-1995', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 3: 218-242.
- Wippermann, W., 1983, *Europäischer Faschismus im Vergleich 1922-1982*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Wippermann, W., 1990, 'Faschismustheorien in systematischer Perspektive', in: Grebing, H. and Kinner, K., eds., *Arbeiterbewegung und Faschismus: Faschismusinterpretationen in der europäischen Arbeiterbewegung*, Essen: Klartext: 15-32.
- Wippermann, W., 1991, 'Faschismus/Faschismustheorien', in: Nohlen, D. and Schultze, R.-O., eds., *Pipers Wörterbuch zur Politik I. Politikwissenschaft: Theorien-Methoden-Begriffe*, 4th edn, 1st vol., München/Zürich: Piper: 227-232.
- Wippermann, W., 1996, 'Antislavismus', in: Uwe Puschner et al., eds., *Handbuch zur 'Völkischen Bewegung' 1871-1918*, München/New Providence/London/Paris: Saur: 512-524.
- Wippermann, W., 1997, *Faschismustheorien: Zum Stand der gegenwärtigen Diskussion*, 6th edn, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Wishnevsky, J., 1990, 'Multiparty System, Soviet Style', *Radio Liberty. Report on the USSR*, 23 November: 3-6.
- Wishnevsky, J., 1991, 'Anatolii Luk'yanov: Gorbachev's Conservative Rival?', *Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR*, 7 June: 8-14.
- Wladimir Schirinowskij: russischer Jurist und Politiker; Liberal-Demokratische Partei', 1995, *Munzinger Archiv/ Internationales Biographisches Archiv*, vol. 10, P 020927-1: 1-4.

- Wyman, M., Miller, B., White, S. and Heywood, P., 1995, 'Parties and Voters in the Elections', in: Lentini 1995: 124-142.
- Yanov, A., 1978, *The Russian New Right: Right Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR*, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.
- Yanov, A., 1987, *The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000*, Oxford/New York: Basil Blackwell.
- Yanov, A., 1993, 'Smotrite, kto prishel, ili rossiiskii variant "veimarskoi modeli"', *Izvestiia*, 23 December: 4.
- Yanov, A., 1994, 'Veimarskaia Rossiia. Chast' vtorai: Lideri', *Neva*, no. 4: 215-259.
- Yanov, A., 1995, *Posle El'tsina: 'Veimarskaia' Rossiia*, Moskva: Izdatel'skaia gruppa 'KRUK'.
- Yasman, V. and Teague, E., 1994 'Who is Vladimir Zhirinovskii?', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 1, 7 January: 34-35.
- Yoffe, M., 1994, 'Vladimir Zhirinovskii, The Unholy Fool', *Current History*, vol. 93, no. 585: 324-326.
- Za edimuiu i velikuiu Rossiui: istoriia Rossiiskogo obshchenarodnogo soiuza v dokumentakh 1991-1994*, 1995, Moskva: Novator.
- Zamkovo, V., 1994, *Totalitarizm: Sushchnost' i kontseptsii*, Moskva: Institut mezhdunarodnogo prava i ekonomiki.
- Zapeklii, A., ed., 1995, 'Izbratel'nye ob''edineniia Rossii na vyborakh 1995 g. (Organizatsii, biografii, telefony)', unpublished manuscript, Moskva: Panorama.
- Zhbankov, V., 1991, 'Time to Register: An Interview with V. Zhbankov, Department Chief, USSR Ministry of Justice', in: Babkina, M.A., ed., *New Political Parties and Movements in the Soviet Union*, Commack, NY: Nova Science: 27-31.
- Zhelev, Zh., 1991, *Fashizm: Totalitarnoe gosudarstvo*, Moskva: Novosti (1st edn 1967, 1st publ. 1982).
- Zhilin, A., 1995, 'Vladimir Zhirinovskii: A Scarecrow in Yeltsin's Garden?' (distributed by the Jamestown Foundation in November 1995), Johnson's Russia List Archive, <http://www.cdi.org/mailling/russia/0011.html>.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1990, 'Predlagaem vsem stat' kapitalistami: Ekonomicheskaiia programma Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii', in: Berezovskii, V.N., Krotov, N.I., Chervikov, V.V. and Solovoi, V.D., eds., 1992, *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov v 10-ti knigakh*, Moskva: RAU-Press/Institut massovykh politicheskikh dvizhenii, 3rd vol.: 136-139.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1991, 'Russkomu narodu nechego teriat', *Kentavr* (formerly: *Voprosy istorii KPSS*), no. 3: 34-36 (excerpted in: *Den*, no. 1 [29], 1992: 2).
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1993a, *Poslednii brodok na iug*, ed. by A.V. Mitrofanov, Moskva: TOO 'Pisatel', IK 'Bukvitsa'.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1993b, *O sud'bakh Rossii. Chast' I: Uroki istorii*, Moskva: RAIT.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1993c, 'Krakh chetvertogo internatsionala', *Izvestiia*, no. 163, 28 August: 10.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1993d, *O sud'bakh Rossii. Chast' III: S moei tochki zreniia*, Moskva: RAIT.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1993e, *O sud'bakh Rossii. Chast' II: Posledni brodok na iug*, Moskva: RAIT.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1994a, "'Ia v"edu v Kreml'": Dialog Aleksandra Prokhanova i Vladimira Zhirinovskogo', *Zavtra*, no. 6 (11), February: 1-2.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1994b, 'Ia kak vrach stavliu diagnoz', *Interv'iu*, no. 3 (6): 6-7.

- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1994c, "'Kontrevoliutsiia velikodushnei revoliutsii!'", *Al' Kods*, no. 32 (53), November: 2.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1994d, 'O sobiratel'skoi roli Rossii i molodykh volkakh', *Izvestiia*, no. 77, 23 April: 4.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1995a, *Zhirinovskii otvechaet zhurnalistam*, ed. by A.M. Batogov, Moskva: LDPR.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1995b, *LDPR: Ideologiia i politika*, Moskva: LDPR.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1995c, *Vladimir Zhirinovskii govorit s Rossiei: Kniga I*, ed. by I.S. Kulikova, Moskva: RAIT.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1996a, *Politicheskaia klassika*, Moskva: LDPR.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1996b, *VII s'ezd LDPR*, Moskva: LDPR.
- Zhirinovskii, V.V., 1996c, *Poslednii brosok na iug*, ed. by V.N. Balakhovskii, S.M. Zhebrovskii, A.A. Zhirinovskii, S.K. Zarichanskii, I.S. Kulikova, V.V. Pchelkin and A.V. Churilov, Moskva: LDPR.
- Zhirinovskii, V., 1996, *My Struggle: The Explosive Views of Russia's Most Controversial Political Figure*, New York: Barricade Books.
- Zimin, A.I., 1994, 'Geopolitika - sud'ba Rossii?', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no. 10: 201-207.
- Zimmermann, W., 1996, 'Foreign Policy, Political System Preference, and the Russian Presidential Election of 1996', unpublished paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boston, MA.
- Ziuganov, G., 1993, 'Rossiia nad bezdnoi', *Nash sovremennik*, no. 11: 182-191.
- Ziuganov, G., 1995, 'Rossiia v bor'be tsivilizatsii', *Nash sovremennik*, no. 10: 102-110.
- Zlobin, N.V., 1993, 'The Political Spectrum', in: Dallin, A., ed., *Political Parties in Russia*, Berkeley, CA: The University of California: 63-79.
- Zolina, M.B., 1996, 'Problema totalitarizma v politologii I.A. Il'ina', *Sotsial'no-politicheskii zhurnal*, no. 5: 183-191.
- Zubkov, A.B. and Kolosov, V.A., 1996, 'What Is Russia Seeking?: Value Orientations of Russian Voters, 12 December 1993', *Russian Social Science Review*, vol. 37, no. 1: 3-36.
- Zupko, S.J., 1995, 'Russia Awake!: The Zhirinovskii Phenomenon', unpublished M.A. thesis, Austin: University of Texas.

Further Reading

Primary Sources

- Bibliotekha LDPR: Ekonomika i zhiz'n*, Moscow: N.p., N.d.
- Bibliotekha LDPR: O russkom liberalizme*, Moscow: N.p., N.d.
- Bibliotekha LDPR: Politika i ekonomika*, Moscow: RAIT, N.d.
- Bibliotekha LDPR: V. Zhirinovskii - politicheskii lider*, Moscow: RAIT, N.d.
- Patrik Briuno and Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Besedy na chistotu*, Moscow: RAIT, 1995.
- Ariel Cohen, ed., *Zhirinovskii in His Own Words: Excerpts from The Final Thrust South*, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1994.
- 'Das Programm der Liberal-Demokratischen Partei Rußland', with an introduction by E. Schneider, transl. by B. Bentlin and C. Dittmann, *Osteuropa*, vol. 44, no. 12, 1994, pp. A691-A698.
- Deputat Baltiki*, a newspaper ed. by Viacheslav Marychev and Igor' N. Brumel', St. Petersburg, 1994-
- Ekonomicheskii manifest Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii*, Moscow: LDPR, 1994.
- <http://web.redline.ru/~arctogai/> (World Wide Web page of Limonov's newspaper *Limonka*).
- <http://www.ldpr.ru> (World Wide Web page of the LDPR).
- 'Iastreb', video cassette, West Hartford, CT: Russian Video, 1994 (?).
- Iuridicheskaiia gazeta* (weekly), a newspaper ed. by Oleg A. Fin'ko, Moscow: Soiuz iuristov, 1990-.
- Izbirateli sprashivaiut: Zhirinovskii otvechaet (15 otvetov na 15 voprosov)*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Izvestnyi-neizvestnyi Zhirinovskii i ego partiia posle oktiabria 1994 goda (dokumenty i materialy)*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- K toporu*, no. 5, n.d., a journal ed. by S. Zharikov, Moscow.
- Kubanskii kur'er* (daily), a newspaper ed. by I. Kolomiitsev, Krasnodar: LDPR.
- Irina S. Kulikova and Riurik Mikhailov, *Russkie voennonachal'niki: A.V. Suvorov, M.I. Kutusov and P.S. Nakhimov* (=Bibliotekha LDPR), Moskva: LDPR, 1995.
- Nikolaev, L.P., comp., *Vladimir Zhirinovskii: O sebe i o nem*, Saransk: Izdatel'stvo respublikanskogo obshchestva 'Znanie', N.d.
- LDPR: Bereznikovskii vypusk*, a newspaper ed. by D.V. Shapovalov, Berezniki: LDPR, March 1995-.
- LDPR: Dialog-Don: Izdanie rostovskoi oblastnoi organizatsii LDPR - Partii Zhirinovskogo*, a newspaper ed. by A.A. Kasianov, Rostov-on-the-Don: LDPR, 1995-.
- LDPR: Organ Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii i fraktsii LDPR v Gosudarstvennoi Dume RF* (fortnightly), a newspaper ed. by Oleg A. Fin'ko (1995-96), N.G. Usol'tseva (1995-96), V. Ivanov (1996) and Viktor Filatov (1996), Moscow: LDPR, July 1995-.
- LDPR: Organ Nizhegorodskoi regional'noi organizatsii LDPR*, a newspaper ed. by A.V. Buravin, Nizhnii Novgorod: LDPR, 1995-.
- LDPR: Permskii oblastnoi vypusk*, a newspaper ed. by S.M. Zhebrovskii and N.A. Vlasova, Perm: LDPR, 1995-.
- LDPR v Saratove: Izdanie Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii i Saratovskoi oblastnoi organizatsii LDPR* (fortnightly), a newspaper ed. by V. Iaroslavskii, L. Roganova and M. Chugunov, Saratov: LDPR, November 1995-.

- Liberal: Izdanie Liberal'no-demokraticeskoi partii* (irregularly), a newspaper ed. by A. Khalitov (1990), A.M. Zhemlo (1992) and S.M. Zhebrovskii (1992-1993), Moscow: LDPR, 1990-1993.
- Liberal: Izdanie Balakovskoi organizatsii LDPR* (weekly), a newspaper ed. by I.V. Sharov, Balakovo: TOO 'Nashe delo', 1993-.
- Liberal v Tveri*, a newspaper ed. by N.V. Semenov and V.A. Khazov, Tver': LDPR, Tverskaia regional'naia organizatsiia, August 1993-.
- Liberal'no-demokraticeskaiia partiia Rossii: Dokumenty i materialy*, ed. by A.N. Sagorodnikov, Moscow: LDPR/Politizdat, 1991.
- Liberal'no-demokraticeskaiia partiia Rossii: Materialy V s'ezda Liberal'no-demokraticeskoi partii Rossii 2 apreliia 1994 goda*, Moscow: LDPR, 1994.
- Liberal'no-demokraticeskaiia partiia Rossii: Sbornik No. 1*, VHS video cassette, Moscow: LDPR, N.d.
- Liberal'no-demokraticeskaiia partiia Rossii: Sbornik No. 2*, VHS video cassette, Moscow: LDPR, N.d.
- Liberal'no-demokraticeskaiia partiia Rossii: Sbornik No. 3* (1. Reklamnyi klip; 2. Reklamnyi klip; 3. Press-konferentsiia v Gosdume 17.11.95; 4. Parlamentskaia nedelia 25.11.95; 5. Interv'iu s P. Gorelovym, MTK), VHS video cassette, Moscow: LDPR, N.d.
- Liberal'no-demokraticeskaiia partiia Rossii: Sbornik No. 4* (1. Predvibornoe obrashcheniie V.V. Zhirinovskogo k izbirateliam; 2. Sergiev Posad, teleefir; 3. Reklamnye klipy), VHS video cassette, Moscow: LDPR, N.d.
- Liberal'no-demokraticeskaiia partiia Rossii: Sbornik No. 5* (1. Reklamnyi klip; 2. Predvibornoe vystuplenie V.V. Zhirinovskogo 'Obrashchenie k russkim; 3. Reklamnyi klip; 4. Press-konferentsiia v Gosdume 02.12.95; 5. Parlamentskaia nedelia 25.11.95; 6. Reklamnye klipy), VHS video cassette, Moscow: LDPR, N.d.
- Limonka: Gazeta priamogo deistviia* (fortnightly), a newspaper ed. by Eduard Limonov, Moscow: Natsional-bol'shevistskaia partiia, 1994-.
- Manifest i garantii kandidata na post prezidenta Rossii V.V. Zhirinovskogo*, Moscow: LDPR, N.d.
- Na 7-mi kholkmakh* (irregularly), a newspaper ed. by V.N. Bogaty, Moscow: Moskovskaia regional'naia organizatsiia LDPR, February 1993-.
- Nadezhda Rusi: Izdanie Lipetskoi organizatsii LDPR*, a newspaper ed. by V. Sviridov and N. Il'in, Lipetsk: LDPR.
- Nakamne: Nezavisimaia gazeta*, a newspaper ed. by V.F. Gol'stev, Gubkin-Staryi Oskol-Belgorod: LDPR, September 1992-.
- Nashe mnenie: Pechatnyi organ LDPR Kirovskogo raiona*, a newspaper ed. by M. Karpenko, Novopavlovsk: LDPR, 1990-.
- Nashi istoki: Ezhemesiachnaia gazeta*, a monthly newspaper ed. by N.P. Lapin, Tol'iatti: Gazeta 'Obo vsem', September 1993-.
- Oppozitsiia* (irregularly), a newspaper ed. by V.E. Zhuravl'ev, Moscow: Fond 'Demokratiia i gumanizm', April 1993-.
- Piatnadsat' press-konferentsii Zhirinovskogo*, Moscow/Briansk: Grani, 1995.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo* (fortnightly), a newspaper ed. by A.Kh. Khalitov (1993), and S.M. Zhebrovskii (1993-1995), Moscow: LDPR, 1993-1995.

- Pravda Zhirinovskogo: Armavirskii vypusk* (fortnightly), a newspaper ed. by Viktor Iu. Zhirinovskii, Armavir: LDPR, 1995-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo: Brianskii vypusk*, a newspaper ed. by G.V. Lemeshev, Briansk: LDPR, 1995-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo: Izdanie Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii i Saratovskoi oblastnoi organizatsii LDPR* (fortnightly), a newspaper ed. by V. Iaroslavskii, L. Roganova and M. Chugunov, Saratov: LDPR, June 1995-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo: Liubertskaia vypusk*, a newspaper ed. by V.N. Balakhovskii, Liubertsy: LDPR, 1995-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo: Mtsenskii vypusk* (weekly), a newspaper ed. by S.M. Zhebrovskii and Iu. M. Konovalov, Mtsensk: LDPR, 1994-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo: Nizhegorodskii vypusk* (fortnightly), a newspaper ed. by V.S. Sakharov, Nizhnii Novgorod: LDPR, 1995-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo: Novgorodskii vypusk*, a newspaper ed. by A.S. Butin, Novgorod: LDPR, September 1995-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo: Novosibirskii vypusk*, a newspaper ed. by A.E. Prosenko, V.N. Kolesnikov, A. Epanchitsev and S. Nikitin, Novosibirsk: LDPR, 1994-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo: Omskii vypusk*, a newspaper ed. by S.N. Nabatov and I.I. Sibirtsev, Omsk: LDPR, 1995-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo (Riazanskii vypusk)* (fortnightly), a newspaper ed. by V.F. Gus'kov and V.N. Rakov, Riazan': LDPR, February 1995-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo - Russkii zapad: Spetsial'nyi vypusk dlia Pskovskoi, Novgorodskoi, Kaliningradskoi i Vitebskoi oblastei*, a newspaper ed. by E.E. Mikhailov, E.A. Elfimov and A.N. Khristoforov, Pskov: LDPR, 1995-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo: Saratovskii vypusk* (irregularly), a newspaper by Mikhail Chugunov, Saratov: LDPR, April 1995-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo (Smolenskii vypusk)* (fortnightly), a newspaper ed. by S. Pakhomov, Smolensk: LDPR, 1995-.
- Pravda Zhirinovskogo: Vypusk vologodskoi oblastnoi organizatsii LDPR*, a newspaper ed. by S.M. Zhebrovskii, I.D. Lednev (1994) and S.V. Mormin (1995), Vologda: LDPR, 1994-.
- Press-sluzhba Vladimira Zhirinovskogo upolnomochena zaicavit' i soobshchit' (Chast' I-ia)*, ed. by A.M. Batogov, L.A. Igoshev and V.I. Filatov, Moscow: Areal+AM, 1995.
- Proekt: Programma*, Moscow: LDPR, Kursk: AP 'Kursk', 1995.
- Programma kandidata na post prezidenta Rossii V.V. Zhirinovskogo*, Moscow, 1996.
- Programma LDPR*, Moscow: LDPR, 1996.
- Programma Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii (LDPR)*, ed. by a group of experts, Moscow: LDPR, 1996.
- Raionnye budni LDPR: Obshchestvenno-politicheskaiia gazeta. Rasprostraniaetsia v Irkutskoi oblasti*, a newspaper ed. by V.G. Firsov, Angarsk: LDPR, 1995-.
- Rech': LDP*, a newspaper ed. by E. Asanova, Moscow: LDP [Krivonosov group], October 1990, no. 1-2.
- Riadam z Zhirinovskim*, a newspaper ed. by V.N. Minakov, Moscow: LDPR, 1993-.
- Rossiiskaia akademiia dialekto-sistemnikh issledovani i razrabotok*, ed., *O putiakh vykhoda Rossii iz sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo krizisa (Analiz i kontseptsiia-vykhod est')*, 2 vols., 2nd edn, Moscow: Sistema, 1995.

- Rossiiskoe vrozozhdenie*, a newspaper ed. by V.I. Skurlatov, Moscow: Rossiiskii narodnyi front, 1990-
- Russkoe voskresenie*, a newspaper ed. by A.M. Batogov, Moscow: Russkoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie, 1990-
- Saranskii v 'domosti* (fortnightly), a newspaper ed. by V.N. Zenkov, Saransk: Mordovskoe regional'noe otделение LDP Rossii/NPP 'Direm', 1992-
- Slovo Zhirinovskogo* (irregularly), a newspaper ed. by Iu.P. Kuznetsov, V.D. Anokhin, St. Petersburg: LDPR/ICHL 'Iuliana', November 1992-
- Sokol Beloi Rusi* (weekly), a newspaper ed. by V.P. Podvoiskii, Gomel': Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia Belarusi, September 1994-
- Sokol Zhirinovskogo* (irregularly), a newspaper ed. by A.V. Arkhipov and S.A. Zharikov (1992), A.Kh. Khalitov (1993), V.V. Pchelkin (1993-94), V.L. Zhogov (1994), and A.V. Trukhin (1994-1995), Moscow: LDPR, March 1992-
- Strannaia gazeta* (monthly), a newspaper, Yekaterinburg: LDPR.
- Tsent: Chastnaia obshchestvenno-politicheskaiia gazeta* (biweekly) (since 1992: *Tsent: Mezhdugorodnii obmen zhil'ia* [irregularly]), a newspaper ed. by V. Voronin, Moscow: Tsentristskii blok politicheskikh partii i dvizhenii, April 1992-
- Utro Rodiny* (monthly), a newspaper, Yekaterinburg: LDPR.
- 'Talking with David Frost: Vladimir Zhirinovskii' (produced by David Paradine Television, Inc. and WETA Washington, DC), VHS video cassette, Washington, DC: PBS Video, 1994.
- 'The Struggle for Russia', VHS video cassette, Alexandria, VA: PBS Video, 1994.
- Tribuna Zhirinovskogo: Obshchestvenno politicheskaiia gazeta* (monthly), a newspaper, Belgorod: LDPR, March 1995-
- Tsent: Chastnaia obshchestvenno-politicheskaiia gazeta*, a newspaper ed. by Vladimir Voronin, Moscow, 1992-
- Vestnik Zhirinovskogo*, a newspaper ed. by V.A. Moiseev, Cheboksary: Chuvashskaia organizatsiia LDPR, 1995-
- Vladimir*, a newspaper ed. by O. Kazanskii, Kazan': Povolzhskaia regional'naia organizatsiia LDPR, 1994-
- Vladimir Zhirinovskii govorit s Rossiei*, 1st vol., ed. by I.S. Kulikova, Moscow: RAIT, 1995.
- Vladimir Zhirinovskii govorit s Rossiei*, 2nd vol., Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- V.V. Zhirinovskii i fraktsiia LDPR v Gosudarstvennoi dume: Obzor*, Moscow: LDPR/TOO 'Mikrotekh', 1995.
- Vzgliad na problemu*, 2 issues, Moskva: LDPR, 17 & 20 October 1992.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Ekonomicheskii manifest Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Ekonomicheskaiia programma Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Ekonomicheskie mysli. Politika*, Moscow: LDPR, 1996.
- Vladimir Zhirinovskii, *Ekonomika dolzhna byt' natsional'noi*, Moscow/Briansk: Grani, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Garantii LDPR izbirateliam*, ed. by V.V. Aleksandrov, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *'Ia soizuznik, a ne poputchik'*, Moscow: LDPR, 1996.

- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Ideologicheskie osnovy Liberal'no-demokraticeskoi partii Rossii*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Iuridicheskie konsul'tatsii Zhirinovskogo*, Moscow: Rossiia, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Jih-li-no-fu-ssu-chi tzu chuan: Hsiang nan fang ti tsui hou ch ung chi* [The Last Dash to the South, Chinese], Ti 1 pan., Beijing: Chung yang pien i ch u pan she, 1994.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Kakim byt' gosudarstvu rossiiskomu*, Moscow: LDPR/Areal+AM, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Khvatit grabit' Rosiiu: pogranichnaia politika i natsional'nye interesy Rossii*, ed. by V.V. Aleksandrov, V.A. Kurochkin, A.M. Telegin and V.I. Filatov, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Last Thrust to the South*, Moscow, 1993.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *LDPR i voennaia politika Rossii*, ed. by V.A. Kurochkin, O.N. Lepikhina and I.P. Novoselov, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *LDPR: Ideologiya i politika*, Moscow: LDPR/Areal-AM, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *LDPR vpolniaet svoi obeshchaniia!*, ed. by V.I. Filatov, V.V. Aleksandrov, A.M. Batogov and L.A. Igoshev, Moscow: LDPR, 1996.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Liberal'no-demokraticeskaya partiia Rossii i natsional'naya ekonomika*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Manifest Liberal'no-demokraticeskoi partii Rossii*, ed. by V.I. Filatov, A.A. Zhirinovskii and I.P. Novoselov, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Metodika partiinoi raboty*, ed. by V.I. Filatov, V.V. Aleksandrov, A.M. Batogov, A.A. Zhirinovskii and L.A. Igoshev, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Moi garantii izbirateliu*, ed. by V.V. Aleksandrov, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Nam muzhny gubernii odnogo rossiiskogo gosudarstva*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *O-lo-ssu ti ming yun* [On Russia's Destiny, Chinese], Ti 1 pan., Beijing: Hsin hua ch u pan she, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *O sud'bakh Rosii. Chast I: Uroki istorii*, Moscow: RAIT, 1993.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *O sud'bakh Rosii. Chast II: Poslednii brosok na iug*, Moscow: RAIT, 1993.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *O sud'bakh Rosii. Chast III: S moei tochki zreniia*, Moscow: RAIT, 1993.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Piat' urokov amerikanskim professoram po ovladeniiu planirovaniia*, ed. by V.V. Aleksandrov, V.A. Kurochkin, A.M. Telegin and V.I. Filatov, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Plevok na zapad*, ed. by V.I. Filatov, V.V. Aleksandrov, A.M. Batogov, A.A. Zhirinovskii, L.A. Igoshev and I.P. Novoselov, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Politicheskii doklad na VII s'ezde LDPR*, ed. V.I. Filatov, V.A. Kurochkin, A.M. Telegin, A.M. Batogov and L.A. Igoshev, Moscow: LDPR, 1996.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Politicheskii landshaft Rossii*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Posledniia bitva Rossii*, Moscow: ANKO, 1996.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Posledniia bitva Rossii: Kniga vtorai*, Moscow: ANKO, 1996.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Poslednii brosok na iug*, Moscow: LDP, 1993.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Poslednii brosok na iug*, Moscow: Foliant, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Poslednii udar po Rossii*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Poslednii vagon na sever*, ed. by Aleksei Churilov, Moscow: Svetoton Ltd, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Poslednii vagon na sever*, Moscow: Foliant, 1995.

- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Poslednii vagon na sever*, Moscow: Conjou Ltd., 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Prestupniki dolzhny sidet' v tjur'me*, ed. by V.I. Filatov, A.A. Zhirinovskii, V.A. Kurochkin, O.I. Lepikhina and I.P. Novoselov, Moscow: LDPR/Areal+AM, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Programmnyi manifest Liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii*, ed. by V.I. Filatov, V.V. Aleksandrov, A.A. Zhirinovskii and I.P. Novoselov, Moscow: LDPR.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *S tankami i pushkami ili bez tankov i pushek*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Shchit i mekh dlia Rossii*, ed. by V.V. Kurochkin, A.M. Telegin and V.I. Filatov, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *VII S'ezd LDPR*, Moscow: LDPR, 1996.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *100 voprosov i otvetov*, Moscow: LDPR, 1996.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii, *Zhirinovskii otvechaet zhurnalistam*, ed. by A.M. Batogov, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii and A.G. Vinogradov, *Rossia i reformy*, with an introduction of Oleg Fin'ko, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii and Viktor V. Vishniakov, *Nasha tsel' - edinoe rossiiskoe gosudarstvo*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii and Vladimir A. Lisichkin, *Narodnaia sobstvennost' - eto narodnaia vlast': Chast' I. Vozrozhdenie russkogo liberalizma. Chast' II. Rossia bogata zarubezhnoi sobstvennost'iu*, Moscow: N.p., 1995.
- Vladimir Zhirinovskii and Vladimir A. Lisichkin, *Narodnaia sobstvennost' - eto narodnaia vlast': Chast' III. Pravoslavie spasët Rossiiu*, Moscow: N.p., 1995.
- Vladimir Zhirinovskii and Vladimir A. Lisichkin, *Narodnaia sobstvennost' - eto narodnaia vlast': Chast' V. Prestupnaia privatizatsiia*, Moscow: N.p., 1995.
- Vladimir Zhirinovskii and Vladimir A. Lisichkin, *Narodnaia sobstvennost' - eto narodnaia vlast': Chast' VI. Rossia: dumaia o budushchem*, Moscow: N.p., 1995.
- Zhirinovskii i fraktsiia LDPR v Gosudarstvennoi дума (1994-1995)*, Moscow: LDPR, 1995.
- Vladimir Zhirinovskii, *My Struggle: The Explosive Views of Russia's Most Controversial Political Figure*, New York: Barricade Books, 1996.

Commented Secondary Literature

Bar'er: Antifashistskii zhurnal [Barrier: The Anti-Fascist Journal], a journal ed. by I. Levinskaia, irregularly, St. Petersburg: Biblioteka 'Zvezda', October 1992-, 20 pp. No bibliography. No index. One of the few significant initiatives of its kind by Russian human-rights activists supported by Western and Russian sponsors. Valuable documentation of right-wing extremist activities, and useful expertises by international and Russian legal and political experts. An important source for reference.

Peter Conradi, *Schirinowski und der neue russische Nationalismus* [Zhirinovskii and the New Russian Nationalism], transl. by Peter Klumbach, Dusseldorf: ECON Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995. 172 pp. No bibliography. With index. A well-investigated and dense journalistic text based mainly on interviews with Russian supporters and adversaries of Zhirinovskii. Some pertinent new details on Zhirinovskii's rise. Very useful as both a general introduction and supplemental reading.

Wolfgang Eichwede, ed., *Der Schirinowski-Effekt: Wohin treibt Rußland?* [The Zhirinovskii-Effect: Where is Russia Moving?], Reinbeck-bei-Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994. 221 pp. Some articles with bibliographies. No index. A snap-shot collection of essays by German and Russian authors published eight months after Zhirinovskii's victory in the December 1993 elections. Short contributions on the course of the Russian reforms (W. Eichwede), the imperialist tradition in Russian history and thought (W. Geyer), ideological features of Russian nationalism (K. Hielscher), the language of Russian nationalism (G. Gussejnow), Zhirinovskii's biography (A. Maximow and M. Odesskij), the rise of the LDP (G. Luchterhandt), Zhirinovskii's electorate (A. Lewinson and W. Schokarew), the political potential of post-Soviet Russian nationalism and its stereotypes (L. Gudkow), Russian nationalism and foreign policy (H. Vogel), similarities between the German and Russian Right (G. Koenen), and the LDP-DVU alliance (B. Schröder). Useful as an introductory overview on different aspects of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon', especially with regard to its historic context. Valuable summaries by Eichwede, Koenen, Vogel and Hielscher. Some interesting details in Luchterhandt's analysis of the LDP.

Fashizm i fashistskie organizatsii v stranakh byvshego SSSR: Daidzhest SMI Rossii i drugikh stran byvshego SSSR [Fascism and Fascist Organisations in the Countries of the Former USSR: Digest of the Mass Media of Russia and the other Countries of the Former USSR], a fortnightly bulletin, Moscow: Agentsvo WPS, June 1995-. 10-35 pp. Sources given in headlines. No index. Compilation of copies of articles on fascism published in CIS (mainly Russian) newspapers and journals. A very useful collection of primary sources on interpretations of generic and Russian fascism and right-wing extremism in Russia and the Newly Independent States.

Monica H. Forbes and Willibald Fink, comps., *Schirinowskij: Politiker-Populist-Nationalist? Berichte und Kommentare der deutschen und internationale Publizistik*, Wissenschaftliche Dokumentationsreihe der Hans-Seidel-Stiftung, vol. 6, Munich: Hans-Seidel-Stiftung e.V.,

1994. 181 pp. With bibliography. No index. A reprint of approximately 130 German and English journalistic and academic reports, commentaries, and analyses. Useful for reference, especially for comparisons of different Western interpretations of the 'Zhirinovskii Phenomenon'.

Graham Frazer and George Lancelle, *Zhirinovskiy. The Little Black Book: Making Sense of the Senseless*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1994 (North American edition: *Absolute Zhirinovskiy: A Transparent View of the Distinguished Russian Statesman*, New York: Penguin Books, 1994). 173 pp. References in footnotes, or in parentheses. No index. Well-commented compilation of Zhirinovskii's statements on the 'near abroad', Russian national security, Russian-Serbian relationships, the West, Russian domestic issues, and himself. Valuable on Zhirinovskii's ideology, and for reference.

Gerhard Hirscher and Klaus Lange, *Schirinowskij und die LDPR - Gefahren für die deutsche und internationale Politik* [Zhirinovskii and the LDP - Threats for German and International Politics], Forschungsbericht der Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, Munich: Hans-Seidel-Stiftung e.V., 1994. 106 pp. References in footnotes, or in parentheses. No index. Short essays on Zhirinovskii's rise and political program, foreign policy concepts, and his relations to German right-wing extremists supplemented by a chronology and a collection of selected quotations. Useful on the LDP-DVU alliance.

Aleksandr Ianov, *Posle El'tsina: 'Veimarskaia' Rossiia* [After El'tsin: 'Weimar' Russia], with an introduction by Irina Khakamada, Moscow: KRUK, 1995 (chapters were previously published in the St. Petersburg 'thick journal' *Neva*, nos. 3, 4, and 5-6, 1994, pp. 211-262, 215-258, and 256-311). 320 pp. References in endnotes. No index. A major interpretation of contemporary Russian revanchism and its relation to Western policies towards post-Soviet Russia by one of the most prolific commentators on Russia's democratization. Chapters on Russia and the West, right-wing extremist leaders (Zhirinovskii, Prokhanov, Sterligov, Ziuganov), ideologists (Shafarevich, L. Gumilëv, Kurginian, Dugin) and activities, supplemented by policy advice for Russian democrats and Western governments. In spite of a few rather sweeping generalizations, an essential text on the historic, international and domestic context of Zhirinovskii's rise.

Leonid J. Ivanov, *Rußland nach Gorbatschow: Wurzeln, Hintergründe, Trends der sich formierenden Gruppierungen - Perspektiven für die Zukunft* [Russia After Gorbachëv: The Roots, Background and Trends of the Evolving Groupings - Prospects for the Future], Passau: Wissenschaftsverlag Richard Rothe, 1996. 448 pp. With index, bibliography and photographs. One of the first comprehensive overviews of the post-Soviet spectrum of nationalist and ultranationalist parties and intellectual groupings as a whole. In spite of a confusing typologization of the spectrum according to colours and some misleading explanatory hypotheses (e.g. on the emergence of Russian neo-fascism because of 'hysteria' of democratic journalists), best introductory reading on contemporary Russian right-wing extremism available in a Western language today.

- Vladimir Ivanov, *Naslazhdenie gibli. Politika v Rossii: ot nauki do psikhopatii* [The Delight of Perishing. Politics in Russia: From Science to Psychopathy], Moscow: Akim, 1996. 319 pp. No bibliography. No index. A revealing insider report on the LDPR by one of Zhirinovskii's most effective regional functionaries, and articulate assistants between 1991 and 1995. Contains (besides outlines of a proto-fascist political agenda, and esoteric speculations about World War III, UFOs, 'bio-fields', etc.) valuable insights into the rise of the LDP especially in the Krasnoiarsk district, and the activities of the LDPR State Duma faction 1993-5. Some good analyses of Zhirinovskii's psychopathology. Allegations about Zhirinovskii's ties to the criminal world. Interesting supplemental reading.
- Vladimir P. Kartsev with Todd Bludeau, *Zhirinovskiy!*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 198 pp. With bibliography and index. An insider interpretation of the 'Zhirinovskii phenonemon' by a former colleague of Zhirinovskii in the *Mir* Publishing House. Fascinating details on Zhirinovskii's activities between 1983 and 1989. In spite of a number of controversial conclusions, important supplemental reading.
- Jacob Kipp, *Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy and the Liberal-Democratic Party: Statism, Nationalism and Imperialism*, January, E 64, Camberley, Surrey: Foreign Military Studies Office, Conflict Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 1994. 18 pp. References in endnotes. No index. Concise summary and partly one-sided interpretation of the LDP ideology.
- Irina S. Kulikova, *Fenomen Zhirinovskogo* [The Zhirinovskii-Phenomenon], 2nd edn, Moscow: Izdatel'sko-informatsionnoe agentstvo RAIT, 1994. 95 pp. No bibliography. Some references in parantheses. No index. An updated comprehensive apology of Zhirinovskii by one of his most articulate advisers who is a Professor of Aesthetics. Revealing on Zhirinovskii's appeal to educated Russians.
- Eduard Limonov, *Limonov protiv Zhirinovskogo* [Limonov against Zhirinovskii], Moscow: Konets veka, 1994. 192 pp. No bibliography. No index. An important anti-Zhirinovskii polemic by a major contemporary Russian novelist and neo-fascist ideologist who, in 1992, for some time closely cooperated with Zhirinovskii. Many interesting details on the LDP's shadow cabinet, and internal affairs. Though sometimes tedious, important supplemental reading.
- James W. Morrison, *Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assesment of Russian Ultra-Nationalist*, McNair Paper 30, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 1994. 144 pp. With references. No index. The first longer interpretation of Zhirinovskii in the context of post-Soviet Russian nationalism published four months after his electoral victory in December 1993. Timely, clear and correct policy advice for Western states supplemented by a collection of selected statements by Zhirinovskii on domestic and international affairs.
- Sergei N. Plekhanov, *Zhirinovskii: Kto on?*, Moscow: Evraziia-Nord/BIMPA, 1994. 215 pp. No bibliography. No index. An important affirmative account of a Russian right-wing author who had direct access to Zhirinovskii and to insider information on the LDP. Some interesting

details on, for instance, Zhirinovskii's contacts with the military-industrial complex. Partly bizarre arguments. Many rare photographs.

Politicheskii ekstremizm v Rossii: Informatsionno-analiticheskii biulleten' [Political Extremism in Russia: Informational-Analytical Bulletin], fortnightly, Moscow: Fond 'Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo', May 1995-. 30 pp. References in parentheses. With index. A comprehensive collection of summaries of essential articles in the Russian right-wing and democratic press. The abstracts are arranged thematically in sections on political and organisational activities, ideology and propaganda, and reactions to extremist tendencies by the Russian state and society (including legal conflicts and anti-fascist activities). The most important, exhaustive and useful publication series on contemporary Russian right-wing extremism (which, as the Panorama manuscript of the same name, for some reason also follows the activities of the prominent former dissident and radical liberal Valeriia Novodvorskaia and her Democratic Union). Principal reading.

Vladimir Pribylovskii, ed., *Russkie natsionalisticheskie i pravo-radikal'ny organizatsii, 1989-1995: Dokumenty i teksty* [Russian Nationalist and Right-Radical Organizations, 1989-1995: Documents and Texts], 2 vols., Moscow: Informatsionno-ekspertnaia gruppa 'Panorama' 1995. 575 pp. No index. No bibliography. 202 documents - programmes, manifestos and statutes, and announcements, resolutions, articles and interviews of leaders - of 37 parties and groupings. Most comprehensive and useful collection of primary sources published so far.

Vladimir Pribylovskii, *Vozhdi: Sbornik biografii rossiiskikh politicheskikh deiatelei natsionalisticheskoi i impersko-patrioticheskoi orientatsii* [Leaders: A Collection of Biographies of Political Activists of a Nationalist and Imperial-Patriotic Orientation], Moscow: Informatsionno-ekspertnaia gruppa 'Panorama' 1995. 97 pp. No index. No bibliography. Detailed descriptions of the background, profile and major activities of 72 leaders of, mostly marginal radical, nationalist parties and grouplets. Excellent data source. Especially valuable on relations and alliances between the groupings.

Wolf Oschlies, *Wladimir Schirinowski: Der häßliche Russe und das postkommunistische Osteuropa* [Vladimir Zhirinovskii: The Ugly Russian and the Post-Communist Eastern Europe], Cologne/Weimar/Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1995 (an earlier version was published as "'Panslawe'" Zirinovskij: Osteuropa und der russische Extremistenführer' in: *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, nos. 51 and 53, 1994). 171 pp. References in endnotes. No index. A comprehensive summary of Zhirinovskii's plans, connections and activities with regard to Eastern Europe (including former Yugoslavia) supplemented by a short introduction on Zhirinovskii's biography, ideology and financial sources. Unique review of a wide range East European press reports. Important supplemental reading.

Radical Opposition Leaders, a fortnightly bulletin, Moscow: Agenstvo WPS (What the Papers Say), May 1994 - Januar 1996. 10-25 pp. Extensive source descriptions given in the headings. No index. English translations of major articles (especially by right-wing politicians) selected from

over 100 Russian periodicals, as well as some TV and radio programmes. Very useful for the Russian specialist. Essential for the non-Russian-speaking student. Unfortunately, the publication was discontinued in early 1996.

Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, *Zhirinovskii: The Paradoxes of Russian Fascism*, transl. by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Viking, 1995 (North American edition: *Zhirinovskii: Russian Fascism and the Making of a Dictator*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995). 256 pp. With bibliography and index. Apart from Conradi's book, the most comprehensive overview on Zhirinovskii's rise introduced here. Contrary to its title weak (and even misleading) on fascism. Some disputable interpretations, and distinctly odd policy advice - the inclusion of Zhirinovskii into the Russian government! Notwithstanding, apart from Conradi's book, the best introduction for 'Zhirinovskii-beginners' published so far.

Viktor Timtschenko, *Ich erwecke Rußland mit Blut - Vladimir Wolfowitsch Shirinowski* [I'll Awake Russia with Blood - Vladimir Vol'fovich Zhirinovskii], Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1994. 209 pp. No bibliography. No index. Impressionistic account by a journalist who did far going on-the-spot investigations in Russia. Some relevant new details and rare photographs. In spite of a number of misleading generalizations and its inaccurate title, good supplemental reading.

Aleksandr Verkhovskii and Vladimir Pribylovskii, *Natsional-patrioticheskie organizatsii v Rossii: Istoriia, ideologiia, ekstremistskie tendentsii* [National-Patriotic Organizations in Russia: History, Ideology, and Extremist Tendencies]. With a foreword by Evgenii Proshechkin, Chairman of the Moscow Anti-Fascist Center, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 'Institut eksperimental'noi sotsiologii', Informatsionno-ekspertnaia gruppа 'Panorama' 1996. With index. With short references and endnotes. Detailed descriptions of 26 (mostly marginal) organizations and 4 publication organs with an explicitly nationalist, mostly manifestly or crypto-fascist orientation supplemented by 50 important programmatic documents. Short introductory essay on the history of post-War Russian dissident and semi-legal ultranationalism. Very useful, accurate and informative data source.

Aleksandr Verkhovskii, Anatolii Papp and Vladimir Pribylovskii, eds., *Politicheskii ekstremizm v Rossii* [Political Extremism in Russia], Moscow: Informatsionno-ekspertnaia gruppа 'Panorama', 1996. 334 pp. With index. With references and endnotes. Short descriptions of 47 organizations and their publications, eight independent publication organs, and 65 political leaders and publicists. In addition, valuable introductory essays on the specific preconditions for the emergence of Russian 'political extremism', legal aspects of a containment of 'political extremism' (co-edited by Iurii Shmidt), the formation of the spectrum of organized 'extremism' (co-edited by Tat'iana Shavshukova and Aleksandr Tarasov), a comparison of the different 'extremist' groupings, the 'New Opposition' trend in the Russian Right (i.e. some marginal Euro-fascist inspired 'national Bolshevik' grouplets and theorists), 'leftish [levatskii] extremism' (i.e. anarchism), and the future prospects of Russian ultranationalism. Although it uses a confusing classificatory taxonomic scheme, this manuscript is, together with the other three collections of the Moscow Panorama Expert Group introduced here, the most detailed, factually rich, comprehensive and reliable source on most ultranationalist groupings. Notable

and unfortunate exceptions are Gennadii Ziuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and some important ultra-right Moscow think-tanks which are not analyzed in any Panorama publication (e.g. Nikolai Troitskii's Association for the Complex Study of the Russian Nation; Aleksei Podberëzkin's Spiritual Heritage Foundation; and Sergei Kurginian's Experimental-Creative Center).

Note: The following articles are useful guides to further - above all older - readings on Russian radical nationalism: 'Bibliographical Note' in: Walter Laqueur, *Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia*, New York: HarperCollins, 1993, pp. 297-306; Valerii D. Solovei, 'Russkoe natsional'noe dvizhenie 60-80-kh godov XX veka v osveshchenii zarubezhnoi istoriografii', *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, no. 2, 1993, pp. 107-112; David G. Rowley, 'Russian Nationalism and the Cold War', *The American Historical Review*, vol. 99, no. 1, February 1994, pp. 155-171; and Andreas Umland, 'The Post-Soviet Russian Extreme Right', *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 44, no. 4, July/August 1997, pp. 53-61.

Andreas Umland

Kurze Zusammenfassung der Arbeit
*Vladimir Zhirinovskii in Russian Politics:
Three Approaches to the Emergence of the
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, 1990-93*
in deutscher Sprache

Die Arbeit stellt einen Versuch dar, einige relevante Aspekte des Aufstiegs der sogenannten Liberal-Demokratischen Partei Rußlands von Wladimir Shirinowskij (geb. 1946) eingehender zu beleuchten und damit sowohl einen Beitrag zur empirischen Aufarbeitung des 'Shirinowskij-Phänomens' zu leisten als auch einen ersten Schritt zu dessen Konzeptionalisierung zu tun. Dabei wird in den Teilen 1 und 2 auf Shirinowskij's Biographie, die Umstände seines Eintritts zunächst in die Moskauer politische Szene und später in die Landespolitik, den Aufbau seiner Partei von ihrer Gründung bis zu ihrem Wahlsieg 1993, ihre Registrierung, zahlenmäßige Stärke, Spaltungen, Allianzen und Auslandsbeziehungen, Shirinowskij's Nominierung als Präsidentschaftskandidat 1991, seine Finanzierungsquellen, seine wichtigsten Assistenten sowie auf die zwei bedeutendsten Denkfiguren, 'Zentrismus' und Imperialismus, in seiner Rhetorik und in den programmatischen Dokumenten der LDPR eingegangen. Im Gegensatz zu den biographischen Teilen 1 und 2, stellt Teil 3 eine systematische, theoretisch begründete Interpretation dar und behandelt das wichtigste Publikationsorgan der LDP zwischen 1990 und 1993, die Zeitung *Liberal*, unter Verwendung eines neueren Faschismuskonzepts. Teil 4 faßt in einem ersten Schritt die Ergebnisse der drei empirischen Teile (1-3) zusammen und vergleicht die unterschiedlichen Resultate miteinander. In einem zweiten Schritt wird versucht, die teils einander widersprechenden Ergebnisse durch Kontextualisierung und internationalen Vergleich miteinander in Einklang zu bringen. Als Anhang sind eine ausführliche Chronologie von Shirinowskij's Biographie und der Entwicklung seiner Partei bis Dezember 1993 sowie ein kurzes Interview mit ihm von August 1993 beigefügt. Die Bibliographie enthält neben einer Aufzählung der zitierten Schriften eine Liste weiterführender Primärliteratur und eine ausformulierte Einführung zu weiterführenden Sekundärschriften.

In der **Einleitung** wird aufgeschlüsselt, welches die Gründe für die Erstellung der Arbeit waren, welche Annahmen über den Charakter moderner Sozialwissenschaften ihr zugrunde liegen und welche spezifischen Fragen die Arbeit einerseits zu beantworten und andererseits zu vermeiden sucht. Es wird zunächst kurz dargelegt, aus welchen Gründen eine intensive, tiefergehende Beschäftigung mit dem Shirinowskij-Phänomen geboten zu sein scheint und darauf verwiesen, daß nicht nur die näher zu behandelnden Eigenschaften Shirinowskij und seiner Partei sondern auch das politische und soziale Umfeld, in dem die LDPR agiert, Anlaß zu der Annahme geben, daß Kenntnisse über die LDPR für ein Verständnis der heutigen sowie künftigen soziopolitischen Entwicklung Rußlands als notwendig erachtet werden müssen. In einem zweiten Schritt wird die Strukturierung der Arbeit eingeführt. In diesem Zusammenhang wird dargelegt, warum in der Arbeit bewußt das Elektorat Shirinowskij ausgeklammert ist. Es wird die These vertreten, daß einerseits die *sinnvolle und aussagekräftige* Auseinandersetzung mit dem Verhalten von Shirinowskij Wählern eine Aufgabe für eine gesonderte Dissertation darstellen würde und daß andererseits bereits vorgelegte Artikel zu den LDPR-Wählern nur wenig Auskunft darüber geben, für was oder mit welcher Intention diese Wähler gestimmt haben mögen, als sie sich für die LDPR - und nicht eine der vielen anderen anti-demokratische Parteien Rußlands - entschieden. Eine eingehendere Beschäftigung mit den Spezifika Shirinowskij und seiner Partei selbst, so bisher nicht geleistet, scheint daher angebracht.

Weiterhin verteidigt die Einführung den idiographisch-induktiven Ansatz in den Sozialwissenschaften als eine notwendige Ergänzung zu formal-deduktiven und systematisch-vergleichenden Ansätzen. Recherchierende, investigative und interpretierende regionalwissenschaftliche Untersuchungen stellen eine notwendige Vorstufe explizit methodengeleiteter, systematischer und formalisierter Hypothesentestung, Kodierung, Begriffsbildung und Komparatistik dar. Erst detaillierte Beschreibung und hermeneutische Auslegung liefern das faktologische und diskursive Umfeld, in welchem der sinnvolle Streit verschiedener Hypothesen und Konzepte möglich wird. Die Qualität der Erkenntnisse über ein Untersuchungsobjekt hängt somit in gleichem Maß von dessen idiographischer wie auch nomothetischer Erfassung ab.

In einem letzten Schritt wird erläutert, weshalb der empirische Part der Arbeit in drei, relative stark voneinander getrennte Teile untergliedert ist. Teil 1 (Kapitel 1-3) geht davon

aus, daß lediglich das Verhalten von politischen Akteuren und weniger deren Verlautbarungen Auskunft über die Intentionen, Motive und Ideologien dieser Akteure geben. Somit konzentriert sich Teil 1 auf die Aktionen und Handlungen von Shirinowskij und der LDPR von 1990 bis 1993 und ignoriert deren Rechtfertigung und Präsentation in den LDPR-Medien. Teil 2 (Kapitel 4) geht im Gegensatz dazu davon aus, daß politische Verlautbarungen und Programme bzw. Ideologien politische Bewegungen und Parteien definieren und deren Aktionen motivieren sowie entsprechende Institutionen strukturieren. Teil 2 behandelt deswegen LDPR-Dokumente und Shirinowskij's Aussagen ausführlich. Teil 3 geht einen Schritt weiter und beruht auf der Annahme, daß nur eine systematisch-vergleichende Betrachtung und generische Klassifizierung politischer Programme mittels Oberkategorien von politischen Ideologien tatsächlich Auskunft über die Natur der aus diesen Programmen erwachsenden Handlungsanleitungen geben kann. Teil 3 behandelt deswegen einen bestimmten Teil von Shirinowskij's Publikationen und mündlichen Aussagen unter einem solchen Gesichtspunkt.

Ziel dieser getrennten Betrachtung des Shirinowskij-Phänomens unter behaviouralistischen (Teil 1), hermeneutischen (Teil 2) und komparatistischen (Teil 3) Gesichtspunkten ist es, die jeweils unterschiedlichen Forschungsergebnisse einander gegenüberzustellen zu können, und so die Möglichkeit zu haben, die jeweiligen Schlußfolgerungen auf ihre Kongruenz, Korrelation bzw. Widersprüchlichkeit hin zu überprüfen. Dem liegt die Annahme zugrunde, daß eine methodisch und forschungslogisch vielfältige Behandlung ein und desselben Phänomens und der Vergleich der auf unterschiedliche Weise gewonnenen Ergebnisse bessere Auskunft über die Natur dieses Phänomens gibt, als eine methodisch und forschungslogisch monistische Herangehensweise.

Kapitel 1 von Teil 1 ('Zur Analyse des Verhaltens') behandelt die Hintergründe und Umstände von Shirinowskij's Wechsel von einer beruflichen zu einer politischen Karriere. Der erste Abschnitt stellt unter dem Gesichtspunkt seines späteren politischen Erfolgs eine Beziehung zwischen einigen Besonderheiten in Shirinowskij's Biographie und dem politischen und sozialen Kontext seines Eintritts in die Politik dar (und nimmt dabei teilweise bezug auf Harold Lasswells Ansatz zur Behandlung politischer Biographien). Es behandelt Shirinowskij (a) als einen in der Kindheit vernachlässigten und in seinem Privatleben gescheiterten

Menschen, der nach Substitution in der Politik sucht, (b) als einen (im Gegensatz zu vielen seiner Moskauer Konkurrenten mit akademischem oder Parteihintergrund) mit den Widrigkeiten des Sowjetsystems wohlvertrauten Politiker, und (c) als einen Populisten dessen Betonung seiner (vorgeblich) besonderen Energie und Entschlußkraft mit einer wichtigen Komponente der russischen politischen Tradition korreliert. Ein weiterer Abschnitt behandelt Shirinowskijs zunächst erfolglose Versuche, in der zweiten Hälfte der Achtziger in der Moskauer politischen Szene Fuß zu fassen. In diesem Zusammenhang wird sein teilweise jüdischer Familienhintergrund kurz dargelegt und den Verdächtigungen, er sei mit KGB ^{dein} liiert, nachgegangen. Der letzte Abschnitt des ersten Kapitels legt detailliert die genaue Abfolge und Begleitumstände von Shirinowskijs ersten politischen Aktivitäten von der Gründung seiner Partei im März 1990 bis zur Bekanntmachung seiner Präsidentschaftskandidatur im April 1991 dar. Besonderer Schwerpunkt ist dabei die Aufschlüsselung und Kontextualisierung der Marionettenrolle, die Shirinowskijs und seine Partei damals für das niedergehende Establishment des sowjetischen *Ancien Regimes* spielten.

Kapitel 2 in Teil 1 behandelt den Eintritt Shirinowskijs in die Politik auf Landesebene, das heißt vor allem seine Präsidentschaftskandidatur im April-Juni 1991. Ein intensiveres Eingehen auf die zu erfüllenden Voraussetzungen und genauen Umstände des Erscheinens seines Namens auf den Wahlzetteln der ersten Mehrparteienwahlen in der Russischen Föderation scheint deswegen gerechtfertigt, als Shirinowskijs Teilnahme und überraschender Erfolg bei diesen Wahlen (ca. 7%) seine Etablierung in der Landespolitik sowie einen wichtigen Bestimmungsfaktor für spätere Erfolge darstellte. Ebenfalls in diesem Kapitel werden die nachgewiesenen sowie weiteren als wahrscheinlich erachteten Finanzierungsquellen Shirinowskijs im Inland im Detail dargestellt sowie einige Hypothesen über die Motivation von Shirinowskijs Sponsoren aufgestellt.

Kapitel 3 in Teil 1 beschäftigt sich mit dem Aufbau der LDPR von 1990 bis 1993. Abschnitt 1 zitiert ein Vielzahl von Angaben, die von der LDPR-Führung und außenstehenden Beobachtern zu Mitgliederzahlen der LDPR gemacht wurden, und stellt darauf basierend Hypothesen über die tatsächliche Mitgliederentwicklung im genannten Zeitraum vor. Abschnitt 2 behandelt kurz die Spaltungsprozesse in der LDPR - Vorgänge die

jedoch im Zeitraum 1990-91 für viele russische Parteien charakteristisch waren. Abschnitt 3 behandelt gesondert die fünf wichtigsten politischen Allianzen, die Shirinowskij im genannten Zeitraum einging, und führt ausführlich die zeitweiligen Partner der LDPR ein - den Moskauer Neonazi Wiktor Jakuschew, Alexander Newsorows St. Petersburger *Nashi* (Die Unsrigen) Bewegung, den berühmt-berüchtigten neofaschistischen Schriftsteller Eduard Limonow, den ebenfalls berühmt-berüchtigten TV-Psychiater Alexander Kaschpirowskij und den ehemaligen Vorsitzenden des Obersten Ökonomischen Rates des Obersten Sowjets und Premierministerkandidaten Michail Botscharow. In den Schlußfolgerungen werden mehrere Hypothesen für die Gründe von Shirinowskij's relativ starker Isolation im russischen politischen Parteienspektrum diskutiert. Als mögliche Bestimmungsfaktoren für dieses bis zum Dezember 1993 im russischen Kontext ungewöhnliche Phänomen werden sowohl die Abneigung potentieller rechtsextremer Partner gegenüber der LDPR als auch Shirinowskij's politische Präferenzen und Strategie angeführt und bewertet. Abschnitt 4 behandelt kurz die relativ gut entwickelten Auslandsbeziehungen der LDPR vor allem zum Irak sowie zu Partnern in Deutschland und Österreich. Besonderer Augenmerk liegt bei dieser Quellenanalyse wiederum auf möglichen Finanzquellen der LDPR. Abschnitt 5 stellt die ursprüngliche Führungsriege der LDPR von 1990 bis 1992 vor und legt die Umstände des Wegganges der meisten der anfänglichen Assistenten Shirinowskij's dar. Abschnitt 6 analysiert die zahlenmäßige Zusammensetzung und Charakteristika der LDPR Führung 1993 und geht im Detail auf die Biographien und Aktivitäten der fünf wichtigsten Figuren um den LDPR-Führer zum Zeitpunkt der Staatsdumawahlen vom Dezember 1993 ein. Abschließend werden darauf aufbauend einige Hypothesen über den Charakter der LDPR als eine Führer- und pragmatische quasi-Volkspartei entwickelt.

Kapitel 4 bzw. Teil 2 ('Zur Interpretation der Programmatik') beschäftigt sich mit Shirinowskij's Ideologie oder genauer mit den zwei hier als am wichtigsten eingeschätzten Ideologemen in den LDPR-Dokumenten. Abschnitt 1 behandelt Shirinowskij's jahrelange Selbstdarstellung als ein in dieser oder jener Hinsicht 'zentristischer' Politiker - eine Strategie die in einer 1996er Bevölkerungsumfrage mit bemerkenswerter Klarheit als erfolgreich bestätigt wurde. Shirinowskij wurde weit mehr als jeder andere russische Politiker als 'Zentrist' eingestuft. Unter den 'zentristischen' Aspekten seiner Agenda waren: seine

anfänglich tatsächlich liberale Rhetorik, die ihn in die Nähe des westeuropäischen Zentrismus rückte; seine spätere Betonung auf Moderation gegenüber dem alten Establishment; seine Anlehnung an den russischen politischen Philosophen Iwan Iljin (1883-1954), der einen neuen Weg zwischen Rückwendung zur Vergangenheit und Verwestlichung vorschlug; sein Eintreten für einen provisorischen Autoritarismus, der alte politische Strukturen zum Zwecke sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Erneuerung bewahren sollte; sein offenes Eintreten für Jelzins Verfassung von einem nationalistischen Standpunkt aus; die häufige Darstellung seiner Partei als 'Dritte Kraft'; sein teilweise demonstrativer Antikonservatismus aus einer nichtsdestotrotz rechten Position heraus; und schließlich seine Annäherung an die im russischen Kontext als 'zentristisch' geltende Programmatik eines 'graduellen' Übergangs zur Marktwirtschaft, wie er vor allem von der sogenannten Bürgerunion 1992-93 vertreten wurde.

Der zweite Abschnitt von Kapitel 4 über Imperialismus behandelt im wesentlichen den innenpolitischen Unitarismus und außenpolitischen Expansionismus in Shirinowskijs Programmatik und hier vor allem seinen Plan eines 'letzten Sprungs nach Süden', das heißt eines Vorstosses russischer Truppen bis an den Indischen Ozean und die Einverleibung der Türkei, des Irans und Afghanistans. Damit im Zusammenhang werden ebenfalls eine ganze Reihe weiterer Denkfiguren, Selbstdarstellungen, Behauptungen und Argumente in Shirinowskijs Schriften vorgestellt und ausführlich als für die Rechtfertigung und Begründung seiner bizarren expansionistischen Ziele funktional interpretiert. In abschließenden Unterabschnitten werden die bis ins 19. Jahrhundert (unter anderem zu Fjodor Dostojewskij) zurückgehenden Quellen und historischen Hintergründe (jahrhundertelanger türkisch-russischer Konflikt) sowie die aktuellpolitische Dimension seines Planes ('Kampf der Zivilisationen' und Nord-Süd-Konflikt) kurz dargelegt.

Kapitel 5 bzw. Teil 3 ('Zur Klassifizierung der Dokumente') der Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Zeitung *Liberal* zwischen 1990 und 1993 und überprüft Shirinowskijs Artikel in dieser Publikation daraufhin, ob eine Klassifizierung als 'faschistisch' unter komparatistischen und historisch-hermeneutischen Gesichtspunkten gerechtfertigt erscheint. Aufgrund der damit verbundenen methodischen und theoretischen Probleme, wird eine ausführliche und mehrgliedrige Einführung zu verschiedenen Teilaspekten dieser Fragestellung vorausgeschickt. Die Einleitung begründet die politische und wissenschaftliche Relevanz der Problematik,

bespricht kurz die jüngere Entwicklung in der vergleichenden, internationalen Faschismusforschung, skizziert die derzeitige Diskussion um Faschismus in Rußland und entwirft darauf aufbauend eine operationale Definition von Faschismus für die folgende empirische Untersuchung. Im analysiert Kapitel 5 die zwischen 1990 und 1993 erschienenen Ausgaben von *Liberal* und untersucht, ob und in welchem Maße einzelne Beiträge Shirinowskij sowie die abgedruckten programmatischen Dokumente der LDPR faschistische Ideologeme enthalten. Das Ergebnis ist das Aufzeigen einer deutlichen Radikalisierung von *Liberal* im genannten Zeitraum und die Identifizierung von drei als 'faschistisch' zu klassifizierenden Ideologemen: (a) Rußlands nicht näher definierte 'nationale Revolution', (b) die Kreation eines 'weißen' vereinigten Europas von La Mancha bis Wladiwostok und (c) Rußlands 'Hinuntersteigen zum Indischen Ozean' zum Zwecke einer nationalen Neugeburt.

Teil 4 ('Zur Bewertung der empirischen Evidenz') faßt die Ergebnisse zusammen, vergleicht sie, identifiziert deren Korrelationen und Widersprüche, stellt das Shirinowskij-Phänomen in den Zusammenhang vergleichender Transitionsforschung und interpretiert schließlich die Herkunft und Natur der Ungereimtheiten in Shirinowskij's Verhalten und Verlautbarungen im Kontext der spezifischen sozio-ökonomischen, kulturellen und politischen Gegebenheiten im post-sowjetischen Rußland.

Kapitel 6 in Teil 4 bespricht zunächst die verschiedenen Ergebnisse der drei empirischen Teile und vergleicht sie miteinander. Darauf aufbauend stellt es zwei gegensätzliche, jedoch gleichsam valide Interpretationen Shirinowskij's vor: (a) Shirinowskij war von Beginn an ein taktisch und propagandistisch versierter Faschist, der seine tatsächliche Agenda bis ca. Mitte 1993 hinter populistischen Losungen verschleierte; bzw. (b) Shirinowskij ist lediglich als ein Rechtspopulist einzustufen, für den faschistische Ideologeme ein Propagandamittel unter vielen darstellt. Ziel von Teil 4 ist es diese beiden Interpretationen miteinander in Einklang zu bringen.

So wird im darauffolgend Abschnitt kurz das Verhältnis von Zentrismus und Faschismus diskutiert und darauf hingewiesen, daß es auch bei anderen rechtsextremen Gruppierungen außerhalb Rußlands zumindest rhetorische Affinitäten zum Zentrismus gegeben hat und daß einige bedeutende Faschismustheoretiker, wie zum Beispiel Seymour Martin Lipset, ausdrücklich Faschismus mit Zentrismus in Verbindung gebracht haben.

Der folgende Abschnitt setzt sich detailliert mit dem oft eingeworfenen Argument, man könne und solle Shirinowskijs Plan eines 'letzten Sprungs nach Süden' nicht ernst nehmen, auseinander. In einem ersten Schritt wird auf die besondere Bedeutung, die Shirinowskij außenpolitischen und generell internationalen Themen bereits seit seinen Studentenjahren beimißt, sowie seine oft wiederholte Forderung nach dem Posten des Außenministers für sich eingegangen. Die LDPR definiert sich selbst als Partei der Außenpolitik. In einem zweiten Schritt wird auf die besondere Bedeutung dessen was Shirinowskij als 'Süden' und derjenigen die er als 'Südler' bezeichnet in seiner Biographie eingegangen. Demnach hat insbesondere eine Obsession mit der Türkei (sein Studienfach) und Turkophobie sein politisches Denken lange vor seinem Eintritt ins Moskauer politische Leben bestimmt. Aufgrund dieser biographischen Angaben und verhaltensmäßigen Besonderheiten der LDPR muß Shirinowskijs Fixierung auf den Süden als ernstzunehmender und bedeutender, ja womöglich wichtigster Aspekt seiner Ideologie betrachtet werden.

Kapitel 7 ("Weimar Rußland": Irreführendes Schlagwort oder angebrachte Metapher') soll nachweisen, daß eine Fragestellung betreffs des faschistischen Gehalts von Shirinowskijs Programmatik insofern von Interesse ist, als die derzeitigen Entstehungsbedingungen eines demokratischen Systems in Rußland in einiger Hinsicht vergleichbar zu denen der Weimarer Republik sind. Dabei werden weniger einzelne Faktoren als bestimmte Konfigurationen von destabilisierenden Faktoren miteinander verglichen. Insbesondere der Überhang alter Eliten und die Simultaneität verschiedenartiger gesellschaftspolitischer Probleme, die einer Lösung bedürfen, stellen Parallelen dar, die Rußlands Transition ähnlich gefährdet, wie diejenige des Zwischenkriegsdeutschlands.

Das zusammenfassende **Kapitel 8** versucht das Konundrum der beiden oben genannten, widersprüchlichen Interpretationen zu lösen. Vor allem interpretiert es Shirinowskij und seine Partei zwischen 1990 und 1993 als ein evolutionäres Phänomen, welches 1990 als populistische, pseudo-zentristische Kreatur des *Ancien Regimes* begann, sich jedoch Mitte 1993 zu einer als in ideologisch-programmatischer Hinsicht 'faschistisch' zu klassifizierenden Kraft entwickelte. Es erklärt Shirinowskijs propagandistische Strategie der Skandalemacherei mit der Zurückgebliebenheit, Isolation und Fragmentierung der post-sowjetischen russischen

Zivil- und politischen Gesellschaft gegenüber dem Staat Ende der Achtziger und Anfang der Neunziger. Es erklärt weiterhin Shirinowskijs ideologische Unbestimmtheit und Schwankungen mit der Okkupierung der palingenetischen (d.h. Neugeburts- bzw. revolutionären) Dimension in der russischen Politik durch radikal-reformerischen, entschlossen modernisierenden Liberalismus und die sich daraus ergebenden Schwierigkeiten für Parteien, die gleichzeitig eine Revolution hin zu einer alternativen, post-liberalen (d.h. faschistischen) Moderne hin propagieren. Es erklärt schließlich Shirinowskijs - aus westlicher Sicht - skandalöses und inkonsistentes Verhalten und dessen Akzeptanz in der russischen Bevölkerung mit der spezifischen Überlappung vor- und post-moderner gesellschaftlicher Charakteristika im post-sowjetischen Rußland. Das Shirinowskij-Phänomen entstand in einem normativ-institutionellen Vakuum, welches sich in Rußland aus einem 'Überspringen' einiger wichtiger Entwicklungsstadien moderner Gesellschaften von einer teilweise traditionellen zu einer teilweise post-industriellen Gesellschaft entwickelte. Das Kapitel schließt mit der Feststellung ab, daß die LDPR lediglich Überleben wird, wenn sie es schafft, sich an den sozio-politischen und kulturellen Reifungsprozeß, den Rußland derzeit erfährt, anzupassen. Bei weiterer Stagnation oder nur stockenden Erholung der russischen Wirtschaft, Freiwerden der palingenetischen Dimension im russischen politisch-ideologischen Spektrum und fortschreitenden Institutionalisierung der LDPR als Partei kann eine weitere Präsenz dieser politischen Kraft in der russischen Politik nicht ausgeschlossen werden.

OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT
an der Freien Universität Berlin
- BIBLIOTHEK -